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PREFACE
Studying Turkish politics is not an easy task for a Greek student. One needs to 
overcome numerous prejudices and stereotypes, which shape Turkey’s image in 
Greece and form his own view. The task becomes even more difficult if one 
comes from a family whose fate was tragically shaped by the process of nation­
state formation in the former lands of the Ottoman Empire.
Turkey then becomes something more than just a foreign or a neighbour 
country. Its land becomes the homeland of ancestors, and fieldwork there is rather 
a long-expected return than a simple fact-finding mission.
I tried hard not to let my national and family background affect my 
research work. I would like to apologise in advance for any errors or 
misperceptions, which were based on prejudice and eluded my attention, and ask 
for the understanding of the reader.
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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the impact of improving EU-Turkey relations on Turkish 
political culture since the 1990s. While republican institutions and a multi-party 
political system were introduced in Turkey by the 1950s, political liberalism was 
the missing part o f Turkey’s substantive democratisation. The subject character of 
Ottoman political culture, compounded by the leading political role of the military 
and successive military coups, resulted in the consolidation of a republican 
political culture, which valued submissiveness toward state authority and did not 
favour citizen participation. The liberal deficit of Turkish politics became 
apparent with Turkey’s decision to pursue membership of the European Union. 
Turkey’s need to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria to achieve the start of EU 
accession negotiations meant that political liberalisation reforms were inevitable.
This study embarks from an examination of the historical background to 
the political culture debate in Turkey. It then explores European and Turkish 
political cultures and draws a comparison between them. The core of this study 
consists of an exploration of the impact that Turkey’s EU-motivated political 
reform had on civil society, state-society relations, the role of religion in politics 
and national identity. An assessment whether Turkish political culture has become 
more participant and citizen-centred is attempted in the concluding chapter.
The theoretical framework of this thesis is informed by the work of 
Almond and Verba on civic culture. Historical institutionalist theories of 
European integration and path dependence theory are also applied to explain the 
role of the European Union in the liberalisation process of Turkish political 
culture. Putnam’s work on two-level games helps explain the interplay of Turkish 
and European actors in the process of EU-Turkey negotiations, while his work on
16
social capital points at a feature, which can serve as the acid test for the 
emergence of a liberal, participant political culture in Turkey.
17
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I. INTRODUCTION-METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. The Scope of this Study
a. Turkey and Europe in Historical Perspective
The relations between Turkey and the European Union and the future of Turkey’s 
EU vocation have attracted considerable public interest in both the EU countries 
and Turkey. The European identity of Turkey, the economic, social and political 
consequences, as well as the practicality of Turkey’s potential membership of the 
European Union, have been discussed at length. Based on Turkey’s history and 
religion, some argued that Turkey is not a member of the “European family” for 
geographical and cultural reasons and, therefore, not eligible for EU membership.1 
Driven by Turkey’s relatively large size and economic underdevelopment, it was 
also argued that Turkey’s membership would disrupt EU economic and 
population balances. Others stressed that the European Union is based on values 
and a culture of which Turkey is not a part. According to this opinion, EU-Turkey 
relations could at best reach the level of institutionalised close political and 
economic co-operation, a “privileged partnership.” Hence, Turkey could never 
become a full member of the European Union. On the other hand, it was also 
argued that tolerance and multiculturalism are the key properties of the emerging 
European identity and that Turkey’s EU candidacy comprised an excellent 
opportunity for the European Union to show its inclusive character.
Turkey’s quest to join Europe is by no means novel or without historical 
precedents. A campaign aiming at the recognition of a European Ottoman identity
1 The relative ease with which Eastern European states were accepted as members o f the 
“European family” in the process o f the EU Eastern enlargement in the 1990s made a striking 
contrast with European circumspection in the case o f Turkey. See Helene Sjursen, "Why Expand? 
The Question o f Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy", Journal o f  
Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, no. 3 (2002), pp. 503-07.
19
had marked Ottoman foreign policy agenda since the initiation of the Ottoman 
modernisation programme (Tanzimat) in 1839. A first success was marked in 
March 1856 when the Ottoman Empire was invited to participate in the “Concert 
of Europe” under the provisions of the Treaty of Paris, which marked the end of 
the Crimean War (1855-1856).2 Yet the failure of the Tanzimat leaders to bring 
about political, economic and social change in the Ottoman Empire and the 
relapse into authoritarianism under the rule of Sultan Abdiilhamid II (1876-1909) 
reinforced existing European stereotypes about the Oriental essence of the 
Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire might have been in Europe, as it had 
successfully invaded and occupied vast parts of Southeastern and Central Europe 
in the past and still ruled over a large part of Southeastern Europe in the late 19th 
century. Nonetheless, it was not viewed as being an integral part o/Europe, a part 
of the European continent in historical, cultural and political terms.3 On the 
contrary, the Ottoman “Turk” was the geographically proximal manifestation of 
the Oriental “Other,” against which Europeanness was measured.4 Despotism, 
underdevelopment, brutality and all the other stereotypical properties of the Orient 
were epitomised in the Ottoman Empire. The 1908 Young Turk revolution, which 
ended the despotic rule of Sultan Abdiilhamid II, raised hopes for political and 
social change, which would bring the Ottoman Empire closer to Europe. 
However, these hopes were soon refuted, as the failure of the Young Turk
2 The Crimean W ar involved Great Britain, France and the Ottoman Empire, which formed a 
military alliance that successfully checked the rise o f Russian naval power in the Black Sea. The 
“Concert o f Europe” was a term with little real political content. However, what was important for 
the Ottoman Empire was that for the first time it was accepted as a “European power”. See 
William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000 (London & Portland OR: Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 
26-27.
3 The consolidation o f the Ottoman Empire in European territory and its early diplomatic 
engagement with Western European powers did not affect these views.
4 Iver B. Neumann and Jennifer M. Welsh, "The Other in European Self-Definition. A Critical 
Addendum to the Literature on International Society", Review o f International Studies, Vol. 17, 
no. 4 (1991), pp. 330-31
20
leadership was much more serious than that of the Tanzimat leaders. The situation 
deteriorated even further when the Ottoman Empire was caught in the maelstrom 
of the Balkan Wars and the First World War, which made it a belligerent against 
Great Britain and France, the two states whose civilisations had arguably 
contributed the most to what was then understood as Europeanness. The Ottoman 
defeat did not signal the end of hostilities, as Mustafa Kemal [Atatiirkf resumed 
the armed struggle in Anatolia. Nonetheless, despite continued hostilities, Ataturk 
reckoned that Turkey’s economic political and economic development could only 
come from the West, from Europe.6
(Figure 1)
Russia
BlackBulgaria Georgia
imenia
O National Capital
•  Region Capaal
•  Secondary City 
Primary Hoad
  R a ilro ad
A/lmmwmtiv*. Border 
—  International Border
Mediterranean
Sea
Figure 1. Political M ap o f Turkey (From  the C N N  W ebsite)
s Surnames in brackets were adopted after 1934, when the Family Name Law was passed. 
h The concepts o f the “West” and “Europe” could be interchangeably used at that time, as the 
United States had not yet gained its dominant position in international politics, which entailed the 
introduction o f a different paradigm o f Westernisation. The rise o f the European Union as a major 
international actor in the late 20lh century made the distinction between the terms “Europe” and 
“West” even sharper.
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The concept of “Westernisation despite the West” (Bati ’ya ragmen Batihla§ma) 
gained crucial importance in Atattirk’s campaign to integrate Turkey into the 
European political, cultural and social paradigm. Despite the recurrence of 
atavistic nationalistic suspicions, Europe would always remain the model for 
Turkey’s political, economic and social transformation.
Yet, the focus of this study will not be on the intricacies of Turkey’s 
Westernisation project, or what its potential membership of the European Union 
would mean for both the European Union and itself. This study aims to explore 
Turkish political culture under the prism of improving Turkey-EU relations since 
the 1990s. Given that political culture is an accurate indicator of political and 
social transformation, a change of Turkish political culture under the impact of its 
ever-closer relations with the European Union and its membership perspective 
would constitute a significant step toward its effective Europeanisation.
b. Hypothesis
The hypothesis to be tested in this study is that Turkey’s decision to pursue full 
membership of the European Union in the 1990s has significantly influenced 
Turkish political culture. Through the Copenhagen Criteria, the European Union 
required the introduction of political liberalism in all states interested in EU 
membership. Turkey, which had adopted republican ideas since its foundation, 
had now to imbue its political culture with political liberalism, the element of 
Western political thought that was disregarded in the process of Turkey’s political 
and ideological Westernisation. The impact of political liberalism on Turkish 
political culture has been profound. Kemalist nationalist ideology, which has been 
dominant since the foundation of the Republic, has come under considerable 
pressure. Turkish national identity has been reconsidered, as all versions of
22
Turkish nationalism as well as Turkey’s minorities have enjoyed increased 
protection of their rights and have also been exposed to the debate that the 
introduction of the European supra- or post-national model has opened. Turkey’s 
state tradition has also been influenced by liberal ideas espoused by the European 
Union. State intervention in the public sphere has been reduced, whilst the 
concept of national security has been openly discussed for the first time. Turkey’s 
human rights legislation has undergone extensive reform aiming at increased 
protection o f citizens’ human rights. The convergence process with the EU human 
rights standards has led to a compromise of state interests for better protection of 
individual rights and freedoms. Islam, whose role in the public sphere was 
historically severely restricted by the secular state, could aspire to improved 
protection of religious freedom. Civil society has also benefited from the political 
liberalisation process. State-independent socialisation, expression and advocacy of 
group interests against the state have never been more profound and vibrant. 
Political and cultural pluralism has been aided through increased protection of 
individual and social rights. The Turkish state, economy and society have already 
undergone substantial transformation; their full convergence with the European 
Union standards, though, is yet to be accomplished.
Turkey’s membership of the European Union would be the culmination of 
a perennial quest for participation in European political and cultural space. 
Turkey’s accession to the European Union would also require the successful 
completion of its transformation process, leading to complete liberalisation of 
Turkish political culture. On the other hand, Turkey’s EU membership would also 
leave a heavy imprint on the European Union itself. Current debates on European
23
identity would then have to be then reconsidered, and a more inclusive 
interpretation of Europeanness would need to be adopted.
c. Importance-Contribution
The importance of studying Turkish political culture lies in the fact that the
liberalisation of Turkey’s political culture in view of its integration into the
European Union would have a profound impact on Turkey itself, the European
Union and directly affect regional politics. Notwithstanding the impact of 
Turkey’s economic situation, the Cyprus question and Greek-Turkish disputes, 
Turkey’s illiberal political system has so far been the biggest domestic obstacle to 
its membership of the European Union.7 Its political liberalisation would lift the 
most serious obstacle for its EU membership. Nonetheless, Turkey’s prospective 
EU membership is of critical importance for the European Union as well: The 
membership of a liberal, democratic Turkey would comprise an acid test for the 
political values the European Union stands for. As Turkey’s population is almost 
exclusively Muslim, the integration of a liberal, democratic Turkey would affirm 
the inclusive, multicultural, tolerant and universalistic character of the European 
Union. Besides, Turkey’s EU membership -despite its obvious functional 
difficulties, due mainly to its size and relative poverty- would multiply the 
strategic capabilities of the European Union in regions as sensitive as the Middle 
East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Studying the debate on Turkish 
political culture that Turkey’s approach toward the European Union and 
subsequent political liberalisation steps have initiated, would also contribute to a 
better understanding of the challenges faced by liberalising developing countries
7 “Cultural” objections o f European circles to Turkey’s EU vocation constitute an additional 
hindrance that, however, rather concerns the ongoing debate within the European Union on its 
identity and potential borders and not Turkey per se.
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with a strongly authoritarian past and provide valuable insights for the global 
questions of democratisation and liberalisation. Although the number of 
democratic states has risen considerably in the recent years, this has not meant 
that democracy has dominated the sphere of world politics, especially in the 
Middle East. The difference between procedural and substantive democracy has 
become clearer than ever.
(Figure 2)
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Figure 2. Political Map o f the European Union. M ember states are coloured in yellow, while 
candidate states in grey (From  the European Com m ission W ebsite)
Democratic institutions and elections cannot guarantee the existence of a fully- 
functioning democratic political system, if a democratic political culture is not
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present. There is a clear need to assist the development of a civic, participant 
political culture, which will then enable the successful functioning of democratic 
institutions. Transition to political liberalism and the introduction of participant 
political culture elements are universal demands, and the political liberalisation of 
Turkey, a Muslim-populated state with strong historic and political links with 
Europe and a secular political tradition, would be highly indicative of the 
prospects of the same experiment at a regional level. Turkey’s success would 
weaken the argument that Islam and Western liberal and democratic tradition are 
incompatible.
2. Theoretical Considerations
Studies focusing on Europeanisation, historical institutionalism, path-dependence 
theory and the two-level games model comprise the theoretical framework of this 
thesis.
a. Understanding Europeanisation
This study has greatly benefited from the theoretical framework on 
Europeanisation proposed in the volume Transforming Europe: Europeanization 
and Domestic Change, which focuses on the impact of Europeanisation on the 
domestic structures of the EU member states.8 Europeanisation is thus defined as 
“the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of 
governance.”9 EU member states change under the exertion of adaptational 
pressures whose strength is inversely proportional to the compatibility of pre-
8 Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso and Thomas Risse, eds., Transforming Europe: 
Europeanization and Domestic Change (Ithaca NY & London: Cornell University Press, 2001)
9 Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles and James Caporaso, "Europeanization and Domestic 
Change: Introduction" in Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso and Thomas Risse, eds., 
Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change (Ithaca NY & London: Cornell 
University Press, 2001), p. 3
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existing domestic conditions {goodness o f fit). If domestic structures are largely 
compatible, convergence occurs at relatively low cost. Nevertheless, when, 
domestic structures turn out to be both incompatible and enduring, the process of 
Europeanisation becomes synonymous with radical domestic reform, which often 
meets serious reaction, and whose success is uncertain.10
The process of adaptation is further affected by the presence or absence 
and activity o f mediating factors. Multiple veto points in the domestic structure, 
facilitating formal institutions, the organisational and policymaking cultures of a 
country, the differential empowerment of domestic actors and learning are cited as 
examples of mediating factors.11 Structural adaptation can be seriously hampered 
by the existence of multiple veto points within a given policy-making structure,12 
while mediating formal institutions provide social actors with material and 
ideational resources to induce structural change. Organisational and policymaking 
cultures have their own impact on the ability of domestic actors to bring about 
structural change through the use of adaptational pressures, whilst differential 
empowerment of actors in the process of Europeanisation provides them with 
incentives to pursue reform with zeal. The extent to which learning mechanisms 
become operational and domestic actors thereby modify their goals, identities and 
preferences is also instrumental for the successful implementation of structural 
change. Learning constitutes “an agency-centred mechanism to induce such 
transformations.”13 The relative strength of elite learning and grassroots societal
10 Diez, Agnantopoulos and Kaliber identified four different types o f  Europeanisation, policy- 
related, political, societal and discursive. See Thomas Diez, Apostolos Agnantopoulos and Alper 
Kaliber, "Turkey, Europeanization and Civil Society: Introduction", South European Society & 
Politics, Vol. 10, no. 1 (2005), pp. 3-7.
11 Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, "Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction", p. 2
12 George Tsebelis, "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, 
Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism", British Journal o f Political Science, Vol. 
25, no. 3 (1996), pp. 289-325
13 Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, "Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction", p. 12
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pressure on elites in the process of structural change is also a function of domestic 
structures. Societal pressure is prevalent in liberal and less so in corporatist 
structures, while elite learning prevails in elitist and less so in statist ones.14
Differentiating between the Europeanisation and globalisation processes 
and their effects is also of critical importance. As Europeanisation and 
globalisation trends are often interlinked, identifying the effects of 
Europeanisation on the domestic political structures of EU member states can 
often become difficult. In some cases, Europeanisation itself might constitute a 
response to the globalisation processes by reinforcing their trends or by protecting 
EU member states against their undesired effects. Careful process-tracing and 
attention to the time sequences between EU policies and domestic changes allow 
us to distinguish between Europeanisation and globalisation effects. The same 
method can be useful for identifying whether specific structural changes can be 
attributed to domestic factors, with minor or no independent effects of 
Europeanisation.15
Turkey is not directly in the focus of this analysis, as the concept of 
Europeanisation stricto sensu relates to states that have already joined the Union. 
Nevertheless, states in the process of fulfilling the criteria for EU membership 
face similar challenges and undergo significant structural changes in their effort to 
meet the Copenhagen Criteria and become eligible for EU membership. In that 
respect, the concept of Europeanisation could also be understood in the wider 
sense, so that it becomes applicable in the cases of states in the process of joining 
the European Union. Improving EU-Turkey relations and Turkey’s desire to join
14 Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Europeanization o f Citizenship?" in Maria Green Cowles, James 
Caporaso and Thomas Risse, eds., Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change 
(Ithaca NY & London: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 182
15 Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, "Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction", p. 4
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the European Union have resulted in increasing adaptational pressures on 
Turkey’s domestic political structures, depending on their goodness o f  fit. 
Meanwhile, mediating factors similar to those described in the study, have 
emerged and been of critical importance in influencing the convergence process 
of Turkey’s political structures to EU norms. Distinguishing between the effects 
of Europeanisation, globalisation and domestic factors on political structures is an 
equally challenging task, and the aforementioned methodological tools can be 
successfully applied in the case of Turkey as well. The model of Europeanisation 
can, therefore, be useful in understanding the impact of improving EU-Turkey 
relations on Turkish political culture.
b. Theories of European Integration
Among the theories that have attempted to explain the political role of institutions 
in the context of European integration, four have attracted considerable interest: 
functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, constructivism and historical 
institutionalism. Functionalism stresses the autonomous power and energy of 
society, especially when coupled to entrepreneurial institutions and agents.16 What 
matters in politics, is the economy, the society and efforts to resolve practical 
problems faced by individuals trying to solve them cooperatively.17 In this 
approach, institutions have little bearing on policies and political structures. What 
really matters is the self-sustainability of European integration, which becomes 
possible as a result of a spillover process. Initial cooperation efforts are amplified 
due to endogenous economic and political dynamics and result to further 
integration. This spillover can be functional or political: It is functional, when
16 Ibid., pp. 13-14
17 Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting o f Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957 
(Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. xviii-xxi
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problems resulting from incomplete integration enforce deeper policy 
coordination, mainly in the economic field. It is also political, when existing EU 
institutions mobilise a self-reinforcing process of institution-building. 
Functionalism lost ground when the development of the European Economic 
Community turned out to be neither cumulative nor smooth. This showed that 
institutions had much more bearing on political developments than functionalists 
had predicted. Neo-functionalist views attempted to bridge the gap between 
functionalism and political developments at the European level, by addressing the 
deficiencies of functionalist arguments with regards to the definability of 
European cooperation outcomes18 and the persistence of national interest 
considerations within supranational institutions.19 Nonetheless, they failed to 
produce a theory offering a satisfactory account of European integration.20
According to liberal intergovernmentalism, states are the primary decision 
makers, while governments are able to structure agendas and control other 
organisational agents. Moravcsik identified three essential elements at the core of 
liberal intergovernmentalism: the assumption of rational state behaviour, a liberal 
theory of national preference formation, and an intergovernmentalist analysis of 
interstate negotiation.21 The “liberal” aspect of liberal intergovernmentalism refers 
to the way social and economic interests use domestic political systems to
18 Ernst B. Haas, "Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration", International 
Organization, Vol. 30, no. 2 (1976), pp. 475-76
19 The case o f the French President de Gaulle and its impact on EEC policies in the 1960s makes a 
clear case. See Ernst B. Haas, "The Uniting o f Europe and the Uniting o f  Latin America", Journal 
of Common Market Studies, Vol. 5, no. 4 (1967), pp. 325-27.
20 Andrew Moravcsik, "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach", Journal o f  Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, no. 4 (1993), pp. 
474-76
21 Ibid., p. 480. For an earlier version o f Moravcsik’s argument in defence o f what he then called 
“intergovernmental institutionalism”, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Negotiating the Single European 
Act - National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European-Community", Vol. 45, no. 1 
(1991).
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influence central decision makers.22 Interdependence in different fields of politics 
influences state decision-making processes. Thus, economic interdependence 
becomes the main determinant of state policies in the field of economics, while 
political-military interdependence has a crucial bearing on foreign policy 
decisions. Rationalist bargaining and institutional choice theories are additionally 
applied in order to explain how states reach compromises on disputed issues.23 In 
their study of the EU Amsterdam Treaty, Moravcsik and Nicolaidis came up with 
“four categories o f evidence confirming the overriding importance of a rational 
ranking of concerns about issue-specific interdependence in the formation of 
national preferences and positions.” First, the positions of major state 
governments on important issues did not disprove the most common theories of 
issue-specific incentives for cooperation. Second, rational, issue-specific 
preferences were what was assumed and reported by officials. National policies 
were also relatively stable before and during the negotiations. Finally, 
“exceptional cases of salient policy reversal were positively correlated with 
salient, predictable and structural changes in domestic politics.”24 When it came to 
the question of how agreements were reached, interstate bargaining to achieve a 
substantive outcome was based on asymmetrical interdependence formation. 
International actors may have been very active, yet their activity was not in direct 
proportion with their real influence. States decided to cede sovereignty rights to 
international actors only where necessary to increase the credibility of their 
commitments. In view of their findings, Moravcsik and Nicolaidis stressed that
22 Meltem Miiftuler-Bac and Lauren M. McLaren, "Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making 
in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey", Journal o f European Integration, Vol. 25, no. 1 
(2003), pp. 19-20
23 Andrew Moravcsik and Kalypso Nicolaidis, "Explaining the Treaty o f Amsterdam: Interests, 
Influence, Institutions", Journal o f  Common Market Studies, Vol. 37, no. 1 (1999), pp. 61-62
24 Ibid., pp. 62-69
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the governments of the EU member states and not the EU institutions are the 
primary actors shaping EU politics.25 Moravcsik elaborated his position by adding 
the role of institutions in the process of preference formation and bargaining. 
This does not mean an approach toward institutionalism. Institutions are not 
recognised as primary actors in shaping preferences or affecting identities. Yet, 
they help enforce agreements, make bargains credible and provide a rule-based 
structure as a bulwark against defection.27
Constructivist views of Europeanisation argued that critical decisions for 
the future of the European Union were made not on the base of rational, but 
normative arguments. The Eastern enlargement is a characteristic case of a norm- 
based decision within the European Union. The decision to incorporate ten new 
member states, whose level of economic development was in most cases far 
behind the EU average levels, could hardly be explained on the basis of the 
national interests of existing member states. The enlargement decision could only 
be made under the influence of “rhetorical action,” the strategic use of norm- 
based arguments. Given that liberal democracy has acted as the core and 
legitimating basis of the European integration project, it provided the bulk of 
norm-based arguments, which were used for the further deepening, and widening 
of the European Union. Since the new candidate states adopted a rhetoric heavily 
influenced by political liberalism and democratic ideals, it was virtually 
impossible for EU institutions and member states to give priority to their 
economic grievances over the need to prove their loyalty to the constitutive values
25 Ibid., pp. 82-83
26 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Rome to 
Maastricht (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 3-4
27 Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, "Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction", pp. 13-14
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and norms of the European Union.28 Identity politics also significantly influence 
political decision-making within the European Union. Collective nation-state 
identities define the realm of interests considered legitimate and appropriate in a 
given political discourse. The responses of Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom to the introduction of a single European currency in the late 1990s 
differed because of the unequal identification of their respective national identities 
with a common European identity. An increasingly Europeanising national 
identity in the case of Germany coincided with strong support for the Euro. In the 
case of the United Kingdom, anti-European sentiment and emphasis on British 
national identity was followed by strong opposition to the Euro, while in France 
fluctuations in the European vs. national identity debate were mirrored on the
• • 29French stance regarding the introduction of the Euro.
While functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism and constructivism 
adopt an essentially bottom-up approach, in which social actors are important 
rather than institutions, institutionalism adopts a top-down approach. Institutions 
are political vehicles, which can crucially affect political structures and policies, 
sometimes against the wish of domestic actors. Hall and Taylor identified four 
key features of historical institutionalism:
First, historical institutionalists tend to conceptualize the 
relationship between institutions and individual behaviour in 
relatively broad terms. Second, they emphasize the asymmetries 
of power associated with the operation and development of 
institutions. Third, they tend to have a view of institutional
28 Frank Schimmelfennig, "The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the 
Eastern Enlargement o f the European Union", International Organization, Vol. 55, no. 1 (2001), 
pp. 27-28
29 Thomas Risse et al., "To Euro or not to Euro? The EMU and Identity Politics in the European 
Union", European Journal o f International Relations, Vol. 5, no. 2 (1999), pp. 175-78
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development that emphasizes path dependence and unintended 
consequences. Fourth, they are especially concerned to integrate 
institutional analysis with the contribution that other kinds of 
factors, such as ideas, can make to political outcomes.30
Historical institutionalism becomes distinctive by emphasising the effects of 
institutions on politics.31 In contrast with functionalist views that institutions have 
been deliberately designed by contemporary actors for the efficient performance 
of specific functions, historical institutionalists argue that institutional choices 
made in the past can persist and thereby shape and contain actors over time.32 
Temporary setbacks may occur due to contemporary actor activities, yet 
institutional choices in the end prevail. Putnam outlined three basic principles, 
which explained differences in democratic performance.33 According to the first, 
“social context and history profoundly condition the effectiveness of institutions.” 
Institutions do not operate in a historical or social vacuum, and the lack or 
existence of civic cooperation, democratic government and public trust traditions 
have a profound influence on institutional performance. As Putnam put it, 
“effective and responsive institutions depend, in the language of civic humanism, 
on republican virtues and rights.”34 According to the second principle, “changing 
formal institutions can change political practice.” Institutions do matter in shaping 
public policy and can become the means for the implementation of policies and
30 Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New 
Institutionalisms", Political Studies, Vol. 44, no. 4 (1996), p. 938
31 For a concise account o f historical institutionalism, see Kathleen Ann Thelen and Sven Steinmo, 
"Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective" in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Ann Thelen 
and Frank Longstreth, eds,, Structuring Politics : Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Analysis (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
32 Mark A. Pollack, "The New Institutionalisms and European Integration" in Antje Wiener and 
Thomas Diez, eds., European Integration Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 139
33 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 182-85
34 Ibid., p. 182
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change of identities, values, power and strategies. This means that states and 
communities are not prisoners of their own history and tradition. Political reform 
programmes can be successful in their efforts to bring about change in political 
practice and institutional performance, yet there is little room for overambitious 
expectations. As the third principle states, “most institutional history moves 
slowly.” In the short run, it is virtually impossible to overcome adverse political 
and social legacies and build thriving networks of civic cooperation, democratic 
government and public trust. Successful political and social reform can only be 
successful through planned efforts for social capital35 building. Historical 
knowledge is crucial in order to understand diversity in institutional development 
and why some possible outcomes prevailed upon others.
c. Path Dependence Theory
The concept of path dependence is instrumental in this respect. According to 
Pierson, early decisions provide incentives for actors to perpetuate institutional 
and policy choices inherited from the past, even when the resulting outcomes are 
manifestly inefficient.36 Levi attempted to give a more detailed approach:
35 While path dependence helps us understand the historical grounds o f contemporary institutional 
performance, social capital is a key factor related to that performance. According to Putnam’s 
definition, social capital refers to “features o f social organisation, such as trust, norms, and 
networks that can improve the efficiency o f society by facilitating coordinated actions.” See Ibid., 
p. 168. For more definitions o f the term, see Fikret Adaman and Ali (^arkoglu, "Social Capital and 
Corruption During Times o f Crisis: A Look at Turkish Firms During the Economic Crisis o f 
2001", Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, no. 2 (2003), pp. 127-31. Social trust is a fundamental component 
o f social capital and can derive in modern societies from two related sources, norms o f reciprocity 
and networks o f civic engagement. The norm of generalised reciprocity has historically been 
effective in reducing opportunism and resolving problems o f  collective action and is likely to be 
associated with dense horizontal networks o f social exchange, linking individuals o f equivalent 
status and power. Horizontal networks have the propensity to sustain social trust and cooperation, 
in contrast with vertical networks, linking individuals o f unequal status and power in asymmetrical 
relations o f hierarchy and dependence. See Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in 
Modern Italy, pp. 173-75. High levels o f social capital are essential for the appearance of virtuous 
circles o f political and social reform, which can enable effective democratic government.
36 Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study o f Politics", American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 94, no. 2 (2000), p. 252
35
Path dependence has to mean, if it is to mean anything, that 
once a country or region has started down a path, the costs of 
reversal are very high. There will be other choice points, but the 
entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct 
easy reversal of the initial choice. Perhaps the better metaphor 
is a tree rather than a path. From the same trunk, there are many 
different branches and smaller braches. Although it is possible 
to turn around or to clamber from one to the other -and 
essential if the chosen branch dies- the branch on which a 
climber begins is the one she tends to follow.37
Risse added that a path dependent process is “one in which positive feedback 
loops lead to increasing returns.”38 In the context of the European Union, the 
Maastricht Treaty could be seen as an example where path dependence crucially 
affected European politics. Once the steps leading to the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) were finalised, the costs of reversing the agreed policies eventually 
became unaffordable for both the public and the private sector. The socialisation 
process, “the gradual adaptation and internalisation of new norms and rules,” was 
a necessary step for the success of the EMU. This process was reinforced by the 
implementation of the EMU and “modified the standard operating procedures of 
existing public and private institutions.”39 Shaped as either a tree or a path, the 
concept of path dependence sheds light on the role of history in the course of 
institutional reform. As North stressed:
37 Margaret Levi, "A Model, a Method, and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical 
Analysis" in Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., Comparative Politics: Rationality, 
Culture and Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 28
38 Risse et al., "To Euro or not to Euro? The EMU and Identity Politics in the European Union", p. 
152
39 Ibid., pp. 153-54
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Path dependence means that history matters. We cannot 
understand today’s choices (and define them in the modelling of 
economic performance) without tracing the incremental 
evolution of institutions....We need to know much more about 
culturally derived forms of behaviour and how they interact 
with formal rules to get better answers to such issues.40
d. The Two-Level Game Model
The model of two-level games introduced by Putnam can also be applied to 
explain the process of the Europeanisation of Turkish political culture. With the 
introduction of this term, Putnam examined the interactions of domestic and 
international politics during diplomatic negotiations, using the example of the 
1978 Bonn Accord between the United States, Japan and West Germany.41 A 
negotiation at the international level (Level I) takes place simultaneously with a 
negotiation at the domestic level (Level II) between the negotiators and their 
respective political constituencies. Negotiators have to constantly think how a 
possible compromise agreement would resonate domestically, and more 
importantly, whether the agreement would be so unpopular that it would fail to be 
ratified. A compromise agreement is then reached, and parties are forced to 
accommodate the positions and interests of their counterparts. However, it appears 
that the observed policy shifts were initially supported by domestic political 
factions, which were outnumbered in the process of domestic decision policy­
making.42 In their view, the achieved compromise was favouring rather than
40 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 100, p. 40 cited in Putnam, Making Democracy Work: 
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, p. 181
41 Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic o f  Two-Level Games", 
International Organization, Vol. 42, no. 3 (1988)
42 Ibid., pp. 429-30
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curtailing national interest. Nonetheless, this policy shift would not have occurred 
had there not been a negotiation at the international level. International 
negotiations, on the other hand, are limited in their scope by the necessity to have 
their outcomes ratified by domestic institutions. To outline the limits of the 
agreement spectrum, Putnam defined “win-sets” as the set of all possible 
international agreements, which would “win” ratification at the domestic level.43 
The outer limits of a win-set are defined by the domestic constraints, which would 
render the ratification of the agreement impossible. The size of the win-set 
depends on the distribution of power, preferences and possible coalitions among 
domestic constituents and institutions, as well as on the strategies of international 
negotiators44 The two-level approach recognises the inevitability of domestic 
conflict on the definition of national interest and accepts that domestic and 
international imperatives are simultaneously compromised.45
e. A Historical Institutionalist Approach
This study has been informed by a broader historical institutionalist approach. 
Liberal intergovernmentalism provides a clear insight into the process of 
Europeanisation, but cannot account for all its complexities. EU member states 
maintain a great leverage inside the European Union; EU institutions, however, 
still retain a considerable degree of autonomy in their actions, which has often 
shaped EU political developments contrary to the perceived interests of EU 
member states. The existence of this slack means that the character of EU 
institutions is primarily political. Their function is not limited to facilitating EU 
member state negotiations by means of reducing transaction costs, managing
43 Ibid., p. 437
44 Ibid., pp. 442-52
45 Ibid., p. 460
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interdependence and locking in agreements. Institutions are crucial in helping 
implementing policies and diffusing norms and expectations, often against the 
wishes of key domestic institutions, which might not approve of their formation.46 
In the context of the European Union, the establishment of autonomous 
enforcement mechanisms reinforces the role of EU institutions. Moreover, the 
European Union constitutes a sui generis type of politics, which is neither 
domestic, nor inter-state, as it creates additional options for domestic political 
actors. The European Union can sometimes become involved in domestic politics 
and have considerable impact on policies and institutions47 The historical 
institutionalist approach does not underestimate existing differences between 
historical institutionalism, sociological institutionalism and rational choice
4-8 • • *theory. Rational choice theory can offer useful insights in historical 
institutionalism debates, yet its incorporation as a subcategory of historical 
institutionalism is problematic, as this would challenge the social ontology of 
historical institutionalism. Institutions are perceived as structures, whose 
functionality is open to empirical and historical research rather than functional 
means of reducing uncertainty. The ineffective and inefficient nature of social 
institutions, institutions as the subject and focus of political struggle and the 
contingent nature of such struggles whose outcomes cannot be derived from the 
existing international context have all attracted the interest of historical 
institutionalists 49 In the words of Thelen and Steinmo:
46 Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, "Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction", p. 14
47 Wayne Sandholz, "Membership Matters: Limits o f the Functional Approach to European 
Institutions", Journal o f Common Market Studies, Vol. 34, no. 3 (1996), pp. 426-27
48 For a contrasting view on the same question, see Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, "The 
Potential o f Historical Institutionalism: A Response to Hay and Wincott", Political Studies, Vol. 
46, no. 5 (1998).
49 Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott, "Structure Agency and Historical Institutionalism", Political 
Studies, Vol. 46, no. 5 (1998), pp. 951-55
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The institutions that are in the centre of historical institutionalist 
analysis...can shape and constrain political strategies in 
important ways, but they are themselves also the outcome 
(conscious or unintended) of deliberate political strategies of 
political conflict and of choice.50
Nonetheless, the historical institutionalist account of European integration should 
not be understood as merely establishing a principal-agent relationship between 
EU member states and institutions.51 While Pierson correctly argues that gaps in 
member-state control over institutions can arise from “altered circumstances or 
new information” and changes in government,52 this account needs to be 
expanded so it includes “the partial autonomy of EU institutions, politicians’ 
restricted time horizons, the ubiquity of unintended consequences and shifts in 
domestic preferences.” Institutions are thus perceived as having a distinct political 
effect by bringing to the fore tensions and inconsistencies between European and 
domestic institutions, which spark in turn adaptational pressures at the domestic 
level. These pressures corroborate the active role of Europeanisation in inducing 
domestic change.53
3. Defining Political Culture
a. Aims
The following section aims to explore the concept of political culture. Various 
approaches of the term “political culture” will be outlined, and the intellectual 
debate on the function and impact of political culture will be explored. The views
50 Thelen and Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Perspective", p. 10
51 Paul Pierson, "The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis", 
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 29, no. 2 (1996), pp. 132-35
52 Ibid., pp. 139-40
53 Risse, Cowles and Caporaso, "Europeanization and Domestic Change: Introduction", pp. 14-15
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of advocates and critics of the usefulness of political culture as analytical tool of 
comparative politics will be juxtaposed, and a working definition will be selected. 
The last part of this chapter will refer to the empirical basis and structure of this 
study.
b. Definitions of Political Culture
The sociocultural tradition of political analysis was by no means a product of the 
20th century. Plato first argued in his Republic that governments vary in according 
to the dispositions of their citizenry.54 This idea was furthered by Alexis de 
Tocqueville in his treatise Democracy in America.55 Tocqueville stressed the link 
between the mores of a society and its political practices. In the case of the United 
States the number and variety of civic associations reinforce the “habits of the 
heart” which are essential to stable and effective democratic institutions.56
The political culture approach gained impetus in the mid 20th century, 
when the failure of purely institutional descriptions of political systems to offer 
adequate explanations of post-Second World War political developments led 
scholars to delve into the reasons why similar political institutions performed so 
divergently in different countries. Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba attempted 
with the introduction of the term “political culture” to offer a new tool for the 
study of political systems.57 This soon attracted the interest of academics whose 
debate gained intensity in the ideologically polarised environment of the Cold 
War. Before embarking on the debate on Turkish political culture, it would be, 
therefore, useful to discuss definitions of and the intellectual debate on political
54 Plato [nXaxcov], "Republic [rioA,vrsia]" in Plato [ I I X & t c o v ] ,  ed., Dialogi Vol. IV [AiaAoyoi Tog. 
A ]  (Lipsia: B.G. Teubner, MDCCCLXXXIII), pp. 48-49
55 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America and Two Essays on America, trans. Gerald E. 
Bevan (London: Penguin Books, 2003)
56 Ibid., pp. 595-600
57 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in 
Five Nations (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963)
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culture, the term that will be the crux of this study. According to Pye, political 
culture is “the sum of the fundamental values, sentiments and knowledge that give
CQ
form and substance to political processes.” Hague and Harrop identified the 
“knowledge, beliefs, opinions and emotions of individual citizens toward their 
form of government” as the “building blocks” of political culture.59 Kavanagh 
argued that the study of political culture is concerned with
orientations towards political objects. Orientations are 
predispositions to political action and are determined by such 
factors as traditions, historical memories, motives, norms, 
emotions and symbols. We can break these down into their 
component parts as follows: cognitions (knowledge and 
awareness of the political system); affect (emotional 
disposition to the system); and evaluation (judgement about the 
system).60
Inglehart maintained that, according to the political culture approach:
a. People’s responses to their situations are shaped by 
subjective orientations, which vaiy cross-culturally and 
within sub-cultures
b. These variations in subjective orientations reflect 
differences in socialisation experience, with early learning 
conditioning later learning61
58 Lucian W. Pye, "Political Culture" in S. Lipset, ed., The Encyclopaedia o f Democracy (London 
& New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 965
59 Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction (New 
York & Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001), p. 78
60 Dennis Kavanagh, Political Culture (London: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 10-11
61 Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 19
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Inglehart added that cultural theory implies that culture cannot be changed 
overnight, though the young are easier to influence; observed cross-cultural 
differences reflect the experience of generations, even centuries, rather than 
relatively short-run factors.62
In what follows, political culture will be understood as a set of citizens’ 
orientations toward political objects based on their knowledge, beliefs, opinions 
and emotions. The classification of political cultures into parochial, subject and 
participant, as suggested by Almond and Verba in their groundbreaking study of 
political culture will also be followed. In parochial political culture there are no 
specialised political roles in societies, and for members of these societies political 
orientations to these roles are not separated from their religious and social 
orientations. In subject political culture there is a high frequency toward a 
differentiated political system and toward the output aspects of the system, but 
there are almost no orientations toward specifically input objects, and toward the 
self as an active participant. It is essentially a passive system as far as government 
influence is concerned. In participant political culture, citizens tend to be 
explicitly oriented to the system as a whole. Close attention is paid to politics, 
while popular participation is regarded as both desirable and effective.63
c. The Debate on Political Culture
Since its introduction in the early 1960s the term “political culture” has attracted 
considerable interest and sparked intellectual debate. Almond and Verba were the 
first to launch a comparative study of the political culture of the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Italy, West Germany and Mexico. In their book they argued that
62 Ibid.
63 Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, pp. 
22-26
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“civic culture” is a blend of parochial, subject and participant political culture, 
which differs in each state and reconciles the participation of citizens in the 
political process with the vital necessity for government to govern. Democratic 
stability was underpinned by a political culture characterised by a blend of 
parochial, subject and participant political cultures on the side of the citizens and a 
balance between obligation and performance on the side of the government.64 The 
pioneering work of Almond and Verba was followed by a considerable number of 
scholars, who applied behaviourist social science techniques to study the political 
culture of both capitalist and communist states. Meanwhile, the first critical views 
of the new political culture “school” appeared and were formed into four main 
groups.
The first group of -predominantly leftist- critics argued that Almond and 
Verba’s work was undermined by hidden assumptions. It seemed to have assumed 
that all political systems should develop along relatively homogeneous paths 
towards some form of largely capitalist economic system and largely non- 
ideological liberal economic polity. It was also pointed that Almond and Verba 
showed no interest in sub-cultures, either class-, or ethnic-based, implicitly seeing 
them as “un-modern”, while they ignored that other forms of stable democracy 
seemed possible, notably “consociational” ones based on “elite accommodation” 
in “pillared” societies like Belgium or the Netherlands. In other words, Almond 
and Verba’s work was accused of merely celebrating the “actually existing” 
Anglo-American democracy.
64 Ibid., pp. 360-65
65 Roger Eatwell, "Introduction: The Importance o f the Political Culture Approach" in Roger 
Eatwell, ed., European Political Cultures: Conflict or Convergence? (London & New York: 
Routledge, 1997b), p. 3
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The second argument was based on more specific methodological issues. 
The problems of using opinion polls, especially for probing complex attitudes, 
were addressed. Matters became even more difficult when transnational 
comparisons were made. Besides, there was still vagueness in the content of the 
Almond and Verba’s term “civic culture”. Their research failed to anticipate 
crucial problems which the US and UK civic cultures faced in the 1960s and 
1970s, when decline in system support and the rise of ethnic nationalism in the 
United Kingdom were observed.66
According to the third group o f critics, the political culture approach faced 
problems with the causality and primacy implied. Many scholars argued that it 
was vital to discover how attitudes were formed in the first place, or to stress how 
powerless individuals were -even in democratic states. It was also argued that the 
political culture school by focusing on the power of socialisation and tradition 
seemed more suited to explain continuity, while it was incapable of explaining the 
causal process, by which political change took place. From a Marxist viewpoint, 
political and social attitudes reflected class and/or ethnic status differences and 
were formed by capitalist-controlled institutions such as school, universities and 
media. This “false consciousness” did not need to be researched; it should be 
replaced, instead, by a socialist political culture, which would guarantee political 
and social development.67 Moreover, it was argued that the causality between 
civic culture and stable democratic government did not run from the former to the 
latter, as Almond and Verba had argued, but vice versa.68
66 Ibid.
67 Gabriel A. Almond, "Foreword: The Return to Political Culture" in Larry Diamond, ed., 
Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder CO & London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1993), p. x
68 Eatwell, "Introduction: The Importance o f  the Political Culture Approach", p. 4
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Criticism of the political culture approach was also articulated by 
economists. The introduction of market and bargaining models into political 
studies resulted in the development of rational and public choice theories. The 
common assertion of all economics-based political theories was that all political 
actors were rational, short-term interest maximisers. Since political behaviour 
could be accurately predicted through the use of economics-based models, the 
study of political culture was unnecessary. Public choice theories gained great 
popularity in the late 1970s and 1980s, and alternative approaches of studying 
political behaviour lost part of their popularity.69
A second point of debate among disciples of the political culture approach 
was whether political culture is a fixed, unchangeable feature of states and 
citizens, or not. Pye and Pye argued in their study of Asian political culture that 
political culture is “remarkably durable and persistent,” because of its roots both 
in national histories and in the personalities of individuals.70 On the other hand, 
Diamond opposed cultural determinism, arguing that historical, theoretical and 
normative reasons affirm the changeability of political culture. Research has 
shown that cognitive, attitudinal and evaluational dimensions of political culture 
can change in response to regime performance and -in  many cases- have 
undergone considerable change. Political culture is also influenced by state 
economic and social structure, international factors and the functioning of the 
political system. The examples of states like Germany, Japan, Spain and Italy,
69 Almond, "Foreword: The Return to Political Culture", p. xi
70 Lucian W. Pye and Mary W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions o f  
Authority (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 20
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which managed to liberalise and democratise their political culture prove that 
efforts to influence political culture can bear fruit.71
The debate certainly pointed out weak points in the formation of the 
political culture approach; on the other hand, critics could not successfully deny 
the usefulness of political culture as an analytical tool in the field of comparative 
politics. The question of how to sustain and promote democracy, the main theme 
of Almond and Verba’s work, has remained among the focal points of 
comparative politics research. The political culture school greatly benefited from 
various responses of academics, as well as alternative theories (e.g. neo­
institutionalism and rational choice theory). The political culture approach was 
thus elaborated and advanced. While rational choice models confirmed their 
usefulness in analysing short-term fluctuations within a given system, taking 
cultural and institutional factors as constant, political culture proved indispensable
77in the study of long-term change. It was also widely accepted that political 
culture is not something static but undergoes constant change, influenced by a 
series of social and political factors. In their later study of political culture, 
Almond and Verba highlighted a number of shifts in the civic culture of the five 
states they had first researched.73 Robert Putnam was the scholar who later had the 
biggest influence on the political culture debate; his work focused on two states 
whose political culture was first studied by Almond and Verba. With his book on 
Italian civic tradition, Putnam revisited Italian political culture, shedding light on
71 Larry Diamond, "Introduction: Political Culture and Democracy" in Larry Diamond, ed., 
Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder CO & London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 10-11
72 Ronald Inglehart, "The Renaissance o f Political Culture", American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 82 (1988), pp. 1228-29
73 Sidney Verba, "On Revisiting the Civic Culture: A Personal Postscript" in Gabriel A. Almond 
and Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Newbury Park CA, London & New Delhi: 
Sage Publications, 1980), pp. 394-96
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civic diversity among Italian provinces.74 Diverging efficiency levels of Italian 
regional governments were directly correlated with the regional political culture. 
In the regions where communal trust and participation were higher, institutional 
performance was also high. Putnam related divergence of political cultures with 
the historical background of each Italian region.75 His book on American political 
culture in the end of the 20th century also illustrated the decline of political 
activity and community engagement in the United States. Putnam attributed the 
decreasing popularity of US civic values in the last third of the 20th century to a 
series of factors ranging from pressure of money and time to suburbanisation and 
electronic entertainment.76 In his view, only recuperation of social capital through 
individual and social initiative could reverse the declining process of the US civic 
culture.
It should however be explained that applying the political culture model is 
not tantamount to endorsement of culturalist theories.77 Political culture should 
not be understood as an immutable property that precludes the possibility of 
political change and favours the perpetuation of the status quo. Processes of 
political socialisation are highly important for the formation of political culture. 
School, family and other social groupings have their contribution to the formation 
of perceptions, affects and evaluations that constitute political culture. Although 
historical memories and political socialisation have considerable impact on the 
formation of political culture, political culture can be -to  a large extent- 
considered as independent variable in political science research. While the
74 Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, pp. 15-16
75 Ibid., pp. 121-37
76 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival o f American Community (New 
York: Touchstone, 2000), pp. 283-84
77 The publication o f  Samuel Huntington’s controversial thesis on “the clash of civilizations” 
sparked fierce debate on culturalist theories. See Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of 
Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, no. 3 (1993) and Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash o f  
Civilizations and the Remaking o f  World Order (London & New York: Touchstone, 1998).
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relationship between political culture and political structures is interactive, the 
survival of “traditional” attitudes even in states where most intensive political 
socialisation programmes were enforced has indicated that there are certain limits 
to the plasticity of political culture.78 In other words, political culture should not 
always be considered as an independent variable in the study of political 
behaviour and institutions. Whether political culture is influenced by or influences 
political behaviour and/or institutions, is to be examined ad hoc, on the basis of 
the idiosyncrasies of the political phenomenon under examination. As Putnam 
succinctly put it,
Social scientists have long debated w hat causes w hat -c u ltu re  
or structure. In the context o f  our argum ent th is debate concerns 
the com plicated  causal nexus am ong the cultural norm s and 
attitudes and the social structures and behavioural patterns that 
m ake up the civic com m u n ity ....M o st d ispassionate
com m entators recognise tha t attitudes and practices constitu te a 
m utually  reinforcing  equilibrium . Social trust, norm s o f  
reciprocity , netw orks o f  civic engagem ent, and successful 
cooperation  are m utually  reinforcing .79
Kavanagh’s categorisation of political culture as an amalgam of cognitions, affect 
and evaluation will be applied in this study. The knowledge, emotions and 
opinions of Turkish citizens and state officials on the issues, which form the 
content of Turkish political culture, will be examined, so that continuity and 
change in Turkish political culture, since EU-Turkey relations started improving,
78 Gabriel A. Almond, "The Intellectual History o f the Civic Culture Concept" in Gabriel A. 
Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Newbury Park CA, London & New 
Delhi: Sage Publications, 1980), pp. 31-32
79 Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, p. 180
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can be assessed. The predominantly subject nature of the traditional Turkish 
political culture outlines the properties of the Turkish political system and 
provides with explanations of popular behaviour and choice.
Applying the political culture approach in the case of Turkey is highly 
illuminating. Both Ottoman and republican Turkish social context and history 
legacies were such that any modernising institutional reform efforts would be 
seriously hampered. Nonetheless, as intensive and radical modernisation 
programmes have dominated both late Ottoman and republican Turkish elite 
politics, Turkey can be seen as a case where the success of radical top-down 
institutional reform programmes can be gauged. The success of Turkey’s 
conversion from an “Oriental” to a Western European state could provide us with 
evidence that elite-based institutional reform programmes have some chance of 
success, no matter how adverse the political and social environment. Turkey, 
indeed, made several important steps in the direction of joining the European 
political and social paradigm, but also failed to keep track of equally significant 
developments focusing on bringing political liberalism to the heart of European 
politics. According to the political culture approach, Turkey’s social context and 
history did not facilitate modernising institutional reform efforts; nonetheless, 
while the possibility that Turkey can endorse the European liberal paradigm is not 
precluded, the reasons why there has been a delay in its adoption are explored. 
Institutional change is not a process, which can be successfully dictated or 
enforced in a short period of time, and understanding the reasons for its partial 
failure is the first step in the effort for its full implementation. Although Turkish 
political culture is treated in this study as one of the reasons why political 
liberalism failed to influence Turkish politics until EU-Turkey relations started
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improving, it is not viewed as an insurmountable obstacle in Turkey’s effort to 
join the European Union. On the contrary, political culture is treated as a 
changeable attribute, which can be affected by major political or social 
developments and become the object of political reform programmes, even though 
change may be slow. A liberal shift in Turkish political culture in view of 
improving EU-Turkey relations would be a first significant signal that Turkey’s 
political liberalisation is not a chimera and that Turkey’s full membership of the 
European Union is a realistic long-term task.
4. Research Details
This study has been based on a variety of primary and secondary sources. 
Literature on Europeanisation, institutional performance, political, social and 
cultural trends in contemporary Turkey has been used as background for an 
exploration of the evolution of Turkish political culture under the influence of the 
European Union since the 1990s.
The conclusions of this study have been based on fieldwork study 
conducted in Istanbul and Ankara between September 2004 and August 2005. 
Thirty-one in-depth, structured interviews were conducted with academics, 
journalists, NGO leaders and diplomats. The selection of interviewees was 
carefully made, so that they comprised a representative sample of the Turkish 
ideological spectrum. Interviewees were -among other questions- asked for their 
opinion on the impact of the European Union on political liberalisation in the field 
of their expertise, the parallel influence of globalisation and domestic politics, the 
role of domestic political actors and the incidence of social learning. These 
interviews helped me obtain a more up-to-date and original view of Turkish
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political culture and the impact of Turkey’s approach to the European Union.
A detailed survey of the Turkish mainstream press was also conducted to 
estimate continuity and change in Turkish political culture. Commentaries and 
news from eight Turkish daily newspapers, namely Hurriyet, Milliyet, Radikal, 
Sabah, Tercuman, Vatan, Yeni §afak and Zaman, were collected from 2002 to 
2005 and served as an information database for this project. The collected articles 
referred to the European Union, political reform and liberalisation, civil society, 
state-society relations, the role of religion in politics, minorities and national 
identity. On the basis of this information, conclusions on the convergence of 
Turkish political culture to the European liberal paradigm became possible.
As far as the time frame of this study is concerned, this study has focused 
on a span of five years, which is defined by two crucial decisions of the European 
Council on the future of EU-Turkey relations. The first is the Helsinki European 
Council decision of December 1999, which awarded Turkey the status of 
candidate for EU membership. The second is the decision of the Brussels 
European Council in December 2004, which set 3 October 2005 to be the start 
date of EU-Turkey accession negotiations. Nevertheless, information dating 
before December 1999 and after December 2004 has also been utilised when this 
was considered necessary.
5. Chapter Outline
Chapter 2 of this study will focus on the historical background to the debate on 
Turkish political culture and EU-Turkey relations. Political developments in 
republican Turkey will be explored with emphasis on attempts to reconcile 
Kemalism and political liberalism. A short historical account of EU-Turkey
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relations will be followed by an introduction to the greater debate, which the 
prospect of Turkey’s EU membership has arisen. Chapter 3 will attempt to 
compare Turkish and European political cultures by first discussing whether a 
European political culture as such exists and whether political liberalism could 
prospectively constitute its core. The cases of the three largest EU member states, 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom, will serve as examples. An assessment 
of the congruence of political cultures in EU member states and Turkey will be 
based on their manifestations in the fields of civil society, state tradition, the role 
of religion in politics and national identity. Chapters 4 to 7 will explore continuity 
and change in the main facets of Turkish political culture and assess the impact of 
improving EU-Turkey relations. A historical introduction dating back to Ottoman 
and republican tradition will be followed by a study of the developments in the 
1990s. The parallel impact of globalisation and domestic politics will be examined 
and distinguished from that of the European Union. The impact of the European 
Union on political liberalisation will be explored in its financial, legislative and 
ideational dimensions. The stance of social actors who played a key role in 
supporting or obstructing the reform process will be scrutinised, as well as the 
incidence of social learning, a crucial indicator for the change of political culture. 
The emergence of new ideas and their popularity among elites and the public 
opinion will be explored. As far as the focus areas of this study are concerned, 
Chapter 4 will focus on civil society, Chapter 5 will focus on state-society 
relations, while Chapter 6 will examine the role of religion in politics. Chapter 7 
will explore the issue of minorities and national identity. In conclusion, Chapter 8 
will comment on the utility of path dependence theory, historical institutionalism 
and two-level games approach in researching the transformation of Turkish
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political culture, as shown through this study. The liberalising effect of the 
European Union will be finally assessed in whole, and the future of this process 
will be speculated in relation with the course of Turkey’s EU accession 
negotiations.
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II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE DEBATE ON
TURKISH POLITICAL CULTURE
1. The Emergence of the Republic
Warfare, massacres and population exchanges in the first quarter of the 20th 
century had altered the multi-religious character of Anatolia, establishing a 
formidable Muslim preponderance. Nonetheless, Turkish national identity was not 
embedded in all the Muslim populations of Anatolia, which were often of diverse 
ethnic origin. Kurds, Arabs, Lazes, Bosnians, Albanians, Circassians, Chechens 
and other Caucasian peoples were only few of the existing Muslim ethnicities in 
Anatolia, while a substantial Muslim Alevi1 minority challenged the Sunni 
majority. Under the leadership of Atatiirk the Turkish nation-state, which emerged 
in the aftermath of the First World War, made quick steps towards what was 
thought to be the “Western” political and civilisational model. A Republic was 
proclaimed and the Caliphate abolished. The new Turkish state was based on 
secularism; the Latin alphabet was substituted for Arabic, while Ottoman and 
Islamic culture was systematically purged, and Western European culture was — 
even forcibly— introduced.2
In the minds of Atatiirk and his followers, the consolidation of a Turkish 
nation-state did not allow for ethnic or religious diversity in Anatolia. The 
authoritarian structure of the Kemalist Turkish state was imperative for the 
implementation of an ethnic homogenisation project and the forging of a strong
1 Alevis represent heterodox Islam in republican Turkey. Their faith is a syncretistic version of 
Shiite Islam enriched with plenty o f local and pre-Islamic religious elements.
2 For a detailed account o f Atatiirk’s reform programme see Niyazi Berkes, The Development o f  
Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), pp. 461-78.
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common Turkish national identity in Anatolia.3 Fundamental human rights were 
consistently violated, while the gradual introduction of democratic institutions in 
Turkey in the course of the 20 century did not signal any significant 
improvement in the status of minorities.4 The ethnic homogenisation of Turkey’s 
population seemed to be largely successful, until it was seriously challenged by 
the revival of Kurdish nationalism, which culminated in terrorist attacks and 
guerrilla warfare in the southeastern provinces of Turkey in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Turkish security forces managed to contain the direct secession threat, but, on the 
other hand, could not prevent the consolidation of a distinct Kurdish national 
identity in a significant part of Turkey’s population. Additionally, other minority 
groups, like the Alevis, challenged official assimilation policies. Kemalism 
managed to create a Turkish nation-state, yet Turkey’s full convergence with the 
Western political and civilisational paradigm remained unfinished. The nature of 
Turkish political culture was one of the issues, which manifested the incomplete 
character of the Kemalist Westernisation project.
a. The Republican Impact on Turkish Political Culture
The founding of a modern Turkish nation-state did not cause a fundamental 
change in the dominant Ottoman political culture. A perennial centre-periphery 
cleavage persisted,5 as the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- 
CHP) took over in republican Turkey the functions of the Ottoman state
3 Yavuz Onen, Fieldwork Interview (Ankara, 28/1/2005)
4 Human rights have attracted the interest o f numerous dissident intellectuals since the early years 
o f the Republic. For a full account o f their arguments, see Tam! Bora, Y. Bulent Peker and Mithat 
Sancar, "Hakim Ideolojiler, Bati, Batihla§ma ve Insan Haklan" in Uygur Kocaba§oglu, ed., 
Modernle$me ve Baticilik (Istanbul: ileti§im, 2002).
5 Mardin argued that in the Ottoman Empire multidimensional social confrontation and integration 
seem to be missing, while the major confrontation was always unidimensional, a clash between the 
centre and the periphery. This cleavage survived the demise o f the Ottoman Empire and played a 
crucial role in republican Turkish politics. See §erif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key 
to Turkish Politics?" Daedalus, Vol. 102, no. 1 (1973), p. 170.
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bureaucracy.6 Besides, Ottoman state autonomy implied that status-oriented 
values, rather than market-oriented values, were dominant. As Ozbudun argues:
The relationship between economic and political power was the 
reverse of its equivalent in Western Europe. Instead of 
economic power (ownership of the means of production) 
leading to political power, political power (high position in the 
state bureaucracy) gave access to material wealth.7
Subject political culture, which prevailed over the parochial model in the late 
years of the Ottoman Empire as a result of extensive centralisation efforts in the 
19th century, was not enriched by elements of participant political culture, a 
characteristic of Western European liberal democracies. On the contrary, 
reverence toward the state persisted and even increased. Despite the lip service 
usually paid to Turkish rural society as the standard-bearer of Turkishness, the 
unity and continuity of the nation-state were perceived to be under constant threat 
by local notables, traditional groups and rural populations. Therefore, the central 
bureaucracy had to employ absolute political control and social-engineering 
policies to secure state interests against those centres of “counter-official 
culture.”8 According to Atatiirk, sovereignty was to “belong to the people without 
any qualifications and conditions.” Yet, in practice, this meant that the state elite, 
which allegedly understood the interest o f the people better than the people itself, 
would exercise sovereignty in the name of the people. As Heper put it,
6 Ibid., pp. 304-05. On the republican modernisation programme, regarding the periphery, see 
Murat Beige, "Cumhuriyet’in D6nu§iim Projesi", Radikal, 23/10/2004.
7 Ergun Ozbudun, "Continuing Ottoman Legacy and the State Tradition in the Middle East" in L. 
Carl Brown, ed., Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996a), p. 135. For an opposing view on state-society relations 
in the Ottoman Empire, see Qaglar Keyder, "The Ottoman Empire" in Karen Barkey and Mark von 
Hagen, eds., After Empire: Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building: The Soviet Union and the 
Russian, Ottoman and Habsburg Empires (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1997a).
8 Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" p. 309
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transcendentalism stressed the priority of the community and the state over the 
citizens, whose interest is identified with the common rather than their individual 
interest.9 The Ottoman tradition of the benevolent father state {devlet baba) with 
an emphasis on equity enshrined a political culture accepting the legitimacy of an 
interventionist state.10 As Mardin points out:
It is conceded in the abstract that the state and its leaders have a 
right and obligation to set a course for society and to use public 
resources to pursue that course....The emphasis is on the ends 
of state intervention, and checks and balances are not seen as 
preventing abuse of power but rather as impeding the state’s 
course toward its goal. Therefore, to some extent, there has 
been an acceptance of a high concentration of power -  
economic, administrative and military.11
On the other hand, the imposition of Kemalist imperatives and views as regards 
the formation of Turkish identity could not remain unchallenged. The Kemalist 
nation-building and civilisational project was so ambitious in its objectives, that 
established groups and ideologies, which could not be reconciled with the new 
image of Turkish political culture, faced marginalisation or even persecution. In 
the field of national identity, both the religious base of the Ottoman Turkish 
national identity and the multiethnic origins of the Ottoman Turkish population 
were removed from the fabric o f the newly constructed Turkish national identity. 
Islamists, minorities and liberals were the main opponents o f this policy. Islamists 
urged that Islam was the crucial factor in the definition of Turkish national
9 Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (Walkington: Eothen Press, 1985), pp. 7-8
10 Ozbudun, "Continuing Ottoman Legacy and the State Tradition in the Middle East", pp. 147-48
11 §erif Mardin, "Turkey: The Transformation o f  an Economic Code" in Ergun Ozbudun and 
Aydin Ulusan, eds., The Political Economy o f Income Distribution in Turkey (New York: Holmes 
& Meier, 1980), pp. 23-53
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identity. This view was in harmony with traditional Ottoman opposition to any 
forms of ethnic nationalism, as the only meaningful division was between 
believers and non-believers in Islam, as it had been institutionalised in the millet 
system.12 Minorities also opposed the Kemalist nation-building project.13 Since 
the Greek and Armenian minorities had become numerically insignificant in 
republican Turkey, the Kurdish minority took the lead in opposition of Kemalist 
plans on Turkish national identity. The Sheikh Said rebellion of 1925 and other 
less important Kurdish uprisings, which also had religious underpinnings, showed 
that even Muslim ethnic groups of republican Turkey did not abandon their 
distinct identity.14 The 1930 “Menemen Incident” (Menemen Olayi) provided 
additional evidence that the secularisation programme faced serious grassroots 
challenge also from the Turkish part of the population.15 As regards Turkish 
liberals, despite their overall support for the Kemalist modernisation project,16 the 
forced imposition of official Turkish national identity on the population could 
only attract their opposition, as it meant severe human rights violations and was
12 The millet system is commonly supposed to be “the framework within which the Ottoman state 
ruled its non-Muslim subjects,” as Braude put it. Yet recent historical research has linked the 
emergence o f the millet system not with the classical age of the Ottoman Empire, but rather with 
the Tanzimat administrative reforms, which could be easier justified if the millet system was 
perceived as part o f the Ottoman political tradition. For more information and insights on this 
issue, see Benjamin Braude, "Foundation Myths o f the Millet System" in Benjamin Braude and 
Bernard Lewis, eds., Christians & Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning o f  a Plural 
Society (New York & London: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982), pp. 69-88.
13 It should be added, though, that Muslim non-Turkish ethnic groups other than the Kurds mostly 
willingly assimilated into mainstream Turkish national identity. See Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey 
Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic (London: Hurst and Company, 
1997), pp. 265-70.
14 The character o f the Sheikh Said rebellion is widely debated in historical literature. Official 
Turkish sources emphasise on the anti-secularist, “reactionary” character o f the rebellion, while 
Kurdish nationalists stress its strongly ethnic Kurdish character. Due to lack o f  sufficient historical 
evidence, it is virtually impossible to take an authoritative view on this question, although it seems 
quite possible that the Sheikh Said rebellion combined religious and ethnic elements.
15 On 23 December 1930 Kubilay, a Kemalist teacher, who was performing his military service as 
a reserve officer, was brutally killed in the city o f Menemen in Western Anatolia, when he 
attempted to intervene into a conflict among the local members o f the -officially banned- 
Nak^ibendi tarikat.
16 Modernisation and Westernisation were largely synonymous terms in the context o f Atatiirk’s 
reform programme. See Ziya Oni§, "Turkish Modernisation and Challenges for the New Europe", 
Perceptions: Journal o f  International Affairs, Vol. IX, no. 3 (2004c), p. 8.
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one more of the characteristics of an increasingly authoritarian state. Their 
political position and influence in the early republican years were, however, too 
feeble to affect the course of political events.
2. Early Republican Encounters with Political Liberalism
a. The Profile of Liberalism in Early Republican Turkey
Ideas like liberalism and democracy -already not very popular in the political 
context of the interwar years- did not attract the interest of the Kemalist 
leadership. The liberal faction within the Young Turk Committee of Union and 
Progress (Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) had been defeated, and subsequent political 
developments had eliminated its political stature.17 Public opinion had linked 
Ottoman liberals with military defeat in the Balkan wars and collaboration with 
foreign occupation forces between 1918 and 1922.18 Ottoman liberals comprised 
the backbone of the Ottoman Istanbul governments, which sided with Western 
powers and signed the Treaty of Sevres, thereby accepting the partition of 
Anatolia. The position of Ottoman liberals was further strengthened by the 
political support provided by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed VI Vahdettin. Only the 
military victory of the Ankara-based Kemalist forces decided the power struggle 
between the Istanbul and Ankara governments. As the Istanbul government 
disintegrated, tarnished by its cooperation with Western forces, and Kemalist
17 On the ideas o f the primary representative o f Ottoman liberalism, Prince Sabahaddin, see Hasan 
Bulent Kahraman, "Bir Zihniyet, Kurum ve Kimlik Kurucusu Olarak Batihla§ma" in Uygur 
Kocaba§oglu, ed., Modernle§me ve Baticihk (istanbul: Ileti§im, 2002), pp. 134-35, Kaan Durukan, 
"Tiirk Liberalizmin Kokenleri" in Mehmet O. Alkan, ed., Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Dugimce Mirasi: 
Tanzimat ve Me§rutiyet'in Birikimi (istanbul: ileti§im, 2001), pp. 154-55 and Ay§e Kadioglu, 
Cumhuriyet iradesi Demokrasi Muhakemesi (istanbul: Metis Yaymlari, 1998), pp. 82-86.
18 Ottoman liberals comprised the core of non-nationalist opposition in the late Ottoman Empire. 
Kamil Pa§a, an advocate o f Ottomanism and adversary of Turkish nationalism, was Grand Vizier 
(Sadrazatn) during the disastrous First Balkan War. The Ottoman governments o f Damat Ferit and 
Ahmet Tevfik Pa§a took over power in the aftermath o f the Moudros Armistice, collaborated with 
the Entente forces and antagonised Ankara-based Turkish nationalist forces until the final military 
victory o f the latter in the fall o f 1922.
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nationalists were taking over control of the whole country, the public appeal of 
political liberalism reached a nadir: Liberalism became inextricably linked with 
capitulation, concession and sacrifice of national interests, and particularly with 
the lethal -for the Ottoman Empire- Treaty of Sevres. Given that political 
environment, it is no wonder that the influence of Ottoman liberals in the newly 
established Republic of Turkey was minimal. In the early republican years, liberal 
ideas could only be advocated by politicians whose Kemalist credentials were 
indisputable. Yet loyalty towards Kemalist orthodoxy could hardly be 
compromised with a liberal view of politics.19 This contradiction became apparent 
in the works of Ahmet Agaoglu, one of the most prominent representatives of 
liberal thinking in republican Turkey.20 Nonetheless, even this version of qualified 
political liberalism could hardly be tolerated. Although Atatiirk was at times 
doubtful of the validity of political authoritarianism and seemed to realise the 
benefits of political pluralism, in the end he decided to eliminate liberal political 
opposition expressed in the form of the Progressive Republican and the Free
9 |Republican Parties.
b. The First Liberal Attempt: The Progressive Republican Party
The first attempt to introduce liberal policies in republican Turkey took place in 
November 1924 with the establishment of the Progressive Republican Party
19 For an account o f synthetic approaches o f liberalism with conservativism, see Levent Koker, 
"Liberal Muhafazakarhk ve Tiirkiye" in Ahmet £igdem, ed., Muhafazakarhk (istanbul: ileti§im, 
2003).
20 For a detailed account o f Ahmet Agaoglu’s thought, see Simten Co§ar, "Turk Liberalizmin 
Aijmazlarina Bir Giri§: Ahmet Agaoglu" in E. Fuat Keyman and A. Ya§ar Sanbay, eds., 
Kiireselle§me, Sivil Toplum ve Islam (Ankara: Vadi Yayinlari, 1998) and Kadioglu, Cumhuriyet 
iradesi Demokrasi Mahakemesi pp. 86-96. For his biography, see Fahri Sakai, Agaoglu Ahmed 
Bey (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1999).
21 On the eclipse o f political liberalism in early republican Turkey, see Cengiz Aktar, "Olmayan 
Avrupa Du§uncesi Uzerine" in Uygur Kocaba§oglu, ed., Modernlepne ve Baticihk (Istanbul: 
ileti§im, 2002), p. 274.
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{Terrakiperver Cumhuriyet Firkasi).22 Increasing tension between the radical and 
the moderate wing of Atatiirk’s People’s Party led Rauf [Orbay] and thirty-two 
deputies of the Turkish National Assembly to the decision to found an opposition 
party. The party manifesto and programme showed that the new party remained 
nationalistic and secular, yet it also opposed the authoritarian tendencies displayed 
by the radical wing of the People’s Party (Halk Partisi). Decentralisation, the 
separation of powers, evolutionary rather than revolutionary change, as well as a 
more liberal economic policy, were some of its political objectives.23 The appeal 
of the views expressed by the Progressive Republican Party was considerable, and 
Atatiirk had to remove Prime Minister ismet [inonii], who had sided with the 
radical authoritarians of the People’s Party. The appointment of the moderate 
Fethi [Okyar] to the Prime Minister office aimed to prevent massive deputy 
defections to the newly established opposition party. Yet the radicals retained key 
positions in the new government, and following events gave them the upper hand. 
The 1925 Sheikh Said rebellion shook the state. Martial law was proclaimed in the 
eastern provinces, and increasing pressure was exercised on the opposition party 
leaders to disband voluntarily. Okyar eventually resigned, inbnii returned to his 
former post and pushed through the parliament the Law of the Maintenance of 
Order (Takrir~i Sukun Kanunu). Two special “ Independence Tribunals” (.tstiklal 
Mahkemeleri)24 —one for the east and one for the rest of the country- were
22 On the conservative leanings o f the Progressive Republican Party, see Erik Jan Zurcher, 
"Terrakiperver Cumhuriyet Firkasi ve Siyasal Muhafazakarhk" in Ahmet £igdem, ed., 
Muhafazakarhk (Istanbul: ileti§im, 2003), pp. 42-53.
23 Erik Jan Zurcher, Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic : the Progressive 
Republican Party, 1924-1925 (Leiden & New York: E.J. Brill, 1991), pp. 95-109 and Erik Jan 
Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London & New York: I.B. Tauris & Co., 1998), pp. 175-76
24 The Independence Tribunals were special military courts first established by Mustafa Kemal 
[Atatiirk] in the aftermath o f the First World War in his effort to consolidate Turkish nationalist 
power in Anatolia. Their reinstatement against the Sheikh Said rebellion and the Progressive 
Republican Party was a move o f political symbolism. Turkish independence was no more
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reinstated. Mounting state suppression affected not only the Kurdish minority, but 
also all Turkish dissident voices. Eight opposition newspapers were closed down, 
while prominent journalists were arrested. Under those adverse circumstances, the 
fate of the Progressive Republican Party was sealed. On the advice of the 
Independence Tribunal, the party was closed down by the government on 3 June 
1925, on the grounds that some of its members had allegedly supported the Sheikh 
Said rebellion and tried to exploit religion for political purposes.25 The “Izmir 
Conspiracy”26 of June 1926 gave radical Kemalists the pretext to exclude the 
leaders of Progressive Republican Party from Turkish politics and secure the 
insulation of republican Turkey against any liberal influences.27
c. The Second Liberal Attempt: The Free Republican Party
Despite his strong opposition to Progressive Republican Party, it was Atatiirk 
himself who encouraged the establishment of the second opposition party in the 
history of republican Turkey 28 The growing authoritarianism of the governing 
Republican People’s Party {Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP)29 and the severe 
economic crisis, which hit the country as a result of the Great Depression, caused 
serious social discontent. Atatiirk attempted to defuse this through the 
establishment of a legal opposition party, which could challenge official policies. 
It seems that he was also concerned about the increasingly authoritarian character
threatened by foreign invaders or Christian minorities, but from internal enemies, Kurdish 
nationalists, Islamists and political dissidents.
25 Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, pp. 177-80
26 The Izmir Conspiracy was an attempt to assassinate Atatiirk during his visit to Izmir on 15 June 
1926. This event served as pretext for increasing state repression against dissidents and minorities. 
See Zurcher, Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic : the Progressive Republican 
Party, 1924-1925, pp. 92-93
27 Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, pp. 181-82
28 William Hale, The Political and Economic Development o f  Modern Turkey (London: C. Helm, 
1981), p. 53
29 Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Firkasi, later renamed into Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi-CHP) is the party founded by Atatiirk himself, which ruled Turkey from the emergence of 
the Turkish Republic until 1950.
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of the Turkish Republic and his despotic image. In 1930 Atatiirk approached the 
former Prime Minister and known moderate Fethi [Okyar] and asked him to found 
a new party, arguing that:
Our present appearance more or less conforms to that of a 
dictatorship.... but I don’t want to leave as a legacy to the 
nation an institution of despotism and go down in history like 
this.30
Following Atatiirk’s instructions, Okyar founded the Free Republican Party 
(jSerbest Cumhuriyet Firkasi) and was joined by fifteen deputies, all prominent 
CHP members. Atatiirk showed his goodwill by persuading his oldest friend Nuri 
[Conker] and his sister Makbule to join the new party. Ahmet Agaoglu was also 
among its founding members. The political orientations of the new party had a 
liberal essence, similar to those of the Progressive Republican Party. Liberal 
economic policies, freedom of speech and direct elections were among the party’s 
main political positions. However, the reaction of the established CHP radical 
wing was vehement and effective. Skirmishes with party supporters and the police 
in Izmir in September 1930 and increasing political tension in the aftermath of the 
October 1930 local elections induced Atatiirk to abandon his formerly neutral 
position, side with the CHP and support its policies. Okyar, who had no intention 
to oppose Atatiirk himself, had no option but to close down the party on 16 
November 1930.31 The Kemalist elite showed its unwillingness to tolerate even 
“loyal” opposition and its inability to mobilise popular support for its reform 
programme. Atatiirk even came to the point of declaring that:
30 See Fethi Okyar, Ug Devirde Bir Adam (istanbul: Terciiman Yayinlari, 1980), pp. 392-93 cited 
in Ergun Ozbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation 
(Boulder CO & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), pp. 22-23.
31 Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, pp. 185-87
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....liberalism is a system applied in colonies! Yet we are not 
and will not become a colony. Considering liberalism is 
denying the revolution.32
While the Turkish people seemed willing to endorse any dissenting political 
movement, which could loosen the grip of the Kemalist elite over the state and 
society33, democracy and political liberalism seemed to be a very low priority at 
that time. The need to forge the unity of a Turkish nation-state and build a 
modern, secular national identity necessarily involved illiberal policies violating 
fundamental human rights. Subject political culture remained dominant in the mix 
of Turkish civic culture. The concurrent rise of authoritarianism and 
totalitarianism all over Europe and the outbreak of the Second World War could 
not but strengthen the illiberal character of the Turkish Republic in the following 
years.
3. Post-Second World War Developments
a. The Rise of the Opposition
Official Kemalist policies affecting political culture faced opposition.34 This 
opposition, however, was not as clear-cut as in the case of national identity, 
because both the preceding Ottoman and the newly championed Kemalist political 
cultures could be classified as predominantly subject and had much in common. 
The focus switch from the Caliph and the Empire-cradle of the Islamic ummah to 
the modern Turkish state certainly caused a lot of friction among Islamists and
32 Ahmet Hamdi Ba§ar, Atatiirk'le Ug Ay ve 1930'dan Sonra Tilrkiye (Ankara: A.I.T.l.A. Basimevi, 
1981), p. 30 cited in Co§ar, "Turk Liberalizmin A5mazlarina Bir Giri§: Ahmet Agaoglu", p. 143
33 Walter F. Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961 : Aspects o f Military Politics 
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1963), pp. 5-6
34 Since the scarcity o f  information on popular political culture o f the time makes a fully-fledged 
account o f grassroots opposition virtually impossible, this study will focus on the elite level.
65
minorities; nonetheless, it did not require a radically different form of political 
socialisation. It was only the liberals, who advocated the introduction of 
participant elements into Turkish political culture and -w ith their sparse forces- 
objected to the establishment of a subject republican political culture.
The introduction of multi-party politics in 1946 constituted a huge leap 
forward as regards Turkey’s democratisation and paved the way for a gradual 
reconsideration of Turkish political culture. The free elections of 1950, the 
peaceful transfer of power from the Republican People’s Party {Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi-CHP) to the Democrat Party {Demokrat Parti-DP), the loosening of 
restrictions on religious activities and increasing cooperation with Kurdish 
chieftains confirmed the change that the introduction of multi-party politics had 
brought about. The latter also allowed for the emergence of instrumentalist views 
of political culture, whereby the individual rather than the community gained 
preponderance. Authoritarian government policies and a series of military coups, 
however, reversed the “instrumentalisation” process of Turkish political culture.35 
Participant elements of political culture faded under the dominant influence of a 
strong, centralised Turkish state. Turkey was transformed into an illiberal 
democracy, a feature of many states outside the Western core, in which 
democratic procedures -above all free elections- were observed, yet respect of 
civil liberties was missing.36 Despite this, advocates o f Turkey’s political 
liberalisation still championed the introduction of participant elements into 
Turkish political culture. The process of Turkey’s political liberalisation would be 
neither smooth, nor cumulative.
35 Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey, pp. 84-91, 130-37
36 Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise o f Illiberal Democracy", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, no. 6 (1997), pp. 
22-24
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b. The Introduction of Multiparty Politics and the Democrat Party
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the introduction of multiparty politics 
was the first step in the process of Turkey’s political liberalisation. Both domestic 
distress and external pressure influenced the decision of Atatiirk’s successor Ismet 
Inonii to allow for the establishment of opposition parties. The CHP was 
increasingly unpopular with the majority of the population, and resentment 
increased due to acute economic and social problems. Meanwhile, territorial 
demands made by the victorious Soviet Union against Turkey forced it to hastily 
join the Western bloc and strengthen its political bonds with the new emerging 
world power, the United States.37 Instrumental in that effort would be Turkey’s -  
even partial- convergence to the US political and economic paradigm. The 
democratic and liberal principles could no more be bluntly ignored by the 
incumbent Kemalist elite. In a speech on 1 November 1945, Inonii declared the 
lack of an opposition party to be the main shortcoming of Turkish democracy.38 
On 7 January 1946 a new opposition party, the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti- 
DP), was registered. Its leaders were Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes, former 
CHP members and Members of Parliament. Freedom in the press and universities 
improved, while direct elections were also adopted.39 The 1946 elections, 
however, outlined the limits of the liberal shift in Turkish politics: a CHP victory 
against the DP was only secured through grassroots organisational superiority and 
incidents of electoral fraud.40 The DP continued exercising pressure for more
37 Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, pp. 111-14
38 The relative importance o f domestic, security and foreign policy considerations in inonii’s 
decision to launch multi-party politics in Turkey is a still heavily debated issue. See Zurcher, 
Turkey: A Modern History, pp. 215-28 and Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, pp. 111-21.
39 Until then a system o f indirect elections o f rather ceremonial function was applied in which the 
slates o f candidates for parliamentary seats could only be appointed by CHP organs. See Zurcher, 
Turkey: A Modern History, p. 185.
40 Frederick W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965), p. 350
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liberal reforms and eventually took over power in the 1950 elections. The 
peaceful transfer of power from the CHP to the DP -despite dissident views 
within the incumbent CHP- was the first big success in the establishment of 
Turkish democracy. The DP broadened the scope of popular participation in 
Turkish politics and showed interest in the marginalised segments of Turkish 
society, especially the peasantry. Nonetheless, it soon relapsed into authoritarian 
policies, highly reminiscent of those o f CHP. The military coup of 27 April 1960 
dealt the first blow against the young Turkish democracy and its liberalising 
policies.
c. The 1960 Coup and the 1961 Constitution
The 1960 coup was followed by arrests and purges of officers and academics with 
suspected liberal and leftist leanings. The Kemalist bureaucracy reasserted its 
dominant position in the Turkish state and society, which had come under 
considerable threat when peripheral forces increased their influence during the DP 
era. Nonetheless, the Constitution proclaimed by referendum on 9 July 1961 
included more liberal clauses than its predecessor of 1924 did. A greater scope for 
political activities became tolerated, the activities of new parties, trade unions, and 
religious groups enjoyed wider freedoms, while individual human rights were 
better protected. This apparent paradox can be explained by referring to the 
proceedings of the constitutional committees set up by the military regime. Given 
the experience of the DP governments in the 1950s, the military bureaucracy 
decided to curb the political powers of the executive through the establishment of 
a checks-and-balances system. Proportional representation in national elections, 
the introduction of a bicameral legislature and a Constitutional Court were seen as
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effective political safeguards against abuse of power by the executive.41 The 
views of this political school of thought eventually prevailed and exerted the main 
influence upon the 1961 Constitution. Sanctioning considerable freedom in the 
activities of political parties affirmed that Turkish democratic institutions were 
trusted, and that tolerance for political activity was thought to constitute the most 
appropriate means of preventing a potential future relapse to authoritarian 
majoritarian politics, which had characterised both the CHP and DP eras.
On the other hand, the crucial political role of the military was for the first 
time constitutionally recognised and institutionalised through the establishment of 
the National Security Council (Milli Guvenlik Kurulu-MGK). In the perennial 
conflict between the Turkish centre and periphery, the periphery had made 
relative gains during the DP era, which the 1960 coup attempted to limit. Through 
the 1961 Constitution, the Turkish centre tried to set institutional guarantees for 
the continuation of its dominant position in the Turkish state and society. As Celal 
Bayar claimed:
The difference between the Turkish Constitution of 1924 and 
the new constitution adopted after the revolution of 1960 
amounted to the constitutional legitimisation of the bureaucracy 
and the intellectuals as one source of sovereignty in addition to 
the “Turkish people”, who had earlier figured as the only source 
of sovereignty in the Kemalist ideology.42
The handover of political power to civilians signalled the beginning of intense 
political debates in Turkish society, in which liberal political ideas were also
41 Weiker, The Turkish Revolution 1960-1961 : Aspects o f  Military Politics, pp. 66-68 and William 
Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (London & New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 137-38
42 Celal Bayar, "Ba§vekilim Adnan Menderes", Hiirriyet, 29/06/1969, cited in Mardin, "Center- 
Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" p. 308
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advocated. Nonetheless, political activism was often followed by political 
extremism. Clashes between ultra-leftist and ultra-rightist groups soon became 
frequent, threatening public order and stability. The growth of political radicalism 
and violence led to more military coups.
d. The Coups of 1971 and 1980
The second military coup “by memorandum” took place on 12 March 1971 and 
marked a turning point. The increasing influence of liberalism in Turkish politics 
of the 1960s was reversed in the 1970s. The 1961 Constitution was amended in 
December 1971, so as to limit the scope of political freedoms and protect state 
interests more effectively. Curtailment of constitutionally protected civil liberties 
by law became possible, while press freedom, university and media autonomy 
were curbed. Yet the amended constitution did not succeed in preventing political 
deadlock and violence. Clashes between militant leftist and state-tolerated rightist 
groups became widespread, especially in the late 1970s, while civilian 
governments seemed to be unable to control the situation.43 Deteriorating political 
conditions set the scene for another military coup. On 12 September 1980 the 
army took over political power, dissolving the parliament and the cabinet and 
suspending political parties, trade unions and newspapers. The new Constitution, 
as approved by referendum on 7 November 1982, brought about severe 
restrictions of the human rights and liberties recognised by the 1961 Constitution. 
The constitutional protection of fundamental human, political and social rights 
was made conditional as these could be annulled, suspended or limited on alleged 
grounds of national interest, public order, national security, or danger to the
43 Kemal Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relation in Turkey before and after 
1980" in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 
1980s (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), pp. 145-46
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republican order. The end of the military rule in 1983 and the rise to power of 
Turgut Ozal and the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) led to an 
unprecedented drive towards economic liberalisation. Nonetheless, these steps, 
which reshaped Turkish economy, were not followed by analogous steps in the 
field of political liberalisation. The established role of the military in politics and 
the escalation of the Kurdish conflict in southeastern Turkey did not favour any 
developments, which could have a liberalising effect on political culture.
4. EU-Turkey Relations in the 1990s
a. The Transformation of the European Union
The debate on Turkish political culture was heavily influenced by the rise of the 
European Union as a supra-national organisation. During the 1990s, the European 
Union underwent a radical transformation: It ceased to be a predominantly 
economic organisation regulating a free trade zone with minimal political 
ambitions and became an organisation whose economic character was 
complemented through the gradual establishment of common foreign, security and 
home affairs policies. This pivotal switch in the character of the European Union 
led to the articulation of the Copenhagen Criteria for prospective EU member 
states and the rise of the European federal debate. The Copenhagen Criteria, 
adopted at the June 1993 EU Council Summit, required the following conditions 
from prospective EU member states:
■ The stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities
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■ The existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the 
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within 
the European Union
■ The ability to take on the obligations of membership, including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union44
Within the European federal debate, two opinion groups were soon formed. Euro- 
federalists maintained that the European Union should only be an intermediate 
stage toward the development of a supranational European federal state.45 To 
facilitate this process, political and cultural elements, which constituted the 
common European heritage, should form the basis of a new, overarching common 
European identity. Political liberalism would unequivocally be among the basic 
components of that identity, while the inclusion of religious elements was heavily 
contested. On the other hand, opponents of Euro-federalism contended that the 
transformation of the European Economic Community into the European Union 
should be the final stage of convergence among EU member states. The European 
Union should retain a heavily economic character, while the debate on a common 
European identity was seen as both chimerical and redundant. The influence of 
Euro-federalist views within the European Union, however, meant that -apart 
from the observance of the Copenhagen Criteria- Turkey’s EU membership 
application could also be judged on its compatibility with the common European 
identity project. Some Euro-federalists, who considered Europe’s Greco-Roman 
and Judaeo-Christian heritage to be the foundations of European identity, 
vehemently opposed the prospect of Turkey’s membership. Others who viewed 
that Europe’s identity should not have religion-specific content, but be based on
44 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration (Boulder CO & 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), p. 191
45 Ibid., pp. 138-39
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liberal political values, strongly supported the accession of a liberal democratic 
Turkey, as this would signal the inclusive, tolerant character of a Union whose 
identity was not based on religion but on universal human values.
The debate on European identity was not exhausted by the Copenhagen 
Criteria and had a constant bearing on EU-Turkey relations and Turkey’s 
concomitant political liberalisation process. Although the decision of the Helsinki 
EU Council Summit in 1999 to grant Turkey the status of a candidate EU member 
state implied a positive answer to the question of Turkey’s European identity, the 
question whether Turkey could be considered European continued to be debated 
and affected European views of Turkey and itself.46
Apart from the European identity debate, Turkey’s decision to join the 
European Union and the measures taken in pursuit of that goal challenged 
Turkey’s dominant subject political culture by hastening the introduction of 
participant elements. Turkey’s full and effective compliance with the Copenhagen 
Criteria would mean the start of the transformation process of Turkish political 
culture: Citizens and state would have to modify their view of each other, as well 
as their role in society. Moreover, the unitary model of national identity would be 
challenged, as well as the militant secularist separation of religion from the public 
sphere.
b. The Domestic Debate
Turkey’s approach to the European Union also resuscitated domestic debate,
which showed signals of change in Turkish political culture. Despite the
predominance of official views, dissident ideological groups, which -until then-
had to remain latent fearing state repression, could articulate their divergent views
46 See Paul Kubicek, "Turkey's Place in the 'New Europe'", Perceptions: Journal o f  International 
Affairs, Vol. IX, no. 3 (2004), pp. 55-58
73
more easily. With respect to Turkish identity, Islamist intellectuals started 
debating the role of Islam in the formation of Turkish nation and identity, in 
contrast with official Kemalist views. The role of Islam as an indispensable 
element of Turkish identity came again to the fore, while the role of Islam as a 
factor in political mobilisation was also demonstrated. The debate on Islamic 
Turkish identity became intertwined with the debate on Turkey’s relations with 
the West and its Islamic neighbours, in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central 
Asia.47 Minority groups also claimed their own distinct identity within or outside 
the scope o f Turkish national identity. Kurds, Alevis and members of other 
national, ethnic and religious minorities contested the amalgamation of their 
respective identities with the dominant Turkish identity. Although the escalation 
of the war between the Turkish military forces and the Kurdistan Workers Party 
{Partiya Karkaren Kiirdistan-PKK) during the 1990s hindered calm discussion of 
national identity and minority rights, the abandonment of official denial policies 
and the reconsideration of official policies toward ethnic and religious groups 
became contested topics. Turkish liberals also found the chance to introduce ways 
of redefining state-society relations and the role of the citizen. The development 
of a novel civic Turkish identity, which could accommodate all existing ethnic 
and religious groups, attracted the interest of liberal intellectuals. In the same 
spirit, the lifting o f illiberal limitations on religious freedom was advocated, while 
a liberal version of secularism was supported. The gradual emergence of civil 
society institutions to political significance in the 1990s also contributed in the 
dissemination of liberal ideas in Turkish society. Relations between citizens and
47 On the question o f Turkish identity in the aftermath o f the Cold War, see Ziya Oni§, "Turkey in 
the Post-Cold-War Era - in Search o f Identity", Middle East Journal, Vol. 49, no. 1 (1995).
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the state and citizens’ views of the state could be renegotiated more easily.4* Both 
Islamists and minority groups came to understand that political liberalisation 
would mean less state interference in society and improved protection of human 
rights. Hence, they both became active proponents of measures, which favoured 
the liberalisation of political culture.
(Figure 3)
EFENDHER
Figure 3. "G entlem en" (E fendiler): Atatiirk is im agined addressing the Parliam entary  
A ssem bly o f the Council o f Europe on the day the start o f EU-Turkey accession negotiations 
is decided (From  the Turkish daily Sabah , 17/12/2004)
4X Although the decision o f the Helsinki EU Summit in December 1999 to grant Turkey EU 
candidate state status could be seen as a landmark in this process, it is true that the first 
convergence steps at the society level preceded the Helsinki decision.
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c. Strategic Implications of Turkey’s EU Membership
i). The Domestic Field 
The reinvigoration of the debate on Turkish political culture is an indication of the 
impact of the EU-initiated liberalisation process on Turkish state and society. 
Nonetheless, the possibility of Turkey’s political liberalisation and curtailment of 
national sovereignty met with the suspicion and opposition of a substantial part of 
the Kemalist military and bureaucratic elite.49 According to this argument, the 
price of liberal reform and the restriction of national sovereignty would be the 
disintegration of Turkish national ideology and -possibly- Turkey itself. The 
whole nation-building project, as conceived by Turkish nationalist leaders in the 
last years of the Ottoman Empire and implemented by Atatiirk in the early 
republican years, would be endangered. In what is called the “Tanzimat 
Syndrome,” it was feared that, as in the case of the Tanzimat, liberal reform would 
not strengthen the state, but lead to further weakening and partition.50 Existing 
national minorities might then claim self-determination and independence, while 
latent ethnic divisions within the Turkish people could re-emerge and threaten 
Turkish national unity. The resuscitation of the “Eastern Question,” the question 
of the partition of the Ottoman Empire, which dominated European politics in the 
19th century and briefly materialised in 1920 with the Treaty of Sevres, has 
haunted the political thought of Turkish Euro-sceptics, who also doubted the 
European identity of Turkey.51
On the other hand, there is no other visible political orientation as 
favourable for Turkey, as its full participation in the European Union.
49 Ihsan D. Dagi, Batihla$ma Korkusu (Ankara: Liberte Yayinlari, 2003), p. 3
50 Hakan Yilmaz, Fieldwork Interview (Istanbul, 1/12/2004)
51 Sina Ak§in, "Avrupah Miyiz?" Radikal Cumhuriyet, 29/10/2004
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Membership of the European Union is also still seen as part of the “Kemalist 
imperative” of identification with -implicitly Western- modernity. The European 
Union is viewed as an international organisation, which can guarantee Turkey’s 
economic development and political stability. Meanwhile, current political and 
economic conditions in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia, offer no 
serious strategic alternatives to Turkey’s option to pursue membership of the 
European Union.52 A further deepening of Turkey’s strategic relationship with the 
United States and its primary regional ally, Israel, could not constitute a substitute 
for Turkey’s EU vocation. The EU member states are by far Turkey’s biggest 
trade partner, while Turkey’s willingness to blindly serve US foreign policy 
objectives is far from given.
ii). The US Factor
While an increasing strategic rift is thought to threaten long-term relations 
between the United States and the European Union, the United States has been 
one of the biggest proponents of Turkey’s EU accession.53 Paradoxically, the 
improvement o f EU-Turkey relations and Turkey’s eventual incorporation into the 
European Union are viewed as extremely favourable for US strategic interests in 
Europe and the Middle East. Turkey’s membership of the European Union is seen
52 Several nationalist authors have opted for the development o f special relations with Russia, 
India or China. See Erol Manisah, "Rusya ile tli?kiler Alternatif mi, Yoksa Bir Denge Arayi§t 
mi?" Cumhuriyet, 10/12/2004 and Ahmet Erdogan, "Tek Alternatif Avrupa Degil", Radikal, 
1/11/2004. A similar view was expressed by Huntington, who argued that Turkey should seek a 
leading position in the Islamic world. See Samuel P. Huntington, "Culture, Power, and War: What 
Roles for Turkey in the New Global Politics", Zaman (English edition), 26/5/2005. An 
independent role for Turkey following the economic model o f China has also been suggested. See 
Gundiiz Aktan, "Tiirkiye'nin Gelecegi (1)", Radikal, 30/6/2005, Gundiiz Aktan, "Ttirkiye'nin 
Gelecegi (2)", Radikal, 2/7/2005 and Giindiiz Aktan, "Ttirkiye'nin Gelecegi (3)", Radikal, 
5/7/2005. This trend was not limited to the Turkish left. For a study o f  anti-Westernism on the 
right o f Turkish political spectrum, see Taml Bora, "Milliyetfi-Muhafazakar ve Islamci Dii§unu§te 
Negatif Bati Imgesi" in Uygur Kocaba§oglu, ed., Modernle§me ve Baticihk (Istanbul: ileti§im, 
2002b).
53 For a succinct account o f the impact o f Turkey’s prospective EU accession on US-Turkey 
relations, see Morton I. Abramowitz et al., Turkey on the Threshold: Europe's Decision and U.S. 
Interests (Washington DC: Atlantic Council o f the United States, 2004), pp. 22-25.
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as the best guarantee for the consolidation of Turkey’s secular, pro-Western 
political system and globalised economy. Turkey could thus serve US regional 
strategic interests in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia by providing 
the paradigm of a Muslim democratic state, fully integrated within the Western 
political and economic institutions.
Open US support for Turkey’s EU membership54 has led to widespread 
suspicion within EU circles that the United States favoured Turkey’s EU 
accession as a part of its effort to subvert the transformation of the European 
Union into a federal state, which would have the potential to challenge US global 
hegemony. EU suspicion of the US role peaked in December 2002, when the open 
intervention of the US President George W. Bush in support of Turkey during the 
Copenhagen European Council backfired.55 This effect was exacerbated by 
European -mainly French and German- opposition to the US campaign against 
Iraq in 2002-2003. The technical difficulties of Turkey’s EU membership were 
not fictitious: Its large population and weak economy would disturb sensitive 
political power balances inside the EU institutions and strain EU economic and 
financial capacity. At the political level, Turkey’s accession was seen as 
strengthening the anti-federalist and Atlanticist blocs inside the European Union. 
It was argued that steps toward the empowerment of European political 
institutions would become even more difficult, while the deployment of a 
European security structure independent of NATO and US influence would be
54 US support reached its highest point in December 2002 when the US President George W. Bush 
personally telephoned EU leaders during the EU Copenhagen Summit to convince them to adopt a 
decision favourable for Turkey’s EU membership prospects.
55 Ziya Oni§ and §uhnaz Yilmaz, "The Turkey-EU-US Triangle in Perspective: Transformation or 
Continuity?" Middle East Journal, Vol. 59, no. 2 (2005), p. 273
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shelved, and a common foreign policy would be harder to achieve. Turkey would 
thus play the role of a US-sponsored “Trojan horse” inside the European Union.56
The weak point of this argument was the assumption that the strategic 
interests of the United States and Turkey were identical. In the aftermath of the 
Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, Turkey has been no more in need 
of full identification with US regional strategic interests. Efforts to create a US- 
Turkey-Israel strategic partnership had only partial success, while the rise to 
power of Islamic-oriented parties, which were more sensitive to the plight of the 
Palestinian people, made the alliance even more precarious. The new US strategic 
doctrine promulgated after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks also alienated 
Turkey to the extent that it implied that the United States could act unilaterally. 
The gap grew even wider in view of the Turkish Parliament’s refusal to allow US 
forces to attack Iraq via Turkish territory in March 2003. Hence, the US invasion 
and occupation of Iraq marked a watershed in US-Turkey relations, making it 
clear that US and Turkish regional strategic interests might even come into 
conflict.57 Anti-Americanism rose to unforeseen levels and became a strong 
feature of Turkish public opinion.58 Even the traditionally pro-US and initially 
circumspect Turkish military eventually coincided with this. US policies in Iraq 
were criticised by both proponents of Turkey’s strategic cooperation with the 
European Union as well as staunchly nationalist officers.59 The US unwillingness 
to address Turkey’s security concerns by eliminating the remaining PKK forces in 
Northern Iraq, its ambivalent position regarding the future of Northern Iraq and
56 Graham E. Fuller, "Turkey’s Strategic Model: Myths and Realities", Washington Quarterly, Vol. 
27, no. 3 (2004), pp. 57-59
57 Sedat Ergin, "Turk-ABD Ili§kileri Yoku§ A§agi", Hiirriyet, 12/12/2004
58 Soner £agaptay, "Where Goes the U.S.-Turkish Relationship", Middle East Quarterly, Vol. XI, 
no. 4 (2004), pp. 44-46
59 David L. Phillips, "Turkey's Dreams o f Accession", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, no. 5 (2004), pp. 
92-93
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the role of the Iraqi Kurds and, finally, its unconditional support for Israeli 
policies in the Middle East served as reasons for different parts of the Turkish 
society to support a shift in attitudes to the United States. Nevertheless, the 
strategic partnership between the United States and Turkey could no more be 
considered as a given, especially if a credible alternative EU strategic vision were 
to emerge, which could appeal to Turkish strategic and security concerns more 
effectively.
iii). The European Vision 
Turkey’s potential EU accession sparked a serious debate inside the European 
Union. Although the strategic, political and economic dimensions of Turkey’s EU 
membership have been anything but insignificant, Turkey’s EU membership 
debate has also been used as a proxy for debates on what the European Union is or 
should become. Differing approaches on the issue of Turkey’s EU membership 
have showed divergent visions of the present and future o f the European Union 
project. Supporters and opponents of Turkey’s EU membership have also been 
internally divided, as they have based their position on different grounds. As 
different definitions of European identity and visions of Europe coexist, the same 
factors may be used for and against Turkey’s EU membership, thus making the 
picture even more complex.
Turkey’s Islamic religious and cultural identity can -fo r example- be 
viewed as a reason either to accept or reject Turkey’s EU membership application. 
This mirrors the fact that in the debate on the essential elements of a future 
European identity no consensus has been reached -even at the elite level- on how
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to deal with the issue of religion.60 Advocates of multicultural ism and supra- 
nationalism, who argue that the EU identity should be based on liberal democratic 
values and cultural diversity, firmly support Turkey’s EU prospective 
membership. In their view, Europe’s diversity is its strength rather than weakness, 
which needs to be protected and celebrated, as the European Union provides an 
alternative way for people to coexist by “not to reproduce a national model at the 
level of the continent but to shape another way for people to live together and 
share a common project”, as Nicolaidis puts it.61 The admission of a Muslim 
country into the European Union would comprise the most effective guarantee of 
its secular, inclusive and multicultural character and provide a powerful paradigm 
to the rest of the world. On the other hand, Turkey’s Islamic character becomes 
the most powerful argument against Turkey’s EU membership, according to many 
European conservatives, who focus on the religious and cultural aspects of a 
European identity. Further steps towards European integration can only be made if 
the European Union forges an identity on its common roots, its Judaeo-Christian 
religious and Greco-roman political heritage. The fact that Turkey lacks this 
heritage makes it unsuitable for EU membership, although a “special relationship” 
between the European Union and Turkey would be desirable for strategic and 
economic reasons.62
Turkey’s geographical position, demographic size and level of economic 
development are also used as arguments for and against Turkey’s EU
60 The heated debate and final compromise on the inclusion o f  religion into the European 
Constitution is characteristic.
61 Kalypso Nicolaidis, "Turkey is European for Europe's Sake" in The Netherlands Ministry o f 
Foreign Affairs, ed., Turkey and the European Union: From Association to Accession? (The 
Hague, 2004a)
62 The views o f German Christian Democrat leading figures are characteristic o f this approach. See 
Angela Merkel and Edmund Stoiber, "Kanzler MuB Tiirkei-Beitritt Stoppen", Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, 5/12/2004 and Wolfgang Schauble, "Talking Turkey", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 
83, no. 6 (2004).
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membership. This echoes persisting divisions within the European Union between 
those who favour widening over deepening and prefer to view Europe as a huge 
integrated market and those who favour Europe’s deepening and have a clear 
federal vision for Europe. Supporters of Turkey’s EU candidacy point to the 
increase of the EU strategic role in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central 
Asia. Proximity to some of the most volatile and strategically crucial regions 
would increase the global strategic role of the European Union. Turkey’s 
demographic size and dynamism could also be seen as an advantage for Turkey’s 
EU membership, as it could help alleviate the emerging serious European labour 
shortage and contribution deficits in EU social security systems. Turkey’s 
relatively low level of economic development, combined with its high and young 
population, also has a positive side, as these features make Turkey a large market, 
which has by far not reached a saturation point. Nonetheless, opponents of 
Turkey’s EU membership argued that Turkey’s geo-strategic position could drag 
the European Union into unnecessary adventures, and that what is crucial is the 
establishment of a deeper political union among existing member states. Without 
this, any efforts to claim a major European regional role would be futile. This 
political union would be seriously complicated and eventually compromised in 
favour of a wider and more lax economic union, if Turkey joined the European 
Union. The discrepancy between Turkey’s population size and economic 
capacity63 would upset the balance of European policy-making, seriously strain its 
economy and result to massive migration of Turkish workers64 to the prosperous 
EU member states, which would have unpredictable socio-economic
63 Michael S. Teitelbaum and Philip L. Martin, "Is Turkey Ready for Europe?" Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 82, no. 3 (2003), pp. 106-07
64 Wolfgang Quaisser, "Vier Miilionen Zuwanderer", Interview with Martin Halusa, Die Welt, 
15.12.04
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consequences. In this view, at a time when the proclamation of a European 
Constitution has already met with serious objections, undertaking the burden of 
Turkey’s EU membership would be suicidal for the European federal project.65
5. A Brief Chronology of EU-Turkey Relations
The prospect of Turkey’s accession to the European Union has posed the latest 
and probably most critical challenge in the course of two-hundred-year Ottoman 
and Turkish efforts to adopt the European political, economic and cultural 
paradigm. Westernisation of the Ottoman state, society and culture was the 
primary goal of the Tanzimat reforms in the mid 19th century, while the same goal 
was later adopted by Young Turks and implemented by Atattirk, who believed 
that the formation of a solid Turkish nation and state were prerequisites of 
Westernisation.66 Turkey has pursued close relations with the European Economic 
Community (EEC)67 since the late 1950s.68 An Association Agreement between 
Turkey and the Community was signed in 1963, while an Additional Protocol was 
signed in November 1970 in which the rules for Turkey’s prospective customs 
union with the European Economic Community were outlined.69 Nonetheless, 
political developments in the 1970s and early 1980s hampered relations between
65 The former French President and President o f the European Convention Valery Giscard 
D ’Estaing has been one o f the most articulate opponents o f Turkey’s EU membership. See Valery 
Giscard d'Estaing, "Pour ou Contre 1' Adhesion de la Turquie A 1’ Union Europeenne", Interview to 
Le Monde, 08/11/2002 and Valery Giscard d'Estaing, "A Better European Bridge to Turkey", 
Financial Times, 25/11/2004. Former European Commissioner Frits Bolkenstein has also been one 
o f the fiercest opponents o f Turkey’s EU membership. See Frits Bolkestein, The Limits o f Europe 
(Tielt, Netherlands: Lannoo, 2004).
66 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence o f  Modern Turkey (Oxford, London & New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1968), pp. 106-28
67 The European Economic Community (EEC) became referred to as European Community (EC) 
during the 1980s and as European Union (EU) after the 1991 Treaty on the European Union.
68 For more details on the early phase o f EEC-Turkey relations, see §aban H. £ali§, "Formative 
Years: A Key for Understanding Turkey’s Membership Policy Towards the EU", Perceptions: 
Journal o f  International Affairs, Vol. IX, no. 3 (2004).
69 Meltem Mufltiller-Bac, "The Impact o f the European Union on Turkish Politics", East European 
Quarterly, Vol. 34, no. 2 (2000), pp. 160-64
83
Turkey and the European Economic Community. The “coup by memorandum’” in 
1971 was the first negative step. The situation deteriorated with the subsequent 
radicalisation of Turkish politics and rise of leftist and rightist nationalist views, 
which viewed the European Economic Community as a capitalist and imperialist 
trust, eager to exploit Turkey’s natural resources. The final blow against Turkey’s 
prospective EEC membership came with the 1980 coup, which politically 
alienated Turkey from Western Europe. Turkey became again interested in EC 
membership during the Ozal administration in the mid 1980s, and a formal 
application was filed in 1987. Yet crucial time had been wasted, and the situation 
was then much less favourable for Turkey inside the Community.70 Despite the 
rejection of Turkey’s application in 1989, the improvement of EC-Turkey 
relations was still pursued. A customs union agreement between Turkey and the 
European Union was signed in 1995 and became effective in 1996. Turkey was 
once again disillusioned when the EU Luxembourg Summit in 1997 refused to 
award it the status of an EU candidate state, although this was awarded to ten 
states of Central Europe, Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean. This brought 
EU-Turkey relations to their lowest point.71 Turkey finally became an EU 
candidate state at the Helsinki EU Summit in 1999. The Helsinki Summit also 
marked the shift of Greece’s position from opposition to support for Turkey’s EU 
membership; Greece’s obstructive stance had hampered EU-Turkey relations, 
ever since Greece joined what was then the European Community in 1981.72 The
70 Greece’s EEC membership in 1981 further complicated EEC-Turkey relations, as Greece 
refused to consent in the improvement o f EEC-Turkey relations, unless Turkey made “positive” 
steps toward the resolution o f the Cyprus and bilateral Greek-Turkish disputes.
71 Atila Eralp, "Turkey and the European Union" in Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis, eds., 
The Future o f Turkish Foreign Policy (Cambridge MA & London: MIT Press, 2002), pp. 71-75
72 For more details on Greece’s position change, see Kalypso Nicolaidis, "Europe's Tainted Mirror: 
Reflections on Turkey's Candidacy Status after Helsinki" in Dimitris Keridis and Dimitrios 
Triantaphyllou, eds., Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era o f Globalization (Dulles VA: Brassey's, 
2001), pp. 251-53.
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start o f EU-Turkey accession negotiations would depend on Turkey’s compliance 
with the Copenhagen Criteria. Several political reform packages attempted to 
achieve Turkey’s convergence with the Criteria. Constitutional amendments were 
aimed at altering the illiberal character of the 1982 Constitution. While the 
Constitution was amended eight times between 1995 and 2004, the most far- 
reaching amendment was made in October 2001.73 Turkey’s political 
liberalisation seemed to proceed at an unforeseen pace as the critical EU 
Copenhagen Summit of December 2002 was approaching. The EU Copenhagen 
Summit in December 2002 decided, however, to defer the decision on the 
commencement of EU-Turkey accession negotiations for the EU Summit of 
December 2004. Despite Turkey’s disillusionment, reform efforts aiming at 
Turkey’s full political liberalisation continued and were rewarded on 17 
December 2004, when 3 October 2005 was set as the start date of EU-Turkey 
accession negotiations. In the course of five years, the prospect of Turkey’s 
accession to the European Union had caused the most significant political 
transformation the Republic of Turkey had experienced since the introduction of 
multiparty politics in 1945. Nonetheless, the agreement on a date for the start of 
accession negotiations did not mean that the political liberalisation process was 
complete and that this had affected political culture. In the following chapter, the 
study of the EU influence on Turkish political culture will be introduced with a 
comparison of European political values and Turkish political culture, so 
differences become more articulated.
73 The 2001 constitutional amendment involved thirty-four articles and had the most far-reaching 
effects on the fundamental rights and liberties. This amendment changed not only the overall 
approach to the restriction o f fundamental rights and liberties, but also brought about 
improvements with respect to a great number o f individual rights. For more information, see Ergun 
Ozbudun and Serap Yazici, Democratization Reforms in Turkey (1993-2004) (Istanbul: TESEV 
Publications, 2004), pp. 14-15.
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III. COMPARING EUROPEAN AND TURKISH POLITICAL
CULTURES
1. Introduction
Before embarking on an introductory exploration of the relationship between 
Turkish political culture and the European Union, the difficulties of defining 
European political culture need to be addressed. The emergence of a common 
European political culture is directly related to the European Economic 
Community and its transformation into the European Union. Whilst the process of 
European integration is neither linear nor incremental, the emergence of a 
common European political culture as a denominator of existing political cultures 
o f EU member states is still problematic and depends on the success of the 
European integration project.
By first focusing on the features which may define a prospective European 
political culture, this chapter aims at showing why while talking about a single 
European political culture is premature, its future emergence would not be an 
absurdity. The case of the Austrian Freedom’s Party (Freiheitliche Partei 
Osterreichs-FPO) will be examined as an indication that a common European 
political culture may be emerging, while elements of continuing divergence will 
be explored in the political cultures of the three biggest EU member states. 
Features defining a prospective European political culture will be explored and 
later juxtaposed against mainstream Turkish political culture. This juxtaposition 
will help to identify the idiosyncrasies of Turkish political culture and the 
potential changes, which have taken place under the influence of improving EU- 
Turkey relations. As Turkey’s drive to join the European Union made the need to
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comply with the Copenhagen Criteria imperative, this compliance process 
inevitably led to unprecedented changes in Turkish political culture.1 The 
influence of improving EU-Turkey relations on facets of Turkish political culture 
will be explored in the remaining chapters of this study.
2. Features of European Political Values
a. Defining the term “European”
The concept o f European political culture is inextricably linked with the debate on 
European identity. Whether there is a single European identity and how it can be 
defined are questions whose answers crucially affect the understanding of the 
term “European political culture”. What needs to be clarified from the beginning, 
though, is that the term “European” is understood in this chapter as referring to 
the European Union and not the whole of the European continent.2 Although the 
European Union has expanded its borders, to include the most of the territory of 
Europe, there are still large parts of the European continent, which remain outside 
its borders. Belarus and Ukraine, Russia and Albania are still -among others- not 
members of the European Union. This fact weakens the claim of the European 
Union to speak on behalf of the whole continent.
On the other hand, political liberalism is undoubtedly a product of Western 
European thought. It spread and flourished in Western Europe and Northern 
America, becoming the cornerstone of post-Second World War Western European 
political systems. Although Western European thought also bore and nurtured 
illiberal ideologies, which -a t times— challenged the popularity of the liberal
1 This process was in tandem with the impact o f domestic socio-economic developments on 
Turkish political culture, whose examination falls beyond the scope o f  this study.
2 The rather clumsy term EU-isation has been coined to address this issue. See Diez, 
Agnantopoulos and Kaliber, "Turkey, Europeanization and Civil Society: Introduction", p. 2.
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paradigm, the prevalence of political liberalism has remained unchallenged in 
Western Europe since the end of the Second World War. Political liberalism was 
embraced by a number of post-Second World War international organisations. 
The European Economic Community -later to become the European Union- was 
the most influential among them due to its increasing economic and -la te r- 
political clout.4 Political liberalism was first defined in narrow terms, so that all 
procedurally democratic states could fit the definition, yet gradually its scope 
expanded, so limits between the public and private sphere could be redefined. 
Since the end of the Cold War political liberalism has spread into most o f Eastern 
Europe, while the European Union has included political liberalisation among the 
criteria for EU membership. Political liberalism has thus become a benchmark of 
the EU-sponsored European identity and a success indicator of the EU deepening 
process. As a consequence of this, the European Union has appropriated the 
human rights agenda of the Council of Europe and included human rights 
protection among its primary foreign and domestic policy objectives. The usage of 
the term “European” in the phrase “European political culture”, therefore, refers 
to the strongly liberal characteristics, which have marked the process of European 
integration.
3 Fascism, Nazism and Stalinism exemplify popular Western European illiberal ideologies. In view 
o f these, North America could qualify as the cradle o f political liberalism more aptly than Europe.
4 The Council o f Europe, the most significant among the rest o f Western European international 
organisations, had a symbolic political clout during the Cold War defending the principles o f 
liberal democracy; yet its real political powers were not significant. The rise in importance o f  the 
Council o f Europe and the recognition o f the right o f individual appeal to its subordinate European 
Court o f Human Rights (ECHR) coincided with the acceleration o f the process o f EU integration. 
Leaving adjudication to the ECHR, the European Union adopted the political agenda o f the 
Council o f Europe as well as the European Convention o f Human Rights. This resulted in the 
adoption o f the Copenhagen Criteria, which were later elaborated in Accession Partnership 
agreements with the candidate EU member states. In Article 6.2 o f the Treaty on the European 
Union as amended by the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, it was stated that “the Union shall respect 
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection o f Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950” . See European Union, Treaty 
on the European Union (Eur-Lex: Maastricht, 1991), available from http://europa.eu.int/eur- 
lex/en/treaties/dat/C 2002325EN.000501.html.
b. Pre-Maastricht European Political Cultures
Fragmentation and discrepancies characterised European political cultures before 
the 1991 Maastricht Treaty and the rise of the European Union. Although the fall 
of fascism and Nazism as a result of the Second World War resulted in a spread of 
liberal democracies in Western Europe, differences among Western European 
political cultures were considerable. As Almond and Verba’s survey suggested, it 
was impossible to talk about a single Western European political culture. The 
United Kingdom was viewed as the state, which most successfully combined a 
majority of participant and a minority of subject and parochial elements in its 
political culture. This balance guaranteed both citizen participation in political 
affairs, as well as a degree of citizen deference to the state, which was necessary 
so that the state could exercise authority. In the case of Germany the failure of the 
Weimar Republic and the bitter experience of Nazism were still influencing 
German political culture. Subject elements were dominant in German political 
culture, while the introduction of participant elements since the end of the Second 
World War had not sufficed to liberalise German political culture. In the case of 
Italy participant elements failed to significantly impact political culture due to the 
dominant influence of parochial elements that still shaped the political cognitions, 
affects and beliefs of the Italian public. This highly polarised depiction of 
European political cultures was revised when Almond and Verba revisited 
European political cultures in the late 1970s. A convergence of the political 
cultures of the United Kingdom, Germany and Italy was observed, A decline in 
the civic qualities of the UK political culture was noted,5 while German and
5 Dennis Kavanagh, "Political Culture in Great Britain: The Decline o f Civic Culture" in Gabriel 
A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Newbury Park CA, London & 
New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1980), pp. 169-70
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Italian political cultures improved, as participant elements increased their 
influence against subject elements in the German case6 and parochial elements in 
the Italian one.7
The evolution of political cultures of other Western European states 
followed largely similar steps. While the balance of parochial, subject and 
participant elements in the first post-Second World War years was mainly a 
function of the political history of each state, a convergence toward a higher 
influence of participant elements in all Western European political cultures was 
noticed in the late 1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless, this development never reached 
the point to allow for the emergence of a single European political culture. This 
could only take place within the framework of European Union integration and 
enlargement.
c. The Maastricht Treaty and European Political Values- Is there a 
Single European Political Culture?
The 1991 Maastricht Treaty for the European Union marked the beginning of a 
new era in the history of the European Economic Community and its member 
states. The target of an “ever closer union” was firmly set, and the European 
Union underwent radical transformations in the 1990s: It ceased to be a 
predominantly economic organisation regulating a free trade zone with minimal 
political ambitions and became an organisation whose economic character was 
transformed through the gradual establishment of common foreign, security and
6 David P. Conradt, "Changing German Political Culture" in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney 
Verba, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Newbury Park CA, London & New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 1980), pp. 263-65
7 Giacomo Sani, "The Political Culture o f Italy: Continuity and Change" in Gabriel A. Almond and 
Sidney Verba, eds., The Civic Culture Revisited (Newbury Park CA, London & New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 1980), pp. 317-18
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home affairs policies.8 This pivotal switch in the character of the European Union 
led to the articulation of the Copenhagen Criteria for prospective EU member 
states and the European identity debate.9 Soon two opinion groups were formed. 
Euro-federalists maintained that the European Union should only be a stage 
toward the development of a supranational European federal state. To facilitate 
this process, political and cultural elements, which constituted common European 
heritage, should form the basis of a new, overarching common European identity. 
Political liberalism would unequivocally be among the basic components of that 
European identity. On the other hand, opponents of Euro-federal ism considered 
that the transformation of the European Economic Community into the European 
Union should be the final stage of convergence among EU member states. It was 
argued that the European Union should thus retain a heavily economic character, 
while the debate on a common European identity was seen as both chimerical and 
redundant (see p. 71).
Despite great differences in their image of the future European Union, 
proponents and opponents of the EU federal idea agreed that the European Union 
was firmly based on common values, which were shared by existing member 
states and had to be shared by any state interested in joining the Union. Political 
liberalism was one of the most fundamental values, which came to define the EU 
character through the establishment of a common set of European ideas and 
principles.10 Under these circumstances, hitherto divergent European political 
cultures came under considerable pressure to converge. As political liberalism
8 Although little progress was achieved in the issues o f citizenship and immigrant rights at the 
European level, this task was undertaken by the Council o f  Europe, which promulgated in 1997 a 
new convention on nationality which addresses issues if citizenship and immigrant rights. See 
Checkel, "The Europeanization o f Citizenship?" p. 185.
9 Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, pp. 138-39
10 Helen Wallace, "The Policy Process: A Moving Pendulum" in Helen Wallace and William 
Wallace, eds., Policy-Making in the European Union (Oxford & New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), pp. 50-51
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was firmly established as a basic political and legal principle in all EU member 
states, the influence of participant elements in the political cultures of member 
states soared. European political cultures became increasingly participant, and the 
level of convergence was such that it became possible to discuss the -as yet 
unrealised- prospect of a common European political culture, which would 
combine a conglomeration of the political cultures of EU member states with a 
novel supranational and multicultural approach of politics and society.
This prospective European political culture would be characterised by 
prevalence of participant elements at the expense of parochial and subject 
elements. The principles of supra-national ism and multiculturalism had already 
gained impetus within the EU institutions and facilitated the wider application of 
an inclusive, liberal European political culture by precluding national 
fragmentation and cultural monism. The establishment of a multi-party 
representative democratic political system, full respect for human rights, liberties 
and the rule of law, a new, broader understanding of citizenship, increased interest 
in civil society activism, a higher degree of trust towards political institutions, 
greater popularity of post-material values and a more liberal approach to private 
and social affairs would all comprise features of this new common European 
political culture.11 Fostering citizen awareness, participation and responsibility at 
the EU level has also been considered to be a crucially important task with the 
aim of forming a European political identity. Heavily influenced by participant 
elements, the prospective European political culture seemed close to Almond and 
Verba’s model of “civic culture,” the optimal mix of participant, subject and 
parochial political culture elements.
11 On the same question, see Angelos Giannakopoulos, "What is to Become o f Turkey in Europe? 
European Identity and Turkey's EU Accession", Perceptions: Journal o f International Affairs, 
Vol. IX, no. 3 (2004), pp. 69-72.
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The contradiction between this debate and some of the features of the EU 
political system has not nullified its positive role within the societies of EU 
member states. The democratic deficit in the function of European Union political 
institutions has hampered the efforts of European Union citizens to increase their 
influence in the European Union decision-making process.12 Despite the lack of 
an institutional framework which would allow for increased and effective citizen 
participation in EU politics,13 the championing of political liberalism and the 
development of an essentially participant European political culture has led to a 
political liberalisation spillover effect inside the EU member states. The 
emergence of the European Union as a zone of peace, security and economic 
development in the post-Cold War era has also successfully induced many 
European states to liberalise their political systems in order to become eligible for 
EU membership. The 2004 Eastern enlargement was ample proof of the catalytic 
role o f the European Union in the process of political liberalisation among post­
communist Central and Eastern European states.14
The debate on European political culture, however, may be affected by 
dramatic changes, which the European Union is undergoing and remaining 
differences in political cultures of the EU member states. The accession of ten 
new member states on 1 May 2004 has increased the potential but also reduced
12 Roger Eatweil, "Conclusion: Part Two: Reflections on Nationalism and the Future o f Europe" in 
Roger Eatweil, ed., European Political Cultures: Conflict or Convergence? (London & New 
York: Routledge, 1997a), pp. 260-61
13 The increase of the powers o f the European Parliament against the European Commission and 
Council as well as popular election o f more EU officials would be measures toward that direction.
14 On 1 May 2004 Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the European Union. This was the biggest enlargement step 
in the history o f the European Union and a highly symbolic reunification move o f the European 
continent after more than fifty years o f East-West division. The desire for EU membership and the 
need to fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria to secure its prospect anchored political liberalism in post­
communist Central and Eastern European states. In the cases o f states like Slovakia or Latvia, 
serious minority rights shortcomings could only be dealt with when the prospect for EU 
membership was questioned.
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the cohesion of the European Union. Integrating ten new member states, eight of 
which used to belong to the Eastern bloc, is a Herculean task. A prospective 
European political culture would thus face the challenge of accommodating an 
even more extensive spectrum of national specificities without forfeiting its 
essentially liberal character. Meanwhile, domestic political debates inside EU 
member states outlined the limits of the penetration of the EU-sponsored liberal 
political model even in old EU member states. The recurring debate in France 
over secularism and the prohibition of religious symbols in state education 
showed that political liberalism was finding considerable resistance when it came 
to the definition of the character of the French public space. In Germany, the 
debate on the citizenship law and the possibility of granting German citizenship to 
foreign immigrants showed that arguments on the ethnic basis of nations and the 
recognition of political rights exclusively to members of the nation were still very 
popular in Europe. The case of the United Kingdom was often cited as 
paradigmatic in Europe for the effective diffusion of political liberalism in all 
facets of public space. The problems of international terrorism and illegal 
migration, however, resulted in legislation and debates which threatened to 
undermine the purely liberal basis of the UK political system. There is a similar 
situation in the remaining EU member states where the spread of political 
liberalism faced an additional obstacle, due to the enhanced need for security in 
the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. It was even argued that 
Europe no longer identified itself only against its own illiberal past, but started 
applying cultural and geographical "othering" against its neighbours, which 
reasserted the role of geopolitics and increased the difficulty of developing a
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common European identity.15 The full adoption of the liberal political paradigm, 
not only in new EU member states, but also in the “historic core” of the European 
Union, is a crucial precondition for the development of a common European 
political culture. The extent to which the European political culture model will be 
embraced by the public in old and new member states will signal the success of 
the European transnational elite to keep the Union deep while widening it, 
something essential for the success of the European project itself.
(Figure 4)
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Figure 4. M ap o f  the EU Eastern Enlargem ent (From the Delegation o f the European
C om m ission to the United States)
15 See Thomas Diez, "Europe’s Others and the Return o f Geopolitics", Cambridge Review o f  
International Affairs, Vol. 17, no. 2 (2004).
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d. In Defence of an Emerging European Political Culture- The 
Case of the Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei 
Osterreichs-FPO)
Pan-European reaction against the rise of Austrian Freedom’s Party {Freiheitliche 
Partei Osterreichs-FPO) and its leader Jorg Haider into prominence in Austrian 
politics has been cited as one of the strongest indications for the emergence of a 
common European political culture. In January 2000, amidst a series of political 
manoeuvres, the Austrian conservative People’s Party {Osterreichs Volkspartei - 
OVP) led by Wolfgang Schiissel decided to enter negotiations aiming at the 
formation of a coalition government with the FPO, which was far rightist, illiberal 
and had clearly expressed its sympathy towards the Nazi era.16 This would be the 
first time in post-Second World War Europe that a party with explicit Nazi 
leanings participated in a government coalition. The uproar caused throughout the 
European Union was unprecedented. Despite the lack of relevant institutional 
framework, the European Union and its member states exerted considerable 
political pressure and even issued a set of sanctions against Austria, on the 
grounds that the FPO maintained its position in the government. The Portuguese 
EU Presidency declared on behalf of the fourteen remaining members of the 
European Union that the advent of the FPO to government could not be allowed to 
pass unchallenged. All fourteen governments also declared their decision to break 
off bilateral political contacts with any Austrian government including the FPO17.
16 The party leader Jorg Haider stated in June 1991 that “ in the “Third Reich” they had an orderly 
employment policy”, while in December 1995 he argued that "the Waffen SS was a part o f the 
Wehrmacht (German ground military forces) and hence it deserves all the honour and respect o f 
the army in public life." For more information, see BBC Profile, Controversy and Jorg Haider 
(BBC News: 2000), available from http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/europe/464260.stm [posted 
on 29/2/2000].
17 Barnaby Mason, EU Differences in Spotlight (BBC News: London, 2000), available from 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/europe/629823.stm [posted on 3/2/2000]
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Further action beyond this limited boycott was also considered in case fears about 
an illiberal and xenophobic twist in Austrian politics were realised. In France, as 
well as the European Parliament, the long-term possibility of suspending Austria's 
voting rights in the EU was discussed. This was technically possible if the other 
fourteen member states unanimously decided that Austria was in serious and 
persistent breach of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights 
and the rule of law.18 Austrian diplomacy and Chancellor Schussel were caught in 
a deadlock. On the one hand, they were trying to allay European concerns about 
the policies of the new Austrian coalition government, by issuing assurances that 
the presence of the FPO in the Austrian government would not bring about any 
change in Austria’s respect for human rights and liberal democracy. On the other 
hand, they were attempting to respond to the unilateral boycott measures taken 
against Austria by the fourteen remaining EU member states by threatening that, 
unless sanctions were lifted, a referendum would be called, seeking public support 
for the use of "all suitable means" to end them. Austria’s diplomatic isolation only 
ended in September 2000, when a special observation team was sent to Austria 
and confirmed that the policies of the Austrian coalition government were 
democratic and not xenophobic, while the FPO was characterised as a rightist 
populist and not as a Nazi party. All diplomatic sanctions were lifted thereafter. 
The FPO role in Austrian politics was drastically diminished after its poor 
performance in the November 2002 parliamentary elections.
The case of the Austrian FPO provided with a powerful argument in 
support of the position that there was, indeed, an emerging common European 
political culture based on political liberalism. The immediate, unanimous and
18 Article 7, paragraph 3 o f the Treaty on the European Union would be applicable.
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stark reaction against the possibility that the achievements o f political liberalism 
would come under threat in a EU member state showed that the European Union 
was also and predominantly a political project, underpinned by the values of 
democracy, pluralism and tolerance.19 The possible strengthening of far rightist 
European parties due to serious social problems in many EU member states and 
advocacy of racist, discriminatory and intolerant policies was viewed with great 
concern throughout Europe. It was a duty of democratic EU member states and 
citizens to protect liberal democracy across Europe, and particularly inside the 
European Union, because this was viewed as one of the fundamental elements of 
European identity. This unity of perceptions, affects and evaluations comprised 
evidence of converging European political cultures and the emergence of a new 
model of political culture, which would be easily adopted by the EU member 
states and citizens and would constitute a major achievement in the process of EU 
integration.
e. In Defence of the Enduring Multiplicity of European Political 
Cultures-The Cases of France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom
On the other hand, a survey of domestic politics of EU member states would
confirm that European political cultures were still multiple. Although a liberal
political system was a common element of all EU member states and convergence
tendencies have been noted, political liberalism significantly varied in EU
member states. The element that would constitute the cornerstone of the new
emerging European political culture has recently come under strong pressure in all
the three biggest EU member states, Germany, France and the United Kingdom,
19 John Palmer, EU's Forceful Warning on Haider (BBC News: London, 2000), available from 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/europe/630028.stm [posted on 2/2/2000]
98
and similar phenomena were observed in the other EU member states. A closer 
look into the domestic politics of Germany, France and the United Kingdom is 
instrumental in understanding whether it would make more sense to talk about 
separate political cultures of EU member states rather than a single European 
political culture.
i). France
In the case of France political liberalism turned out to be unable to overrule the 
legacy of Jacobinism.20 This confrontation became particularly clear in sensitive 
issues like the manifestation of religiosity in the French public sphere. The influx 
o f Muslim immigrants radically changed the composition o f the French society 
and challenged the alleged homogeneity of the French nation. In their effort to 
integrate an increasingly diverse society, French authorities resorted in the use of 
assertive secularism as a benchmark of French civic identity.21 French society was 
open to all immigrants, regardless of their religious and ethnic backgrounds; 
however, the latter had to adopt the properties defining French civic identity. The 
question whether the Islamic headscarf should be allowed in French public 
schools raised a huge controversy, as it outlined the limits of the appeal which 
political liberalism had within the French society. A vibrant public debate on the 
issue resulted in the banning of all religious symbols, the Islamic headscarf, the 
Jewish kippa and visible Christian cross, in French public schools.22 Tolerance of
20 On 9 December 1905, a law on the separation o f the French church and state was promulgated. 
This law has -w ith  minor modifications- regulated the relations between the French state and the 
church and thereby defined the French version o f secularism. The full text o f the law can be found 
at: Le Senat et la Chambre des Deputes, Loi Concernant la Separation Des Eg/ises Et de L’etat (Le 
Journal Officiel: Paris, 1905), available from http://www.laicite-laligue.org/laligue/laicite- 
laligue/pdf/loi.pdf [posted on 9/12/1905].
21 Similar efforts were made in republican Turkey whose version o f assertive secularism was based 
on the French model.
22 L'Assemblee Nationale et le Senat, Loi No. 2004-228 dit 15 Mars 2004 Encadrant, En 
Application du Principe de La'icite (Le Journal Officiel: Paris, 2004), available from
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various religious identities in contemporary France was thus seen as breach of the 
spirit of assertive secularism, a fundamental element of French civic identity. 
Political liberalism, the set of political values, which was arguably the least 
common denominator of European political cultures, was compromised in one of 
the core EU states.
ii). Germany
In Germany political liberalism collided with established views on the ethnic 
foundation of German citizenship. This perception, dating back to Fichte and 
Herder, had crucial impact on the formation of German citizenship legislation. A 
claim for German citizenship could be solely made on the basis of German ethnic 
descent (Jus sanguinis) and not on residence and/or birth within the territory of 
Germany. The consequences of that approach became clear when millions of 
foreign immigrants settled in Germany during the second half of the 20th
23  • • • •  * •century. Neither they, nor their offspring could have a legitimate claim on 
German citizenship, regardless of the number of years spent in Germany, their 
contribution to the development of German economy and society, and even their 
will to sever their sentimental links with their country of origin and strengthen 
those with Germany. The situation resulted in a quagmire, which the German 
Social-Democrat government tried to tackle with a reform of the citizenship law 
in 1999.24 Significant steps were made,25 yet they were not courageous enough, 
and the problem was only alleviated. Thus, the division of Germany’s residents
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/Visu?cid=689656&indice=3&table=JORF&ligneDeb=l 
[posted on 17/3/2004]
23 Checkel, "The Europeanization o f Citizenship?" p. 181
24 Deutscher Reichstag, Staatsangehdrigkeitsgesetz Berlin, 1913), available from 
http://bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/rustag/htmltree.html
25 Jus sanguinis lost substantial ground in favour o f ins soli, as immigrants’ children born in 
Germany acquired German citizenship at birth, yet they had to opt for one citizenship -Germ an or 
other- before their 23rd birthday. In addition, conditions for resident immigrants to apply for 
German citizenship were relaxed.
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into citizens, with full rights and duties, and denizens, with full duties but less 
rights, on the basis of their ethnic descent was not abolished. Despite all efforts of 
post-war Germany to denounce its authoritarian political culture, German 
citizenship legislation has remained as a vestige of illiberal thought, thereby 
displaying the difficulties of jettisoning nationalist citizenship models in favour of 
new liberal civic understandings on citizenship and membership at the European 
level even in states like Germany which have been among the most successful in 
their effort to converge with EU political values.26
iii). United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom could qualify as the European cradle of political liberalism. 
The UK perception of national identity was initially developed on territorial 
grounds. Domestic political realities and the formation of the British Empire 
resulted in a civic understanding of citizenship and national identity,27 which, 
however, -unlike the French case- was tolerant and inclusive, open to immigrant 
populations of diverse cultural and ethnic roots. UK citizenship was awarded to 
anyone born in UK territory (ius soli), regardless of his ethnic or cultural 
background. This was the culmination of the development of the liberal political 
system in Western Europe. Nonetheless, while the United Kingdom proved its 
more liberal, “European” approach to its immigrant populations than France or 
Germany,28 the rejection of a common European identity remained firm. UK 
national identity maintained its popularity vis-a-vis the emerging European
26 Checkel, "The Europeanization of Citizenship?" pp. 196-97
27 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f  Nations (Oxford & Malden MA: Blackwell, 1988), pp. 
138-40
28 This trend was again confirmed in 2004, when the United Kingdom imposed the slightest 
provisional immigration restrictions to the citizens o f Central and East European states that had 
just joined the European Union. See David Blunkett, No UK Benefits fo r  EU Accession Countries 
(Home Office: London, 2004),
available from http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/n_story .asp?item_id=826 [posted on 23/2/2004].
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identity model, decades after the UK accession into the European Union.29 
Meanwhile, increasing immigration flows towards the United Kingdom and the 
new global security environment in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 
terrorist attacks on the United States put the UK liberal political model under 
severe pressure.30 A discussion on new, more restrictive migration laws was 
launched, as the ability of the UK society to integrate incoming immigrants 
socially and economically was believed to have reached a point of saturation, 
while security considerations were also very influential.31 Moreover, the need for 
improved security was translated into widespread and more sophisticated police 
surveillance methods, to the extent that basic human rights and freedoms could be 
compromised. The United Kingdom was by no means the only state where the 
need to compromise the ideal of political liberalism for improved security was 
strongly felt. The same trend was observed in all European states, which were 
thus trying to address new security concerns. Yet the UK case was rather striking 
because of the deep roots which political liberalism had struck in the country and 
its fundamental role in defining the political system. If political liberalism came 
into pressure even in its European cradle, it would be unlikely to comprise a 
cementing factor for the development of a common European political culture.
What can be concluded from this quick look into domestic politics of 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom is that acceptance of political 
liberalism is neither uniform, nor unchallenged by alternative or even competing 
sets of political values. Despite significant steps made in the direction of
29 Thomas Risse, "A European Identity?" in Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso and Thomas 
Risse, eds., Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change (Ithaca NY, London: 
Cornell University Press, 2001), pp. 204-06
30 Similar is expected to be the impact o f  the terrorist attacks, which hit London on 7 July 2005.
31 A striking example o f  new UK considerations on migration is given at a speech by the British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair. See Tony Blair, Speech to the Confederation o f  British Industry on 
Migration London, 2004), available from http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page5708.asp 
[posted on 27/4/2004].
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convergence of political values at the EU level, it would be premature to argue 
that a European political culture is soon to appear and give a new meaning and 
speed in the process of EU integration. Events, however, like the pan-European 
reaction against Austria’s FPO stated that the development of a common 
European political culture was not a chimerical target. Despite existing 
differences among EU member states, political liberalism is still the single most 
important element of European political systems and has the potential to 
constitute the core of European identity and act as a catalyst in the formation of a 
European demos?2 A common political culture across all EU member states 
would constitute a sine qua non for the success of the EU federal project and its 
ability to integrate states with diverse cultural and religious backgrounds.
While the formation of a common European political culture is an ongoing -  
albeit not always linear- process, Turkish political culture has been undergoing 
fundamental changes. A comparative examination of Turkish political culture and 
an exploration of its shifting character become extremely interesting in that 
respect because of Turkey’s unique geographical position on the borders of 
Europe and Asia and its peculiarity as a Muslim-populated and yet Western- 
oriented secular state. Outlining the basic features of Turkish political culture will 
allow for a comparison of prospective European and Turkish political cultures and 
an assessment of the liberal elements of the latter.
32 For an alternative third way o f approaching European integration on the basis o f  demoicracy, 
see Kalypso Nicolaidis, "We, the Peoples o f Europe..." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, no. 6 (2004b), pp. 
101-04.
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3. Assessing the Congruence of Political Cultures of EU Member 
States and Turkey
In the remaining part of this chapter, fundamental features of mainstream Turkish 
political culture will be explored, and its idiosyncrasies will be compared with 
trends in EU member states. Special emphasis will be given on the proliferation of 
political liberalism as the latter is considered to be the primary benchmark of 
“Europeanness”. An assessment of the “Europeanisation” of Turkish political 
culture will therefore be a function of the degree to which parochial and subject 
elements recede and participant elements grow. Civil society, state tradition, the 
role of religion in politics and national identity are the fields, which will be 
scrutinised in order to assess the “Europeanness” of Turkish political culture.33 
This examination can disclose crucial information with respect to the convergence 
levels between Turkish and European political cultures.
a. Civil Society
Civil society is an accurate indicator of a liberal political culture. A vibrant civil 
society has become the talisman of modern liberal societies, and the degree of 
citizen participation in political and other communal activities is seen as the acid 
test of a well-functioning, substantive democracy34 and horizontal networks of 
citizens acting for the advancement of social aims normally by influencing rather 
than taking over government. It reduces the social influence of vertical 
clientelistic networks furthering the continuation of existing social divisions and
33 Public trust and economy are two more aspects whose study could provide useful conclusions on 
Turkish political culture. However, their study exceeds the scope o f this -inherently limited in 
size- study.
34 For a succinct theoretical approach the civil society concept, see Robert Fine, "Civil Society 
Theory, Enlightenment and Critique" in Robert Fine and Shirin Rai, eds., Civil Society: 
Democratic Perspectives (London & Portland OR: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 6-28.
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inequality.35 The weakness of civil society in the interwar years was instrumental 
in explaining the prevalence of totalitarian ideologies in a great number of 
Western European states. Nazism and fascism advocated citizen participation in 
coordinated social action, yet only under the grip of the state and for the 
furthering of its interests. A fa?ade of civil society was developed, where citizens 
were free to form associations, but only to further preset social ideals and goals. In 
the aftermath of the Second World War, the development of a resilient civil 
society was viewed as a sine qua non for the establishment of stable democratic 
systems in states that had suffered under totalitarianism, especially West 
Germany. The extent to which civil society institutions would develop would be 
tantamount to the inclusion of participant culture elements into the dominant 
political culture. The project for the development and reinforcement of civil 
society in states with weak democratic tradition met with success, which was 
compounded by analogous developments in the rest of the Western European 
states. Citizens became increasingly aware of their social role and felt the need to 
exercise their rights and exert influence on the political and social developments 
not only of their respective countries, but also of their region and globally. An 
unprecedented economic boom in post-Second World war Western European 
economies facilitated this trend. The improvement of economic means for 
Western European citizens was a necessary condition for their increasing interest 
in post-material values. Issues like environment, peace and economic 
development, human rights and democracy became foci of social mobilisation at 
both a national and an international level. Single-issue groups soon emerged and
35 Stefanos Yerasimos, "Civil Society, Europe and Turkey" in Stefanos Yerasimos, Gunter Seufert 
and Karin Vorhoff, eds., Civil Society in the Grip o f  Nationalism (Istanbul: Orient-Institut & 
Institut Fransais d'Etudes Anatoliennes, 2000), p. 12
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grew stronger, even to the point of forming independent political parties.36 
Besides, interest in citizenship and its social role mounted. An ever growing 
number of citizens realised that citizenship should not only entail benefits and 
advantages given by the state, but should also include a degree of awareness for 
political and social issues and commitment to collective action for improving life 
conditions both domestically and globally.
Civil society is not equally developed in all EU member states. It was 
weak in Southern Europe, where social institutions such as the family and church 
offered an alternative hybridic mode of social organisation, parochial and yet 
modern, by undertaking a very broad spectrum of social action and thus reducing 
the potential action scope of civil society organisations.37 Meanwhile, political 
developments before and during the Second World War had weakened the 
existing civil society fabric, not only in Germany, but also in all Western 
European states which had experienced Nazi occupation. Nonetheless, the rapid 
rise of civil society in post-Second World War Western Europe resulted in a 
convergence at a European level. Civil society may still be not as strong in 
Southern European countries, whose democratic consolidation process was 
completed only in the 1970s and 1980s,38 yet its strength has significantly 
increased and allowed for considering a vibrant civil society to be a basic 
characteristic of European societies. As high levels of popular participation point 
to a liberal political culture, a civil society with high degree of civic participation 
has been perceived as a condition for the emergence of a European political public
36 Green parties, represented in most Western European parliaments, are a primary example.
37 For the case o f Greece, see Nicolas Demertzis, "Greece" in Roger Eatwell, ed., European 
Political Cultures: Conflict or Convergence? (London & New York: Routledge, 1997). For the 
cases o f Portugal and Spain, see Antonio Costa Pinto and Xose M. Nunez, "Portugal and Spain" in 
Roger Eatwell, ed., European Political Cultures: Conflict or Convergence? (London & New 
York: Routledge, 1997).
38 Greece obtained a democratic regime in 1974, Spain in 1975 and Portugal in 1976.
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sphere39 and as one of the most important features of a prospective European 
political culture.
In the case of Turkey, the lack of an independent, autonomous civil society 
was often cited as one of the most substantial obstacles to Turkey’s democratic 
consolidation. According to this view, this phenomenon had deep historical 
grounds. The concepts of citizenship and civil society had no equivalents in 
Turkish history. Islam and Ottoman state tradition obstructed the development of 
a civil society. Emphasis on the community (cemaat) rather than the individual 
citizen persisted.40 However, alternative views stressed that substitutes of a civil 
society existed in the Ottoman Empire. Social engagement was possible through 
guilds (esnaf) and the institution of religious foundations (vakf), which often 
performed a variety of social welfare activities prescribed by their founders. There 
was an analogous situation in Ottoman non-Muslim minorities, where the 
institutionalisation of the millet system allowed for a degree of social organisation 
and action. However, all these activities were inextricably linked with religion, 
and any efforts to develop secular civil society structures in the Tanzimat years 
were suppressed by the ensuing authoritarian shift in Hamidian and Young Turk 
policies.
In congruence with the Ottoman legacy, the republican Turkish state took 
an inimical position towards civil society. Membership of voluntary associations 
was scarce even among elite members 41 The establishment of independent civil 
society associations was suspected, in resonance with the French tradition of 
suspicion against any form of association, which could constitute a threat against
39 JUrgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (Oxford: Polity Press, 2001), pp. 102-03
40 Yerasimos, "Civil Society, Europe and Turkey", pp. 14-15
41 Frey, The Turkish Political Elite, pp. 99-100
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the “general will.”42 A strong civil society was perceived as a threat for Turkey’s 
territorial integrity, national unity and state interests, and the relevant legislation 
was accordingly formed. Turkish constitution, legislation and state practices put 
severe limits to freedoms and human rights related to the development of civil 
society. Freedoms of association and expression were nominally guaranteed in all 
Turkish constitutions, yet the number and nature of exceptions from the rule 
meant that their respect lay -in  effect- at the discretion of state officials. In 
contrast to these developments, an alternative state-controlled civil society was 
formed.43 Private associations were assigned with the task of furthering a state- 
defined political and social agenda by mobilising Turkish society. The success of 
this experiment was only limited and could not gainsay the fact that an 
independent civil society was indispensable for Turkey’s democratic 
consolidation. Despite the persistence of neo-patrimonial networks,44 the gradual 
reduction of restrictions in civil society action, since military rule ended in 1983, 
resulted in incremental improvements in the position of civil society 45 However, 
convergence steps regarding the status of civil society in Turkey and Europe could 
not bridge the existing gap.46 The lack of a complete institutional and legal 
framework, which would facilitate the emergence of an independent Turkish civil 
society, was often cited in explanation.
42 This thought was first articulated by Rousseau and had considerable impact on French political 
thought.
43 Yerasimos, "Civil Society, Europe and Turkey", pp. 15-16
44 Ersin Kalaycioglu, "Sivil Toplum ve Neopatrimonyal Siyaset" in E. Fuat Keyman and A. Ya§ar 
Saribay, eds., Ktiresellegme, Sivil Toplum ve Islam (Ankara: Vadi Yayinlan, 1998), pp. 132-33
45 E. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet Ifduygu, "Globalisation, Civil Society and Citizenship in Turkey: 
Actors, Boundaries and Discourses", Citizenship Studies, Vol. 7, no. 2 (2003), pp. 220-21. For an 
account o f improvements in the constitutional and legal protection o f the freedom of association 
in the 1990s, see Ozbudun and Yazici, Democratization Reforms in Turkey (1993-2004), pp. 20- 
21 .
45 For a critique o f the reification o f  Turkish civil society since the 1980s, see Yael Navaro- 
Yashin, Faces o f the State: Secularism and Public Life in Turkey Princeton University Press, 
2002a), pp. 152-54.
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b. State Tradition
The term “state tradition” refers to the perceptions, affects and beliefs, which state 
elites have with respect to the state and its role.47 State tradition is crucially 
important as it defines the prioritisation of state and social interests and objectives 
over individual ones. Whether freedom is given priority over equality or public 
order, and the balance struck between them, are issues inextricably linked with the 
tradition of each state. Emphasis on state sovereignty, security and public order 
were common features of all European states when the Republic of Turkey was 
founded. In the interwar years liberal campaigns for the preponderance of 
individual human rights over state interests found little resonance. State interests 
and individual duties were given absolute priority over individual interests and 
rights. The rise of totalitarianism, tragically peaked in the cases of Nazism and 
Stalinism, marked the apogee o f this trend. The unspeakable human catastrophes, 
which came as a result of totalitarianism, led to a radical prioritisation shift. 
Individual human rights and interests gained then a greater degree of interest. 
Although emphasis on individual human rights and interests was soon proven to 
be often lip service, the political significance of documents like the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights is 
major. While individual interests gained importance against state interests at the 
international level, at the European level even more advanced steps were made. 
The founding of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 pointed to an 
unprecedented decision made by member states to concede part o f their 
sovereignty on issues as sensitive as economic and financial policy to an
47 For an account o f  the peculiar character o f  Turkey’s state tradition, see Metin Heper, "The State, 
the Military and Democracy in Turkey", The Jerusalem Journal o f  International Relations, Vol. 9, 
no. 3 (1987), pp. 52-55.
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international organisation. This organisation could even constitute the ultimate 
port of call for a citizen of a member state, whose rights, were violated, despite 
being guaranteed by the organisation founding documents or legislation. In the 
following decades, sovereignty concessions by EEC member states continued at 
an accelerated pace, to the extent that EEC legislation was recognised to prevail 
over all domestic legislation, including constitutions. The establishment of the 
European Court of Human Rights -within the framework of the Council of 
Europe- to oversee the implementation of the European Convention of Human 
Rights, and especially the grant of the right of individual appeal to the Court after 
the exhaustion of domestic legal means on the basis of the Convention was an 
additional leap towards the empowerment of the individual against the state.48 
These developments signalled the willingness of EU member states to reconsider 
their role, interests and objectives, as well as their relationship with their citizens. 
A novel liberal prioritisation of state and individual interests replaced the existing 
sovereignty-based tradition. Sovereignty concessions were no more a taboo issue, 
but could be considered if this favoured the general interest of the society and 
individuals. This liberal-minded state tradition spread through the expansion of 
the European Union and succeeded in comprising one of the most important 
elements of a prospective European political culture.
State tradition has been, despite its European roots, one of the biggest 
hindrances in Turkey’s effort to converge with the European political paradigm.
48 In 1994, Protocol 9 o f the European Convention o f Human Rights enabled individual applicants 
to bring their cases before the Court subject to ratification by the respondent state. In 1998, 
Protocol 11 strengthened the judicial character o f the system by making it compulsory for the 
member states. See Registrar o f the European Court o f Human Rights, The European Court o f  
Human Rights: Historical Background, Organisation and Procedure (European Court o f Human 
Rights: Strasbourg, 2003), available from 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/EDocs/HistoricalBackground.htm .
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Efforts to maximise state power49 and a strong sense of state autonomy, whereby 
the state is insulated from societal pressures and is free to make important policy 
decisions, has been the legacy of the Ottoman Empire to republican Turkey.50 As 
Westernisation was the first and foremost issue in Ataturk’s political agenda for 
Turkey, republican Turkey additionally sought for inspiration in Western 
Europe.51 Atatiirk was inspired by the French strong state model in his effort to 
establish a modern Turkish state, and sensitivity in issues of sovereignty, security 
and public order was in parallel with similar sensitivities in France. Yet Turkey 
failed to follow the steps taken by France and the rest of the Western European 
states after the end of the Second World War in the direction o f liberalising their 
state tradition. Military and bureaucratic elites maintained a tutelary role and the 
right to define the guidelines of grand strategy and high politics even against the 
political agenda of democratically elected governments expressing the popular 
will. What mattered was not the accurate expression of the popular will, which 
was not trusted, but the expression and realisation of long-term state interests as 
defined by them. Members of the state elite came to the point of distinguishing 
between “state policy” and “government policy.”52 In parallel with its democratic 
deficit, Turkish political culture remained heavily security and sovereignty- 
centric, while Western European states were conceding significant parts of their 
sovereignty to international organisations and were reshuffling their prioritisation 
of state and individual interests in favour of individuals. Any attempt to put 
forward individual rights claims was suspected to be aiming at undermining
49 Carter Vaughn Findley, "The Ottoman Administrative Legacy and the Modern Middle East" in 
L. Carl Brown, ed., Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), pp. 158-60
50 Ozbudun, "Continuing Ottoman Legacy and the State Tradition in the Middle East", pp. 134-35
51 Heinz Kramer, "Demokratieverstandnis und Demokratisierungsprozesse in der Turkei", 
Siidosteuropa Mitteilungen, Vol. 44, no. 1 (2004), p. 13
52 Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms : Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War (Seattle: 
University o f Washington Press, 2003), p. 69
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Turkey’s territorial integrity and national security and was dealt with accordingly. 
Sovereignty concessions were rebuffed on the basis of external and internal 
security threats, which could benefit from the weakening of the Turkish state. In 
contrast with the international trend, individual rights were only marginally 
advanced, while the prioritisation of state over individual interests remained 
essentially the same. Improving the democratic legitimacy and societal control of 
the Turkish state, as well as human rights protection,53 has been one of the 
primary points in Turkey’s political reform agenda.54 As a liberal-based state 
tradition has already prevailed in EU member states and defined a facet of the EU 
political identity, Turkey’s illiberal state tradition has been an additional 
divergence point between European and Turkish political cultures.
c. Religion and Politics
The question of the role of religion in politics has been central in Western 
European political debates. The dominant political role of the Catholic Church in 
the Middle Ages undermined its spiritual legitimacy and gave rise to reform 
movements, which culminated with the rise of Protestantism in the 16th century. 
Ferocious and protracted warfare between Catholic and Protestant Christians, 
deportations and massacres wrought havoc in Western Europe and raised the 
question of how to disentangle religion from politics. The era of Enlightenment 
and the 1789 French revolution stressed the issue of secularism at the European 
level, yet the levels of secularisation differed from state to state. While France 
became the pioneer of secularisation in Western Europe, Germany followed in 
due course the same route. Nonetheless, the secularisation process never went as
53 William Hale, "Human Rights, the European Union and the Turkish Accession Process", 
Turkish Studies, Vol. 5, no. 1 (2003a), p. 112
54 Henri J. Barkey, "The Struggles o f a "Strong" State", Journal o f  International Affairs, Vol. 54, 
no. 1 (2000), pp. 104-05
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far as in France. In the case of the United Kingdom, the shift towards secularism 
did not affect well-established political traditions, which had created a special link 
between the Anglican Church and the state.
The role of religion in Turkish politics is o f great interest given that 
Turkey is the only Muslim-populated state that has professed secularism and 
republican democracy. Whilst the debate on the compatibility of Islam and 
democracy thrives, Turkey provides an interesting experimental case because of 
its Ottoman past and secular practice. While the Ottoman Empire inherited the 
Arab political legacy where state and religion were inextricably linked, it also 
developed a secular state tradition (adab). Nonetheless, the Ottoman Sultans 
assumed the title of Caliph in the early 16th century, and Islam remained 
intertwined with politics, since the state remained unaffected by contemporary 
political and ideological developments in Western Europe. Despite receiving less 
priority in the Tanzimat era, Islam was privileged by the Young Ottomans and 
dramatically rose in political significance in the Hamidian era.55
The failure to reach a widely accepted solution on the role of religion in 
politics has also distinguished Turkey from Western European states. Under the 
influence of the French model, the Young Turks were the first to advocate secular 
ideas in the late Ottoman Empire, yet the disengagement of Islam from Ottoman 
politics never became one of their political priorities. The introduction of 
secularism by Atatiirk in the early republican years was followed by severe 
repression of the public manifestation of the Islamic faith as well as its 
subordination to the state. Political Islam was perceived to comprise an existential 
threat for Turkey’s republican democracy. The Caliphate was abolished in 1924,
55 Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 83
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the state took over control of all religious institutions, and all public 
manifestations of religion were banned.56 Religion became a taboo issue in 
republican politics until the rise of the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti-DP) with 
the advent of Turkish multiparty politics in 1946. The DP reintroduced religion 
into Turkish politics by appealing to the religious beliefs and needs of the popular 
majority, which had not endorsed the Kemalist secularisation reform programme. 
Although the coups of 1960 and 1971 attempted to check the islamisation of 
Turkish politics, Turkey experienced the rise of political Islam under the 
leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. The coup of 1980 banned Islamic political 
parties, but, on the other hand, favoured the Islamisation of the Turkish society to 
counterbalance leftist and Kurdish nationalist influences.57 In the 1990s, the 
influence of Turkish political Islam rose steeply and even came to political power 
in 1996, when the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi-RP) participated in a coalition 
government with the True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi-DYP), and its leader 
Necmettin Erbakan became Prime Minister. The collapse of the RP-DYP 
government after a crucial military intervention on 28 February 1997, which has 
been remembered since then as a “soft” coup, restored the dominant position of 
secularist political parties. The RP was closed down following a decision of the 
Turkish Constitutional Court in 1998, and Erbakan was banned from politics. Its 
successor, the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi-FP), suffered a similar fate in 2001. 
The failure to reconcile Islam and politics in Turkey could also be attributed to the 
lack of a participant political culture. While the Kemalist elite was enforcing its 
own understanding of secularism, disregarding the views of the majority of 
Turkey’s population, early Islamist political parties were also misrepresenting the
56 For detailed information, see Berkes, The Development o f Secularism in Turkey, pp. 461-78.
57 Paul J. Magnarella, "Desecularization, State Corporatism and Development in Turkey", Journal 
of Third World Studies, Vol. 6, no. 2 (1989), pp. 37-44
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religiosity of a large part of the Turkish population as support for an illiberal, non- 
democratic, Islamic form of government. The predominantly subject political 
culture did not allow the citizens to influence this debate within either the 
Kemalist or Islamist camps, so as to come to a solution which really reflected 
popular views. While the question of secularism is not normally an issue of 
intense political debate in Europe,58 its persistence in Turkey provides evidence 
for the divergence of European and Turkish political cultures.
d. National Identity
Western Europe has also been the cradle of nationalism, one of the most 
successful ideological currents, which shaped the modern world. Alternative 
models of national identity were developed in different Western European states, 
giving emphasis to different elements of nationhood.59 The territorial, civic model 
of national identity was first developed in France. National identity was based on 
citizenship deriving from birth within the borders of the national territory, and all 
citizens were expected to appropriate the basic elements of this civic national 
identity. The ethnic model of national identity was perfected in Germany. Ethnic 
descent replaced citizenship and territory as the crucial factor for the formation of 
national identity. National identity was based on kinship, while culture, tradition 
and memories provided a powerful foundation for its further development. All 
European nationalisms, which have risen since the end of the 18th century, were 
inspired by these two paradigms. Although the imperial experiments of the major 
Western European states first highlighted the need for more flexible approaches,
58 France is an exception to this. French assertive secularism has been challenged under the impact 
o f large immigration flows towards France in the recent decades, which mainly involve people of 
Islamic religion. French attempts to “ integrate” these immigrants to French civic identity have 
resulted in a backlash in the debate on secularism.
59 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin, 1991), pp. 82-83
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national identity models remained largely intact until the beginning of the First 
World War. The end of the First World War signalled the demise of the 
multiethnic European empires and the final triumph of the nation-state model. As 
multiethnic empires were partitioned and transformed into nation-states, 
provisions for the protection of minorities were made for the first time.60 Under 
the impact of liberal ideas, dominant in the early post-First World War years, an 
international legal framework for the protection of minorities was developed. 
Nonetheless, neither the League of Nations, nor liberal clauses in national 
constitutions, were successful in providing effective protection to minority 
groups.61 The rise of totalitarian regimes in many European states and the 
outbreak of the Second World War resulted in severe minority repression. In the 
aftermath of the Second World War, national identity models were reconsidered, 
under the need to provide full rights to minorities, the increasing pressure of 
migration and the emerging paradigm of pluralism. Despite strong reluctance by 
nation-states to acknowledge the existence of collective minority rights, the
60 There is no universally accepted definition o f the term “minority” due to its complicated and 
politically sensitive nature. Francesco Capotorti defined a minority as “a group, numerically 
inferior to the rest o f the population o f a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members- being 
nationals o f the State- possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of 
the rest o f the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards 
preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.” See Francesco Capotorti, Study on the 
Rights o f Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities [UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Add. 1-7] (Geneva: UN Sub-commission on the Prevention o f Discrimination 
and Protection o f Minorities, 1977). Justice Jules Deschenes suggested in the proceedings of the 
UN Subcommission on the Prevention o f Discrimination and Protection o f Minorities that a 
minority is “a group o f citizens o f  a state, constituting a numerical minority and in a non-dominant 
position in that state, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from 
those o f the majority o f the population, having a sense o f solidarity with one another, motivated, if 
only implicitly by a collective will to survive and whose aim is to achieve equality with the 
majority in fact and in law.” See Jules Deschenes, Proposal Concerning a Definition o f the Term 
'Minority' [UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/31. par. 181] (Geneva: UN Sub-commission on the 
Prevention o f Discrimination and Protection o f Minorities, 1985) cited in Ivan Gyurcsik, "New 
Legal Ramifications on the Question o f National Minorities" in Ian M. Cuthbertson and Jane 
Leibowitz, eds., Minorities: The New Europe’s Old Issue (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1993), p. 
22. Given the failure o f long negotiations to include a commonly accepted definition into an 
international treaty, these two definitions remain the most widely used and referred to.
61 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f  Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), pp. 57-58
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protection of minority rights improved as minority members could benefit from 
increased respect for individual human rights and defend their rights more 
effectively. Moreover, migration into Western Europe disrupted the national and 
cultural homogeneity of Western European nation-states62 and challenged the 
dominant national identity models. The model of liberal, pluralist society also 
became more attractive. This trend gained impetus with greater protection of 
diversity at the domestic and international levels and culminated in the founding 
and further transformation of the European Economic Community. Traditional 
national identity models came under severe pressure. Although it turned out that a 
reform of citizenship legislation, the hard core of national identity models, was 
anything but easy, respect for diversity and pluralism rose significantly in all EU 
member states. The process of EU integration finally opened the debate about a 
new type of supra-national or post-national European identity, which would not be 
based on the model of the nation-state, but celebrate European diversity and 
adhesion to liberal political values.
The model of Turkish national identity has been an amalgam63 of Western 
European models, which failed to follow subsequent developments in the 
European political sphere. The French civic/territorial model of national identity 
was deemed in the early republican years to be the most suitable for the newly 
born Turkish nation-state. As part of his campaign to homogenise the diverse 
Muslim populations of Anatolia and form a modern Turkish nation, Atatiirk used 
the tool of citizenship and the bond to Anatolian territory in his effort to instil 
Turkish national identity. Anatolia was presented as the historic heartland of
62 The homogeneity o f  Western European nation-states -a ll but natural- had been the result o f war, 
ethnic cleansing and minority discrimination policies.
63 Ayhan Akman, "Milliyetfilik Kurarmnda Etnik/Sivil M illiyet^lik Kar§ithgi" in Tanil Bora, ed., 
Milliyetqilik (istanbul: ileti§im, 2002), pp. 82-83
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Turkism, while Turkish citizenship provided for all the rights and duties, which 
brought modern nations together. Nevertheless, the French model was considered 
insufficient for the development of a strong Turkish national identity and 
incorporated elements from the German ethnic model. According to the official 
view, the modern Turkish nation did not merely consist of citizens who were 
residents of Anatolia. It was claimed that these people were also ethnic Turks, 
tracing their origin to the numerous tribes that had invaded Anatolia since the 11th 
century. The term “Turk” lost its previous derogatory meaning and became a 
source o f national pride.64 The Turkish national identity model did not allow any 
room for diversity and minority rights. Minority differences could be temporarily 
tolerated only under the condition of expressed willingness to assimilate with the 
dominant national identity65 Such approaches were widespread in interwar 
Europe, when Turkish national identity was forged and became eventually 
obsolete in Western Europe after the end of the Second World War. This was not 
the case in Turkey.
Political liberalisation steps in Europe, which led to the adoption of more 
tolerant, inclusive approaches to diversity, did not find their counterpart in 
Turkey. Tolerance of minorities, multiple identities, religious and cultural 
diversity, which seriously challenged and modified Western European national 
identity models, were suspected in Turkey as threatening the success of the 
Kemalist ethnic homogenisation project and inciting ethnic division and territorial 
partition.66 Due to the rise of Kurdish separatism in the late 1970s, Turkish 
suspicions rose. The gap between Turkish and European notions of national
64 David Kushner, The Rise o f  Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908 (London: Frank Cass, 1977), pp. 
20-22
65 Taner Aksam, "Turk Ulusal Kimligi Uzerine Bazi Tezler" in Tanil Bora, ed., MMiyetgilik 
(istanbul: lleti?im, 2002), p. 62
65 Fuller, "Turkey's Strategic Model: Myths and Realities", pp. 61-62
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identity grew even bigger after the 12 September 1980 coup. Severe repression of 
minority rights and attempts to enforce the dominant national identity model were 
in absolute dissonance with political developments in the European Economic 
Community. The brutal enforcement of an illiberal model of national identity 
comprised an additional barrier to the convergence of Turkish and European 
political cultures.
In the following chapters, the divergence of Turkish political culture from 
European norms will be examined through the study of some of its main features. 
Continuity and change in civil society, state-society relations, the role of religion 
in politics and national identity will be explored in separate chapters, and the role 
of the European Union as a catalyst in facilitating the liberalisation process of 
Turkish political culture will be explored.
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IV. CIVIL SOCIETY
1. What is Civil Society
Definitions of civil society have historically varied,1 the main point of contention 
being whether civil society can only be defined in a liberal democratic 
framework.2 Most scholars accept the essentially liberal character of the term. 
Hall defines civil society as “the self-organisation of strong and autonomous 
groups that balance the state.”3 Civil society is perceived as the counterweight that 
effectively checks the state. According to Diamond, civil society is
the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self- 
generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the 
state, and bound by a legal order or a set of shared values.4
Diamond remains loyal to the tradition linking civil society with a liberal 
democratic political system. Gellner expands the definition, so it can include the 
counterbalancing function of civil society against the dominant social role of the 
state and its arbitrative role against competing social interests. According to him, 
civil society is
that set of diverse non-governmental institutions, which is 
strong enough to counterbalance the state, and, whilst not
1 The concept o f civil society is broad, having its roots in the works o f Hegel and Marx. However, 
a deeper examination o f this intellectual debate on civil society lies beyond the scope o f this study. 
For a succinct account o f the intellectual history and debate on the term “civil society”, with 
emphasis on the Gramscian approach o f the term, see Robert W. Cox, "Civil Society at the Turn o f 
the Millennium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order", Review o f  International Studies, Vol. 
25, no. 1 (1999).
2 Sefa §im§ek, "The Transformation o f Civil Society in Turkey: From Quantity to Quality", 
Turkish Studies, Vol. 5, no. 3 (2004), p. 44
3 John A. Hall, "In Search o f Civil Society" in John A. Hall, ed., Civil Society: Theory, History, 
Comparison (London: Polity Press, 1996), p. 15
4 Larry Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation", Journal o f  
Democracy, Vol. 5, no. 3 (1994), p. 5
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preventing the state fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and 
arbitrator between major interests, can nevertheless prevent the 
state from dominating and atomizing the rest of society.5
Other scholars, however, attempt to disengage the concept of civil society from a 
liberal democratic context. According to this view, state and society should be 
viewed as products of a common political order, where conflicts occur within the 
state and the civil society rather than between them. Because of this, civil society 
could exist and thrive in non-democratic environments, without necessarily 
promoting political liberalisation. Thus, one could conceptualise “patriarchal, 
Islamic, communist and fascist civil societies.”6
The question whether civil society can be understood as “uncivil” lies in 
the heart of this discourse. In this study, “civility” is understood as tolerance to 
opposing views, ideologies and cultures and viewed as an essential element of 
civil society. Hence, social formations, which are not characterised by civility, 
cannot be characterised as components of a civil society. Civil society has been 
taken as one of the most accurate indicators of the existence of a substantive, 
participatory democracy. A high degree of citizen participation in civil society 
associations is positively correlated with a flourishing liberal democratic system. 
The proliferation of horizontal citizen networks increases the levels of social 
capital and reduces the influence of non-egalitarian vertical networks.
The crucial role that civil society could play in promoting democratisation 
resulted in the active support of civil society organisations in states in a transition 
stage towards democracy. Western states and international organisations provided
5 Ernest Gellner, "The Importance o f Being Modular" in John A. Hall, ed., Civil Society: Theory, 
History, Comparison (London: Polity Press, 1996b), p. 32
6 Bjorn Beckman, "Explaining Democratisation: Notes on the Concept o f  Civil Society" in 
Elizabeth Ozdalga and Sune Persson, eds., Democracy, Civil Society and the Muslim World 
(Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute, 1997), p. 2
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financial and moral support for the development of strong civil society 
institutions. The European Union was especially active in the post-communist 
Central and East European states that had aspired to become EU members. As 
EU-Turkey relations were improving in the 1990s and the prospect of Turkey’s 
EU membership became increasingly realistic, EU interest in Turkish civil society 
rose. The lack of a vibrant civil society in Turkey was viewed as one of the main 
reasons for Turkey’s weak democratic consolidation and evidence of its illiberal 
political culture. In this chapter, the past and present of Turkish civil society will 
be explored, and the role of the European Union in influencing developments will 
be assessed. The role of selected social actors in the rise of Turkish civil society, 
as well as the incidence of social learning, will also be considered. Finally, 
tentative conclusions on the applicability of path dependence, historical 
institutionalism and two-level game models in studying the EU impact on Turkish 
civil society will be attempted.
2. Civil Society in Turkey
a. The Ottoman Legacy
The rise of a vibrant Turkish civil society since the 1990s has been one of the 
most hotly debated issues in Turkish politics. Part o f the debate has been focused 
on the question whether the deficiencies of Turkish civil society could be 
attributed to an unfavourable historical legacy. Many scholars have argued that 
the main reason for that deficiency was historical in nature. Ottoman history 
lacked any equivalents to the concepts of citizenship and civil society. As Heper 
suggested:
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The absence of civil society in Turkey was an inheritance from 
the Ottoman Empire, where political, economic and social 
power coalesced in the center. Within the upper strata, status 
and wealth were attached to offices, and not to lineages or 
families. Bureaucratic position, thus, had the greatest weight in 
determining policy. The elite justified its appropriation of 
policymaking based on its presumed cultural pre-eminence and
n
superior knowledge.
Apart from the Ottoman state tradition, Islam was also held responsible for the 
deficiencies of Turkish civil society. The compatibility of Islam with the concept 
of civil society has been widely debated, and Islam -o r  at least its scripturalist, 
“high” version- has been viewed to be a rival form of social order.8 In contrast to 
Christianity, Islam lacks an institutional formation equivalent to the church, which 
has historically provided for broad non-state social networks and counterbalanced 
the monopolistic role of the state even in the peak of the Middle Ages. While 
Sunni Islamic political tradition favoured the centralisation of state power,9 the 
political and military success of the Ottoman Empire from the 14th to the 16th 
century was an additional reason for strengthening the role of central state 
authorities. Ottoman state bureaucracy accumulated powers unparalleled to the
7 Metin Heper, "The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics", Journal o f International Affairs, Vol. 
54, no. 1 (2000), p. 78. Heper cited Joseph S. Szyliowicz, "The Ottoman Empire" in Christoffel 
Anthonie Olivier van Nieuwenhuijze, ed., Commoners, Climbers, and Notables: A Sampler o f  
Studies on Social Ranking in the Middle East (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1997), pp. 103, p. 07 and §erif 
Mardin, "Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution", International Journal o f  Middle 
Eastern Studies, Vol. 2, no. 3 (1971), p. 202.
8 See Ernest Gellner, Conditions o f  Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals (London: Penguin, 
1996a), pp. 15-18
9 The importance o f  strong central power in Islamic political thought was already emphasised in 
the following saying o f  Ibn Hanbal, one o f the most prominent Islamic jurisprudents: “Sixty years 
under a tyrant are better than a single night o f anarchy” . See Fazlur Rahman, "The Law of 
Rebellion in Islam" in Jill Raitt, ed., Islam in the Modern World: 1983 Paine Lectures in Religion 
(Columbia, MO: University o f Missouri-Columbia Department o f Religious Studies, 1983), pp. 1- 
10.
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powers of any other contemporary medieval state. The ongoing decline of the 
Ottoman Empire from the 17th century onwards, which was first signalled by the 
Celali rebellions in Anatolia10 and the emergence of local notables {ayan) and the 
Janissary corps as de facto  power shareholders, reversed this process. This also 
led to the thriving of deep-rooted institutions such as the intisab (connection- 
based clientelism), which favoured the establishment of hierarchical and 
clientelistic social networks and rendered the development of horizontal networks 
even more difficult.11
Others argued that it would be inaccurate to argue that quasi-civil society 
formations were totally absent in the Ottoman Empire. Social functions similar to 
those of a civil society were undertaken by traditional institutions, which mediated 
between the state and its subjects.12 The Islamic foundation ivakf) performed a 
variety of social welfare functions, which substituted for the absence of similar 
state activities. As its property was exempt from state confiscation, the vahf also 
served as a vehicle for the protection of the economic interests of state officials, 
and especially the emerging ayan class in the 18th century. Besides this, the 
activities of religious orders (tarikat), guilds (esnaf) and professional religious 
fraternities {ahi) also checked the dominant role of the state and gave the Ottoman 
society a more plural character. Mardin argues that a tacit social contract existed 
in the Ottoman context, which incorporated the Janissaries, the ayan, the 
“civilian” merchant population and the men of religion {ulema) and served as
10 Murat Beige, Fieldwork Interview (Istanbul, 7/12/2004)
11 Murat Beige, "Modernizasyon'da intisab", Radikal, 17/10/2004
12 Emre Erdogan, Turk Sivil Toplum Kurulwjlarmin Gelipmleri Uzerine Bazi Notlar (Istanbul: 
Infakto, 2005), pp. 1-3
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justification for a series of Janissary rebellions.13 Additionally, Ottoman non- 
Muslim minorities under the millet system developed an advanced network of 
social organisation, religious, educational and charity foundations and 
associations.
The situation changed dramatically during the Tanzimat. The elimination 
of the ayan class was one of the first tasks in the agenda of the early Ottoman 
state modernisers, while the drastic limitation of the power, which the tarikats, the 
esnafs and the ahis wielded, followed suit. Following the model o f the Western 
European centralised state, the Ottoman statesmen attempted to achieve maximum 
power concentration in their effort to make the state the agent of social 
modernisation and also introduce elements of political liberalism. Non-Muslim 
minorities, which were disproportionately represented in the emerging Ottoman 
bourgeoisie, thrived under the more tolerant Tanzimat environment. Efforts were 
made to develop secular civil society structures across the millet divisions. The 
centralisation campaign, however, had a countervailing effect on the development 
of an Ottoman civil society. The intisab networks were disproportionately 
strengthened, as members of the emerging bureaucratic class monopolised the 
state power and organised their own clientelistic networks.14 The centralisation 
programme reached the peak of its success in the Hamidian era15 and left its 
enduring legacy in the Young Turk regime and republican Turkey. The triumph of 
clientelism meant that horizontal social networks remained weak. The unity of the
13 §erif Mardin, "Freedom in an Ottoman Perspective" in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., 
State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 
1988), pp. 30-31
14 Beige, "Modernizasyon'da intisab"
15 Sultan Abdiilhamid II wielded far greater powers than any o f his predecessors. See Bernard 
Lewis, "Why Turkey is the Only Muslim Democracy", Middle East Quarterly, Vol. I, no. 1 
(1994).
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state and the presumed indivisibility of the people were principles that restrained 
the development of a civil society.
b. Civil Society from 1923 to the 1990s
The state-centric ideology of the Ottoman statesmen crucially affected the 
founding cadre of republican Turkey and left little free space for the development 
o f a Turkish civil society.16 The corporatist vision of Ziya Gokalp, the most 
prominent ideologue of the Turkish Republic, prescribed the absolute dominance 
o f collective interest over individualistic ones and the concentration of all powers 
in the state and its functionaries.17 Turkey’s Westernisation was a gigantic project 
requiring the coordination of all social actors. Thus, any civil society movement 
was viewed with suspicion as prioritising individual interests over the general 
good. This choice became embedded in republican politics with the promulgation 
of the 1924 Constitution. Freedom of association was formally recognised, yet, in 
practice, the unrestrained ability of the state to limit it for the sake of alleged 
public interest meant that this recognition was meaningless.18 Early reactions 
against Atatiirk’s secularisation and national homogenisation campaigns enhanced 
his determination to silence non-state social actors. Tarikats and opposition 
political parties were banned, while the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi-CHP) claimed to be a bridge between the Turkish state and society. 
The number of non-governmental associations (NGOs) remained low, and their 
activities were strictly non-political. There was even an attempt to develop a
16 Non-Muslim minorities had become numerically insignificant as a result o f  events that preceded 
the foundation o f the Republic, so their role in the formation o f a Turkish civil society was 
negligible.
17 For more details, see Taha Parla, Ziya Gokalp, Kemalizm ve Tiirkiye’de Korporatizm  (istanbul: 
ileti§im, 1993) cited in Aykut Kansu, "Turkiye'de Korporatist Dti§unce ve Korporatizm 
Uygulamalan" in Ahmet Insel, ed., Kemalizm (istanbul: Ileti§im, 2001), p. 260.
18 See the Articles 70, 79 and 86 o f the 1924 Constitution at TOrk Btiyiik Millet Meclisi (TBMM), 
1924 Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasi (4695/1945).
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substitute civil society, consisting of public or quasi-private associations, which 
undertook to further a state-defined political and social agenda. The role of 
chambers of commerce, professional associations, trades unions19 and other state- 
controlled civil society organisations (e.g. the Turkish Aviation Foundation-7YH: 
Hava Kurumu Vakfi) are primary examples of the strong influence of corporatist 
models in the early republican years.20 The advent of multi-party politics in 1946, 
the rise of the Democrat Party to power in 1950, and the waning grip of the state 
over society allowed for a new debate on civil society. Nonetheless, state and 
military elites deplored what they saw as a shift toward particularistic interests at 
the expense of the general good and attempted to “regulate” Turkish democracy 
through a series of military coups.21 Developments were temporarily halted by the 
I960 coup. However, the 1961 Constitution provided the legal framework for the 
rise of a civil society movement in Turkey. Despite the pitfalls of extreme 
polarisation and violent activism in the 1960s, Turkish society underwent a 
politicisation process. Politics were not simply left to “expert” state bureaucrats; 
each citizen claimed the right to express his political views and try to influence 
others. The nascent Turkish civil society suffered a blow in 1971, when a military 
coup enforced a constitutional amendment, which limited basic freedoms. Worse 
was to come with the 1980 coup. The high degree of politicisation of Turkish civil
19 For more information on trades unions, see Ronnie Margulies and Ergin Ytldizoglu, "Trade 
Unions and Turkey's Working Class", MERIP Reports (1984).
20 See Tanil Bora, "Professional Chambers and Non-Voluntary Organisations: The Intersection of 
Public, Civil and National" in Stefanos Yerasimos, Gunter Seufert and Karin Vorhoff, eds., Civil 
Society in the Grip o f  Nationalism (Istanbul: Orient-Institut & Institut Fran?ais d'Etudes 
Anatoliennes, 2000), pp. 99-101 and Kemali Sayba§ili, "Chambers o f Commerce & Industry, 
Political Parties, Governments: A Comparative Study o f British and Turkish Cases", Studies in 
Development (Middle East Technical University) (1976). Such associations are referred to in the 
academic literature on civil society as Governmental Non-Governmental Organisations 
(GONGOs).
21 Metin Heper, "State and Society in Turkish Political Experience" in Ahmet Evin and Metin 
Heper, eds., State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s (Berlin & New York: Walter 
de Gruyter, 1988b), p. 6
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society and its alleged identification with leftist and minority movements sealed 
its fate. While the military regime lasted (September 1980-November 1983), all 
political activities were banned, and the 1982 Constitution imposed even further 
restrictions on basic freedoms. Changes in the Law on Associations completed the 
dramatic limitation of the operating space of civil society.22
The end of military rule in 1983 and the victory of the Motherland Party 
(.Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) in the November 1983 elections signalled a series of 
social transformations, which had a significant effect on Turkish civil society.23 
Turkey’s economic liberalisation and the shift from import substitution to an 
export-oriented economic model reshaped the Turkish economy. Changes in the 
economy necessarily affected Turkish society, although the effects were less 
rapid. Turkish civil society was still weak in terms o f its membership and the 
scope of its activities, while the legislative framework was anything but conducive 
to its expansion. Public opinion was still unfavourable, as the views that civil 
society associations have divisive impact and, therefore, constitute a threat to the 
general good, still dominated. Even the word used in Turkish for the term 
“association” (orgut) reinforced these views, as it was linked with criminal or 
separatist groups aiming to harm the unity of the people and/or the territorial 
integrity of the state.24 Nonetheless, the ongoing transformation of the Turkish 
economy and society in the 1980s would set one of the conditions for the 
flourishing of civil society in the 1990s.
22 For more details, see Paul Kubicek, "The Earthquake, Europe, and Prospects for Political 
Change in Turkey", Middle East Review o f  International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 5, no. 2 (2001), p. 
36. On the post-1980 legal framework for civil society, see Ergun Ozbudun, "The Post-1980 Legal 
Framework for Interest Group Associations" in Metin Heper, ed., Strong State and Economic 
Interest Groups : the Post-1980 Turkish Experience (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 
1991).
23 See Omer £aha, "The Inevitable Coexistence o f Civil Society and Liberalism: The Case o f 
Turkey", Journal o f  Economic and Social Research, Vol. 3, no. 2 (2001), pp. 40-44.
24 Ozgul Erdemli, Fieldwork Interview (Istanbul, 29/12/2004)
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c. Civil Society since the 1990s
The 1990s became a watershed for the development of a Turkish civil society. 
The number of civil society organisations boomed, the spectrum of their activities 
was widened, and citizen participation grew. There are several reasons for this 
phenomenon, which need to be treated separately. Global and domestic factors 
were influential. Last, but not least, the European Union had a crucial role in 
accelerating the growth of civil society in Turkey.
i). The Impact of Global Actors 
Several global events affected the rise of Turkish civil society. The fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War had profound consequences for the 
political and ideological structure of Europe. The collapse of communist regimes 
in Central and Eastern Europe sparked new ideological explorations, which 
resulted in the reshaping of the political spectrum on more liberal lines. While 
Marxism had expressed a deep suspicion of civil society, leftist youth in the 
aftermath of the Cold War sought ways to change their communities, societies and 
the world by limiting state power and “open the political space for civic 
participation.”25 Involvement in civil society activities provided an alternative 
mode of social engagement. Despite fierce state persecution in the past, the 
Turkish left remained a potential political power, which was particularly popular 
among the younger generation. Turkish leftist youth formed a substantial part of 
Turkish civil society activists, shaping its distinctively political character.
25 Binnaz Toprak, "Civil Society in Turkey" in Augustus Richard Norton, ed., Civil Society in the 
Middle East (Leiden, New York & Koln: E.J. Brill, 1996), pp. 95-96
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The emergence of a global civil society also assisted the rise of Turkish 
civil society.26 Interest in global issues such as the environment and human rights 
attracted the interest of like-minded people across the world. Associations like 
Greenpeace, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International grew in size and 
international appeal, which allowed them to intensify and diversify their 
worldwide activities. Under the influence of international environmental NGOs, 
local environmental NGOs like the Turkish Foundation for Erosion Fighting, 
Forestation and Protection of the National Endowment (Turkiye Erozyonla 
Mucadele, Agaglandirma ve Dogal Varliklan Koruma Vabfi-TEMA) emerged. 
Turkey also attracted the interest of most international NGOs focusing on human 
rights. As Turkey was a country in the Western bloc and, therefore, accessible 
with relative ease, severe human rights violations could not escape the attention of 
international human rights NGOs.27 Their increasing activity in Turkey attracted 
much suspicion from the state, yet it also offered a paradigm for the development 
of local civil society associations. The United Nations Conference on Human 
Settlements {Habitat II), which was held in Istanbul in June 1996, was a windfall 
for Turkish civil society. The organisation of the conference brought to Turkey a 
number of international NGOs and afforded plenty of opportunities for 
cooperation with the existing civil society network. Local NGOs found a rare 
chance to obtain expertise as well financial aid in the course of the conference
preparations, which helped them take more courageous steps in the following
28years.
26 Keyman and Igduygu, "Globalisation, Civil Society and Citizenship in Turkey: Actors, 
Boundaries and Discourses", pp. 225-26
27 Jonathan Sugden, Fieldwork Interview (Istanbul, 9/12/2004)
28 Taciser Beige, Fieldwork Interview (Istanbul, 26/11/2004)
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The transformation of the Turkish economy continued in the 1990s and 
had a significant impact on the development of civil society in Turkey. Turkish 
business capital was historically extremely dependent on the state. The emergence 
of a Turkish business class in the late 19th and early 20th century was actively 
supported by the state, while the import substitution model selected in the 
republican years created favourable conditions for the emergence of a local 
business elite, whose industrial production would benefit from high import tariffs 
and have privileged access to the growing Turkish market. Turkish business grew 
in size, and large business conglomerates dominated the Turkish economy. 
Nonetheless, economic liberalisation and the shift from import substitution to an 
export-oriented economy model in the 1980s meant that Turkish business would 
have to compete on equal terms with their foreign counterparts for a share of the 
Turkish market and expand their economic activity outside the borders of Turkey. 
The challenge was anything but negligible, yet the performance of Turkish 
business was remarkably successful. The geographical expansion of its operations 
and its integration into the global economy also meant the end o f its dependence 
on the Turkish state. While they no more identified with the state and its interests, 
Turkish businesspersons were influenced by contemporary debates on political 
liberalism and the social role of capital.29 The idea of corporate social 
responsibility spread for the first time,30 and interest in politics flourished in a 
group which had until recently avoided to take any political positions, fearing that 
this might alienate its indispensable allies, the state bureaucrats and the military. 
Turkish businesspersons established associations or activated pre-existing ones, 
giving them a wide scope of activities and gave financial support to independent
29 Toprak, "Civil Society in Turkey", p. 101
30 Diba Nigar Goksel and Rana Birden Giine§, "The Role o f NGOs in the European Integration 
Process: The Turkish Experience", South European Society & Politics, Vol. 10, no. 1 (2005), p. 67
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associations.31 Associations like the formerly politically neutral Turkish 
Industrialists' and Businesspersons’ Association (Turk Sanayicileri ve Lyadcimlan 
Dernegi-TijSlKD) developed a keen interest in Turkey’s human rights situation 
and started pushing for democratic reforms.32 Through its membership of the 
Union of Industrialists and Employers’ Confederation o f Europe (UNICE), it also 
actively lobbied in favour of Turkey’s EU membership perspective as well as
• i  • *5 'i
domestic political reform. The 1997 TUSIAD report on democratisation was a 
landmark document in this process.34 In the same spirit, Turkish business started 
providing financial support to independent NGOs, whose activities coincided with 
its political agenda. The globalisation of Turkish business thus improved the 
success of NGO fundraising activities, rendering them more resilient and active.
ii). The Impact of Domestic Politics 
Domestic political developments had a catalytic role in the development of 
Turkish civil society. Minority groups such as the Kurds and peripheral groups 
such as the Islamists increased their demands for recognition of their rights by the 
state. They addressed their problems as part of Turkey’s general 
democratisation.35 Meanwhile, a series of incidents challenged the supremacy of 
the state in the public sphere and brought to the fore serious deficiencies in 
Turkish democracy.
1). The Kurdish Issue
31 Emre Erdogan, Fieldwork Interview (Istanbul, 17/1/2005)
32 Ziya Oni§ and Umut Ttirem, "Business, Globalization and Democracy; A Comparative Analysis 
o f Turkish Business Associations", Turkish Studies, Vol. 2, no. 2 (2001), pp. 98-103
33 Bulent Tanor, 1997 TUSIAD Report: Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey (Istanbul: 
TUSiAD, 1997)
34 Serap Atan, "Europeanisation o f Turkish Peak Business Organisations and Turkey-EU 
Relations" in Mehmet Ugur and Nergis Canefe, eds., Turkey and European Integration : Accession 
Prospects and Issues (London & New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 104-07
35 Binnaz Toprak, "Civil Society in Turkey" in Jillian Schwedler, ed., Towards Civil Society in the 
Middle East (London: Lynne Rienner, 1995), pp. 79-80
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The escalation of Turkey’s Kurdish question was one of these developments. The 
1980 military regime had intensified state policies aiming at the repression of 
Turkey’s Kurdish minority. This policy shift had coincided with the rise of 
interest among the Kurds of Turkey in their distinct identity and the intensification 
of guerrilla warfare by the Kurdish Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan- 
PKK). In the southeastern and eastern provinces of Turkey, where most of 
Turkey’s Kurdish population lived and most of the fighting took place, the martial 
law regime remained intact. This resulted in severe violations of even the most 
basic human rights and freedoms. Extra-judicial killings, forced relocations and 
systematic torture were only some of the reported incidents of human rights 
violation, while the practices of the PKK were also blameworthy. Throughout 
Turkey, the use of the Kurdish language was forbidden, and even the existence of 
a Kurdish minority in Turkey was officially denied. In the early 1990s, it became 
increasingly clear that state policies on the Kurdish question were unsustainable. 
Human rights violations attracted the interest of international human rights 
associations and caused international protests. Some first steps towards 
liberalisation were made when the ban on the use of the Kurdish language was 
lifted in 1991, and Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel spoke in March 1992 for the 
need to accept the “Kurdish reality,” thus putting an end to the denial policies of 
the 1980s.36 Yet the intensification o f warfare between Turkish security forces and 
Kurdish guerrillas in the 1990s led to a rapid deterioration of the human rights 
situation. A massive forced relocation programme of Kurdish villagers was 
organised and implemented, while the number of extra-judicial killings and 
torture cases peaked. The work of local and international human rights
36 Kemal Kiri§?i and Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example o f  a  
Trans-State Ethnic Conflict (London & Portland OR: Frank Cass, 2003), p. 113
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associations was obstructed by local officials, as the view that human rights 
NGOs were themselves a “bunch of terrorists” was widespread. This emerging 
humanitarian crisis led, however, to the involvement in civil society associations 
of citizens of Turkish and Kurdish descent, who were outraged by the atrocities of 
the Turkish security forces and the PKK, wanted to help bring an end to the 
ongoing slaughter and to find a peaceful and commonly acceptable solution of the 
problem. Civil society mobilisation seemed to be the only legitimate way to claim 
peacefully respect for the human rights of Turkey’s Kurdish population as well as 
the recognition of a separate Kurdish identity in Turkey. The “Saturday mothers” 
(Cumartesi Anneleri) demonstrations were a powerful manifestation of the human 
rights situation in Turkey, as well as the diffusion of civil society mobilisation as
o
a way of peacefully expressing dissent. The intensity of human rights violations 
somewhat receded after the capture o f the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and a 
series of successful operations by the Turkish security forces against the PKK in 
1998. This rendered the PKK threat as a pretext to evade respect for human rights 
even less plausible.39 Nonetheless, persistent persecutions of NGOs focusing on 
human rights violations showed that serious problems still existed.40 The Turkish 
state seemed unwilling to acknowledge full human rights to its Kurdish
37 Sugden, Fieldwork Interview
38 This was a group o f mothers whose children were missing as a result o f state security 
operations. The “Saturday Mothers” demonstrated every Saturday from 1995 to 1999 in the 
Galatasaray Square o f Istanbul, demanding an account o f their children’s fate and became a 
symbol o f Turkey’s human rights problems. See Jonathan Sugden, "Human Rights and Turkey's 
EU Candidacy" in Mehmet Ugur and Nergis Canefe, eds., Turkey and European Integration : 
Accession Prospects and Issues (London & New York: Routledge, 2004b), p. 246.
39 Yllmaz, Fieldwork Interview
40 The Turkish Human Rights Association (Insan Haklan Dernegi-iHD), one o f the most active 
supporters o f human rights for Turkey’s Kurdish population, repeatedly faced state persecution. 
For an indicative account, see Commission o f the European Communities, 1998 Regular Report 
on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession (Brussels: European Union, 1998), p. 16, Commission of 
the European Communities, 1999 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession 
(Brussels: European Union, 1999), pp. 12-13, Commission of the European Communities, 2000 
Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession (Brussels: European Union, 2000), p. 17.
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population, yet pressure originating from a nascent local civil society was 
mounting.
(Figure 5)
Figure 5. A D em onstration o f  the "Saturday M others" at G alatasaray Square, Istanbul 
(Picture by Aclan Uraz)
2). The Rise of Political Islam 
The resurgence of Islam in Turkish politics and society since the 1980s also 
contributed to the rise of Turkish civil society. Islam had returned to Turkish 
politics during the 1980 military regime via the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” 
(Tiirk-islam Sentezi-TiS) ideological formation. This aimed to use Islam as a 
cementing factor against Kurdish nationalist and leftist centrifugal social forces 
(see p. 268). In the Ozal era, which had also been marked by a shift toward an 
increasing role of Islam in the public sphere, the enhanced role of Islam was
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regularised. Turkish Islamic movements started using civil society associations as 
a legal framework for their activities. A great number of NGOs were founded with 
the objective of the erection and maintenance of mosques or religious vocational 
schools (imam-hatip okullan).4! Soon political Islam found its authentic political 
representative in the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi-RP), founded by the veteran 
Islamist leader Necmettin Erbakan. The RP’s electoral appeal steadily grew in the 
elections of 1987 and 1991. Its first major electoral success was scored in the 
1994 municipal elections, when the party candidates were elected in Istanbul and 
Ankara. A great part of the RP’s electoral success was due to an unprecedented 
and a highly efficient mobilisation of grassroots Islamist activism. Islamist 
activism operated at the civil society level establishing associations, which were 
directly or indirectly linked with the RP and focused their activities in the squatter 
areas (gecekondu) of Turkish big cities. Islamist associations developed from 
traditional Anatolian values, such as imece, the traditional, community-based form 
of horizontal mutual support and cooperation in rural Anatolian communities, and 
himaye, the principle of protection by and loyalty to family and larger community 
groups.42 Primordial ties, which had led to the formation of separate townsmen’s 
(hem$eri) associations, were also exploited. Benefiting from the strong 
collectivistic spirit among Turkey’s newly urbanised populations, they expanded 
their activities in a broad field of social welfare and relief operations and 
significantly raised their public profile.
The contribution of tarikats to the growth of Islamist associations was also 
striking. Having been forced to operate underground after their banning in the
41 Erdogan, Turk Sivil Toplum Kuruluflanmn Geli§imleri Uzerine Bazi Notlar
42 Jenny B. White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics (Seattle & 
London: University o f Washington Press, 2003), pp. 69-76
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1920s, tarikats found in civil society associations a legitimate public face for their 
multifarious social activities. Some of the originally Islamist associations were 
reformed into fully-fledged Western-style civil society associations, only retaining 
a thin Islamic underpinning. The Organisation of Human Rights and Solidarity for 
Oppressed People (Insan Haklari ve Mazlumlar igin Dayam§ma Dernegi- 
Mazlum-Der)43 and the Independent Association of Industrialists and 
Businesspersons (Mustakil Sanayici ve l§adamlan Dernegi-MUSIAD) are prime 
examples of successful civil society associations with Islamic roots.44 The rise of 
political Islam enriched Turkish civil society by providing associations, which 
were inspired by traditional solidarity and support networks. By speaking a 
language more familiar to the majority of the Turkish population than 
conventional NGOs, Islamist associations introduced the idea of civil society to a 
much broader audience. The periphery of Turkish society thus found the chance to 
develop its own civil society associations, whose leadership constituted a part of 
its own emerging political elite. Turkey’s Islamist civil society associations were 
shown to be compatible with the democratic framework of Turkish politics45 
Despite the fact that Islamist civil society activity was often value-laden, Islamist 
civic activities were successful in raising interpersonal trust, horizontal solidarity 
networks and citizenship awareness 46 Islamist associations also became active in
43 For more information on Mazlum-Der, see Gottfried Plagemann, "Human Rights Organisations: 
Defending the Particular or the Universal?" in Stefanos Yerasimos, Gunter Seufert and Karin 
Vorhoff, eds., Civil Society in the Grip o f Nationalism (Istanbul: Orient-1 nstitut & Institut Fran9ais 
d'Etudes Anatoliennes, 2000), pp. 451-59.
44 For a thorough portrait o f MUSIAD, see Karin Vorhoff, "Businessmen and Their Organizations: 
Between Instrumental Solidarity, Cultural Diversity and the State" in Stefanos Yerasimos, GUnter 
Seufert and Karin Vorhoff, eds., Civil Society in the Grip o f  Nationalism (Istanbul: Orient-Institut 
& Institut Framjais d'Etudes Anatoliennes, 2000), pp. 158-72. For a comparative study o f 
MUSIAD and the Islamic-oriented labour union Hak-lj, see §ennur Ozdemir, "MUSIAD ve Hak- 
i§'i Birlikte Anlamak" in Yasin Aktay, ed., Jslamcilik (Istanbul: ileti§im, 2004).
45 Nilufer Gole, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamic Participation: The Case o f Turkey" in 
Jillian Schwedler, ed., Towards Civil Society in the Middle East (London: Lynne Rienner, 1995b),
pp. 81-82
46 White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics, p. 211
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pinpointing the cases where religious freedom in Turkey was compromised 
through the application of an extreme version of secularism.
The strength of Islamist civil society was proven when the Islamist parties, 
with which it was linked, namely the Welfare Party {Refah Partisi-KP) and its 
successor the Virtue Party {Fazilet Partisi-FP) were successively shut down by 
the Turkish Constitutional Court in 1998 and 2001. Despite this double blow 
against Turkish political Islam, Islamist civil society associations maintained their 
diverse activities, proving that their growth was not coincidental and incumbent 
upon the support of political parties. When the membership of the closed FP was 
split into two new Islamic parties, the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi-SP) and the 
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi-AKP), most of the 
Islamic civil society associations became affiliated with the moderate AKP. Their 
support was decisive for the stunning electoral victory of the AKP in November 
2002, although it is questionable whether their strong link with the AKP has been 
preserved since then.
d. The Collapse of the State Icon
The rise of Turkish civil society was further facilitated by a series of events, 
which damaged the image of the Turkish state.47 The Susurluk accident, the 
Manisa affair, the response to the 1999 Istanbul earthquake and the devastating 
economic crisis which hit Turkey from 2000 to 2001 reduced respect for the state 
and encouraged the growth of civil society mobilisation.
47 On “the legitimacy crisis o f  the strong-state tradition” in Turkey since the 1980s, see Key man 
and l9duygu, "Globalisation, Civil Society and Citizenship in Turkey: Actors, Boundaries and 
Discourses", p. 223.
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i). The Susurluk Accident 
On 3 November 1996, a car stuffed with cash and weapons crashed into a truck in 
the northwestern Anatolian town of Susurluk. Its passengers included Sedat Edip 
Bucak, Member of the Parliament, Huseyin Kocadag, head of the Police 
Academy, and Abdullah Qatli, a fugitive convicted for drug trafficking and linked 
with the Turkish far right. £atli, who was also wanted for the murder of seven 
leftist students in 1976, turned out to be a holder of a green passport, a privilege 
reserved for high-ranking civil servants. The Susurluk accident provided ample 
evidence of the suspected links between the government, the police and organised 
crime in Turkey.48 Under the pretext of the need to organise covert operations 
against leftist and Kurdish terrorist groups, segments of the state bureaucracy, 
collectively called the “deep state” (derm devlef), had developed close 
cooperation with rightist terrorist groups and organised crime. The accident made 
it clear that the “deep state” had infiltrated Turkish party politics. The Turkish 
public was outraged at the revelations and mobilised against the government. The 
most characteristic of the organised demonstrations, the “One Minute of Darkness 
for Permanent Light” {Siirekli Aydinhk igin bir Dakika Karanhk) campaign49 was 
a spontaneous citizens’ reaction against state corruption and a clear demand for 
justice and full accountability. A large number of outraged citizens, who 
demanded a purge of the state bureaucracy of its criminal members, made it clear 
that they could no more remain neutral bystanders.50
48 Sugden, "Human Rights and Turkey’s EU Candidacy", p. 247
49 Millions o f Turkish citizens simultaneously turned off the lights o f their houses at 21:00 for one 
minute throughout February 1997. See Taml Bora and Selda £aglar, "Modernle§me ve 
Batihla§manm Bir Ta§iyictsi Olarak Sivil Toplum Kurulu§lari" in Uygur Kocaba§oglu, ed., 
Modernle§me ve Baticihk (Istanbul: tleti§im, 2002), p. 340.
50 Human Rights Watch, World Report 1998-Turkey New York, 1998), available from 
http://www.hrw.org/worldreport/Helsinki-23.htm
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ii). The Manisa Affair 
On 26 December 1995, a group of sixteen teenagers were arrested in the western 
Anatolian town of Manisa while writing political slogans on walls. They were 
immediately charged on the grounds of “being members of a terrorist 
organisation.” During their ten-day police custody, the teenagers were exposed to 
extensive and systematic torture. Their case was brought to court, and ten police 
officers were charged with torture. Despite ample existing evidence, the police 
officers were acquitted in March 1998 for “lack of evidence.” The decision was 
nullified by the Court of Cassations in October 1998, yet the defendants were 
again found not guilty in January 1999. After a second appeal, the Court of 
Cassations reviewed the case and found the defendants guilty in June 1999. The 
lower court had to follow this decision and condemned the defendants in 
November 2000. An appeal against this decision was upheld by the Court of 
Cassations in May 2001 on procedural grounds. The defendants were finally 
condemned in April 2003, only three months before the period within which the 
defendants could be prosecuted elapsed.51
The Manisa affair became a symbol of the abuse of state power and 
disrespect for the fundamental human rights of Turkish citizens. Torture had been 
common in Turkey since the 1980 coup. What made the Manisa affair different 
was the fact that the victims were juveniles and their alleged misdemeanour so 
petty. Moreover, the repeated acquittal of the defendants despite the existence of 
ample evidence and the unusual length of the criminal procedure, which almost 
led to the lapse of the crime, raised suspicions about the complicity of members of 
the judiciary and the police. Domestic and international civil society associations
51 Tiirkiye insan Haklan Vakfi, Press Release on the Manisa Trial Ankara, 2003), available from 
http://www.tihv.org.tr/press/press09042003manisa.html [posted on 9/4/2003]
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and the media concentrated their attention on the Manisa affair and demanded the 
delivery of justice and full accountability. The mobilisation of Turkish public 
opinion on the issues of torture and human rights greatly benefited Turkish civil 
society. The Manisa affair made clear to all Turkish citizens that potential victims 
of torture could not only be terrorists or criminal thugs, but also their own 
children.
iii). The 1999 Earthquake 
In the early morning of 17 August 1999, Istanbul was shattered by a huge 
earthquake, 7.4 on the Richter scale whose epicentre was in the neighbouring city 
of Izmit. More than 30,000 people perished, and whole city quarters suffered 
heavy damage. The tragic situation in the aftermath of this humanitarian 
catastrophe ironically proved favourable for the development of Turkish civil 
society. The urgent need for rescue and relief operations for the millions affected 
by the earthquake raised expectations for immediate and effective state 
intervention. As the Turkish state had traditionally occupied a disproportionately 
large part o f the public sphere, Turkish citizens were used to expecting a dominant 
state role in the management of humanitarian crises. Nevertheless, state 
mechanisms proved blatantly unable to deal with the magnitude and complexity 
of the situation. The inability of state institutions to respond to the great 
humanitarian crisis paved the way for the intervention of Turkish civil society 
organisations.52 The Search and Rescue Association (Arama ve Kartarma 
Dernegi-AKUT) was one of the best-organised NGOs, whose immediate and 
efficient relief work complemented and even overshadowed the activities of the 
official relief organisation Red Crescent (Kizilay). AKUT soon gained overall
52 Demir Murat Seyrek, "The Road to EU Membership: The Role o f  Turkish Civil Society", 
Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 3, no. 3 (2004), p. 118
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respect and became the symbol of an emerging Turkish civil society.53 While the 
state was shown as being unable to perform its basic duties, Turkish voluntary 
associations filled the vacuum left by state inefficiency. This boosted the image of 
civil society associations in the eyes of the Turkish public and legitimised its role 
in the public sphere. Turkish civil society gained visibility, prestige and 
legitimacy in its public role54 and increased its self-confidence. The earthquake 
crisis made clear that NGOs could really make a difference. This was converted 
into public recognition and appreciation.
iv). The 2000-2001 Economic Crisis 
Nonetheless, it was the collapse of Turkish economy, which delivered the final 
blow to the image of the state. In November 2000 and February 2001, Turkey 
experienced a double economic crisis, the worst after the end of the Second World 
War. Chronic economic mismanagement, hyperinflation, massive debt and a 
weak, corrupt banking sector had resulted in the December 1999 stabilisation 
programme. However, the liquidity problems of a mid-size bank (Demirbank) had 
a negative spillover effect for the whole financial system. The Central Bank 
temporarily intervened, providing liquidity to troubled banks; when it decided to 
stop doing so, overnight market interest rates soared to over 2,000 per cent. The 
crisis ended on 6 December 2000, when an IMF financial aid package of more 
than $15 billion was announced and Demirbank was taken over by the Banking 
Regulation and Supervision Agency (Tasarruf Mevduati Sigorta Fo««-TMSF).55 
The crisis re-erupted on 19 February 2001, when the President of the Republic 
Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Prime Minister Biilent Ecevit argued during a MGK
53 Kubicek, "The Earthquake, Europe, and Prospects for Political Change in Turkey", p. 38
54 Rana Birden GUne§, Fieldwork Interview (Ankara, 25/1/2005)
55 Hakan Tun?, "The Lost Gamble: The 2000 and 2001 Turkish Financial Crises in Comparative 
Perspective", Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, no. 2 (2003), p. 46
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meeting, and Ecevit explicitly stated afterwards that Turkey was in the middle of a 
“political crisis.” This made financial markets believe that Ecevif s government 
was about to resign and that the IMF stabilisation programme would be 
abandoned. A major speculative attack was launched on the Turkish Lira, while 
the Central Bank refused this time to act as lender of last resort. The interbank 
payments system collapsed on 21 February, and on the following day, the 
government announced the floatation of the Turkish Lira.56 The extent of this 
crisis is hard to overstate. GNP dropped by 9.4 per cent in real terms during 2001, 
while nominal per capita income plummeted from $2,986 to $2,110. The Turkish 
Lira was devalued by about 50 per cent, and about one million people became 
unemployed. The crisis equally affected skilled and unskilled labour and led to a 
dramatic aggravation of cases of extreme poverty.57 It also underlined the acute 
deficiencies of a state unable to play its regulatory role in the economy. 
Clientelistic ties and patronage networks had limited the ability of state 
mechanisms to regulate the smooth operation of the economy. The proliferation of 
corruption also meant that in many cases state officials had themselves become 
the source of inertia. The heavy economic price that Turkish citizens had to pay 
had a highly damaging effect on their image of the state. The fact that the 
consequences of the crisis were mainly overcome through informal networks of 
social support and the informal economy, rather than coordinated state action, 
resulted in a massive loss of legitimacy for the state.58
56 Ibid., pp. 47-48
57 Ziya Oni§, "Domestic Politics versus Global Dynamics: Towards a Political Economy of the 
2000 and 2001 Financial Crises", Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, no. 2 (2003), pp. 14-15
58 Ibid., p. 15
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e. A Typology
The exponential rise in the number of civil society organisations in Turkey since 
the 1990s has been a striking phenomenon. From only 205 in 1938, associations 
numbered 54,144 in 198159 and over 100,000 in 2004, although only about 10,000 
of them were active.60 This arithmetic growth, however, could not hide a number 
of structural and practical problems.
Turkish civil society associations could be classified into five groups on 
the basis of their nature and membership.65 Associations (dernek), foundations 
(•vakf), public professional associations, cooperatives (kooperatif) and hybrid 
forms cover the spectrum of Turkish civil society.62 The legal shell of a civil 
society association is not always indicative of its actual activity. Many 
foundations depart from the interest in non-political social public benefit issues 
and engage in wider political debates. Questions such as Turkey’s democratisation 
process and EU membership have attracted the interest of foundations such as the 
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Tiirkiye Ekonomik ve Siyasal 
Etudler Vakfi-TESEW) and the Marmara Group Foundation (.Marmara Grubu 
Vakfi), which have performed the advocacy functions of an association. Public 
professional associations and cooperatives still maintain a significant social role, 
although they no longer monopolise the representation of civil society, something 
they had enjoyed in the early republican years. On the basis of their ideological
59 Fikret Toksoz, "Demekler" Cumhuriyet Donemi Tiirkiye Ansiklopedisi (istanbul: ileti§im, 1996), 
p. 373
60 Goksel and Birden Giine§, "The Role of NGOs in the European Integration Process: The Turkish 
Experience", p. 58
61 Ahmet Ifduygu, "Democratic Consolidation and European Integration: The Role o f Civil 
Society in Turkey", Paper presented at the 2nd Pan-European Conference on European Politics: 
“Implications o f  a Wider Europe: Politics, Institutions and Diversity" (European Consortium for 
Political Research (ECPR) Standing Group on the European Union, Johns Hopkins University 
Bologna Center, Bologna, 24/6/2004)
62 Akkan Suver, Fieldwork Interview (Istanbul, 12/1/2005)
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orientation, Turkish civil society organisations could also be classified into 
conventional, Western-oriented, primordial, religious and hybrid. The 
associations, which -along with their other aims- advocate mainstream Kemalist 
ideology (e.g. the Association of Ataturk’s Thought-Atatiirk Dti§unce Dernegi), 
fall into the first category. The associations for the construction and restoration of 
a mosque (cami yaptirma demegf) belong to the religious civil society 
organisations, while the associations of people from the same district in large 
cities (hem§eri dernekleri) are typical primordial organisations. On the other hand, 
the Search and Rescue Association (Arama ve Kurtarma Dernegi-AKUT) and the 
ARI Movement (ARI Hareketi) exemplify liberal, Western-oriented civil society 
organisations. Nonetheless, all organisations have some common characteristics. 
The high degree of politicisation and the emphasis on large social questions rather 
than specific issues differentiates Turkish civil society from that found in most 
Western European states. As ideological concerns often override objectives,63 
Turkish NGOs have developed a confrontational political sub-culture.64 This has 
resulted to the development of a fragmented civil society, where several 
associations with diverse religious, ideological and political leanings share fields 
of activity.65 Fragmentation has reduced the power and efficiency of Turkish civil 
society, as even cooperation among NGOs with similar interests has sometimes 
been difficult. The lack of consensus and -even- civility in the activity of several 
NGOs has led some scholars to the point of doubting whether a genuine civil
63 Ahmet l5duygu, Fieldwork Interview (Istanbul, 17/12/2004)
64 Ersin Kalaycioglu, "State and Civil Society in Turkey: Democracy, Development and Protest" in 
Amyn B. Sayoo, ed., Civil Society in the Muslim World (London: I. B. Tauris, 2002), pp. 258-59 
and Rana Zincir, Fieldwork Interview (Istanbul, 22/12/2004)
65 The case o f human rights protection is an illustrative example. The leftist IHD shares its field 
with the Islamist-leaning Mazlum-Der. See Plagemann, "Human Rights Organisations: Defending 
the Particular or the Universal?" pp. 470-71.
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society exists in Turkey.66 While the majority of observers would not agree with 
this, most would accept that civil society in Turkey still suffers from qualitative 
problems. Although the widening of civil society is quite successful, as the steady 
increase in the numbers of NGOs confirms, the quality of their work, as well as 
their political influence have not increased pari passu. Although a number of 
diverse and innovative activities are often organised, deepening is still lagging 
behind widening in Turkish civil society. Major discrepancies are also observed 
between the quality of the work and the potential of professional central and local 
peripheral NGOs. Such disparities hamper the harmonious growth of Turkish civil 
society as well as its more effective public role.
3. The Impact of the European Union
The European Union showed keen interest in the development of civil society in 
Turkey and the solution of its various problems. EU policies were developed in 
two pillars: The programme of financial support aimed at providing new 
opportunities and healing existing deficiencies of Turkish civil society 
associations. Legislative reform was supported through the application of the 
political conditionality principle in the process of Turkey’s prospective EU 
membership evaluations.
a. Financial Support
As a member-state of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership since its inception in 
1995, Turkey received EU financial aid through the MEDA I programme, which
66 Metin Heper, Fieldwork Interview (Ankara, 26/1/2005)
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lasted from 1995 to 1999.67 Turkish NGOs were among the beneficiaries of this 
programme. Some of them, which were active in promoting democracy, human 
rights and civil society, started receiving financial aid under various EU budget 
lines even before 1995. Between 1993 and 2001, Turkish NGO's received an 
average of €500,000 in grants per annum.68 The 1999 Helsinki European Council 
decision, which gave Turkey the status of EU candidate member-state, was the 
first step towards the establishment of comprehensive EU financial aid 
programmes for Turkey. The signing of Accession Partnership documents in 2000 
and 2003 also paved the way for the support of structural reform. In the 2000 
Accession Partnership document,69 the Turkish government was required to 
strengthen “legal and constitutional guarantees of the right to freedom of 
association and peaceful assembly and encourage development of civil society.”70 
The same commitment was reiterated in the 2003 Accession Partnership
71 • ■ • • •document. Turkey became eligible to participate in the Pre-Accession 
Assistance Programme, which meant that the amount of financial aid would 
drastically rise, with the aim of facilitating Turkey’s convergence with the EU 
economic, political and social acquis.
67 For details on the EU-fiinded promotion o f democratisation in the Mediterranean countries 
through the MEDA programme, see Nadim Karkutli and Dirk Butzler, Final Report: Evaluation of  
the MEDA Democracy Programme 1996-1998 (Brussels: European Commission, 1999).
68 European Union, Financial Assistance before Candidacy (Delegation o f the European 
Commission to Turkey: Ankara, 2004), available from
http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int/default.asp?lang=l&ndx=12&mnID=3&ord=5&subOrd=l
69 Accession Partnership documents are signed between the European Union and applicant states. 
Within the spirit o f the Copenhagen Criteria, they identify reform priorities and objectives, as well 
as a roadmap, whose implementation will enable the start of accession negotiations.
70 Official Journal o f the European Communities, 2000 Accession Partnership Agreement with the 
Republic o f Turkey [2001/235/EC] (Brussels, 2001), p. L85/16
71 Official Journal o f  the European Communities, Accession Partnership Agreement with the 
Republic o f Turkey [2003/398/EC] (Brussels, 2003), p. L145/44
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Six major programmes were launched from 2003 to 2004 to support the 
development of Turkish civil society.72 The amount of financial support reached 
the level of €20,008,091 in total.
The Civil Society Development Programme was the most ambitious of all 
EU-funded programmes aiming at the support of civil society in Turkey. Its 
general objective was to
reinforce civil society in Turkey, to develop capacity for 
citizens' initiatives and dialogue, domestically and abroad, and 
to help establish a more balanced relationship between citizens 
and the state, thereby contributing to the maturing of 
democratic practice.73
The programme had five components, referring to local civic initiatives, the 
Turkey-Greece civic dialogue,74 dialogue and development o f chambers, trade 
union dialogue, and police professionalism and the public. The overall allocation 
for the Civil Society Development Programme was €8,000,000.
The programme titled “Rethinking Human Rights & Civil Society in 
Turkey: An Historical Account with Photographs” aimed at collecting visual 
material, which highlighted the milestones in the historical development of human 
rights in Turkey, as well as the parallel historical evolution of civil society. The 
aim of this programme was the promotion of awareness on the issues of human 
rights and civil society. €408,091 was allocated for this programme.
72 The information on the six programmes has been obtained from European Union, EU Funded 
Programmes in Turkey 2003-2004 (Ankara: European Commission Representation to Turkey, 
2004), pp. 39-45.
73 Ibid., p. 39
74 For more details, see Bahar Rumelili, "Civil Society and the Europeanization o f Greek-Turkish 
Cooperation", South European Society & Politics, Voi. 10, no. 1 (2005), pp. 49-52.
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The target of the “Development of Human Rights, Democracy & 
Citizenship Education” programme was to strengthen human rights, democracy 
and citizenship education in schools and society with related partners all over 
Turkey. The project was further divided into four components, namely the 
adjustment of the legal base for human rights, democracy and citizenship 
education, the revision of curricula and educational material development, 
capacity building and awareness raising and dissemination. The allocated fund for 
this project amounted €5,000,000.
The “European Initiative for Democracy & Human Rights” programme 
targeted the support of human rights, democracy and conflict prevention activities, 
to be carried out primarily in partnership with NGOs and international 
organisations. Both major and minor projects were supported. The support of 
minor projects aimed at contributing to democracy by providing small-scale 
financial support for initiatives from grassroots non-governmental organisations. 
An average of €2,000,000 per annum has been allocated since Turkey became a 
focus country in 2002. €600,000 from this fund became available for micro­
projects.
The programme titled “Improving Cooperation between the NGOs & the 
Public Sector and Strengthening the NGOs' Democratic Participation Level” 
aimed at strengthening of NGOs democratic participation and the ties between the 
public sector and the civil society within the framework o f the EU alignment 
process. For the whole project, €2,000,000 has been allocated.
The aim of the “Turkish Democracy Human Rights & Civic Participation 
Network” programme was to improve youth awareness of and support for human
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rights and rule of law issues in the Turkish society. Emphasis was given on youth 
living outside Istanbul and Ankara. This project was granted with €600,000.
Most Turkish NGOs made good use of EU funds for the expansion of their 
activities. Capacity-building programmes aimed to overcome the Achilles’ heel of 
Turkish civil society associations, that is, their relatively low organisational and 
operational quality. Some of the perennial structural problems of Turkish civil 
society, such as the high degree of politicisation, their ideological, partisan nature, 
or the lack of a consensual approach to politics, were not definitely resolved; on 
the other hand, they were mitigated by EU financial assistance and training.75 As a 
conclusion, it can be argued that EU financial aid had a very significant impact on 
the growth of civil society in Turkey.
b. Legislative Reform
i). Before the Reform 
Constitutional and legal restrictions on the development of civil society in Turkey 
were mainly a product of the military regime installed by the coup of 12 
September 1980. The 1982 Constitution, as well as the relevant legislation, did 
not provide for effective protection of the freedom of association, which is a 
prerequisite for the development of a free civil society. According to Article 33 of 
the 1982 Constitution, associations were prohibited from pursuing political aims, 
engaging in political activities, receiving support from or giving support to 
political parties, or taking joint action with labour unions, public professional 
organisations or foundations. Associations could normally be dissolved by a 
decision of a judge, or suspended by the competent (administrative) authority 
pending a court decision in cases where delay was deemed to endanger the
75 Rduygu, Fieldwork Interview
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“indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, national security, 
national sovereignty, public order, the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others, or the prevention of offences.” The Law on Associations, which was also 
promulgated under the military regime in 1983, followed the same illiberal line.76 
Founding an association for the purpose of engaging in any activity on the 
grounds of or in the name of any region, race, social class, religion or sect was 
banned. Relations with international associations were also forbidden, and 
associations could not use languages other than Turkish in their official contacts. 
Finally, the grounds for banning an association were loosely described, so 
maximum state intervention was allowed.
The first amendment to Article 33 was enacted in 1995 as part of a limited 
reform programme aiming at overcoming objections by the European Parliament 
to the Customs Union agreement between the European Union and Turkey 
negotiated in that year. The ban on the political activities of associations was 
abolished, and collaboration with political parties and other associations was 
permitted. In cases where an association was suspended from activity by the 
decision of the competent administrative authority, this decision had to be 
submitted to the approval of the competent judge within twenty-four hours. The 
judge was required to announce his decision within forty-eight hours; otherwise, 
the administrative decision automatically ceased to be effective.77 Despite these 
minor reforms, constitutional and legal protection of the freedom of association 
was anything but satisfactory.
76 Korel Goymen, "The Third Sector in Turkey: Towards a New Social Contract with the State", 
Paper presented at the EGPA 2004 Annual Conference: Four Months After: Administering the 
New Europe (Ljubljana, 1/9/2004), p. 5
77 Ozbudun and Yazici, Democratization Reforms in Turkey (1993-2004), p. 20
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The regular reports prepared by the European Commission on Turkey’s 
progress toward accession consistently cited the insufficient protection of the 
freedom of association as one of the main deficiencies in Turkey’s progress 
toward the fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria. In 1998, the European 
Commission report clearly stated that the freedom of association in Turkey was 
“subject to certain limitations” and listed an indicative list of restrictions. 
Associations were not allowed to “invite foreign associations to Turkey, issue 
public statements or organise any activities outside their premises without 
obtaining the prior permission of the authorities.” At the same time, however, the 
report noted the significant rise in the number and activities o f Turkish NGOs.78 
In 1999 the Commission report briefly commented that the situation regarding the 
freedom of association had not changed since 1998, adding that several branches 
of the Turkish Human Rights Association (insan Haklan Dernegi-IHD), a 
prominent Turkish NGO with extensive activity in the field of human and 
minority rights protection, had been closed, either temporarily, or for an indefinite 
period. From 2000 onwards, the Commission reports devoted much more space 
to the freedom of association in Turkey. As a result of the 1999 Helsinki 
European Council decision, Turkey became an EU candidate state. This focused 
the attention of EU officials on human rights and freedoms violations, including 
the freedom of association. In 2000, the Commission report repeated that the 
freedom of association was still not fully respected. The need for official 
permission for common NGO activities such as conferences or distribution of 
leaflets, the ban on establishing umbrella institutions and from arranging
78 Commission of the European Communities, 1998 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards 
Accession, p. 16
79 Commission of the European Communities, 1999 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards 
Accession, p. 13
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institutional collaboration with other international NGOs -unless permitted by a 
decree of the Council of Ministers- and pressure on NGOs active in the field of 
human rights, were among the problems cited. The situation was particularly 
problematic in regions under emergency rule. The IHD branch in Diyarbakir was 
closed down and re-opened several times by administrative decision of the 
Governor without explanation. The Commission report concluded by stating that 
“major efforts are still required to guarantee freedom of association and 
assembly.” 80 Bureaucratic obstacles to the establishment of an association, close 
state control and restrictions on the receipt of financial aid from abroad continued 
to restrict the development of civil society.
ii). The Reform Process 
Political conditions in the aftermath of the 1999 Helsinki European Council and 
the 2002 Copenhagen European Council decisions81 were more favourable for 
reforms affecting the freedom of association. In principle, the coalition 
government supported Turkey’s bid for EU membership and declared its 
willingness to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria so as to permit the start of accession 
negotiations between the European Union and Turkey. Nonetheless, consensus 
disappeared when the reform debate touched on sensitive issues, which were 
thought to affect Turkey’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and security. Freedom 
of association was thought to be one of these issues. As a result of this, reforms 
were piecemeal and rather reluctant.
80 Commission o f the European Communities, 2000 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards 
Accession, p. 17
81 The 2002 Copenhagen European Council considered for the first time whether Turkey should be 
given a date for the start for accession negotiations and decided to move the final decision to 
December 2004.
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A first step was made with the amendment of Article 33 of the Turkish 
Constitution on 3 October 2001,82 which guaranteed the freedom of association. 
General rules and restrictions on the right to form associations were modified, 
with minor positive effects on the freedom of association. The right to form an 
association was broadened, but restrictions “to the extent that the duties of civil 
servants so require” were retained.83
Much more comprehensive amendments were made to the Law on 
Associations, a remnant of the authoritarian 1980-1983 military regime, under the 
second “reform package” (uyum paketi) of March 2002. Articles 7, 11 and 12, 
which restricted relations with international associations, were removed. The 
freedom to establish and join associations was elaborated, while the grounds for 
banning an association were restricted.84 On the other hand, countervailing 
reforms of the Civil Code in January 2002 maintained the possibility of state 
control over NGO relations with international organisations. Further reform of the 
Law on Associations was undertaken under the third reform package of August 
2002. Limitations on civil servants’ right to establish associations were lifted, as 
was the possibility of a ban on association activities for civil defence purposes.85 
A new body in charge of associations was created within the Ministry of the 
Interior, as opposed to the Directorate General of Security.86
Further reforms were enacted under the fourth reform package of January 
2003 after the election of the AKP government in November 2002. Associations
82 Turk Buyuk Millet Meclisi (TBMM), Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasimn Bazi Maddelerinin 
Degi§tirilmesi Hakkinda Kamin (4709/2001)
83 Commission o f the European Communities, 2001 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards 
Accession [SEC(2001) 1756] (Brussels: European Union, 2001), pp. 26-28
84 Turk Biiyuk Millet Meclisi (TBMM), Bazi Kanunlarda Degi?iklik Yapilmasina III'}kin Kamtn 
(4748/2002)
85 See Turk Buyuk Millet Meclisi (TBMM), Qeqitli Kanunlarda DegLpklik Yapdmasina Hi.?kin 
Kanun (4963/2003a).
86 Commission o f the European Communities, 2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards 
Accession [SEC(2002) 1412] (Brussels: European Union, 2002), p. 35
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were allowed to use any language in their non-official correspondence, while legal 
persons were also allowed to become members of associations. Restrictions on 
making announcements or distributing publications were eased, while the 
obligation to forward copies of these documents to the relevant authorities prior to 
distribution was removed.87 Under the seventh reform package of July 2003, 
restrictions on the establishment of associations by people convicted of certain 
crimes or former members of an association or political party closed down by a 
court decision were eased.88 Higher education students could establish 
associations not only related to education and recreation, but also art, culture and 
science. Following the provisions of the third reform package, a Department of 
Associations was established in August 2003 within the Ministry of Interior.89
Finally, a new Law on Associations was adopted in July 2004.90 The new 
law dealt with many of the shortcomings of the previous legislation,91 although its 
implementation was temporarily suspended, due to a presidential veto. The law 
was finally promulgated unchanged in November 2004,92 although its 
implementation has again been partially blocked93 after an appeal to the 
Constitutional Court by the CHP. Limitations on the establishment of associations 
on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sect, region, or any other minority group 
were lifted, as well as the requirement to seek prior permission to open branches 
abroad, join foreign bodies or hold meetings with foreigners and inform local
87 See Turk BUyiik Millet Meclisi (TBMM), C]e?Uli Kanunlarda Degi?iklik Yapilmasina Hi?kin 
Kanun (4778/2003b).
88 Turk Biiyiik Millet Meclisi (TBMM), Qe?itli Kanunlarda Degi?iklik Yapilmasina lli?kin Kanun
89 Commission o f the European Communities, 2003 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards 
Accession (Brussels: European Union, 2003), p. 32
90 Turk Biiyiik Millet Meclisi (TBMM), Dernekler Kanunu (5231/2004b)
91 Senem Aydin and E. Fuat Keyman, European Integration and the Transformation o f  Turkish 
Democracy [No. 2] (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 2004), pp. 29-30
92 Turk Biiyiik Millet Meclisi (TBMM), Dernekler Kanunu (5253/2004a)
93 This referred to Articles 10 (on financial assistance from/to political parties) and 13 (on the 
minimum number o f association members).
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government officials of general assembly meetings. The new law lifted all 
restrictions on student associations and allowed for the establishment of 
temporary and informal platforms or networks for all civil society organisations. 
Governors were now required to issue warnings prior to taking legal action 
against associations, while security forces were no longer allowed to enter an 
association’s premises without a court order.
(Figure 6 )
Figure 6. "Don't stay silent about torture!" (Ifkenceye sessiz kalm a!). A poster from the 2004 
cam paign o f the Human Rights Foundation o f Turkey ( Tiirkiye insun H aklan  FaA/i-TlHV)
Associations were allowed to conduct joint projects and receive financial support 
from other associations and public institutions and no longer had to seek prior
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permission to receive funds from abroad. Associations acting outside the scope of 
their statute only received a fine and were no longer subject to dissolution.94
4. The Stance of Social Actors
a. The Bureaucracy
It would be wrong to maintain that the whole of the state bureaucracy opposed the 
reform process. However, while parts of the bureaucracy seemed to be adjusting 
to the new political and social conditions, others remained recalcitrant opponents 
of liberalisation. This division cut through all the branches of Turkish 
bureaucracy, so it would be possible to talk about reformist and reactionary 
factions within the judiciary, the police, the state bureaucracy and the military.95 
The rise of an active civil society and the EU pressure to make relevant legislative 
steps necessary for its successful development caused fault lines to emerge 
between reformists and reactionaries within the bureaucracy. While some sections 
of the bureaucracy recognised the need for reform on instrumentalist or non­
instrumentalist grounds, reform was vehemently opposed by some other 
bureaucratic groups. Systematic police harassment of NGOs, which were 
frequently cited in the human rights reports of domestic and international 
organisations, provided evidence of this. A series of judicial decisions, which had 
a negative impact on the activities of NGOs, corroborated the point. The 
annulment by the Court of Cassations in May 2005 of a lower court decision, 
which had refused to order the closure of the Education Trades Union (Egitim- 
Sen) on the alleged grounds that its constitution defended the right of education in 
one’s mother tongue, was a clear signal that reform efforts had not affected old
94 Commission o f the European Communities, 2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards 
Accession [SEC(2004) 1201] (Brussels: European Union, 2004), pp. 40-41
95 Ziya Oni§, Fieldwork Interview (Istanbul, 17/12/2004)
157
mindsets at the highest echelons of the judiciary .96 The ambivalence and 
hesitation with which the Turkish parliament treated the issue of reform in civil 
society legislation as well as the piecemeal nature of adopted reforms -especially 
during the rule of the 1999-2002 coalition government- showed the strength of 
resistance.97 Coalition partner parties like the far-right Nationalist Action Party 
(Milliyetgi Hareket Partisi-MHP) and the nationalist leftist Democratic Left Party 
{Demokratik Sol Parti-DSP) opposed reform or accepted it with the greatest 
reluctance only as a sine qua non for the success of Turkey’s European bid. The 
AKP government showed more courage in reforming the legislation on civil 
society, which became clear with the promulgation of the new Law on 
Associations. Yet the immediate reaction of the President of the Republic Ahmet
98 ►Necdet Sezer, who returned the law to parliament and the major opposition party 
CHP, which appealed against the Law to the Constitutional Court, showed that the 
liberalisation of civil society legislation was still not popular among parts of the 
highest echelons of the Turkish politics and bureaucracy.
b. The Business Capital
The positive role of the business capital in the rise of Turkish civil society cannot 
be ignored. Turkish business capital has been the biggest social ally as well as 
domestic financial supporter of Turkish NGOs and has also participated in the 
formation of some of the most successful NGOs. While Turkish businesspersons 
had historically showed no interest in politics, preferring to do lucrative business 
with the state, the situation changed rapidly in the 1990s. Turkish capitalists 
assumed the role of a pressure group for democratisation and the development of
96 Derya Sazak, "Egitim-Sen Davasi", Milliyet, 27/5/2005
97 Sugden, Fieldwork Interview
98 According to Article 89 o f the Turkish Constitution, the President o f the Republic has the right 
to return bills to the Parliament on the grounds o f unconstitutionality.
civil society. A series of reports originating from the most prominent capitalist 
association made this point clear. The 1997 TUSlAD report on democratisation 
stated that
Not only TUSIAD, but all Turkish citizens and all institutions 
representing the civil society are obliged to strive towards the 
improvement and assimilation o f democracy in this country.
Our future depends on it. Turkey's future does not lie in 
isolating itself from the world, on the contrary it should keep 
step with global developments. Barriers between the world and 
democracy are being raised one by one. Henceforward, 
economic and political relations cannot evolve independently of 
democracy and human rights."
The rise of a consciousness of corporate social responsibility and the resulting 
clear defence of democratisation and liberalisation were unprecedented for a 
business association of the size and political importance of TUSIAD. TUSiAD 
saw itself as a member of the larger community of NGOs in Turkey, which had a 
special role to play in the process of Turkey’s democratisation:
A broader-based democracy will certainly not result from this 
study, nor will it be realised by TUSIAD alone. This can only 
be achieved by those who adopt the perspectives put forward by 
this document and who are willing to come together to reach an 
agreement on the details. Thus, it would only be possible by the 
concerted effort o f groups such as: non-governmental
organisations, trade unions, professional bodies, industrialists 
and businesspersons’ associations, whose struggle would be
99 Tanor, 1997 TUSIAD Report: Perspectives on Democratization in Turkey, p. 3
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reflected in Parliament by the political parties. After all, if we 
decide that "now is not the right time, or it is not our job" then 
we, as the true sovereigns o f this land, who authorize politicians 
to represent us in Parliament, we as members of civil society 
organisations should ask ourselves this question: If not us -  
who?, If not now -  when?100
Support for such statements was not unanimous inside TUSiAD. Some of its own 
members took a critical stance towards the report and TUSIAD’s increasing 
interest in politics. The reaction of several nationalist, extreme leftist and 
conservative groups was even harsher. TUSiAD was accused of being a “Western 
agent.” 101 Yet the argument was finally won by the reformists. Business capital 
thus made an important contribution to the legitimation of civil society as an 
independent social actor. However, the role of business capital was not 
exclusively moral and political, since Turkish civil society soon benefited from 
increasing financial support by Turkish businesspersons. Some of the most 
prominent NGOs, such as the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation 
(Tiirkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etiidler FtfA/i-TESEV) and the Turkish Third Sector 
Foundation {Tiirkiye Ugiincii Sektor Vakfi-TVSEV), were able to support their 
extensive research and advocacy work through the active support of Turkish 
businesspersons, who had also founded their own non-profit foundations. The 
Vehbi K0 9  Foundation, (Vehbi Kog Vakfi), Haci Omer Sabanci Foundation {Haci 
Omer Sabanci Vakfi) and the Aydin Dogan Foundation {Aydm Dogan Vakfi) are 
characteristic well-endowed non-profit foundations, which are named after their 
businessman founder and perform a broad range of social activities in the fields of
100 Ibid.
101 See Bora and £aglar, "Modernle§me ve Batilila§manin Bir Ta§iyicisi Olarak Sivil Toplum 
Kurulu§lari", pp. 344-45.
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education, health and culture. Although this support may have not always been 
even-handed, and some civil society sectors were disproportionately favoured, 
this cannot minimise the importance of the business capital contribution in 
general. 102
5. The Incidence of Social Learning
The Europeanisation of civil society in Turkey may have faced serious problems 
and drawbacks, yet it also initiated a process whereby views on the meaning, role, 
priorities and objectives of Turkish civil society have been rethought and 
modified. Social learning has taken place at different levels within the ranks of 
several social actors. Turkey’s business community was the social actor most 
affected by this socialisation process. It was more widely agreed that civil society 
should be prepared to intervene in all aspects of policymaking and support 
Turkey’s course toward democratisation. 103 Similar trends were also observed 
within the ranks of Turkish bureaucracy, although the existence of strong 
opposing views showed that the socialisation process was incremental and 
incomplete. Within civil society, self-confidence and trust in the ability of NGOs 
to bring about political and social change in the direction of Turkey’s democratic 
consolidation were reinforced. A positive change was also noted in public opinion 
polls. Civil society was approached with less suspicion and more appreciation and 
interest in its activities.
102 Ersin Kalaycioglu, "Civil Society in Turkey Continuity or Change?" in Brian W. Beely, ed., 
Turkish Transformations: New Centuries, New Challenges (Walkington UK, 2004), pp. 74-75
103 The empowerment o f Turkish civil society also became evident in its impact on Turkey’s 
refusal to join the United States in its 2003 war against Iraq. See Ian O. Lesser, Turkey in the EU: 
A New U.S. Relationship (Western Policy Center: Washington DC, 2004), available from 
http://www.westernpolicy.org/Secondary.asp?PageName-Publication&Page=Commentary/Comm 
entary75.asp.
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The AKP government, which came to power in November 2002, has 
been the relatively most receptive to NGOs. When NGO delegations were invited 
for the first time by the government to discuss a series of political issues arising 
from Turkey’s EU candidacy, the government made a move of major symbolic 
importance. 104 The degree of change in the relations between the state and civil 
society under the impact of improving EU-Turkey relations was clearly displayed. 
After the meetings, most NGOs remained disappointed by the outcome of their 
meetings with the government, as their views did not seem to have the expected 
impact on government decisions. Nonetheless, a crucial first step was 
accomplished: Turkish civil society was accepted by the government as a 
legitimate social actor and interlocutor, which was to be consulted when 
government decisions in the field of their expertise were pending. Support for the 
development of Turkish civil society was no more just viewed as part o f Turkey’s 
“homework” for the fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria, but as a strategy for 
the empowerment and consolidation of Turkey’s democratic institutions, with its 
own rationale.
6. Conclusions
The path dependent character of the transformation of civil society is one of the 
main conclusions of this chapter. The qualitative and quantitative growth of civil 
society resulted in the increasing empowerment of civil society actors and the 
formation of new social alliances. The successful engagement o f Turkish civil 
society associations in multifarious social and political activities increased their 
appeal and legitimation in the eyes of public opinion. It also made clear that a
104 Goksel and Birden Giine§, "The Role of NGOs in the European Integration Process: The 
Turkish Experience", p. 63
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vibrant civil society was not a threat but -on  the contrary- a valuable asset. This 
made a reversal to the previous illiberal regime increasingly difficult.
The usefulness of historical institutionalism and the two-level game 
model as explanatory tools for the EU impact on Turkish civil society is also 
clearly manifested. Given that the creation of conditions conducive to the growth 
of civil society has been among the primary objectives of EU democratisation 
policies, a success can be claimed in the case of Turkey. Through their generous 
financing of civil society activities, the identification of the areas where reform 
was necessary and the careful tracking of improvements, EU institutions proved 
their crucial impact on the transformation of civil society in Turkey. The 
European Commission, in particular, exerted through its annual reports 
considerable pressure towards the amendment of the Constitution and the drafting 
of the new Law on Associations. This facilitated the work of local NGOs, liberal 
intellectuals, the business capital and reformist bureaucrats. While it would have 
barely possible to achieve such a comprehensive reform programme with their 
own political influence, this became possible as a result of Turkey’s efforts to 
converge with the Copenhagen Criteria.
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V. THE STATE
1. Defining State Tradition
One of the basic functions of a state is to compromise inherently antithetical and 
often conflicting interests, represented by different social groups. The point where 
this balance is struck is a function of the degree of popular participation and 
political tradition. In democratic political systems, the need to secure full and 
effective popular participation in political decision-making needs to be matched 
with the need to guarantee swift and effective government. Sartori described this 
as the horizontal and vertical dimensions of democracy. Horizontal links, which 
refer to popular participation and action, give a regime its essentially democratic 
character. As Sartori put it:
Public opinion, electoral democracy, participatory democracy, 
referendum democracy —all represent a horizontal
implementation and diffusion o f democracy.... for the 
uniqueness of democracy resides precisely in establishing, or 
re-establishing, the horizontal dimension o f politics.105
Horizontal links in modern democracies are countervailed by vertical links. While 
vertical links between rulers and ruled exist in non-democratic regimes, modern 
democratic regimes are also characterised by a vertical dimension. Apart from 
securing popular empowerment and participation, democracy is also a system of 
government that strikes a balance in the relationship between the rulers and the 
ruled in a democratic context. 106 A democratically elected representative 
leadership exercises command and control to achieve the long-term interests of
105 Giovanni Sartori, The Theory o f  Democracy Revisited (Chatham NJ: Chatham House 
Publishers, 1987), pp. 213-14
105 Ibid., p. 132
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the political community. Power is concentrated in the hands of the state and is 
employed to ensure coercion to the rulings of the representative leadership, while 
state bureaucracy aims at increasing the efficiency of this policy. The 
establishment of salient vertical links in a democratic system makes sure that 
democracy will not degenerate into anarchy. As Dahl argued:
Everyone who is not an anarchist is likely to agree that the risks 
of concentration are sometimes offset by the advantages of a 
uniform policy. The conflict between the advantages and risks 
of concentration is genuine, and citizens and leaders cannot 
escape the force o f this dilemma in any democratic country.107
A nexus of horizontal and vertical links coexists in democratic systems, and the 
balance struck between them can indicate priorities for a more participatory or 
more efficient government. Berki attempted to juxtapose two different 
prioritisations of balancing vertical and horizontal dimensions of democracy by 
introducing the polar terms “transcendentalism” and “instrumentalism.” 
Transcendentalism prioritises the vertical aspect of democracy, giving absolute 
priority to the state, which is conceptualised as a transcendental entity, over the 
individual:
Transcendentalism, then, refers to the belief that man primarily 
belongs to a moral community....that the community has a 
paramount moralising function and is, therefore, logically 
speaking “prior” to its members....The public interest does not 
merely delimit but also defines the proper pursuits of
107 Robert Alan Dahl, Dilemmas o f  Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control (New Haven CT: 
Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 106-07
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individuals who belong to it.... (Transcendentalism) connotes 
the high ideals o f duty, service, the sublimation of energies. 108
Instrumentalism, on the other hand, does not recognise a transcendental character 
to the state, but rather considers it to be an instrument for the promotion of 
individual private aims. Instrumentalism lays its weight on the horizontal aspects 
of democracy and prioritises individual over state interests:
Instrumentalism hence has an air of freedom, diversity, 
plurality, colourful and “healthy” conflict about it; it is 
unheroic, and its dynamism is confined to that o f its self- 
assertive members. 109
Therefore, the quality of a democratic regime can be measured by its success in 
striking an optimal balance between the horizontal and vertical dimensions of 
democracy and taking a moderate instrumentalist approach. A democratic state 
tradition, therefore, refers to a balance, which neither dismisses particularistic 
groups, nor ignores the need to pursue long-term state interests. 110 Politics thus 
becomes the tool for the resolution of different views and interests on the basis of 
compromise and a mechanism to reach a “dynamic rather than static consensus” 
and “organic rather than mechanical solidarity.” 111
A strong state tradition has been a common theme in Ottoman and 
republican Turkish politics. 112 Classical Ottoman and Tanzimat state traditions
108 Robert N. Berki, "State and Society: An Antithesis o f Modem Political Thought" in Jack 
Hayward and Robert N. Berki, eds., State and Society in Contemporary Europe (Oxford: Martin 
Robertson, 1979), pp. 2-3
109 Ibid., pp. 3-4
uo Metin Heper, "The Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation o f  Democracy - Turkey and 
Germany Compared", Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 25, no. 2 (1992), p. 170
111 Metin Heper, "Political Culture as a Dimension o f  Compatibility" in Metin Heper, Ay§e Oncii 
and Heinz Kramer, eds., Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), p. 15
112 Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey, pp. 15-17
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coalesced in recognising absolute priority to “community” interests expressed by 
the state over any particularistic interests. The pursuit of individual interest was 
dismissed as divisive and harmful for the common good. In republican years, this 
legacy has been instrumental in shaping politics, as well as the way the balance 
between the horizontal and vertical dimensions of democracy was struck. Shifting 
the balance point in the direction of accepting a more instrumental view of the 
state and increasing the relative importance of horizontal aspects of democracy 
has been a key element of the democratic consolidation process in Turkey.
2. State Tradition in Turkey
a. The Ottoman Legacy
The Ottoman state tradition is a topic of critical importance in the study of Balkan 
and Middle Eastern politics. Ozbudun defined it as
a strong and centralised state, reasonably effective by the 
standards of its day, highly autonomous of societal forces, and 
occupying a central and highly valued place in Ottoman 
political culture.113
Although the Ottoman Empire in its classical era still belonged to the medieval 
world, it was the most centralised of all its contemporaries. The absence of 
hereditary landed gentry meant that the power of the sultan met no effective 
power checks. The appointment of Janissaries in all critical military and 
administrative positions epitomised the patrimonial character of the system114 and
113 Ozbudun, "Continuing Ottoman Legacy and the State Tradition in the Middle East", p. 133
114 Murat Beige, "intisab: Yaygm ve Dayamkli ili§ki", Radikal, 16/10/2004
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prevented the development of a military and administrative aristocracy.115 The 
concentration of most land in the hands of the sultan and systematic confiscations 
of private property proved to be an effective way of keeping sultanic power intact. 
Meanwhile, the gradual development of a predominantly non-Muslim urban 
merchant class did not have any impact on state-society relations. 116 The Islamic 
nature of the Ottoman state prevented the conversion of the economic power of 
the non-Muslim merchant elites into political power. 117 Non-Muslim Ottoman 
subjects could have no claim to a share of political power or participation in the 
military and administrative state apparatus. 118
The Ottoman state tradition was shaped under the influence of two 
countervailing trends. On the one hand, the Ottoman Empire was influenced by 
the Middle Eastern patrimonial dynastic tradition, where the political and 
religious realms were diffused and political legitimacy rested on the person of the 
sultan. Sultan Mehmed the Conqueror {Fatih) declared his “holy warrior” (gazi) 
title to be the legitimacy basis of his rule. 119 Moreover, the sultan was considered 
personally responsible for the welfare of his subjects. 120 The personal character of 
sultanic rule was also manifested by the customary ratification of existing laws 
each time a new sultan ascended to the throne. On the other hand, political 
legitimacy was not exclusively based on Islam and personal rule. The sultan was
115 Frank Tachau, "The Political Culture of Kemalist Turkey" in Jacob M. Landau, ed., Atatiirk and 
the Modernization o f Turkey (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1984), p. 60
1,6 Metin Heper, "The State and Interest Groups with Special Reference to Turkey" in Metin 
Heper, ed., Strong State and Economic Interest Groups : the Post-1980 Turkish Experience (Berlin 
& New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991), p. 13
117 Ozbudun, "Continuing Ottoman Legacy and the State Tradition in the Middle East", p. 135
118 The development o f the Phanariot Greek class since the 18th century is an exception, which can 
be, however, explained on the basis o f Ottoman state pragmatism. The absence o f Western 
language speakers among the Ottoman Muslim elite and the Ottoman obligation to appoint 
Christian suzerain rulers in the Danubian provinces o f Moldova and Walachia resulted in the de 
facto  emergence o f  a small Christian administrative elite until the outbreak o f the Greek 
Revolution in 1821.
119 Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey, p. 24
120 This was the essence o f the patriarchal duty o f hisba. See Heper, "The Ottoman Legacy and 
Turkish Politics", p. 65.
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bound to take measures outside the Islamic law, if this was demanded by state 
interest. In due course, a special body of legislation (orf-i sultani) was 
accumulated, which did not emanate from Islam or the sultan’s whim, but from 
reason and necessity. The sultan was then referred to not as “the shadow of God 
upon earth," but as a temporal, secular ruler. The traditional Middle Eastern 
notion of “Circle of Justice” 121 served as an additional justification for the shift 
toward reason-based rule. 122 This secular tradition was codified under the word 
adab and remained a constant determinant of Ottoman state policy, differentiating 
it from other Islamic states.
The first signs of Ottoman decline in the 17th century were followed by a 
decrease in the power of the central state and the adab tradition. The devastating 
results of Ottoman campaigns against the Habsburg and Russian Empires stressed 
the need for increased state cash revenues, which could only be possible through 
the abolition of the timarm  system and the establishment of tax-farming. Local 
notables (dyan and derebeyler) who took over the function of tax-farming 
emerged as serious contenders for state power at the regional level. The “Deed of 
Alliance” (Sened-i Ittifak) of 1808 was the document that marked the apogee of 
the power of local notables, as well as the separation between the person of sultan 
and the state. It was the state and not the sultan that was mentioned as a party to 
the pact. 124
121 According to the “Circle o f Justice” argument, a ruler can have no power without soldiers, no 
soldiers without money, no money without the welfare o f his subjects and no popular welfare 
without justice. See Ayhan Akman, "Modernist Nationalism: Statism and National Identity in 
Turkey", Nationalities Papers, Vol. 32, no. 1 (2004), pp. 33-34.
122 Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey, p. 25
123 The timar was “a grant o f land, in return for which the sipahi, a feudal cavalryman, was bound 
to render military service in person and with as many men-at-arms as were required by the size 
and income o f his fief.” See Lewis, The Emergence o f  Modern Turkey, p. 90.
124 Heper, "The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics", p. 65
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Sultan Mahmud II saw the need to modernise the Ottoman state, in order 
to forestall its disintegration. The Napoleonic expedition to Ottoman Egypt in 
1798, the outbreak of the Greek Revolution in 1821 and the successful 
Westernisation reform programme of Egypt’s ruler Mehmed Ali were all powerful 
signals of the urgent need for Ottoman reform. The brutal suppression of the 
Janissary Revolt in 1826 was the first successful test o f the modernising state 
apparatus and removed the last vestiges of a parochial institution, which could 
perform even a minor power-check role. The abolition of traditional checks and 
balances in the absence of Western-based equivalents meant that the Ottoman 
state could grow virtually uncontrolled. The reform of military and civil 
bureaucracy increased state efficiency, while the introduction of Western 
technology increased the ability of the state to control society. In fact, the state 
was seen as an indispensable tool in the struggle to transform society. While the 
state was growing stronger domestically, its international position was 
increasingly precarious. Successive military defeats and territorial concessions 
showed the military and diplomatic incompetence of the Ottoman state, which 
resulted in the rise of the “Eastern Question.” The urgent need for reform was 
epitomised in the question often discussed among Ottoman intellectuals of the 
time: “How can this state be saved?” (Bu devlet nasil kurtarilabilir?). Ottoman 
reformists thought state reform and centralisation was the only answer. 125 A vision 
of “order-in-progress” replaced the emphasis on the durability of the established 
order.126
125 Opinions favouring decentralisation and power devolution as a means to sustain the unity o f  a 
multiethnic, multi-religious empire were expressed by Midhat Pa§a among the Young Ottomans 
and Prince Sabahaddin among the Young Turks. Nonetheless, they never appealed to the majority 
o f elites and the public.
126 Akman, "Modernist Nationalism: Statism and National Identity in Turkey", p. 34
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The 1876 Constitution was the first attempt to introduce representative 
institutions. However, these efforts were quickly frustrated when the new Sultan 
Abdtilhamid II indefinitely suspended the force of the Constitution in 1878. While 
the previous steps toward political liberalisation were swiftly undone in the 
Hamidian era, state modernisation continued unabated. A strong Ottoman state 
was needed to serve Hamidian government domestically and prevent the 
disintegration of the ailing Empire. The Ottoman state further developed an 
unmistakeably authoritarian character. It was valued in its own right and remained 
relatively autonomous from society. Phrases like “May God not bring adversity to 
the State and the Nation” {Allah Devlete, Millete zevel vermesin), “the Sublime 
State” {Devlet-i Aliye) and “the sublime interests of the State” {Devletin all 
menfaatleri) entered Ottoman political vocabulary and survived the demise of the 
Ottoman state itself. 127 The state retained its tutelary role even after the 1908 
Young Turk Revolution, when the 1876 Constitution was reinstated and 
parliamentary elections were held. The Revolution brought an end to Hamidian 
rule, but built upon its already strengthened state apparatus. After a brief and 
unsuccessful experimentation with pluralism, a military dictatorship was 
established shortly after the outbreak of the Balkan Wars. According to Karpat, 
this was inevitable for the implementation of the Young Turk agenda:
The only way out of this chaos, was, as Young Turks saw it, to 
strengthen the state apparatus and launch a series of cultural and 
economic reforms to modernise the social and political 
structure....Thus, Young Turks ended in the dictatorship of a 
small group, which fully utilised the state to achieve those ends.
127 Ozbudun, "Continuing Ottoman Legacy and the State Tradition in the Middle East", p. 137
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The age-old autocratic traditions were continued on behalf of 
the state.128
The Young Turk triumvirate (Enver Pa§a, Talat Pa§a and Cemal Pa§a) resorted to 
state violence and terror to defend the Empire’s interests and transform the 
remaining territories into a Turkish nation-state. Ferocious atrocities orchestrated 
by state and para-statal apparatuses tainted the last years of the Ottoman Empire 
but could not prevent its demise. After the Ottoman Empire surrendered by 
signing the Moudros Armistice of 30 October 1918, it was not the Istanbul 
government, but the Ankara-based nationalists who successfully claimed the 
mantle of Ottoman state tradition. The new Republic was a radical break from the 
old order, but, at the same time, continuities were too significant to ignore.
b. The Turkish State from 1923 to the 1990s
Despite ail the cataclysmic changes in the transition from the Ottoman Empire to 
republican Turkey, the Ottoman state tradition showed remarkable endurance in 
the new era. Kemalism could also be viewed as the institutionalised republican 
version of the Ottoman adab tradition. 129 This climate was anything but conducive 
to the development of a free civil society.130 In accordance with the ideological 
trends of the interwar years, corporatist ideas were also seriously considered. 131 
Under the leadership of Recep Peker, the CHP developed in the early 1930s
128 Kemal H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System (Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 443
129 Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey, p. 61
130 Kalaycioglu, "Civil Society in Turkey Continuity or Change?" pp. 67-69
131 For the encounters o f early republican elites with corporatism, see Kansu, "Tiirkiye’de 
Korporatist Dii§unce ve Korporatizm Uygulamalari", pp. 260-66, Murat Beige, "Korporatizm", 
Radikal, 30/10/2004 and Murat Beige, "Fevzi £akmak", Radikal, 9/11/2004. For the enduring 
impact o f corporatist ideas in Turkish politics, see Murat Beige, "Gunliik Hayatta Korporatizm", 
Radikal, 31/10/2004.
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strong corporatist features, 132 while attempts to develop a statist but more leftist 
ideology were stalled. 133 While the allegiance of Kemalism to democracy 
remained -a t best- dubious, 134 the image of the strong state remained impeccable, 
and its role as the agent of a forced top-down modernisation was reaffirmed. As 
Kazancigil argued:
...Kemalists, although very different from the traditional 
Ottoman bureaucrats, since they were trained in secular schools 
to become adepts of Western ideas, were heirs to the old 
patrimonial tradition, which assumed the dominance o f state 
over civil society and reserved the monopoly of legitimacy and 
authority to state elites.135
Dissidence or opposition were not tolerated in this Hegelian type of state, 136 and 
coercion was crucial in the implementation of the Kemalist reform programme. 
The state elite137 became the implementer of the Kemalist reform, given that the 
lack of a multi-party, democratic system meant the absence of a political elite. 138 
The emergence of a competitive political elite after the introduction of a multi­
party system in 1946 changed this picture, as the state elite was not willing to give
* 1 IQup its political prerogatives. A struggle between state elite and politicians has
132 Yiiksel Akkaya, "Korporatizmden Sendikal Ideolojiye, Milliyet5ilik ve Is9i Sinifi" in Tanil 
Bora, ed., Milliyetgilik (Istanbul: ileti§im, 2002), pp. 831-33
133 For the case o f the intellectual movement linked with the magazine “Kadro”, see Mustafa 
Turke§, "Kadro Dergisi" in Ahmet insel, ed., Kemalizm (Istanbul: ileti§im, 2001).
134 Levent Koker, "Kemalizm/Ataturk?uluk: Modernle§me, Devlet ve Demokrasi" in Ahmet insel, 
ed., Kemalizm (Istanbul: Ileti§im, 2001), pp. 108-11
135 Ali Kazancigil, "The Ottoman-Turkish State and Kemalism" in Ali Kazancigil and Ergun 
Ozbudun, eds., Atatiirk, the Founder o f  a Modern State (London: C. Hurst, 1981), p. 48
136 Hasan Biilent Kahraman, Fieldwork Interview (Istanbul, 18/1/2005)
137 For the purposes o f this study, the term “state elite” encompasses civil and military 
bureaucracies and excludes politicians, for whom are the term “political elite” is used.
138 For an early and valuable study o f  Turkish political elite, see Frey, The Turkish Political Elite .
139 liter Turan, "The Evolution o f Political Culture in Turkey" in Ahmet Evin, ed., Modern Turkey: 
Continuity and Change (Opladen: Leske Verlag + Budrich GmbH, 1984), p. 105
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been a common theme of Turkish politics since then and has shaped republican 
state tradition. As Heper argued:
....for a long time democracy in Turkey developed as a conflict 
between the state elites and political elites. The state elites 
tended to act basically as the guardians o f the long-term 
interests o f the country and held a condescending attitude 
towards the particularistic interests; political elites in turn 
perceived themselves primarily as the defenders o f the 
particularistic interests. The state elites’ expectations of 
democracy and the consequent rift between them and the 
political elites came to have critical implications for Turkish 
politics.140
The advent of multiparty politics also gave the chance for a rapprochement 
between the Kemalist state elite and peripheral political forces. Nonetheless, the 
process of integration turned out to be highly problematic. The state failed to 
penetrate the periphery, 141 o f which politicians took over the leadership. 142 The 
struggle between the state elite and politicians was also characterised by a strong 
sense of repugnancy to any form of opposition. 143 Empowered by popular vote 
and support, politicians, represented by the DP in the 1950s, attempted to 
challenge the dominant role of the state elite by renegotiating the relationship 
between state and society, centre and periphery. 144 This happened without the due
140 Metin Heper, "The Consolidation of Democracy versus Democratization in Turkey", Turkish 
Studies, Vol. 3, no. 1 (2002a), p. 140
141 Heper, Fieldwork Interview
142 Metin Heper, "Conclusion" in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., State, Democracy and the 
Military: Turkey in the 1980s (Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988a), p. 250
143 §erif Mardin, "Opposition and Control in Turkey", Government and Opposition, Vol. 1, no. 3 
(1966), pp. 379-80
144 Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" p. 185
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respect to the democratic rights of the opposition. 145 What resulted was a vicious 
circle. As Heper argued:
The state elites were sensitive to the crisis o f integration and 
were therefore intolerant toward the periphery, whilst the 
periphery, mostly smothered, and therefore, overly, defiant 
whenever it could afford to be, was prone to add fuel to and 
reinforce the prejudices of the state elites.146
The effort of the DP to reshape Turkish politics through majoritarian democracy 
was violently interrupted by the Turkish military. The coup of 27 May I960 was 
the first clear response of the state elite to the effort made by politicians to 
challenge its power and promote particularistic interests against the perceived 
long-term state interests.147 It also initiated a vicious circle of military coups, 
illustrating the deadlock, which Turkey’s democratisation process had entered. 
The establishment of a multiparty democratic system by the state elite led to the 
election of political parties, which -a t least allegedly- did not show the same 
commitment to Kemalist principles. Such policies inevitably led to a new military 
coup, which, after abolishing existing democratic institutions, purifying the 
political space from harmful influences and reinforcing institutional guarantees 
for the Kemalist nature of the system, set democracy back into operation. 148
Before handing over the power to a civilian government, the military 
attempted to make sure, through the promulgation of the 1961 Constitution, that
145 Turan, "The Evolution o f Political Culture in Turkey", p. 98
146 Heper, "State and Society in Turkish Political Experience", p. 5
147 Udo Steinbach, "The Impact o f Atattirk on Turkey's Political Culture since World War II" in 
Jacob M. Landau, ed., Atattirk and the Modernization o f Turkey (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 
1984), p. 81
148 Ernest Gellner, "The Turkish Option in Comparative Perspective" in Sibel Bozdogan and Re§at 
Kasaba, eds., Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey (Seattle & London: University 
o f Washington Press, 1997), p. 241
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bureaucratic elites would maintain formidable political power and that the 
restored “static order” of Kemalist orthodoxy could not be again challenged by 
peripheral forces. 149 On the one hand, the new constitution greatly expanded 
human rights protection; on the other hand, it also strengthened the institutional 
position of the bureaucracy vis-a-vis the government and the parliament. 150 A 
National Security Council (Milli Guvenlik Kurulu-MGK) o f civilian-military 
composition was established to decide on national security issues with a remit, 
which was very widely interpreted. 151 The dominant role of the military was 
further established by its close involvement in the economy. The Armed Forces 
Mutual Assistance Fund (Ordu Yardimla$ma Kurumu-OYAK) was founded in 
1961 to manage military social security funds. 152 Soon it became one of the 
biggest economic actors of the country, with multifarious and lucrative business 
operations, which improved the living standards of Turkish officers and provided 
them with additional power. 153 Special links were also developed with business 
groups, which exchanged their protected dominant position in domestic market 
with a degree of subordination to the state elite. 154 The constitutional amendments 
in the aftermath of the 1971 coup further strengthened the position of the 
military. 155 The establishment of State Security Courts (Devlet Guvenlik 
Mahkemeleri-DGM) in 1973, in line with a constitutional amendment passed in 
February 1972, was an additional manifestation of the accumulation of power in
149 Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" p. 186
150 Ergun Ozbudun, "State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey" in Larry Diamond, 
ed., Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder CO & London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 257-58
151 Ozbudun and Yazici, Democratization Reforms in Turkey (1 9 9 3 -2 0 0 4 '), p. 33
152 Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, pp. 174-75
153 Tim Jacoby, "For the People, o f the People and by the Military: The Regime Structure of 
Modern Turkey", Political Studies, Vol. 51, no. 4 (2001), p. 677
154 Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey, pp. 102-03
155 Ozbudun and Yazici, Democratization Reforms in Turkey (1 9 9 3 -2 0 0 4 ) ,  pp. 33-34
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the hands of the bureaucracy. 156 State security courts tried cases deemed to affect 
national security and became instrumental in checking political dissent under the 
provisions of the extremely illiberal Turkish Penal Code. 157 The state elite 
maintained its grip over all forms of civil society. Political parties, trades unions, 
business and professional organisations remained partly subordinated to the 
state. 158 The MGK and the State Security Courts became the symbols of the 
institutionalised nature of the military’s political role. 159
The rift between politicians and the state elite was also instrumental in the 
rise of political patronage and clientelism in Turkey. As the state elite claimed to 
be the sole advocate of long-term community interests, politicians were persuaded 
to represent purely the particularistic interests of the periphery. 160 This 
strengthened existing local patronage and clientelistic links and led to a 
bifurcation of the state, which was “double-faced,” strong in some respects and 
weak in others. 161 The expression “father state” {devlet baba) was not coined in 
the republican era; in fact, its roots can be traced to the Ottoman times. 162 The 
Ottoman state had maintained a strong paternalistic character. It acquired a 
fatherly image, which -in  theory- cared for the welfare of its citizens but never
156 Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, p. 208
157 Articles 141 and 142 o f the Turkish Penal Code severely restricted freedom o f expression and 
association. Participation in “any society aiming to establish the hegemony or domination o f a 
social class over the other social classes” or “overthrow any o f the fundamental economic or social 
orders established within the country” or to “carry on propaganda” to the same effect was severely 
penalised. See Ibid., p. 197.
158 Ibid., p. 318. Some parties came to develop special links with the state, claiming to be 
protectors o f its interest. For the relationship between the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetqi 
Hareket Partisi-MHP) and the state, see E. Burak Arikan, "Turkish Ultra-Nationalists under 
Review: A Study o f  the Nationalist Action Party", Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 8, no. 3 (2002), 
pp. 371-72. For the statism o f the CHP, see Hasan Bulent Kahraman, "tki Devletsilik, tki 
Populizm", Radikal, 1/12/2004.
159 Muftiiler-Bac, "The Impact o f the European Union on Turkish Politics", pp. 168-69
160 Heper, "The Consolidation o f Democracy versus Democratization in Turkey", p. 141
161 On the bifurcated nature o f the state, see Metin Heper and E. Fuat Keyman, "Double-Faced 
State: Political Patronage and the Consolidation o f Democracy in Turkey", Middle Eastern 
Studies, Vol. 34, no. 4 (1998).
162 On the Ottoman roots o f clientelism, see Beige, "Modernizasyon'da Intisab".
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allowed individual freedom . 163 However, this expression became a more accurate 
representation of societal perceptions of the state after the introduction of multi­
party democracy. Suleyman Demirel, one of the most influential politicians of the 
second half of the 20th century, who served long tenures as Prime Minister and 
President, came to personify in the eyes of many Turks a fatherly political 
figurehead, as well as political patronage and clientelism . 164 The cognomen 
“Father” (.Baba), which Demirel gained for his populist and paternalistic policies, 
clearly illustrated this perception. 165 Patronage politics in the 1960s and 1970s had 
their impact on the coherence of the bureaucratic elite. Political parties succeeded 
in colonising large segments of the civil bureaucracy, so it was only the military 
that remained insulated from party infiltration and fragmentation and maintained a 
clear autonomy and conscience of its vanguard and tutelary mission. 166 Politicians 
were dismissed as sectarian, selfish and inefficient. 167 This included the CHP, the 
party of the Kemalist elite, which had lost its elitist bureaucratic credentials. It 
was suggested that its role came to be de facto  played by the military. 168 The rise 
of patronage politics coincided with a period of serious political violence and 
anarchy, which ended with the military coup of 12 September 1980.
The 1980-1983 military regime took drastic measures to restore the 
dominance of the state and the tutelary role of the bureaucracy, besides
163 For the limited political role o f the Turkish citizen, see Etyen Mah9upyan, "Devlet Sirrindan 
Devlet Su5una", Zaman, 12/12/2004.
164 Heper and Keyman, "Double-Faced State: Political Patronage and the Consolidation of 
Democracy in Turkey", pp. 264-65
165 For a comparison o f the populist image o f Demirel and Ozal, see Taml Bora and Necmi 
Erdogan, "Muhafazakar Popiilizm" in Ahmet £igdem, ed., Muhafazakarhk (Istanbul: ileti§im, 
2003), p. 644.
166 Ozbudun, "State Elites and Democratic Political Culture in Turkey", p. 262
167 Ihsan D. Dagi, "Human Rights and Democratization: Turkish Politics in the European Context", 
Journal o f  Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 1, no. 3 (2001), p. 52
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reinterpreting Kemalism in a more conservative way . 169 The promulgation of a 
new constitution was one of its most important restoration tools. In the Preamble 
of the 1982 Constitution, the exaltation of the state came almost to the point of 
sanctification, the state being referred to as “sacred” (kutsal Turk Devleti).™  State 
interests took increased priority, 171 and the position of the military was also 
significantly strengthened. 172 In the aftermath of the 1980 coup, the grip of 
bureaucratic elites over academia was tightened with the establishment of the 
Higher Education Council {Yuksek Ogretim Kurulu-YOK), which was entrusted 
with the inspection of Turkish higher education institutions and its faculty staff. 
The YOK became very active in suppressing dissident voices among Turkish 
academics, thus imposing an authoritarian aura in the academic world. Although 
the end of political violence, as a result of the 1980 military coup, was met with 
relief by most Turks, an exorbitant price was paid for this. The weakness and 
immaturity of the Turkish democratic system became once more clear. It was 
reasonably argued that the rigid suppression of political dissent was not the only 
alternative to political anarchy and that democracy did not merely consist of an 
elected government, but also the right to express dissident opinions. 173 The clearly 
illiberal character of the regime also led to a reaction by European states, which 
had been less critical of military coups in the past. 174 The emphasis on national 
security also meant that programmes for welfare and social services had little
175priority.
169 For more details, see Yiiksel Ta§km, "12 Eyliil A taturk^lugti ya da Bir Kemalist Restorasyon 
Te§ebbusu Olarak 12 Eylul" in Ahmet insel, ed., Kemalizm (Istanbul: ileti§im, 2001).
170 Ozbudun, "Continuing Ottoman Legacy and the State Tradition in the Middle East", p. 137
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173 Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, p. 270
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In the aftermath of the 1980-1983 military regime, the wave of economic 
liberalisation initiated by the Motherland Party (.Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) 
governments reshaped economic and social conditions and questioned the 
dominance of the state elite. The ideological fragmentation o f civil bureaucracy 
was allowed to continue, while the dramatic growth of the private sector lowered 
the status and prestige of the civil service. 176 This facilitated the autonomisation of 
politicians from the tutelage of the bureaucracy. A new generation of politicians 
emerged, led by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, which had a technocratic rather than 
ideological approach to politics and was markedly closer to public sentiment. 177 
The debureaucratisation of the state was resumed through politicisation, a 
personalistic style of government and closer government control over the 
bureaucracy. 178 In 1987, Ozal came to the point of openly challenging the military 
by appointing to the position of the Chief of General Staff not the Commander of 
the Land Forces General Necdet Oztorun, who was earmarked by military custom, 
but his preferred candidate General Necip Torumtay. This was seen as a violation 
of the military-enforced principle that governments should not influence 
appointments at the top the armed services. Ozal’s insistence on having the 
political initiative in security and foreign policy issues led to the early resignation 
of Torumtay, following their disagreement on Turkey’s position during the first 
Gulf crisis in 1990-1991.179 This was, however, a crucial first test pointing to the 
gradual civilianisation of the regime. 180
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c. The Turkish State since the 1990s
i). The Impact of Global Actors 
State-society relations in Turkey were also affected by global developments in the 
aftermath of the Cold War. A new strategic and security environment emerged in 
Turkey’s region. The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the establishment of 
eight new states in the Caucasus and Central Asia, many of which shared cultural 
and linguistic links with Turkey. The first Gulf war brought the Middle East into 
the centre of international and US interests and reshuffled regional strategic 
balances. Under these circumstances, the loss of strategic importance, which the 
end of the Cold War meant for Turkey,181 was counterbalanced by its new 
strategic role in the volatile regions of the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central 
Asia. Aiming to use Turkey as a strategic ally for their regional policy, the United 
States -especially its security establishment- planned a special relationship with 
the Turkish military, thus de facto  recognising its extra-institutional political role. 
This tacit support for the dominant role of the military in Turkish politics was 
based on the US will to ensure stability and a pro-Western regime in Turkey. The 
Turkish military was seen as the strongest and most reliable domestic interlocutor 
and ally and a guarantee for the continuation of a pro-US regime in Turkey, While 
the United States clearly favoured the predominant role of the state elite, the 
impact of globalisation was countervailing. Access to private and international 
media weakened the information monopoly of the state elite and spread 
understanding of Western European, liberal ways of dealing with state-society 
relations. The spread of liberal democracy in Eastern Europe after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall showed that democratic consolidation was not an impossible task and
181 Soli Ozel, Fieldwork Interview (Istanbul, 29/12/2004)
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left Turkey’s tutelary democracy more exposed to criticism. In, Europe, demands 
to subordinate military forces to democratic control gained general support, while 
the significance and status of the military, in the aftermath of the Cold War, was 
reduced.182 Meanwhile, there was a shift from “hard” security issues to “soft” 
issues like regime type, civil disorder and terrorism. This new security agenda 
influenced the role of the Turkish military, which became increasingly 
preoccupied with issues of “soft” security.183 Nonetheless, globalisation only 
marginally challenged the dominant position of the state elite. In fact, the state 
elite grew stronger in some cases as a result of domestic developments.184
ii). The Impact of Domestic Politics 
The struggle between transcendental and liberal perceptions of the state continued 
in the 1990s.185 Two issues, which dominated the political agenda, the escalation 
of the Kurdish conflict and the rise of political Islam, were used as pretexts for 
reinstating a powerful role for the state elite. The sudden death of Ozal in 1993 
further facilitated this development, as there was no other politician with 
sufficient popular authority to balance bureaucratic power. In due course, the 
military attempted to develop a concept of national security that legitimised and 
perpetuated its involvement in almost every aspect of domestic politics.186
The PKK insurgency took the dimensions of a full-scale war in several 
provinces of eastern and southeastern Turkey in the early 1990s. This allowed for 
the implementation of martial law in the “state of emergency” region (Olaganiistii
182 Umit Cizre, "Egemen Ideoloji ve Turk Silahli Kuvvetleri: Kavramsal ve lli§kisei Bir Analiz" in 
Ahmet insel, ed., Kemalizm (Istanbul: ileti§im, 2001), p. 158
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East Journal, Vol. 57, no. 2 (2003), p. 217
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University o f  Washington Press, 1997b), pp. 46-49
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Hal Bolgesi-OHAL) where the military enjoyed virtually unlimited powers. The 
PKK threat gave the military the chance to take over extensive administrative and 
judicial duties in the conflict-ridden provinces and gain wide public support for its 
security operations.187 The prioritisation of state over individual interests took 
new dimensions, as severe and brutal human rights violations affecting the 
civilian population of eastern and southeastern Turkey, PKK members and 
prisoners were justified as necessary for the protection of long-term state interests. 
The final defeat of PKK forces in 1998 and the subsequent capture of its leader 
Abdullah Ocalan in February 1999 was seen a success for the military, which 
proved its ability to defend state sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The growth of political Islam also mobilised the assertively secularist 
reflexes of the bureaucracy and the military. The rise of the RP to power in 1996 
was a severe shock for the state elite, which mobilised to prevent its infiltration by 
Islamists. Their campaign culminated in the MGK meeting of 28 February 1997, 
which has been cited since then as a “soft” coup. The military members of the 
MGK presented to the civilian members -in  effect, the government— an 18-point 
memorandum, which aimed at suppressing “reactionary Islam” (irtica). The most 
important of these points included limitation of Islamic vocational education, 
screening of the economic activity of Islamic groups, strict control in the 
recruitment of people with Islamist leanings into the bureaucracy and prevention 
of acts, which could be deemed anti-secular through the introduction of stricter 
legislation for the protection o f the secular character of the state.188 After some 
hesitation, Prime Minister Erbakan was forced to endorse the memorandum on 5
187 The increased role o f the military in dealing with the Kurdish issue was agreed upon by Prime 
Minister Tansu (filler, who had developed a special relationship with it. See Robins, Suits and 
Uniforms : Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War, p. 176.
188 M. Hakan Yavuz, "Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere", Journal o f International Affairs, 
Vol. 54, no. 1 (2000), pp. 37-38
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March 1997. His coalition government came under tremendous political, social 
and bureaucratic pressure through backbench defection and was finally forced to 
resign on 18 June 1997. This mode of military intervention was drastically 
different from former military coups and was coupled with the mobilisation of the
1 OQ
secular segment of civil society. Although the “28 February process” can be 
seen as a big setback in the process of democratic consolidation, it was significant 
that the military avoided an outright coup and attempted to influence political 
developments through the mobilisation of friendly civil society forces.190 The 
mode of the military intervention and the interest of the state elite in co-opting 
civil society showed evidence of increasing legitimation of the civil society and 
the politicians in the eyes of the state elite.191 While, in the past, the military had 
aimed to invoke societal indifference and fear, now it aimed to secure consent and 
support. The segments of the civil society that collaborated with the military did 
not necessarily oppose the political role of the military. On the contrary, many of 
them thought that “the intensity of the Islamic threat may require the suspension 
of democratic freedoms and limitation of representative principles and 
institutions.”192
1). The Securitisation of Turkish Domestic Politics 
The securitisation of Turkish domestic politics was a process that reshaped 
Turkish national security perceptions. The rise of the Kurdish and Islamist issues
189 As Admiral Guven Erkaya who participated in the crucial MGK meeting, reportedly later 
pointed: “This time it was not the ‘armed’, but the ‘unarmed forces’ (silahsiz kuvvetler), which 
should be activated.” See Ahmet Ta§getiren, "YOK'ii Ciddiye Almak", Yeni §afak, 21/8/2003.
190 Metin Heper, "Turkey: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow", Journal o f Southeast European and 
Black Sea Studies, Vol. 1, no. 3 (2001), pp. 13-14
191 On the other hand, it could also be argued that the 1982 Constitution had established such a 
powerful veto power in politics for the military, that a “crude military intervention had become 
redundant.” See Umit Cizre Sakallioglu, "The Anatomy o f the Turkish Military's Political 
Autonomy", Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, no. 2 (1997), pp. 53-54.
192 Umit Cizre and Menderes £inar, "Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the Light 
o f the February 28 Process", South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 102, no. 2/3 (2003), p. 322
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were instrumental in a military effort to redefine the concept of national security. 
National security was no more defined as “hard” foreign military threat, but also 
included issues of domestic public policy. As Umit Cizre succinctly argued:
The most radical implication of the post-Cold War 
understanding of security in Latin America, Turkey, and other 
similar contexts is that it is conceived o f as synonymous with 
public policy, thus granting the military a free entry into policy 
making. This is made possible by letting the national security 
concept influence codification of laws pertaining to internal 
security, anti-terrorism, and maintenance of public order, 
criminalising certain political activities, constraining public 
debate and expanding military jurisdiction over civilians. It is 
the translation of national security into laws, decrees and 
regulations that, in fact, gives the Turkish military a wide 
latitude in policy making and law enforcement.193
The securitisation of domestic politics strengthened the political role of the 
military and facilitated the compromise of human rights for the sake of national 
security.194 This was expressed both through the operations of a powerful MGK, 
as well as through various statements of high-ranking officers who took clear 
position on contested issues of domestic policy. This attitude accorded with the 
guardian role of the Turkish military and the shifting of attention towards the 
“ internal enemies” (ig duqmanlar) of the state, in other words, the groups, which -  
allegedly or not- were aiming to compromise Turkey’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty, as well as the assertively secular, unitary, mono-ethnic character of
193 Cizre, "Demythologizing the National Security Concept: The Case of Turkey", p. 219
194 Cizre and £inar, "Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the Light o f the February 
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the Turkish state.195 The military maintained for itself the privilege of defining 
what internal or external threat for national security was.196 On the other hand, 
increased military activity had also its downside, as Umit Cizre and Menderes 
Qinar stressed:
.. ..the m ilitary  is m ore exposed to charges o f  partisansh ip  and  is 
m ore vu lnerab le to  criticism s. G iven the fac t tha t the m ilita ry ’s 
trad itional "m ost trusted  institution" status w as based  on its 
im age o f  being "above politics," one could argue tha t by 
rem ain ing  in the political arena it w eakens the very  foundations 
o f  its ow n strength. The increasing  in tolerance o f  the  m ilitary  
for any criticism  or alternative view s, w hich w e can observe in 
the frequency w ith  w hich the institu tion  responds to  w hat it 
considers counter-positions taken  by public figures, reflects its 
increasing sense o f  insecurity  about its status. It is perhaps for 
th is reason  tha t the m ilitary  aim s to  construct its ow n support 
base by acting like a  political party d irectly  addressing  the 
public. H ow ever, this strategy feeds back into the w eaken ing  o f  
the m ilitary 's carefully  nurtured  "above politics" im ag e .197
Meanwhile, increased interest in “ internal” enemies did not mean that “external” 
threats were discounted. Armenia, Greece, Iran, Syria and -occasionally- the 
Russian Federation were listed as states comprising “external” threats for Turkish 
national security. The Cyprus question also maintained its key importance in 
foreign policy. The often exaggerating emphasis on the possibility of external
195 Ali Karaosmanoglu, "The Evolution o f the National Security Culture and the Military in 
Turkey", Journal o f  International Affairs, Vol. 54, no. 1 (2000), p. 213. For the outdated nature of 
this vocabulary, see Aktar, "Olmayan Avrupa Du§uncesi Uzerine", pp. 273-74.
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security threats, given the comparative size of Turkish military machine, economy 
and diplomatic position had a historical explanation. The Sevres syndrome, the 
atavistic fear that the Great Powers could collaborate with Turkey’s neighbouring 
states with the aim of partitioning it, following the model of the 1920 Sevres 
Treaty, remained a feature of the social habitusm  of the Kemalist elite.199 The 
Sevres syndrome has been a constant undercurrent thought in Turkish national 
psyche and security thinking,200 which proliferated in large parts of the public
• * 901 •opinion. Suspicion and fear of encirclement have resulted not only in poor 
relations with neighbouring states, exorbitant military expenditure and respective 
increase of the military’s influence. It also meant Turkey’s inability to trust its
own material, intellectual capacity and potential. Last, but not least, it
contradicted the military’s long-term Western orientation, as democracy was seen 
as causing political instability, which the “multifarious enemies of Turkey” and 
their local collaborators could only benefit from. This insecurity was a lethal 
threat, which needed to be tackled dynamically.202
The MGK has had a central role in the reactivation of political activity of 
bureaucratic elites and has been a focal point of the democratic consolidation 
debate in Turkey. Being the bulwark of military influence into politics, its 
operation manifested the deficiencies of Turkish democratic system. Turkey, 
despite being a democracy in the procedural sense, still lacked crucial
characteristics of a substantively democratic regime.
198 Following the works o f Bourdieu and Elias, the social habitus can be defined as “a system of 
historically and socially constructed generative principles, granting a symbolic frame in which 
individuality unfolds.” See Dietrich Jung, "The Sevres Syndrome: Turkish Foreign Policy and its 
Historical Legacies", American Diplomacy, Vol. 8, no. 2 (2003), p. 3.
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2). The National Security Council {Milli Guvenlik 
Kurulu-MGYS)
The direct involvement of the military into politics dated back to the late years of 
the Ottoman Empire, and it has been argued that Turkish politics has not been 
fully civilianised since then.203 The Young Turk movement largely consisted of 
military officers, and the 1908 Young Turk Revolution was essentially a military 
one. The coup of 1913 brought Young Turk military leadership to dictatorial 
power. The Young Turk Triumvirate remained the effective ruler of the Ottoman 
Empire until its demise. Being a retired officer himself, Atatiirk attempted in the 
early republican years to bring an end to the political role of the military.204 
Although a large part of Atatiirk’s ruling cadre consisted of retired officers, 
serving officers were banned from politics.205 The rule of the DP further widened 
the gap between the military and politicians. However, the 1960 coup signalled 
the return of the military into politics as a guardian of Turkey’s Kemalist regime, 
The military achieved the institutionalisation of its political role through the 
establishment of the National Security Council (Milli Guvenlik Kurulu-MGK).206 
Article 111 of the 1961 Constitution stated that
The MGK membership consists of the Chief o f the General 
Staff, representatives o f the Armed Forces and other ministers, 
as provided by law.
The President of the Republic presides over the MGK, and, in 
his absence, this duty is taken over by the Prime Minister.
203 Cizre, "Egemen Ideoloji ve Turk Silahh Kuvvetleri: Kavramsal ve ili§kisel Bir Analiz", p. 160
204 Heper, "Turkey: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow", p. 12
205 For the mixed Kemalist legacy on military intervention to politics, see William Hale, 
"Transitions to Civilian Governments in Turkey: The Military Perspective" in Metin Heper and 
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Walter de Gruyter, 1988), pp. 160-61.
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The MGK informs the Council of Ministers about its basic 
views -w hen necessary- in order to assist decision-making on 
issues o f national security and achieving coordination.
This article provided the basis for the institutionalisation of the military’s political 
role. The power of defining issues of national security and implementing policy 
measures for them was transferred from the government to the MGK.207 The 
elastic definition of national security enabled policy formation within the MGK 
on all major issues of domestic and foreign policy. Views formed in the MGK 
constituted the basis of all subsequent government policies. Thus, the military 
obtained a crucial influence over government policy and a veto power against any 
possible political attempts to follow policies, which it did not approve. The state 
elite secured its predominant and unchallengeable role against the politicians, as 
well as their guardianship of the republican character o f the state, whose attributes 
they had the monopoly to define.
The subsequent coups of 12 March 1971 and 12 September 1980 
reaffirmed the leading role of the MGK, while legislation pertaining to its 
competence and operation widened its jurisdiction. The 1982 Constitution 
affirmed the conservative interpretation of Kemalism208 and further increased the 
authority of the MGK. According to Article 118, the government was obliged to 
“give priority consideration” to the MGK decisions, in matters which “the MGK 
deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the 
state.” Article 35 and Article 85 §1 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service 
Law defined the duties of the Turkish armed forces as to “protect and preserve the
207 Cizre, "Egemen Ideoloji ve Turk Silahli Kuvvetleri: Kavramsal ve ili§kisel Bir Analiz", pp. 
177-78
208 On the conservative transformation o f Kemalism, see Murat Beige, "Muhafazakarlik Uzerine" 
in Ahmet £igdem, ed., Muhafazakarlik (Istanbul: ileti§im, 2003b), p. 100.
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Turkish Republic” on the basis of the principles referred to in the Preamble of the 
Constitution, including territorial integrity, secularism and republicanism. Article 
35 stated that “the military is responsible for defending both the Turkish 
Fatherland and the Turkish Republic as defined by the Constitution.” Article 85 §1 
stipulated that “the Turkish Armed Forces shall defend the country against the 
internal as well as the external threats, if necessary by force.”209 Similarly Article 
2a of the National Security Council Law defined national security in such broad 
terms that it could - i f  necessary- be interpreted as covering virtually every policy 
area.210 In effect, the MGK became the supreme decision-making body of the 
state. Severe restrictions of human rights further embedded the absolute priority 
given to state over individual interests.211
3. The Impact of the European Union
a. Before the Reform
European Commission reports were replete with references to the democratic 
deficiencies of the Turkish state structure and operations, focusing on the 
military’s political role and the illiberal and dysfunctional judicial system. The 
1999 report included references to the judiciary, the continuous operation of the 
Emergency Courts system and problems related to State Security Courts. The 
verdicts of the European Court o f Human Rights (ECHR) against Turkey on the 
State Security Courts issue were noted. In 1998, the presence of a military judge 
in State Security Court panels was deemed a violation o f the European 
Convention of Human Rights, while the ECHR additionally concluded in 1999
209 Heper, "Turkey: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow", p. 14
210 Commission o f the European Communities, 2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress 
Towards Accession, p. 23
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that those tried by them had been denied the right to have their cases heard by an 
“independent and impartial tribunal.” The report also pointed to the major role, 
which the MGK continued to play in political life.212 In the 2000 report, the lack 
of further progress on the question of State Security Courts was noted, as well as 
the need for measures, which would guarantee the implementation of ECHR 
verdicts against Turkey. Emphasis was given to civil-military relations. The fact 
that the Chief of General Staff remained accountable to the Prime Minister and 
not to the Defence Minister and that he appointed military members to the 
Council of Higher Education (Yiiksek Ogretim Kurulu-YOK) and the Higher 
Education Supervisory Board (Yiiksek Ogretim Denetim Kurulu) were cited as 
evidence of the exalted status of the military and a deviation from European 
standards. Regarding the MGK, the report noted that it maintained its 
overwhelming influence on issues related with defence, security and the secular 
character of the state and thus -in  practice- drastically limited the role of the 
democratically elected institutions, the government and the parliament.213 The 
2001 report stressed that little progress was made regarding the increase of 
civilian control over the military and reiterated the need for measures to ensure 
the execution of ECHR judgments at the domestic level.214
The 2002 report pointed to problems of independence and consistency in 
the operation of the judiciary. Lack of clarity, transparency and legal certainty 
became apparent when prosecutors were using irrelevant articles of the Penal
212 Commission o f the European Communities, 1999 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress 
Towards Accession, pp. 9-10
213 Commission o f the European Communities, 2000 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress 
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214 Commission o f the European Communities, 2001 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress 
Towards Accession, pp. 16-18
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Code to prosecute citizens after the abolition of the formerly used articles.215 The 
public statements of the MGK military members on the question of EU reform 
were mentioned, as well as their important role in domestic politics. The report 
commented that previous reforms did not appear to have changed the MGK’s 
operation in practice. Although decisions were taken by majority, opinions of its 
military members continued to carry major weight. The report also marked the 
substantial degree of military autonomy in establishing the defence budget and the 
existence of two extra-budgetary funds available to it.216 The defence budget and 
any other military expenditure was never exposed to parliamentary debate or 
media discussion.217
The 2003 report marked the ineffective or unwilling implementation of 
reform measures by the bureaucracy. Measures drawn up by executive bodies 
responsible for the implementation of specific aspects of the political reforms 
adopted by Parliament considerably narrowed the scope of these reforms by 
establishing very strict conditions. The High Radio-Television Board (Radyo- 
Televizyon Ust Kurulu-KIGYY) and the General Directorate of Foundations 
( Vakiflar Genel Mudiirlugu-WGM) were mentioned as examples. The continued 
autonomy of the military in dealing with the defence budget and procurement was 
stressed, as well as its informal -but powerful- political role. The report also 
pointed to problems related to the impartiality and consistency of judicial acts.218 
The 2004 report finally stressed that, apart from formal reforms to the legal and 
institutional framework, civilian authorities should fully exercise their supervisory
215 Article 169 (support for illegal armed organisations), for example, was applied to students 
petitioning for optional Kurdish language courses at their university.
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functions in practice -particularly as regards the formulation of national security 
strategy and its implementation, relations with neighbouring countries and the
9 10control of the defence budget.
b. The Reform Process
The reform process was admittedly long and uneasy, yet it managed in the course 
of five years to produce major progress in the direction of liberalising the Turkish 
state. It was argued that the extent of the EU reform on the Turkish state could 
only be compared with that of the Tcmzimat.220 European Commission reports 
served again as accurate monitors of reform steps. In June 1999, the military 
judge was removed from State Security Courts.221 The establishment of a special 
executive organ, the General Secretariat for the European Union (Avrupa Birligi 
Genel Sekreterligi-ABGS), attached to the Office of the Prime Minister, in June 
2000, aimed to ensure the effective co-ordination of all governmental affairs 
related to EU-Turkey relations and facilitated the state reform process.222 As 
regards the issue of civilian control over military expenditure, the Law on Public 
Financial Management and Control was amended in December 2003 to allow the 
inclusion of extra-budgetary funds in the budgets of the Defence Ministry as of 1 
January 2005 and the dissolution of these funds by 31 December 2007. A military 
member of the YOK, appointed by the Chief of General Staff, and a member of 
the RTUK, appointed by the MGK Secretary General were removed as a result of
219 Commission o f the European Communities, 2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress 
Towards Accession, p. 23
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legislative reform aiming to reduce the political role of the military.223 The most 
important fields of reform, however, were the MGK and the judicial system.
i). The National Security Council {Milli Guvenlik Kurulu- 
MGK)
The reform of the National Security Council {Milli Guvenlik Kurulu-MGK) was 
one of the most sensitive reform issues. The political activity of a military- 
controlled body was repeatedly cited in European Commission reports as evidence 
for Turkey’s serious democratic shortcomings. In October 2001, Article 118 of 
the Constitution concerning the role and the composition of the MGK was 
amended. The number of civilian members of the MGK was increased from five 
to nine while the number of the military representatives remained five. In 
addition, the new text emphasised the advisory nature of this body, stressing that 
its role was limited to recommendations, which the government was required to 
“evaluate” instead of giving "priority consideration" to them.224
Further improvement was noted in the 2003 European Commission report. 
The advisory nature of the MGK was confirmed through an amendment to the 
Law on the MGK in July 2003, in which the provision that "the MGK will report 
to the Council of Ministers the views it has reached and its suggestions" was 
removed. This amendment abolished the extended executive and supervisory 
powers of the MGK Secretary General. In particular, the provision empowering 
the Secretary General to follow up, on behalf of the President and the Prime 
Minister, the implementation of any recommendation made by the MGK was 
abrogated. Other provisions authorising unlimited access by the MGK to any
223 Commission o f the European Communities, 2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress 
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civilian agency were lifted. Another amendment stated that the post of Secretary 
General would no longer be reserved exclusively for a military officer. 
Nonetheless, in August 2003, it was decided to appoint a military candidate, 
General §ukrii Sarn§ik, for one last year. The frequency of the meetings of the 
MGK was modified, so that it would normally meet every two months instead of 
once a month.225
The most far-reaching reforms of the MGK took place in 2004. As regards 
the duties, functioning and composition of the MGK, a regulation was adopted in 
January 2004 implementing previous legislative changes of July 2003. The MGK 
Secretariat General was also transformed into a body serving the purely 
consultative function o f the MGK. Its role was limited to the definition of the 
agenda. The Secretariat was no longer able to conduct national security 
investigations on its own initiative and manage directly the special funds allocated 
to it, which came now under the exclusive control of the prime minister. Further 
changes concerned the internal restructuring of the MGK, with a substantial staff 
reduction and the abolition of some units. Legislation, which came into force in 
December 2003, abolished the secret status of decrees governing the activities of 
the MGK General Secretariat. Finally, in August 2004, a high-profile diplomat, 
Yigit Alpogan, became the first civilian MGK Secretary General. This 
appointment had a highly symbolic significance, as it provided one of the clearest 
manifestations of the civilianisation trend in Turkish politics.226
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c. The Judicial System
Shortcomings in the Turkish judicial system were noted by successive European 
Commission reports. The State Security Courts {Devlet Guvenlik Mahkemeleri- 
DGM) and Turkey’s illiberal legislation were among the main foci of concern. 
Noteworthy steps were first made in 2002 with respect to State Security Courts. 
The number of offences falling under their jurisdiction decreased, while the right 
of defence for detainees falling under their competence was improved. 
Limitations on detainees’ right of access to a lawyer were abolished. Detainees 
prosecuted for collective offences falling under the jurisdiction of the State 
Security Courts became legally entitled to access to a lawyer, but only after 48 
hours. As regards the application of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
the Constitutional Court ruled in March 2002 that this was a source on which the 
Turkish courts could base decisions. In August 2002, provisions were added to the 
Turkish legal system to allow for retrial in the event of convictions, which were 
found contrary to the Convention. Training programmes for judges continued in 
such fields as the prevention of torture, freedom of expression and fair trial.227 In 
2003, the Code of Civil Procedure and the Code of Criminal Procedure were 
amended to allow retrial in civil and criminal cases in which the ECHR found 
violations of the Convention and its Additional Protocols. The Law on the 
Establishment and Trial Procedures of Military Courts was amended aiming to 
end military jurisdiction over civilians and to align the provisions of the military 
code of procedure with reforms adopted by previous packages concerning 
freedom of expression. An increasing number of judges and prosecutors attended 
training seminars, while a Justice Academy was created to train junior judicial
227 Commission o f the European Communities, 2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress 
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officers.228 Courts also started making concrete steps in the implementation of 
political reform. As the 2003 Commission report pointed out:
“C rim inal p roceedings launched against individuals on the  basis 
o f  A rticles 312 (incitem ent to  class, ethnical, relig ious o r racial 
hatred) and  159 (insu lting  the state institutions) have generally  
concluded w ith acquittals. T he courts have started  to  rev iew  
convictions o f  persons convicted  under A rticle  8 o f  the A nti 
T error law  and to  order their release from  prison. T he courts 
have also  started  to  rev iew  the  convictions o f  persons convicted  
under article 169 o f  the T urk ish  Penal Code, w hich has been 
am ended, and in appropriate cases, to order the ir release .229
Judicial reform accelerated in 2004. Following a constitutional amendment 
adopted in May 2004, the State Security Courts were abolished. Jurisdiction over 
most of the crimes falling within the competence of the State Security Courts -  
mainly organised crime, drug trafficking and terrorist offences- was transferred to 
the newly-created regional Serious Felony Courts. The office of the Chief Public 
Prosecutor for State Security Courts was also abolished. Prosecutions before the 
Regional Serious Felony Court were handled by the office of the Chief Public 
Prosecutor. In accordance with the May 2004 constitutional amendments, Article 
90 of the Constitution was revised, enshrining the principle of the supremacy of 
international and European treaties ratified by Turkey over domestic legislation. 
Where there was conflict between international agreements on human rights, and 
national legislation, the Turkish courts would have to abide by the international 
agreements. A new Penal Code was adopted in September 2004, replacing the
228 Commission o f the European Communities, 2003 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress 
Towards Accession, pp. 19-22
229 Ibid., p. 21
197
previous 80-year-old Penal Code. In general, the Code adopted modern European 
standards, in line with the recent developments of criminal law in many European 
countries. It strengthened sanctions against certain human rights violations and 
introduced new offences reflecting recent developments in international criminal 
law, such as genocide and crimes against humanity, discrimination and abuse of 
personal data. Some of its stipulations, however, were considered to weaken 
fundamental rights and freedoms, and a good deal of public reaction ensued.230
4. The Stance of Social Actors
a. The Bureaucracy
The role of civil and military bureaucracy was of critical importance for the 
transformation of the Turkish polity. It was the military, which had three times231 
stalled attempts of political leaders to shift the balance of power towards their 
side. The process of EU reform affected this balance in favour of the politicians. 
Nonetheless, this time the empowerment of the political leadership could not lead 
to the imposition of a majoritarian authoritarian regime, as one could argue in the 
1950s, or to anarchy and chaos, as one could argue in the 1970s. It was linked 
with the process of Turkey’s full and effective democratic consolidation in its 
effort to meet the Copenhagen Criteria. Bringing Turkey closer to Europe was the 
foremost mission of the state elite; however, the very process of Turkey’s 
Europeanisation meant ending its tutelary political role. Military and civil 
bureaucracy reacted differently. The civil bureaucracy was always more prone to 
internal fragmentation, as the experience of the 1970s had demonstrated, even 
though the 1980-1983 military regime was quite successful in restoring the
230 Commission o f the European Communities, 2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress 
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homogeneous character of the state elite. Moreover, among the aims of the 1997 
“soft” coup was also the purge of bureaucratic staff with -real or alleged- Islamist 
leanings. Nevertheless, the divide that appeared within the civil bureaucracy was 
an unprecedented one. There was a reaction against the imminent loss of status 
and political influence that the full implementation of the reform programme 
would entail. Reaction sometimes became clear and explicit, but in most cases 
remained silent and implicit. Obstructing reform programmes through the swift 
use of procedural tools, procrastinating with the implementation of reform 
programmes up to the latest possible point, or deliberately failing to understand 
and implement the spirit rather than the letter of the law were common practices 
among these increasingly marginalised and nationalistic bureaucrats,232 who 
objected to the reform process. As Atilla Yayla commented on a speech by the 
President of the Constitutional Court Mustafa Bumin (see p. 249):
(The speech o f  M ustafa  B u m in )....sh o w ed  us once m ore and in 
a  b itter fash ion  the d istance w hich separates a  part o f  T u rkey ’s 
jud ic ia l bureaucracy  from  com m itm ent to the rule o f  law  and a 
liberal dem ocratic u n d ers tan d in g ....233
On the other hand, other bureaucrats, mainly in the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, 
but also in other ministries, the judiciary and public administration showed a keen 
interest in promoting reform. The General Secretariat for the European Union 
{Avrupa Birligi Gene I Sekreterligi-ABGS) became a reformist bulwark, while 
increased interest in participation was manifested for multifarious seminars 
aiming to train Turkish bureaucrats on how to ensure full and effective respect of 
liberal democratic norms during the performance of their duties. State bureaucrats
232 Oni§, Fieldwork Interview
233 Atilla Yayla, "Bumin, Demokrasi ve Laiklik", Zaman, 27/4/2005
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were exchanging their customary hard power for soft power and were enjoying an 
improving public image.234
While fragmentation in the ranks of civil bureaucracy was not a novel 
phenomenon, it certainly was in the case of the military. For the first time in the 
history of republican Turkey, a latent division emerged between the military 
leaders. While some objected to the diminution of the political role of the military 
and the abolition of its guardian role, others saw —with more or less uneasiness- 
the military’s withdrawal from politics as an inevitable step in the process of 
Turkey’s Westernisation and democratic consolidation. The EU reform process 
and the prospect of EU membership became an additional reason for the 
development of two countervailing trends within the body of the Turkish 
bureaucracy. On the one hand, traditionalists in the judiciary and administration 
were very hesitant about a possible erosion of the predominant role of the 
bureaucracy as a result o f the EU reform process and refused to make any 
reinterpretation of Kemalist principles in line with contemporary developments.235 
As an eclectic vision of Westernisation was substituted by Europeanisation, which 
entailed political liberalisation, they felt that this transformation left Turkish 
national interests in jeopardy.236 General Tuncer Kilinip, Secretary General of the 
MGK, epitomised this stance on 7 March 2002, when he stated during a 
conference at the Istanbul Military Academies Directorate that he opposed 
Turkey’s membership of the European Union and added:
Turkey absolutely  needs to  seek  new  alliances. In m y opinion, 
the best d irection  w ould  be to  seek  an alliance w ith  the R ussian
234 Ozel, Fieldwork Interview
235 On the issue o f Kemalist orthodoxy, see Hasan Bulent Kahraman, "Atatiirk^ulukler", Radikal, 
10/11/2004. For a thorough critique, see Cengiz fandar, "Atatiirk Kemalistlere Ait Degildir", 
Terciiman, 2/11/2004.
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Federation, which would include Iran, without ignoring the 
United States - i f  possible. Turkey has not received any help 
from the European Union. The European Union has negative
237approaches to the problems, which concern Turkey.
Such a statement by a top-ranking officer was not only a blunt verbal intervention 
in the ongoing debate over Turkey’s EU membership and the steps Turkey had to 
make to fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria. It was also a radical departure from the 
perennial quest of the state elite to decisively direct Turkey towards the West. The 
fear that the culmination of Turkey’s Westernisation process, namely its 
membership of the European Union, would lead to the abolition of their 
undemocratic privileges and their subordination to politicians, turned many 
bureaucrats against the prospect of EU membership.
On the other hand, a much more reserved stance was held by the majority 
of the Turkish military, including the Chief of the General Staff General Hilmi 
Ozkok, who saw Turkey’s EU membership as the fulfilment of Atatiirk’s political 
programme.238 The reform programmes of both the Ecevit coalition and the AKP 
government called for significant limitations in the power o f the military and civil 
bureaucracy. The abolition of the State Security Courts, the gradual civilianisation 
of the MGK, the diminution of its competences and the increasing governmental 
control of military expenditure meant the loss of privileges mostly accumulated 
during previous periods of military rule. The prospect of Turkey’s EU 
membership also meant that this process was irreversible; the military could not
237 Murat Gurgen, "Orgeneral Kilin?: Avrupa Bize Uymaz", Radikal, 8/3/2002. For a similar 
approach, see Manisah, "Rusya ile ili§kiler Alternatif mi, Yoksa Bir Denge Arayi§i mi?", Erdogan, 
"Tek Alternatif Avrupa Degil",
238 Metin Heper, "The Military-Civilian Relations in Post-1997 Turkey", Paper presented at the 
IPSA Armed Forces and Society Research Committee Conference: "Globalization o f  Civil-Military 
Relations: Democratization, Reform, and Security" (Bucharest, 29-30/6/2002), p. 3
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reclaim its former prerogatives without marginalising Turkey in the world scene. 
Nonetheless, the majority of the military supported the reform process, viewing it 
as an inevitable step in a process which Ataturk himself had initiated. Tacit 
support or acceptance of more liberal approaches was not limited to the de­
securitisation of several domestic policy issues and the abolition of the military’s 
institutional prerogatives. Even in issues of foreign and security policy, like the 
Cyprus question, the military did not oppose a liberal shift of government policies, 
which brought the Turkish position into harmony with United Nations initiatives. 
Although it would be exaggerating to attribute this shift to a single person, it 
appears that the moderate stance of the Chief of the General Staff General Hilmi 
Ozkok greatly facilitated the reforms.239 After he assumed the leadership of the 
Turkish armed forces in 2002, Ozkok did not object to the reforms. His 
circumspectly supportive stance was instrumental in silencing other top-ranking 
officers, who might have openly criticised the reduction of military privileges.240 
Ozkok fortunately seemed to prioritise Turkey’s long-term interests over the 
interests of the state elite he was leading.
b. The Political Elite
Turkey’s political leaders became increasingly assertive in claiming the role that 
they reasonably thought they should play in a liberal democratic Turkey. 
Although there was still some support for the continuation of the status-quo,241 an 
increasing number of politicians, journalists and civil society figureheads stressed 
the need for a reconsideration of state-society relations, so as to end the tutelary
239 Ozel, Fieldwork Interview
240 Metin Heper, "The European Union, the Turkish Military and Democracy", South European 
Society & Politics, Vol. 10, no. I (2005a), pp. 37-42
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prerogatives of the state elite. A speech made by the leader of the ANAP and 
government coalition partner Mesut Yilmaz at a congress of his party in August 
2001 attacked the national security taboo:242
R egard ing  the obstacles to the efforts to converge w ith  the  EU 
standards, there is a  taboo issue, w hich  alm ost everyone know s 
about, but rem ains s ilen t....T h e se  are the national security  
ex ig en c ies .... Or, m ore accurately, the national security  
sy n d ro m e.... The tim e has com e today to lift the curta in  o f  this 
taboo issu e ....
N ational security  is a  concept absolutely  necessary  to  ensure the 
continuity  o f  a sta te ...H o w ev er, the w ay th is  concep t is 
currently  used, produces the opposite results. The concep t o f  
national security  has becom e an obstacle to  any step  w hich 
secures the future o f  our s ta te ....O u r concern  is tha t the 
prevention  o f  any initiatives under the pretex t tha t national 
security  is getting  out o f  control, w ill cause great dam age to  the 
future o f  our country as w ell as to our national security .243
Yilmaz clearly implied that national security was used as a tool for legitimising 
the tutelary role of the military in Turkish politics and obstructing EU-inspired 
reforms. The protection of the assertively secular, unitary, mono-lingual, mono­
ethnic, mono-cultural character of the state was seen as the essence of national 
security. Hence, if EU-initiated liberalisation steps put any o f these into question, 
then they had to be resisted in the name of national security 244 Yilmaz clearly
242 Ankara Biirosu, '"Ulusal Giivenlik Tarti§ilmali"', Radikal, 5/8/2001
243 Mesut Yilmaz, 'Ulusal Giivenlik Tarti$masi' Ankara, 2001), available from 
http://www.belgenet.com/2001/yilmaz_04080l.html
244 Cizre, "Demythologizing the National Security Concept: The Case o f Turkey"
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stated that national security was a concept indispensable for the welfare of a state, 
but also added that the way national security was understood in Turkey was 
damaging to Turkey’s national security. Democratisation would not mean the 
collapse of national security, but rather its reinforcement.245 Therefore, the de­
securitisation of Turkish politics would constitute a substantial step in the course 
o f Turkey’s political liberalisation.
The need to eliminate the military’s political role in Turkey was also 
expressed by a growing number of journalists and other opinion makers. It was 
pointed that a large part of the Turkish public opinion had become addicted to the 
military’s political tutelage role, and this had contributed to a trend of political 
inactivity or indifference. By thinking that the army would intervene whenever 
governments diverted from Kemalist orthodoxy in dealing with the issues that 
came under the umbrella of “national security”, many Turkish citizens neglected 
their own civic responsibilities. As the widely read columnist Mehmet Ali Birand 
remarked in the aftermath of the November 2002 elections:
In the past, w e have been in the habit o f  com plain ing  to  the 
arm y about the attitude o f  the politicians in the governm ent 
every tim e w e believed tha t the secu lar system  w as under th reat 
o r w hen som eone w hose v iew s w e did not share go t into pow er.
In such circum stances, w e alw ays appealed  to  the m ilitary  to 
in tervene to “do their du ty” by putting pressure on the 
governm ent in our nam e and  thus to  put an end to  these 
developm ents.246
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Nonetheless, it was argued that the Turkish public should become more 
mature and exercise its democratic responsibility. The November 2002 elections 
gave a unique opportunity for the maturation of Turkish politics, since the AKP, a 
party with clear anti-establishment features, won an impressive victory, which 
was publicly acknowledged by the state elite. Birand added that it was the public’s 
responsibility to let the military retreat from politics and focus on its essential 
duties:
In th is new  phase, the nation  m ust give up th is habit o f  
entrusting  the m ilitary w ith  the task  o f  p ro tecting  and 
guaran teeing  the system , the m ission o f  oversigh t and control.
The essential duty o f  the  arm y is to  protect the country  against 
ex ternal threats. People see the m ilitary as the “sav iours to 
w hom  one turns as a  last resort.” For them , the arm y is an 
insurance policy. But it w ould  be better if  the arm y left the field  
o f  day-to-day  politics. This objective could be ach ieved  no t by 
adop ting  the short cut o f  knocking  on the doors o f  the m ilitary 
every  tim e the country  is faced w ith a difficulty , but by letting  
the  population  express its reactions through non-governm ental 
organisations. These are the bodies, w hich  should  pro tect the 
system . Let us not forget that these organisations, w hich  can 
lead m illions o f  people to  com e dow n into the  streets, w ould  be 
m uch m ore effective that the serried ranks o f  the arm y 
advancing  in form ation. N o  governm ent could resist p ressure o f  
tha t k ind .247
247 Ibid.
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Therefore, the development of a vibrant civil society should create a discursive 
space where all opinions regarding domestic and foreign policies could be 
democratically discussed. This would make any political intervention from the 
military not only illegitimate, but also redundant, and the gravity centre of politics 
would thus move from the state elite to civil society movements.248
5. The Incidence of Social Learning
The change in the stance of some of the state elite towards their guardian role and 
the abolition of established prerogatives provided ample evidence that a process 
of social learning was ongoing as a result of improving EU-Turkey relations.249 A 
significant part of the civil and military bureaucracy became increasingly 
accustomed to a new role, which required the limitation of their duties to what a 
liberal democratic regime would allow.250 The duties of the military would be 
limited to countering external security threats, while civil bureaucrats would 
prioritise the protection of human rights and liberties and consider them the basis 
of state interest.251 The prosecution of the retired Admiral Ilhami Erdil on 
corruption charges in December 2004 was indicative of a dramatic shift in 
military practices regarding accountability and the rule of law. Until then, 
accusations of corruption within the military were never brought to court. 
Bureaucratic solidarity and the fear that the impeccable and uncorrupted image of 
the Turkish military would suffer heavy damage were supposed to justify this 
practice. Nonetheless, the Erdil case was the first occasion -since the 1930s- on
248 Ahmet insel, "The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey", South Atlantic Quarterly, 
Vol. 102, no. 2/3 (2003), p. 300
249 Usttin Erguder, Fieldwork Interview (Istanbul, 14/12/2004)
250 Meltem Muftiiler-Bac, Fieldwork Interview (Istanbul, 29/11/2004)
251 On the diachronic question o f human rights and Westernisation in Turkey, see Bora, Peker and 
Sancar, "Hakim Ideolojiler, Bati, Batilila§ma ve Insan Haklart" .
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which a high-ranking military officer was prosecuted on corruption charges. This 
provided evidence that the military -and Ozkok personally- positively responded 
to public pressure and the need to address questions of integrity and rule of law.252 
Similarly political leaders staunchly supported political liberalism as the new 
ideological basis of state-society relations and increased protection of individual 
interests against long-term state interests. Politicians, journalists and civil society 
activists claimed a more assertive role in the process of liberalisation. The need to 
reconsider the social role of the state was also addressed. It was argued that the 
establishment of a liberal democracy should not mean weakening of the 
development of a social welfare system.253
On the other hand, it should be noted that the process of social learning 
was neither smooth nor complete. Several examples can be cited where the 
persistence of transcendentalist views over the role of the state and individual 
rights and interests was evident. In spite of judicial reform and the acceptance by 
many judges of the new liberal-minded legislation, there was also strong 
resistance to reform in some quarters. A decision of the Court of Cassations in a 
case based on Article 312 of the Penal Code stated that “the limitation of freedom 
of thought with the aim to protect the public order of democratic regimes, does 
not harm but, on the contrary, strengthens pluralist democracy.”254 This argument 
indicated that transcendentalist visions of democracy were still popular among the 
Turkish judiciary. Despite stiff EU reaction, the Chief of the General Staff 
remained accountable to the Prime Minister and not the Defence Minister.255 This
252 Ankara Burosu, "Emir Ozkok’ten", Hiirriyet, 7/12/2004
253 Ahmet Insel, "Cumhuriyet'in Yol Ayrimi", Radikal Cumhnriyet, 29/10/2004
254 Ankara Burosu, "Dii§iince A^klam ak Hala Su?", Radikal, 11/5/2005
255 This issue has continued to create friction in EU-Turkey relations and is being used as evidence 
o f Turkey’s failure to apply EU norms. The Turkish military refused to endorse a report o f an 
experts’ group on Turkey’s democratisation financed by the Dutch EU Presidency, on the grounds
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resistance showed the persisting refusal of the state elite to accept its full 
subordination to politicians, even at the symbolic level.
Even more serious was the relapse of leading reformist figures within the 
military elite into practices reminiscent of previous military interventions in 
politics. In a ninety-minute speech at the Military Academy on 20 April 2005, the 
Chief of General Staff General Hilmi Ozkok broke a long-held silence and 
addressed all issues of Turkish domestic and foreign policy. The Kurdish question 
and the PKK, the Armenian question, Cyprus and disputes with Greece, relations 
with the European Union, United States and the Iraq question, the economy, 
political Islam and democratisation, were all addressed in Ozkok’s speech, which 
spared only fifteen minutes to talk about military issues.256 The publication of this 
speech allowed many Europeans to question the sincerity of the military retreat 
from politics.257 Nonetheless, this time reaction was also sparked within Turkey. 
In two opinion pieces written as a response to Ozkok’s speech, Mehmet AH 
Birand outlined the dilemmas the Turkish military faced. He argued that although 
Ozkok supported Turkey’s EU membership, other commanders did not show the 
same sensitivity on questions of civil-military relations. Nonetheless, the Turkish 
military had to abide by the rules of democracy and the Copenhagen Criteria; 
otherwise, Turkey should give up its EU objective. Birand added:
that it recommended the subordination o f the military to the Ministry o f Defence and the transfer 
o f decision-making authority on national security issues to the parliament. See Barkin §ik, 
"Ankara'yi Kizdiran Rapor", Radikal, 10/5/2005 and Ozgur Ek§i, "Pa§alar Rapordan imzalarim 
fek ti", Hiirriyet, 27/6/2005.
256 Hilmi Ozkok, Harp Akademileri Komutanhgindaki Yilhk Degerlendirme Konu.pna.si Ankara, 
2005), available from
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/bashalk/konusma_mesaj/2005/yillikdegerlendirme_200405.htm [posted on 
20/4/2005]
257 Editorial, "Glosse Politik: Machtwort", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22/4/2005
T here w ill be som e w ho w ill denounce this d iscussion  as “anti- 
m ilita ry” or “an ti-secu larism /separatism .” . ... [H ow ever]....
Support for the EU  and abiding by its rules com e together. A ll 
sen ior com m anders, especially  the C h ie f o f  G eneral S taff, 
repeatedly  state the ir support for T urkey 's E uropean  U nion 
m em bership . T hose w ith  a  m inim al know ledge o f  strategy 
w ould  realize that they don 't have any other option. The strange 
th ing  is, the sam e com m anders w ho say they support the EU, 
seem  determ ined not to  abide by one o f  the m ost fundam ental 
p rincip les o f  the organisation. The EU C openhagen C riteria 
stipulates that the m ilitary  needs to  be subservient to  the  civ ilian  
authority . In o ther w ords, m ilitary  officers cannot in terfere in 
po litics and cannot put p ressure on civ ilian  authority . [In liberal 
dem ocratic countries] the O ffice o f  the C h ie f  o f  S ta ff  is an 
institu tion  subordinate to the D efence M inistry  and  is 
responsible for form ulating  m ilitary strategies in line w ith  the 
choices m ade by the civil authority. It is obvious that the w ay 
th ings w ork  in Turkey needs to  be changed dram atically .258
Birand also speculated that Ozkok’s intervention might have been a result of 
pressure from lower-ranking generals and commented on the political activities of 
the Deputy Chief of Staff General Ilker Ba§bug and the Commander of the Land 
Forces General Ya§ar Btiyukanit. He then chastised their usual response to such 
critiques:
258 Mehmet Ali Birand, "Asker Kendini Zora Sokuyor", Posta, 26/4/2005
“ W e are executing  our duty as stipulated  in the C onstitu tion  and
our service laws. It is our jo b  to pro tect and preserve the
coun try .”259
Birand concluded his first piece by warning the military of the disastrous
consequences of a possible reaffirmation of its political role and a collapse of
Turkey’s EU membership perspective as a result. In his second piece, he raised
the issue of the responsibility of politicians in democratising and civilianising the
state to achieve EU membership. Politicians had to become more trustworthy and 
thus make the public stop looking at the military whenever things wrong. He 
advised politicians and media as follows:
O ur po liticians need to  be principled, hard w orking, serious 
individuals w ho know  w hen they are spurned by the peop le and 
have to  pro tect the people they represent. U nless they  fulfil 
these  criteria, the  public w ill continue to  look  to  the m ilita ry  for 
lead e rsh ip .... The m edia needs to  m ake up its m ind. W e need  a 
certain  degree o f  clarity  to  replace the confused pic ture w e now  
face. I f  T urkey is to  becom e European, the m ed ia  needs to  stop 
asking the G enerals: “ W here are yo u ?” The tendency  to  praise 
the generals at receptions, before d ism issing  them  as “use less ,” 
should  end. The m edia needs to  stop m aking sta tem ents by a
G eneral head line new s, w hile try ing  to teach  the people how
dem ocracy w orks.260
Birand’s opinion pieces skilfully pointed to the shortcomings of the EU-initiated 
political liberalisation process on the issues of civil-military relations.
260 Mehmet Ali Birand, "Tiirkiye Artik Tercihini Yapmali", Posta, 27/4/2005
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Nevertheless, these shortcomings should not occlude the progress made in a 
number of significant fields. While Ozkok could reasonably be accused of 
interfering in politics, due to his speech of 20 April 2005, this should not fully 
discount his previous stance throughout the long and arduous political reform 
process. Although still lagging behind EU standards, the civilianisation of Turkish 
politics made substantial steps. Last, but not least, the very fact that the need to 
fully civilianise and debureaucratise Turkish politics was openly discussed was 
indicative of a very significant liberal shift within Turkish society and a 
significant step in the process of democratic consolidation.261
6. Conclusions
The value of path dependence theory in explaining the gradual liberalisation of 
Turkish state tradition is explicit. It could be convincingly argued that the reform 
process remained unfinished and that serious deviations from European standards 
persisted. Yet the major steps made in the cases of the MGK and State Security 
Courts showed the extent and nature of the accomplished progress. The reform of 
these institutions did not occur at once but was the result of long deliberations and 
negotiations. However, as the need for reform became clear, further developments 
could only take the form of more comprehensive reform: there could be no going 
back. As the decision to give Turkey a date for the start o f accession negotiations 
was pending, the opponents of reform could only object to its details but had no 
power to reverse it.
The role of EU institutions was also crucial in bringing about reform. 
Pressure from the European Commission was exerted in the repeated inclusion of 
criticisms on the issues of civil-military relations and the judicial system in
261 Erguder, Fieldwork Interview
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Turkey. Significant pressure also came from the European Parliament,262 whose 
reports and resolutions often stressed the problems arising from the tutelary 
functions of the state elites. The timing of the reform steps provided ample 
evidence that it was the impact of the EU institutions, which dictated them. The 
two-level game approach helps to clarify this process. Pressure imposed at the 
international level (Level II) alleviated the work of those members of the political 
elite, NGOs and intellectuals, who supported the limitation of the privileges of the 
state elite, its subordination to the democratically elected government and the 
redefinition of the concept of national security at the domestic level (Level I).
262 See Eduard Soler i Lecha, "Debating on Turkey's Accession: National and Ideological 
Cleavages in the European Parliament" in Esther Barbe and Anna Herranz, eds., The Role of 
Parliaments in European Foreign Policy (Barcelona: European Parliament Information Office, 
2005).
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VI. THE SECULARISM DEBATE
1. Defining Secularism
a. History and Types of Secularism
The question of the relationship between political and religious authority, has 
been a recurrent theme in Western political debates. Ever since the question was 
first addressed in Christianity,1 the need to delineate the jurisdictions of the 
political and the religious realm has been a pressing political issue. The diffusion 
of the two realms became a reality with the dominant political role of the Papacy 
and the Catholic Church in medieval Western Europe. The Pope was the 
undisputed religious leader and one of the most influential political figures in 
Europe. His dominance would only be effectively challenged with the rise of the 
Protestant Reformation movement in the 16th century. The ensuing ferocious 
fights and massacres of Catholics and Protestants, which left Europe in rubble, led 
to the limitation of papal political and religious domination of Europe and the 
opening o f a new debate on the relationship between religion and politics. The 
protection of religious minorities, who had become the main victims of atrocities 
during the religious wars of the Reformation, became one of the major issues in 
the political agenda of liberal thought. John Locke considered freedom of 
religious belief to be one of the fundamental human rights whose protection 
formed the basis of state legitimacy. The question of state-church relations was 
stressed at the European level during the Enlightenment. Voltaire was the 
intellectual who linked his name with the advocacy o f secularism, the full
1 The issue was first addressed in Christianity in the famous response o f Jesus to a man who asked 
him whether Jews should pay taxes to the Roman Caesar. Jesus then showed him a Roman coin on 
which Caesar’s face and name were inscribed and replied: “Render to Caesar what is Caesar's, and 
to God what is God's.” His response clearly recognised that the realms o f  religion and politics do 
not overlap. See Luke [Aouk&<;], Gospel [EvayyeXiovJ, 20 (20-26) .
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separation of the political and religious realms. His ideas came close to realisation 
with the 1789 French Revolution. France became the first Western European state 
where secularisation policies were applied. The secularisation of the French state 
continued to be debated throughout the 19th century and was finally firmly 
established in 1905 with the promulgation of a law, which broke the remaining 
links between the church and the state. Other European states followed the French 
example with varying degrees of reservation. Germany also adopted secularisation 
measures, due to the confessional division of the German people between 
Catholicism and Protestantism. Nonetheless, the process was not as radical as in 
France. The weak but existing links between the German state and churches as 
well as the dominant role of the German Christian Democratic parties have 
provided ample proof of this. In the case of the United Kingdom, however, the 
drive towards secularism did not affect the historical links between the state and 
the Anglican Church. While religious toleration was firmly established, the British 
King has remained the head of the Anglican Church and the Archbishop of 
Canterbury is still appointed by the British Prime Minister.
The interchangeable use of the terms “secularism” and “laicism” has also led to 
considerable confusion.2 For the purposes of this study, “passive secularism” will 
be defined as the separation of the political and religious realm, which is followed 
by a neutral approach of state institutions toward religion. “Assertive secularism”, 
on the other hand, is a militant version of secularism where the separation of the 
political and religious realms is followed by state will to intervene in and control
2 For a study o f the two terms, which, however, does not help much in clearing the confusion, see 
Andrew Davison, "Turkey, a "Secular" State? The Challenge o f Description", South Atlantic 
Quarterly, Vol. 102, no. 2/3 (2003).
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religion and/or pursue active anti-religious policies.3 While secularism in its 
varying forms has characterised most of Western European states and France 
since the 19th century, assertive secularism (la'icite) prevailed in the Third French 
Republic (1871-1940). Any public manifestation of religious belief was banned, 
while state officials systematically abstained from directly or indirectly declaring 
any religious belief. This model had a profound impact on Young Turk 
intellectuals and the founding elite of the Turkish Republic.4
2. Religion and Politics in Turkey
a. The Ottoman Legacy
The Ottoman Empire inherited the Arab political legacy where state formation 
came as a result of the rise of Islam and religion and politics were inextricably 
linked. Unlike Christianity, Islam had its own state project. Therefore, the Koran 
simultaneously performed the roles of a holy scripture and a quasi-constitution. 
This meant that the state controlled religion but had at the same time an inherently 
religious character. State control of Islam was common in the Islamic world, as 
Islam lacked an independent institutional structure, which would protect it from 
effective state domination. The crucial role of Islam in the formation of the early 
Arab Empire led to its inherently Islamic character. As the Islamic world never 
went through the political and ideological processes, which resulted in the 
development of secularism in Western Europe, religion and politics remained 
intertwined, at least at the theoretical level. As the Ottoman Sultans assumed the 
title of Caliph in the early 16th century, Islam remained a key element of the
3 See Ahmet T. Kuru, "Reinterpretation o f Secularism in Turkey: The Case o f the Justice and 
Development Party" in M. Hakan Yavuz, ed., Transformation o f Turkish Politics (Salt Lake City: 
University o f Utah Press, forthcoming).
4 Binnaz Toprak, "Religion and State in Turkey", Paper presented at the Dayan Center 
Conference: "Contemporary Turkey: Challenges o f  Change" {Tel-Aviv, 20/6/1999), p. 2
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Ottoman political ideology. This however did not mean that the Ottoman state 
officials were not the ultimate power holders. As Mardin put it, paraphrasing 
Orwell, “religion and the state are twins..,, but in the Ottoman Empire one of the 
twins could often become more equal.”5
The relationship between Islam and politics remained a key issue in the process of 
Ottoman modernisation. Young Ottomans argued that the corruption of Islam in 
recent centuries was the reason for the continuing decline of the Ottoman Empire 
and that the return to the pure Islam of the first four Caliphs was a condition for a 
new Islamic “Golden Age” or “Era of Felicity” (Asr-i Saadet). Despite hesitant 
secularisation steps in the field of law in the Tanzimat era, the political role of 
Islam did not diminish; on the contrary, its political significance dramatically 
rose, when Sultan Abdiilhamid II attempted to use Islam as a geopolitical tool.6 
The reassertion of the Caliphate intended to increase Ottoman influence in all the 
regions of Asia and Africa, where European colonial rule had been established. It 
was hoped this would counterbalance European political and economic 
penetration. This instrumental use of Islam did not deter measures of 
secularisation, mainly in the fields of law and education.7
However, the fact that Islam was inextricably linked with the failing empire meant 
that - in  the Ottoman case- its ability to galvanise a radical reform movement was 
limited.8 Western ideas were better fitted for this. Secularism soon found 
supporters among members of the Ottoman Turkish elite. The Young Turks were 
the first to advocate secular ideas in the late Ottoman Empire. Following the
5 Mardin, "Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution", p. 206
5 Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, p. 83
7 For more information on the Hamidian educational reform, see Benjamin C. Fortna, Imperial 
Classroom : Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire (Oxford & New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2002).
8 Gellner, "The Turkish Option in Comparative Perspective", p. 239
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French positivist paradigm, religion was viewed as a vestige of the pre-modern 
era, which obstructed the process of Ottoman modernisation.9 The renaissance of 
the Ottoman Empire required, according to them, a reform programme based on 
scientific and rational thought, in which Islam should be excluded from the public 
sphere. The 1908 Young Turk Revolution gave the opportunity for a radical 
secularisation of the Ottoman Empire. However, the disengagement of Islam from 
Ottoman politics never scored high in the Young Turk political agenda. The 
alliance of non-religious local elites and the religious establishment against any 
hesitant secularisation steps made reform extremely difficult.10 Political 
considerations and expediency indefinitely postponed the implementation of the 
Young Turks’ secularist ideas. Islam was used as a mobilising factor in the wars, 
which the Empire waged against its Christian Balkan neighbours and the Entente 
forces. The question of secularism was not raised during the Turkish War of 
Independence, as Atatiirk did not want to alienate a substantial part of the 
Ottoman Turkish population, which still considered Islam to be inseparable from 
the state. Radical steps toward secularisation were only made in the aftermath of 
the war, when Atatiirk felt powerful enough to pursue his own agenda.
b. Religion and Politics from 1923 to the 1990s
The separation of religion and politics was implemented by a series of severe 
measures in the early years of republican Turkey.11 On 17 November 1922, the 
last Ottoman Sultan, Mehmed VI Vahdettin, was forced into exile. On 29 October 
1923, the Republic of Turkey was proclaimed, while the Caliphate was officially
9 Nuray Mert, "Cumhuriyet Tiirkiyesi'nde Laiklik ve Kar§i Laikligin Du§iinsel Boyutu" in Ahmet 
insel, ed., Kemalizm (Istanbul: ileti§im, 2001), pp. 202-07
10 Mardin, "Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution", p. 208
11 For thorough accounts o f this process, see Binnaz Toprak, Islam and Political Development in 
Turkey (Leiden: Brill, 1981), pp. 40-58 and Berkes, The Development o f  Secularism in Turkey, pp. 
461-78.
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abolished on 3 March 1924. Strict measures were taken to secularise the state and 
the society.12 The office of §eyh-iil-islam was abolished and its functions taken 
over by the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet I§leri Ba§kanhgi) in 1924. 
Religious orders (tarikats) were banned in 1926, while the remnants of the Islamic 
Law (§eriaf) were replaced by the Swiss Civil and the Italian Penal Codes. 
Meanwhile, existing Islamic courts and schools were abolished, as well as 
religious education in public schools. At the symbolic level, a measure of crucial 
importance was the adoption of the Latin alphabet in 1928, which broke a strong 
cultural bond between the Turkish nation and Islam. The breach with the Ottoman 
Islamic past was finalised, when the declaration of Islam as state religion in 
Article 2 of the 1924 Constitution and of the state as the executor of Islamic law
* 1Tin Article 26 were removed in 1928. Severe repression of the public 
manifestation of the Islamic faith and the abolition of tarikats were evidence of 
the complete subordination of Islam to the state.14
Kemalism followed the Young Turk positivist approach of religion, 
dismissing it as a remnant of the despicable Ottoman past and shaped an agnostic 
or atheistic approach. Assertive secularism became a constitutional principle in 
193715 and an indispensable element of republican Turkish politics, as the 
potential of Islam to serve as an alternative political project, source of common 
identity and resistance to modernisation was acknowledged.16 Religion remained a 
taboo issue in republican politics until the first multi-party elections in 1946. The 
rise of the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti-DP) to power in the 1950 elections
12 Suna Kili, "Kemalism in Contemporary Turkey", International Political Studies, Vol. 1, no. 3 
(1980), pp. 383-92
13 Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey, p. 46
14 Sencer Ayata, "Patronage, Party, and State: The Politicization o f Islam in Turkey", Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 50, no. 1 (1996), pp. 44-45
15 Davison, "Turkey, a "Secular" State? The Challenge o f Description", pp. 337-39
16 Aydin and Keyman, European Integration and the Transformation o f  Turkish Democracy, p. 6
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was a milestone event, as dissident political forces gained access to power for the 
first time. The DP appealed to the rural majority of the Turkish population, which 
had not endorsed the Kemalist secularisation reform17 and courted the religious 
vote.18 Islam was gradually reintroduced into the public sphere, and politics also 
obtained an Islamic colouring.19 Religious vocational schools (imam-hatip 
okullan)20 were established in 1951, while the budget allocation of the Directorate 
of Religious Affairs for mosque construction soared. The ban on the recital of the
* * 91Islamic call of prayer (ezan) in Arabic, introduced in 1931, was lifted, and 
Koran readings were allowed to be broadcast on public radio.22 Consecutive 
electoral victories for the DP confirmed public support for the return of Islam into 
politics.
The DP rule came to a violent end with the military coup of 27 May 1960. 
The 1960 coup was the response of the sidelined Kemalist elite, which attempted 
to check the Islamisation of Turkish politics and reassert the dominance of 
assertive secularism by banning the DP and neutralising its leadership.23 The 
military regime attempted to minimise the threat that an Islamist-leaning party 
could comprise for assertive secularism by limiting the powers of the executive.
17 Islam as a social idiom maintained its significance throughout the republican years, as Kemalism 
failed to provide a formidable alternative. See §erif Mardin, "Islam in Mass Society: Harmony 
versus Polarization" in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., Politics in the Third Turkish Republic 
(Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 164.
18 Ronnie Margulies and Ergin Yildizoglu, "The Political Uses o f Islam in Turkey", Middle East 
Report, Vol. 153 (1988), p. 13
19 Binnaz Toprak, "The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey" in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, 
eds., State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 1980s (Berlin & New York: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1988), pp. 123-24
20 These public secondary schools provided - in  addition to the regular school curriculum- Arabic 
and Islamic religion courses, so their graduates could qualify to become prayer leaders (imam) and 
preachers (hatip).
21 Berkes, The Development o f  Secularism in Turkey, p. 490
22 Toprak, Islam and Political Development in Turkey, pp. 79-80
23 For the tension between assertive secularism and democracy in republican Turkey, see Niliifer 
Gole, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamic Participation: The Case o f Turkey" in Augustus 
Richard Norton, ed., Civil Society in the Middle East (Leiden, New York & Koln: E.J. Brill, 
1995a), pp. 19-20.
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Yet the 1961 Constitution, whose liberal stipulations were meant to serve as 
guarantees against a relapse of a majoritarian Islamist-leaning party rule, allowed 
for the growth o f the first purely Islamist political movement in Turkey. The 
National View {Milli Goriif) movement was founded and led by the historic 
leader of Turkish political Islam, Necmettin Erbakan.24 It was the driving force 
behind the first Islamist party in the history of republican Turkey, the National 
Order Party {Milli Nizam Partisi-MNP), founded on 26 January 1970. Having its 
political roots in the Turkish conservative right, the National View took pains in 
distancing its political ideology and programme from mainstream political 
conservatism expressed by the DP and its successor, the Justice Party (Adalet
' j r
Partisi-AP). It also tried to appeal to the dispossessed rural populations of 
Anatolia as well as to the growing mass of urban migrants. Tarikats also gave 
their full support for the MNP.26
The party’s political ideology followed an Occidentalist27 ideological 
blueprint and tried to develop an Islamic, non-Western version of modernity.28 Its 
political agenda openly opposed the Kemalist Westernisation programme. The 
perceived political, economic and moral decline of republican Turkey was 
attributed to the corrupting influence of the West. Islam was thus invited back into
24 Despite being an anti-systemic political movement, the National View borrowed many 
conceptual tools from orthodox Kemalism. See Menderes £inar, "Kemalist Cumhuriyettjilik ve 
islamci Kemalizm" in Yasin Aktay, ed., Islamcihk (Istanbul: ileti§im, 2004), pp. 174-76.
25 For a thorough account o f how conservatives viewed secularism, see Nuray Mert, 
"Muhafazakarhk ve Laiklik" in Ahmet Cigdem, ed., Muhafazakarhk (Istanbul: ileti§im, 2003). On 
the pragmatic approach o f the Justice Party {Adalet Partisi-AP), see Umit Cizre Sakallioglu, 
"Parameters and Strategies o f Islam-State Interaction in Republican Turkey", International 
Journal o f  Middle East Studies, Vol. 28, no. 2 (1996), pp. 239-40,
26 This was the first time in republican Turkish history that tarikats were involved in party politics. 
See Cizre Sakallioglu, "Parameters and Strategies o f Islam-State Interaction in Republican 
Turkey", p. 241.
27 Occidentalism is the mirror image o f Orientalism, a discourse, which essentialises the West as 
inherently imperialistic, rapacious, unjust and ultimately uncivilized, despite its material affluence 
and power superiority.
28 Burhanettin Duran, "Cumhuriyet Donemi Islamciligi" in Yasin Aktay, ed., Islamcihk (Istanbul: 
ileti§im, 2004a), pp. 144-51
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Turkish politics to deter further decline and bring Turkey back to prosperity and 
morality. The solution offered by the MNP and its successor political parties 
founded under the aegis of the National View, was summarised in the “Just 
Order” {Adil Duzeri) political programme. The term “justice” was understood in 
purely Islamic terms and was contrasted with “unjust” Western civilisation. The 
moral superiority of Islamic over Western civilisation was based upon its 
preference for right (hak) over power (kuvvet).29 The implementation of the “Just 
Order” programme would be a transitory stage toward the “Order of Felicity” 
{Nizam-i Saadef), which would resemble the “Era of Felicity” (Asr-i Saadet) of 
the early Islamic era.30 Adopting a radical phraseology against the ruling class and 
business capital and conceptual schemes, not very different from Marxist ones, 
the MNP and the subsequent political parties of the National View found in Islam 
the moral base for the regeneration of the Turkish state and society. The excesses 
of Western capitalism and individualism would be dealt with by a return to the 
original Islamic political and moral values, where justice would play a key role. 
An intensive programme o f heavy industrialisation based on import substitution 
would secure Turkey’s economic independence from the West.31
A second military coup on 12 March 1971 included among its objectives 
the control of Turkey’s growing political Islam. The MNP was shut down by the 
Constitutional Court on the grounds that it had been “operating against the
29 See Necmettin Erbakan, Adil Ekonomik Diizen (Ankara: Semih Ofset, 1991a) cited in 
Burhanettin Duran, "Islamist Redefinitions o f European and Islamic Identities in Turkey" in 
Mehmet Ugur and Nergis Canefe, eds., Turkey and European Integration : Accession Prospects 
and Issues (London & New York: Routledge, 2004b), p. 127.
30 Ru§en £akir, "Milli Goru§ Hareketi" in Yasin Aktay, ed., islamcihk (Istanbul: ileti§im, 2004), p. 
562
31 Haldun Giilalp, "Modernization Policies and Islamist Politics in Turkey" in Sibei Bozdogan and 
Re§at Kasaba, eds., Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey (Seattle & London: 
University o f Washington Press, 1997), p. 59
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principles of the secular state and Atatiirk’s revolutionism.”32 Nonetheless, the 
National Movement soon registered a new political party, the National Salvation 
Party {Milli Selamet Partisi-MSP,) under the same leadership and organisation. 
Due to Erbakan’s adroit political skills, the MSP participated as minor coalition 
partner in coalition governments alternately with the CHP and the AP throughout 
the 1970s. Access to political power helped the party broaden its political and 
social base and influence the agenda of coalition governments. In the field of 
domestic policy, the “restoration of Islamic morality” ranged from limitations on 
alcohol consumption to the improvement of the professional rights of the religious 
vocational school graduates and their appointment in public service positions.33 In 
the field of foreign policy, opposition to Turkey’s prospective membership of the 
European Economic Community (EEC) remained a cornerstone of the MSP 
policy. In Erbakan’s view, the EEC epitomised all the despicable characteristics 
of the West, which had infiltrated Turkey and which the “Just Order” programme 
aspired to remove. The slogan “We are the market, they are the common partners” 
{Bizpazar, onlar ortak) epitomised suspicion and animosity towards the European 
Common Market project. EEC -and later EU - membership was seen as a 
Kemalist plot to finalise the conversion of Turkey to Western civilisation and stall 
the growth of political Islam.34 In Erbakan’s view, instead of aspiring to join the 
European Economic Community and other “Christian” Western organisations, 
Turkey should play a leading role in the formation of equivalent Islamic 
organisations, such as an “Islamic Economic Community,” an “Islamic Defence
32 Turkiye Anayasa Mahkemesi, Milli Nizam Partisi'nin (MNP) Kapatilma Davasi Gerekgeli 
Karan  Ankara, 1971), available from http://www.belgenet.com/dava/mnp_05.html
33 Ali Ya$ar Sanbay, "Milli Nizam Partisi'nin Kurulu§u ve Programmin iferigi" in Yasin Aktay, 
ed., islamcihk (Istanbul: ileti§im, 2004), pp. 584-87
34 For more details, see Necmettin Erbakan, Tiirkiye'nin Temel Meseleleri (Ankara: Rehber, 
1991b) cited in Duran, "Islamist Redefinitions o f European and Islamic Identities in Turkey", p. 
127.
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Cooperation Organisation,” an “Islamic United Nations Organisation,” an 
“Islamic Common Currency” (the dinar) and an “Islamic Cultural Cooperation 
Organisation.”35 Islam should, therefore, become the primary defining element of 
Turkish domestic and foreign policy.
The 1980-1983 military regime shut down the MSP and banned Erbakan 
from politics. On the other hand, it undermined the assertively secular character of 
the state by adopting the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” (Turk-tslam Sentezi-TlS) 
doctrine36 (see p. 268). The reopening of religious vocational schools and the 
mandatory character of religious education in primary and secondary schools were 
clear signals of an Islamic shift in Turkish politics, with the clear aim of 
counterbalancing leftist and Kurdish nationalist influences.37 The rise to power of 
the conservative Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-AN A?) in the 1980s did not 
prevent the recovery of political Islam. While the ANAP government was 
increasingly influenced by Islam in its domestic and foreign policy orientations,38 
a new party from the National View tradition emerged in 1983. The Welfare Party 
(Refah Partisi-KP), whose leadership was taken over by Erbakan, as soon as he 
was re-allowed into politics in 1987, contested the hegemony of the ANAP on the 
right of the Turkish political spectrum.
The growth of the RP was also facilitated by Turkey’s rapid social 
transformation. Turkey’s economic growth facilitated the emergence of an 
Islamist counter-elite, pious, but modern in ideology, education and consumption
35 £akir, "Milli Gorii§ Hareketi", p. 566
36 For the role of TlS in the formation o f post-1980 conservatism in Turkey, see Yitksel Ta§kin, 
"Muhafazakar Bir Proje Olarak Turk-islam Sentezi" in Ahmet £igdem, ed., Muhafazakarhk 
(Istanbul: ileti§im, 2003), pp. 398-401.
37 Magnarella, "Desecularization, State Corporatism and Development in Turkey", pp. 37-44
38 Udo Steinbach, "The European Community, the United States, the Middle East, and Turkey" in 
Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., Politics in the Third Turkish Republic (Boulder CO: Westview 
Press, 1994), p. 112
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patterns, which sought to secure its own political representation.39 The rise of 
Islamist capital challenged the domination of the secular economic establishment 
and reshaped the Turkish economy and society.40 Industrialisation reinforced 
urban migration trends and brought millions of peasants into Turkey’s big urban 
centres41 While the urban newcomers suffered from severe socio-economic 
problems and underwent a process of painful cultural transformation, Turkish 
political Islam attempted to fill the vacuum of their political representation. An 
effort to compromise modernity with an Islamic identity became clear at the civil 
society level42 As the Turkish left had not yet recovered from the heavy blow, 
which the 1980-1983 military regime had dealt against it, the campaign of the RP 
was facilitated by the lack of an influential social democratic party, which could 
serve as an alternative electoral option for the urban poor.43 A series of economic 
scandals also boosted the electoral appeal of the RP. While corruption had 
become endemic, the RP vowed for the re-injection of Islamic moral values into 
Turkish politics. This populist and conservative rhetoric struck a chord among 
new urban migrants, who formed the backbone of the RP’s urban electoral base.44
39 Nilufer Gole, "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making o f Elites and Counter-Elites", 
Middle East Journal, Vol. 51, no. 1 (1997b), pp. 53-55
40 Baskin Oran, "Kemalism, Islamism and Globalization: A Study on the Focus o f Supreme 
Loyalty in Globalizing Turkey", Journal o f Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 1, no. 
3 (2001), p. 30
41 Haldun Giilalp, "Globalization and Political Islam: The Social Bases o f Turkey's Welfare Party", 
International Journal o f  Middle East Studies, Vol. 33, no. 3 (2001), pp. 441-42
42 Nilufer Gole, "The Quest for the Islamic Self within the Context o f Modernity" in Sibel 
Bozdogan and Re§at Kasaba, eds., Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey (Seattle 
& London: University o f  Washington Press, 1997a), pp. 91-92
43 Haldun Gulalp, "Political Islam in Turkey: The Rise and Fall o f the Refah Party", Muslim 
World, Vol. LXXXIX, no. 1 (1999), pp. 34-35 and Omer Ladner, "Islamcihk, Sosyalizm ve Sol" 
in Yasin Aktay, ed., Islamcihk (istanbul: ileti§im, 2004), p. 475
44 Toprak, "Religion and State in Turkey", p. 5
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c. Religion and Politics since the 1990s
i). The Impact of Global Factors 
Global political developments have influenced the debate on religion and politics 
in Turkey since the 1990s. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 contributed to a 
global religious revival and a more intensive discussion on the relationing 
between religion and politics. Leftist ideas suffered a recession in Turkey, and 
Islam filled part of the emerging vacuum.45 On the other hand, as the communist 
bloc had ceased to comprise an existential threat for the Western countries, some 
saw religion as a new potential ideological base of conflict. The spread of ethno­
religious conflict in Europe, Asia and Africa seemed to provide evidence in 
support of this assertion. The supposed division of the world on the basis of 
civilisational divides brought religion to the epicentre of world politics, due to the 
often inextricable links between religion and culture. The civilisation fault lines 
suggested by Huntington in his treatise on the “clash of civilisations” as the areas 
of conflict in the post-Cold War era were mostly identical with religious borders. 
Turkey’s unique position between Europe and Asia, and its secular regime 
naturally attracted the attention of scholars. Huntington found in the case of 
Turkey the archetypical “torn” country, whose elite has systematically sought to 
substitute Western for its Middle Eastern Islamic civilisation, but faced persistent 
resistance by the bulk of its population. The rise of global Islamic terrorism in 
the early 1990s also attracted attention to the relationship between Islam and 
democracy. US diplomats often presented Turkey as a “model state” whose 
secular regime guaranteed the survival of one of the few democracies in the
45 Omer Qaha, "Ana Temalanyla 1980 Sonrasi tslami Uyam§" in Yasin Aktay, ed., islamcihk 
(Istanbul: Ileti§im, 2004), p. 479
46 Huntington, "The Clash o f Civilizations?" pp. 42-43
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Muslim world. On the other hand, a blind eye was turned to the liberal 
shortcomings of the Turkish model of assertive secularism.47 US support for 
Turkish secularism strengthened the hand of the Kemalist establishment, but 
could not deter the increasing appeal of Turkish political Islam on the domestic 
political stage.
ii). The Impact of Domestic Politics 
In the 1990s, the influence of Turkish political Islam continued to rise. The fall of 
the ANAP from political power in the 1991 parliamentary elections coincided 
with a drastic increase in the RP’s political power. The share of the RP’s vote in 
the 1991 general elections rose from 7.16 per cent in 1987 to 16.88 per cent,48 and 
the party entered the mainstream political arena. This was confirmed with the 
1993 municipal elections in which the RP assumed control of the municipalities of 
Istanbul, Ankara and 28 other cities. This success sent shockwaves toward the 
Kemalist secular establishment.49 Benefiting from a growing pro-Islamist civil 
society50 and a grassroots political mobilisation network,51 the RP became a 
protagonist o f mainstream politics in the 1995 elections when it became the 
biggest single party in parliament, with 21.38 per cent of the vote. The rise of the 
RP to political power became a reality on 8 July 1996, when it formed a coalition 
government with the True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi-DYP), and its leader 
Necmettin Erbakan became Prime Minister.
47 This was hardly a surprise, given that experiments with liberal democracy in the Muslim world 
often threatened to bring to power governments with stark anti-US policies, such as in the case of 
the Algerian failed elections experiment in 1992.
48 It should be mentioned, though, that the rise in the RP’s vote share was also due to its temporary 
election alliance with the Nationalist Labour Party (Milliyetqi CJahqma Partisi-M £P), led by 
Alparslan Turkey.
49 Recep Tayyip Erdogan was the RP candidate who won the elections for the Municipality o f 
Istanbul.
50 See Bahattin Ak§it, Ay§e Serdar and Bahar Tabakoglu, "islami Egilimli Sivil Toplum 
Kurulu§lan" in Yasin Aktay, ed., A/amc///A (istanbul: ileti§tm, 2004).
51 For more details on Islamist political mobilisation, see White, Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A 
Study in Vernacular Politics .
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While many feared a government led by Erbakan would form an 
existential threat for the Republic, such fears turned out to be exaggerated. While 
continuing to pay lip service to his Islamic-inspired “Just Order” political 
programme, Erbakan followed a largely pragmatic line.52 The Islamic 
underpinnings of the “Just Order” programme were weakened; “just order” now 
simply meant more moral, transparent and honest government.53 Although he had 
attacked Turkey’s European orientation ever since the 1960s and had explicitly 
opposed Turkey’s Customs Union Agreement with the European Union, Erbakan 
did not overrule the application of the Agreement on 1 January 1996. Islamist 
traces could, nonetheless, be found in new foreign policy orientations.54 Erbakan 
attempted to shift the balance of Turkish foreign policy from the West towards the 
Middle East and the Islamic world. A series of official visits to Arab and Islamic 
states, an expressed interest in the development of political and trade relations 
with them,55 and Turkey’s active role in the establishment of the D-8 Group 
together with predominantly Muslim states countries such as Bangladesh, Egypt, 
Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria and Pakistan, were novel additions to Turkey’s 
traditionally Western-looking foreign policy agenda. Yet Erbakan’s Islamist 
diplomatic openings did not produce the expected results and occasionally even 
backfired, such as his disastrous official visit to Libya in October 1996,56 On the
52 This pragmatism even created -ephemeral, in retrospect- hopes that the RP rule could reconcile 
Islam and democracy in Turkey. See Metin Heper, "Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Toward a 
Reconciliation?" Middle East Journal, Vol. 51, no. 1 (1997), pp. 44-45.
53 M. Hakan Yavuz, "Political Islam and the Welfare (Refah) Party in Turkey", Comparative
Politics, Vol. 30, no. 1 (1997), pp. 73-74
54 Ziya Oni§, "Political Islam at the Crossroads: From Hegemony to Co-Existence", Contemporary
Politics, Vol. 7, no. 4 (2001), p. 285
55 The signature o f a multi-billion dollar trade agreement between Turkey and Iran for the 
construction o f a pipeline for the delivery o f  Iranian natural gas to Turkey, despite explicit US 
opposition, was a clear sign o f this new policy. See Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, pp. 
314-15.
56 While Erbakan condemned the UN sanctions against Libya and declared that Libya was the 
country suffering most from terror -apparently of Western origin, the Libyan leader Muammar 
Qaddafi called in Erbakan’s presence for the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in
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domestic front, symbolic moves such as the plans to erect a new mosque at 
Taksim Square in the heart of Istanbul, and efforts to strengthen the influence of 
political Islam in state education, administration and economy met with a decisive 
reaction by the military. A blunt threat of military intervention appeared during 
the MGK meeting of 28 February 1997, which has been remembered since then as
cn  #
a “soft” coup (see p. 182). Erbakan surrendered -after some hesitation- to the 
military ultimatum on 5 March 1997, and swift steps toward the purge of Islamist 
elements and the restoration of secular order were made.
The collapse of the RP-DYP coalition government on 18 June 1997 
signalled the return of assertively secular political parties and establishment forces 
to political dominance. Measures aiming at the restoration of early republican 
assertive secularism were swiftly taken. These were contrary to the policies of not 
only the RP-DYP coalition government, but also of the post-coup “neo­
republican” governments, which attempted to introduce Islamic elements into the 
public sphere discourse to provide “a moral basis, ideological unity, and some
CO
certainty in the face of global capitalism.” In January 1998, the RP was closed 
down following a decision of the Turkish Constitutional Court, and its leader 
Necmettin Erbakan was -once more- banned from politics for five years.59
Following the tradition of the National View parties, a successor party of 
the RP had already been established in December 1997, before its expected 
closure. The Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi-FP) took the mantle of Turkish political
Turkey. See Alan Makovsky, "How to Deal with Erbakan", Middle East Quarterly, Vol. IV, no. 1 
(1997).
57 The lack o f any serious genuine civil society reaction against the military intervention and the 
coalition o f  other civil society forces with the military against the coalition government, were clear 
manifestations o f the shortcomings o f the democratic political system. See Bekir Berat Ozipek, 
"28 §ubat ve islamcilar" in Yasin Aktay, ed., islamcdik (Istanbul: lleti§im, 2004), pp. 646-48.
58 Cizre and £inar, "Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the Light o f the February 
28 Process", p. 312
59 Yavuz, "Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere", pp. 37-38
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Islam and attempted to present a moderate face by supporting democratisation, 
closer relations with the EU, privatisation and a smaller economic role of the 
state.60 Nonetheless, divisions within the party about the future of political Islam 
in Turkey could no longer remain latent. Traditionalist views expressed by the 
banned leader Erbakan and his close disciples were challenged by a generation of 
younger reformist politicians who sought to reorganise the party along 
constitutional rules and reconcile Islamic and Western European political values. 
In the first party conference in May 2000, Erbakan’s favoured candidate, Recai 
Kutan, beat the reformist candidate, Abdullah GUI, but only with difficulty. 
Despite the defeat of the reformist faction, the public profile of the FP was far 
more moderate and system-oriented than that of the RP.61 However, when the 
Constitutional Court shut down the FP in June 2001 on the grounds that it was “a 
centre of anti-secularist activity,”62 division in the party ranks became official. 
Under Erbakan’s auspices, Recai Kutan and the traditionalists formed the Felicity 
Party {Saadet Partisi-SP), while the reformists under the leadership of Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan founded the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma 
Partisi-AKlJ). The split within political Islam was of crucial importance for the 
development of novel approaches to the question of religion and politics in 
Turkey.
d. Is Turkey a Secular State?
Republican Turkey is commonly quoted as the “only Muslim secular state,” which 
can serve as a “model for the Middle East and the rest of the Islamic world.” 
Nonetheless, a closer look over the term “secular” shows this description is not
60 Oni§, "Political Islam at the Crossroads: From Hegemony to Co-Existence", p. 287
61 Birol Ye§ilada, "The Virtue Party", Turkish Studies, Vol. 3, no. 1 (2002), pp. 78-79
62 Tiirkiye Anayasa Mahkemesi, Fazilet Partisi'nin (FP) Kapatihna Davasi Gerekgeli Karan 
Ankara, 2001), available from http://www.belgenet.com/arsiv/fazilet.html
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strictly accurate.63 The meaning of the term “secular,” colloquially understood as 
“non-religious,” is not limited to the separation of religious and political realms. It 
entails a neutral stance toward different religious beliefs as well as the 
phenomenon of religion in general. A genuinely secular state has no preferential 
links with any religion and neither promotes, nor obstructs religious belief among 
its citizens. The Turkish state fulfils neither of these conditions. Opposition to any 
religious form of expression within a widely defined public sphere shows the 
hostile approach of the Turkish state toward religion. The ban on tarikats and 
religious attire, the headscarf issue (see p. 243) and the eradication of religion 
from the public sphere are indicative of a state which does not remain indifferent 
to religion, but on the contrary takes active measures to put religious institutions 
under its firm control and promote a religion-free, “rational” society. Religion was 
expected to decline as a result of the enlightenment and modernisation of Turkish 
society and the upward economic and social mobility of its citizens.64 This means 
that the term “assertive secularism” -rather than merely “secularism”-  is more 
accurately descriptive of state-religion relations in republican Turkey. 
Nevertheless, the assertively secular character of the Turkish state has often been 
compromised as a result of political expediency. This compromise was not in the 
direction of original secularism, but rather toward championing a certain state 
religion.
Ideological opposition to religion did not mean lack of state interest in the 
instrumental use of religion for political purposes. Sunni Islam has been skilfully 
used since the founding years of the Republic as a cementing factor of Turkish 
national identity and a counterweight to the perceived divisive influence of ethnic
63 Fuller, "Turkey's Strategic Model: Myths and Realities", p. 52
64 Haldun Giilalp, "Whatever Happened to Secularization? The Multiple Islams in Turkey", South 
Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 102, no. 2/3 (2003), pp. 389-90
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nationalism and leftist ideas, even though this contradicts the principle of 
secularism.65 Atatiirk himself had successfully used Islam to unify Anatolian 
Muslims under his leadership during the 1919-1922 war. While Islam was purged 
from the public sphere in the early republican period, the state kept a firm control 
over it by banning the tarikats and establishing the Directorate of Religious 
Affairs (Diyanet i§leri Ba$kanhgi).66 Islam made a gradual comeback to the 
public sphere during the rule of the Democrat Party. This comprised one of the 
several reasons for the 1960 military coup. The rapid recovery of political Islam in 
the 1960s confirmed that the state could not afford to ignore the Islamic question. 
Passivity about religious developments was deemed extremely dangerous for the 
future o f the Turkish Republic. Active intervention and control was viewed as the 
only means to secure the containment of the Islamist threat. This policy shift 
became institutionalised with the official championing of the “Turkish-Islamic 
Synthesis” by the 1980-1983 military regime, the introduction of mandatory 
religious primary education and the clauses of the 1982 Constitution that 
strengthened the power of Sunni Islam.67 Sunni Islam of the Hanefi School gained 
an absolute priority over other versions of Sunni, Shiite and Alevi Islam, as well 
as other religions. The clear Sunni character of the Directorate of Religious 
Affairs, the mandatory instruction of Sunni Islam in state schools and the state- 
funded construction of mosques throughout the country -even in Alevi villages-
65 This paradox was already observed in 1954 by Ali Fuat Ba§gil. See Ali Fuat Bajgil, Din ve 
Laiklik (istanbul: Kubbealti Ne§riyat, 2003), p. 220 cited in Ru§en £akir and Irfan Bozan, Sivil, 
Seffaf ve Demokratik Bir Diyanet igleri Bagkanhgi Miimkiin mil? (istanbul: TESEV Yayinlari, 
2005), p. 107.
66 Ismail Kara, "Diyanet i§leri Ba§kanhgi" in Yasin Aktay, ed., Islamcihk (istanbul: Ileti§im, 
2004), pp. 180-83
67 This instrumental use o f Islam, however, met with the opposition o f Islamists. See Murat 
Yilmaz, "Darbeler ve islamcihk" in Yasin Aktay, ed., Islamcihk (istanbul: ileti§im, 2004), pp. 
637-39.
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comprise clear manifestations of a pervasive bias in favour of Sunni Islam.68 
When it came to non-Muslims (see p. 265) and Alevis (see p. 275), the assertively 
secular Turkish state suddenly became a Sunni one.69
This mixed legacy of animosity toward religion, state control and bias in 
favour of Sunni Islam forms the framework of state-society relations in republican 
Turkey. Turkey could, therefore, be characterised as a sui generis assertively 
secular state, in which long-term antireligious policies are matched by a short­
term instrumental use of Sunni Islam. This situation created a serious obstacle to 
the process of Turkey’s democratisation and created an environment conducive to 
political conflict.70
3. The Impact of the European Union
a. Legislative Reform
i). Before the Reform 
The European Union could not oppose secularism as such, but merely its 
implementation in a way that violates basic civil liberties and minority rights. Tn 
that spirit, it has been often critical of the religious policies of the Turkish state. 
Issues related to the freedom of religious belief for Muslims and non-Muslims and 
state control over religion were addressed in all the European Commission reports 
on Turkey. In the 1998 European Commission progress report, the dissolution of 
the RP was noted as well as the criminal conviction and imprisonment of the -  
then- Mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, due to a speech deemed to
68 Gole, "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making o f Elites and Counter-Elites", pp. 48-49
69 Etyen Mahfupyan, "Aleviler, Azinhk, Diyanet", Zaman, 1/11/2004
70 Binnaz Toprak, "Turkiye'de Laiklik, Siyasal Islam ve Demokrasi" in Demokrasi ve Genslik 
Vakfi, ed., Uhislararasi Atatiirk ve Cagdag Toplnm Sempozyumu (istanbul: i§ Bankasi KiiltUr 
Yayinlan, 2002), p. 289
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constitute “racial or religious provocation.”71 The obligatory character of Sunni 
religious education in state primary schools was stressed. While the practice of 
non-Sunni religions -including Alevis- faced several bureaucratic restrictions, 
numerous administrative privileges were enjoyed by Sunni Islam. The report also 
pointed out the extra-institutional role of the military as guardian of secularism, 
which excluded from its ranks persons suspect for links with Islamist 
organisations.72 In the 2000 report, the launch of legal procedures for the 
dissolution of the FP for violating the “principle of secularism” was noted.73 Alevi 
complaints about state education and financial support for Sunni religious 
purposes, and the sentencing of Necmettin Erbakan to one-year imprisonment for 
“inciting religious and ethnic hatred” under Article 312 of the Penal Code, were 
also recorded.74 In the 2001 report, Alevi grievances were reiterated.75 The 2002 
report shed light on the dissolution of the “Cultural Association of the Union of 
Alevi and Bekta§i Formations.” This had been closed down, under Articles 14 and 
24 of the Constitution, and Article 5 of the Law on Associations, according to 
which founding an association by the name of Alevi or Bekta§i contravened the 
principle of secularism.76 The 2003 report, whilst acknowledging the considerable 
progress made, expressed the persistence of concerns regarding representation of 
non-Sunni religious communities in the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet 
I§leri Bagkanligi) and compulsory religious instruction in schools, which failed to
71 Commission o f the European Communities, 1998 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards 
Accession, p. 10
72 Ibid., p. 19
73 Commission o f the European Communities, 2000 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards 
Accession, p. 11
74 Ibid., pp. 17-18
75 Commission o f the European Communities, 2001 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards 
Accession, p. 27
76 Commission o f the European Communities, 2002 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress Towards 
Accession, p. 37
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acknowledge the Alevi identity.77 In the 2004 report, the extra-institutional role of 
the military as guardian of assertive secularism was again stressed. The provisions 
of Articles 35 and 85 §1 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law, which 
defined the duties of the Turkish armed forces as being to “protect and preserve 
the Turkish Republic on the basis of the principles referred to in the Preamble of 
the Constitution,” including secularism, were mentioned. Similarly, Article 2a of 
the National Security Council Law, defined national security in such broad terms, 
that it could be interpreted as covering the assertively secular character of the 
state.78 Regarding the status of Alevis, the report underlined the continuation of 
state discriminatory practices and reiterated the claim of most Alevis that “as a 
secular state Turkey should treat all religions equally and not directly support one 
particular religion (the Sunni Muslims) as it currently does through the 
Directorate of Religious Affairs.”79
ii). The Reform Process 
Assertive secularism has historically been one of the most sensitive political 
questions in the history of republican Turkey. Given that the principle of assertive 
secularism found constitutional protection -m ost importantly in the Preamble and 
Article 2 of the Constitution- and that the military had repeatedly used its role as 
guardian of Turkey’s assertively secular model to justify its political 
interventions, any efforts to liberalise Turkey’s assertively secular model were 
hesitant and circumspect. This meant that the constitutional protection of assertive 
secularism never became a part of the EU reform debate. The need, however, to 
address the issues raised by the reports of the European Commission and human
77 Commission o f the European Communities, 2003 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards 
Accession, p. 36
78 Commission o f the European Communities, 2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards 
Accession, p. 23
79 Ibid., pp. 44-45
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rights organisations facilitated the reform of Turkish legislation on assertive 
secularism and its protection. Article 312 of the Penal Code, which penalised 
“incitement to class, ethnic, religious or racial hatred,” was amended to meet 
liberal concerns. Not any incitement, but only incitement “in a way that may be 
dangerous for public order” would be punishable according to the amended 
Article 312. Narrowing the scope of the Article allowed for more freedom in the 
public discussion of assertive secularism and state-religion relations.80 With 
respect to the judicial implementation of the reform, the number of acquittals in 
cases based on Article 312 increased. On the other hand, the broad use of Article 
312 did not recede, despite the effort to limit the scope of the Article.81
The reform record was also mixed when it came to ending the preferential 
treatment of Sunni Islam by the state. In April 2003, the previously banned 
“Cultural Association of the Union of Alevi and Bekta$i Formations” was granted
R7legal status and allowed to pursue its activities. In 2004, the regional office of 
the Directorate of Religious Affairs in Antakya established a multi-religious 
committee aimed at developing a harmonious relationship between Muslims, 
Christians and Jews.83 Nonetheless, these steps did not signal a fundamental 
change in state policies toward religious groups. Sunni Islam continued to enjoy 
preferential treatment by the state, which became all apparent when it came to 
access to state funding and education.
80 Commission o f the European Communities, 2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards 
Accession, p. 32
81 Commission o f the European Communities, 2003 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards 
Accession, p. 21
82 Ibid., p. 36
83 Commission o f the European Communities, 2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards 
Accession, p. 44
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b. The Transformation of Turkish Political Islam
Although the fruits of the legislative reform process were not impressive, the 
European Union was instrumental in assisting the transformation process of 
Turkish political Islam, which had a major impact on the discourse of religion and 
politics. The “soft” coup of 28 February 1997 and the subsequent fall of the 
Erbakan-led coalition government triggered a series of developments of crucial 
importance for the future and the shape of political Islam in Turkey. The impact 
of the European Union as a facilitator of these developments was anything but 
insignificant.
At the domestic level, it became clear that any ideas about regime change 
and the introduction of the Islamic law were utterly unrealistic. This was due not 
only to the reaffirmation of the guardian role of the military in Turkish politics, 
but also to the lack of appeal of any Islamisation programme to the vast majority 
of the people. Turkish political Islam managed to attract considerable popular 
support, but never appealed to the greater public because of its purely and 
narrowly Islamist orientation. If a party with Islamist political character could 
ever manage to claim a leading role in Turkish politics, this could only happen 
through its transformation into a conservative centre-right party with Islamist 
leanings. The mobilisation of Turkish civil society organisations against any 
Islamist-leaning policies during the rule of the RP-DYP coalition government 
provided additional evidence for the unpopularity of pure Islamist policies.
At the European level, the decision of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) to uphold the decision of the Turkish Constitutional Court to close 
the RP was a milestone event. On the one hand, Erbakan’s decision to appeal to
84 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, "AKP and the Paradox o f Islamic Europhilia", Turkish Policy Quarterly, 
Vol. 3, no. 1 (2004), p. 66
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the ECHR against the closure of the RP undermined his rhetoric against European 
institutions and civilisation. The establishment of an Islamic “Just Order” in 
Turkey, which had been the perennial quest of the National View movement, 
implied the moral supremacy of the Islamic civilisation over the European. By 
appealing to the ECHR, Erbakan tacitly acknowledged that “Christian Europe” 
was an alternative and acceptable source of justice. The relativisation of the 
concept of Islamic justice by the very person who had fought throughout his life 
for its establishment in Turkey undermined any belief in the superiority of Islamic 
civilisation and showed that the Islamist political project in Turkey had reached its 
limits. The court ruled in July 2001 that, by closing the RP, the Turkish court did
not violate Article 11 of the European Convention o f Human Rights. The Court
held that
the sanctions imposed on the applicants could reasonably be 
considered to meet a pressing social need for the protection of 
democratic society, since, on the pretext o f giving a different 
meaning to the principle o f secularism, the leaders o f the Refah 
Partisi had declared their intention to establish a plurality of 
legal systems based on differences in religious belief, to 
institute Islamic law (the sharia-geriaf), a system of law that
was in marked contrast to the values embodied in the
Convention. They had also left in doubt their position regarding 
recourse to force in order to come to power and, more 
particularly, to retain power.85
85 European Court o f Human Rights (ECHR), Registrar’s Press Release: Judgment in the Case o f  
Refah Partisi (Welfare Party), Erbakan, Kazan and Tekdal v j . Turkey Strasbourg, 2001b), 
available from http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2001/July/RefahPartisi2001jude.htm [posted on 
31/7/2001], The full text o f the decision is available at European Court o f Human Rights (ECHR), 
"Refah Partisi [Welfare Party] and Others vs. Turkey," (Third Section, 2001a).
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This decision, which was made by the Third Section of the ECHR, was firmly 
upheld by the ECHR Grand Chamber in February 2003.86 The ECHR decision 
demonstrated that Islamic extremism could not be protected by European liberal 
democratic institutions. Support of European political institutions for Turkish 
political parties under state persecution was not unconditional. Turkish political 
parties had to subscribe to European political values to be then able to claim 
European support. Like terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism could not expect 
support from European courts.87 The threat which Islamic fundamentalism 
constituted for democratic principles and human rights was not underestimated, 
and the use of democratic institutions for undemocratic objectives could not be 
endorsed.
In the aftermath of the RP closure, ideological fermentation within the 
Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi-FP) showed that political Islam was undergoing a 
radical transformation. Many of its members attempted to break the vicious circle 
of state suppression, which had historically inflicted Islamist political parties by 
advocating a radical transformation of Islamist ideology. The establishment of an 
Islamic republic would no more be the ultimate aim. Allegiance to the secular 
principles of Western European democracy was adopted, instead, and an 
amalgamation of Islamic values with Western political liberalism was attempted.88 
Crucial for the rehabilitation of the Western image was the experience of 
immigration to Western Europe for millions of Turkish citizens, who realised that 
they could more freely profess Islam in “Christian” Germany than in “Muslim”
86 European Court o f Human Rights (ECHR), "Refah Partisi [Welfare Party] and Others vs. 
Turkey," (Grand Chamber, 2003)
87 Grigoriadis, "AKP and the Paradox o f Islamic Europhilia", p. 68
88 For parallel developments in the field o f tarikats and the Fethullah Gtilen movement, see M. 
Hakan Yavuz, "Towards an Islamic Liberalism? The Nurcu Movement and Fethullah Gillen", 
Middle East Journal, Vol. 53, no. 4 (1999), pp. 600-05.
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Turkey.89 This ideological trend within the Islamist intelligentsia obtained a 
political vehicle with the formation of the Justice and Development Party {Adalet 
ve Kalkinma Partisi-AKP), in the aftermath of the closure of the FP. The AKP 
leadership took pains to dissociate the new party from its Islamist past, and 
advertised itself as a moderate conservative party,90 loyal to secularism.91 The 
ideology of the party was an amalgam of conservativism, liberalism, Islamic 
values and rightist political ideas. The term “Islamist” was rejected as a 
description of the ideological identity of the party; the term “conservative 
democratic” {muhafazakar demokrat) was preferred.92 The AKP was the first 
party from the Islamic political tradition to address the grievances of Turkey’s 
pious Muslim population not in terms of Islamic justice or “Just Order”, but on 
the basis of a liberal and human rights agenda. The assertively secular character of 
the Turkish state was criticised, not from an Islamist but from a liberal 
perspective. Contested issues of major symbolic importance, like the headscarf 
and religious education, were now discussed as evidence of Turkey’s democratic 
deficit. The liberal shift of the AKP was confirmed when -contrary to the tradition 
of the National View parties- it ardently supported Turkey’s bid for EU 
membership.
The November 2002 elections became the big test case for the AKP 
political experiment: With 34.4 per cent of the votes and 365 parliamentary seats,
89 Effie Fokas, "The Islamist Movement and Turkey-EU Relations" in Mehmet Ugur and Nergis 
Canefe, eds., Turkey and European Integration : Accession Prospects and Issues (London & New 
York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 154-55
90 Gareth Jenkins, "Muslim Democrats in Turkey?" Survival, Vol. 45, no. 1 (2003), pp. 53-55
91 Soner Cagaptay, "The November 2002 Elections and Turkey's New Political Era", Middle East 
Review o f International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 6, no. 4 (2002), p. 44
92 Nuh Yilmaz, "islamcihk, AKP, Siyaset" in Yasin Aktay, ed., islamcihk (istanbul: ileti§im, 
2004), pp. 613-17 and Yal9in Akdogan, "Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi" in Yasin Aktay, ed., 
Islamcihk (istanbul: ileti§im, 2004a), pp. 625-31. Dagi suggested the term “post-Islamist” to 
explain the transformation o f the AKP ideology. See ihsan D. Dagi, "Rethinking Human Rights, 
Democracy, and the West: Post-Islamist Intellectuals in Turkey", Critique: Critical Middle 
Eastern Studies, Vol. 13, no. 2 (2004).
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the AKP formed a single-party government, while the traditionalist Islamic 
Felicity Party (,Saadet Partisi-SP) gained only 2.5 per cent and no seats. The AKP 
had succeeded in winning power, dominating the political agenda and ideology of 
Turkish political Islam and opening it to the influence of Western political ideas. 
The emphasis on Islamic morality as an antidote to chronic political corruption 
remained,93 but the political priorities of the new government were different. After 
taking over power, the AKP and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan vowed to 
pursue the reform steps necessary for Turkey to qualify for the start of EU 
accession negotiations. The prospect of EU membership provided a vision, which 
the vast majority of the Turkish society shared, and for which many sacrifices 
could be tolerated. The AKP leadership realised that the European Union could be 
of critical help in its effort to gain political legitimacy94 and promote the sensitive, 
religion-related aspects of its political agenda. By becoming an ardent supporter 
and promoter of Turkey’s EU membership, the AKP leadership challenged the 
monopoly of Kemalist elites in their advocacy of Westernisation. The reform of 
Turkey’s human rights legislation would necessarily mean a redefinition of the 
public and private spheres in Turkish society. Many activities, which would -until 
the reform- fall within the scope of the public realm, would be transferred to the 
private realm and thus enjoy full protection under the new human rights 
legislation.95 The prospect o f EU membership and the EU monitoring of Turkish 
politics also provided a secure environment against any intervention by military 
and bureaucratic elites. This enabled the AKP government to implement its 
reformist political programme, which confirmed the transformation of the AKP
93 Metin Heper and $ule Tokta§, "Islam, Modernity, and Democracy in Contemporary Turkey: The 
Case o f Recep Tayyip Erdogan", Muslim World, Vol. 93, no. 2 (2003), p. 173
94 ihsan D. Dagi, "Transformation o f Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and 
Westernization", Turkish Studies, Vol. 6, no. I (2005c), p. 31
95 Grigoriadis, "AKP and the Paradox o f Islamic Europhilia", p. 67
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from an Islamist to a conservative democratic party,96 increasingly similar to the 
equivalent religious value-based Christian Democratic parties of Western 
Europe.97
c. A New Version of Secularism in the Making?
While Europe affirmed its opposition to Islamic fundamentalism and Turkish 
political Islam was transformed, the question of how to protect freedom of 
religion against assertively secular state practices remained open. Turkish political 
Islam traditionally viewed the assertively secular character of the Turkish state as 
a dire consequence of the greater Kemalist Westernisation project. Europe was the 
historic cradle of secularism and as such responsible for the antireligious character 
of the Turkish Republic, Nonetheless, with the rise of the AKP, alternative 
Western systems of regulating state-religion relations were explored. The fact that 
the AKP abandoned the Islamic state project for the sake of Western liberal 
democratic principles did not mean that it lost its sensitivity on issues of religious 
freedom; its argument, however, was now based upon political liberalism. The 
establishment of a pluralist public sphere in Turkey was now seen as the solution 
for the problems related to the public visibility of Islamic identity in Turkey.98 
This could be the starting point for the reform of the assertively secular system. 
Turkish secularism was inspired from French laicite o f the Second French 
Republic, the most vehemently antireligious system in the Western world and 
hardly compatible with the principles of liberal democracy. It was, therefore, 
possible to argue for a reform of Turkish secularism not on the basis of restoring
96 On the conservative nature o f the AKP, see Yasin Aktay, "islamciliktaki Muhafazakarhk 
Bakiye" in Ahmet £igdem, ed., Muhafazakarhk (istanbul: lleti§im, 2003), pp. 348-50.
97 See Oni§, "Turkish Modernisation and Challenges for the New Europe", pp. 13-17.
98 Cizre and £inar, "Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in the Light o f the February 
28 Process", p. 327
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Islamic law, but rather of introducing liberal principles." This reform would aim 
at substituting a truly secular, religion-blind policy for the antireligious character 
of state policies as well as the bias in favour of Sunni Islam. This model of 
passive secularism would be distanced from the French model of laicite and could 
be closer related to the UK or German models of secularism. It would protect state 
and religion from mutual interventions and promote Turkish democracy without 
obstructing the free religious expression of the majority of the Turkish people. In 
a treatise, which appeared on the official AKP website and can thus be considered 
to reflect the party’s official views, Yal9 in Akdogan argued:
The AKP understands “secularism”100 as an institutional stance 
and method, which ensures that the state remains neutral and 
keeps an equal distance from all religions and ideas.
Differences o f religion and/or different confessions and 
ideologies can be professed in social peace without them 
turning into conflict. The party thinks that, for secularism to 
work as an adjudicating institution of the fundamental rights 
and freedoms under constitutional protection, it needs to be 
supported by democracy and operate in a conciliatory 
environment.101
Secularism was, therefore, accepted as “an indispensable condition of democracy 
and the guarantee of the freedom of religion and conscience,”102 and was linked to 
democracy and human rights. This position attempted to reconcile the legacy of 
illiberal Turkish assertive secularism with respect for democratic principles and
99 Ihsan D. Dagi, Fieldwork Interview (Ankara, 24/1/2005)
100 Assertive secularism is here used as a synonym of secularism.
101 Yalgin Akdogan, A K  Parti ve Muhafazakdr Demokrasi (AK Parti Yayinlari: Ankara, 2004b), 
available from http://www.akparti.org.tr/muhafazakar.doc
102 Insel, "The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey", p. 304
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fundamental freedoms. Secularism should not mean the absence of religion from 
the public sphere, or the state control of religious institutions. The version of 
passive secularism the AKP advocated did not eliminate religion from the public 
sphere, but required the state to adopt a neutral stance on religious issues and
• • 103respect the freedoms of religion and conscience of its citizens. The re- 
emergence of religion in the public sphere should not, therefore, be seen as a 
reassertion of militant political Islam, but as maturation in the process of 
democratisation and transition from assertive to passive secularism. The 
introduction of such a secular system would mean the simultaneous abolition of 
Kemalist assertive secularism and Islamism in favour of a liberal democratic 
solution. This became clear in the AKP political programme, where passive 
secularism was defined as an “orienting principle for the state, but not for the 
individual,” “a means to freedom and social harmony” and “a guarantee of 
freedom of conscience.”104
The appeal of this redefinition of secularism was not restricted to the 
leading circles of the AKP. Prominent Islamist intellectuals, who had in the past 
supported the establishment of an Islamic state in Turkey, became proponents of 
Turkey’s European vocation.105 The European Union was no more the arch­
enemy, but a de facto  ally in the struggle against the Kemalist bureaucracy and its 
iron fist, the military. The reform of assertive secularism could be achieved 
through Turkey’s democratisation, which only the process of Turkey’s EU 
accession could guarantee. While democracy and human rights had been despised
103 See §ahin Alpay, "AB, Tiirkiye ve isiam", Zaman, 9/10/2004.
104 Heper and Tokta§, "Islam, Modernity, and Democracy in Contemporary Turkey: The Case of 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan", p. 176
105 Ali Bulag is a primary example o f this shift. His argument on the “three generations o f Islamist 
politics” is illuminating. See Ali Bulag, "istam'in Ug Siyaset Tarzi Veya Islamcilarm Ug Nesli" in 
Yasin Aktay, ed., islamciltk (istanbul: ileti§im, 2004), pp. 48-50. See also Dagi, "Rethinking 
Human Rights, Democracy, and the West: Post-Islamist Intellectuals in Turkey", pp. 143-49.
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as prime examples of Western concepts, which had adulterated sound Islamic 
political thought,106 they now occupied the centre of Islamist political 
discourse,107 offering a solution to the problem of secularism. The adoption of 
these principles of modernity resulted in a paradoxical situation whereby former 
Islamist intellectuals were defending human rights and democracy, pointing to the 
shortcomings of the Kemalist modernisation project, which, despite professing 
modernity, had failed to deliver its biggest blessings.108
i). The Headscarf Issue 
The same discourse was applied in a novel approach to the headscarf issue, one of 
the symbols of the secularist controversy in republican Turkey. The ban on 
headscarf use in state institutions was one of the clearest manifestations of the 
assertively secular character of republican Turkey. The rise of an Islamist counter­
elite in the 1980s resulted in the extreme politicisation of the headscarf issue, as 
its members now felt able to challenge the hegemony of the established secularist 
elite. While retaining its original religious and traditional meaning, wearing the 
headscarf also obtained an explicitly political symbolic value. It became a 
political statement of a new rising and ambitious elite. Nonetheless, the argument 
in favour of the headscarf use was still based on an Islamist discourse. The 
headscarf was understood as an indispensable element of female Islamic morality, 
and the Islamic law failed to recognise the distinction between the public and the 
private sphere. The assertively secular principle of keeping religion outside the 
public sphere could not tolerate the most public manifestation of resistance to
106 This was the phenomenon o f “Westoxification”, a favourite topic o f Iranian political Islam.
107 Some authors even came to the point o f discovering human rights courts during the Islamic 
“Era o f Felicity” . See Ahmet §ahin, "Islam’da Insan Haklari Mahkemesinden Bir Ornek!" Zaman, 
14/12/2004.
108 Dagi, "Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and the West: Post-Islamist Intellectuals in 
Turkey", p. 141
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assertive secularism. The purge of the public sphere culminated in the aftermath 
of the “soft” coup of 28 February 1997. The response to this campaign by the 
short-lived FP and, most importantly, the AKP, markedly differed in its content. 
Reference was now made to universal human rights embodied in international 
human rights conventions, and Islamic law was no more seen as the sole 
manifestation of justice. The right to education, the principle of non- 
discrimination, the freedom of religion as protected by the European Convention 
of Human Rights and other international human rights treaties were quoted in 
defence of the right of women to wear the headscarf. Even the solution suggested 
for the problem, based on a “social consensus,”109 was borrowed from Western 
liberal thought.110
This shift in the AKP discourse was not well received by everyone. Many 
saw the headscarf question as a litmus test for the commitment of the AKP to 
republican ideals. A segment of the republican elite has persistently doubted the 
motives of the AKP government, accusing it of having a secret agenda for the 
Islamisation of Turkish state and society.111 It was argued that the AKP leadership 
could not have jettisoned its Islamist worldview within a few years.112 According 
to that view, the AKP had actually been engaged in dissimulation (takiyye), a 
practice with strong roots in Shiite Islamic tradition, by hiding its true intentions 
to establish an Islamic state, until the time was ripe.113 Although such arguments 
were rather exaggerated, they were sometimes supported by clumsy attempts by
109 Ali Bula?, "CHP, Anadolu Solu ve Ba§6rtiisu", Zaman, 3/7/2002
110 Dagi, "Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and the West: Post-Islamist Intellectuals in 
Turkey", p. 142
111 Simten Co§ar and Aylin Ozman, "Centre-Right Politics in Turkey after the November 2002 
Election: Neo-Liberalism with a Muslim Face", Contemporary Politics, Vol. 10, no. 1 (2004), p. 
66
112 Leyla Tav§anoglu, Fieldwork Interview (Istanbul, 15/1/2005)
113 Heper and Tokta§, "Islam, Modernity, and Democracy in Contemporary Turkey: The Case of 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan", p. 160 and Murat Beige, "Takiye Tarti§masi", Radikal, 08/11/2002
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the AKP to appease the Islamist part of its electoral base of which the short-lived 
proposal to penalise adultery during the reform of the Turkish Penal Code in 
August 2004 is a prime example.
The rise of the AKP to power in November 2002 did not signal a break 
with past state policies on the headscarf issue. Despite the explicit expectations of 
its electoral base, the AKP government normally abstained from openly raising 
the headscarf issue, in an effort to avoid polarising the political scene and 
antagonising the military and bureaucratic elite. Instead, it opted to wait for the 
imminent decision of the European Court of Human Rights decision on the issue, 
which was hoped that it would relieve the government of the political cost of 
reforming the headscarf legislation. The decision of the ECHR, however, in the 
case Leyla §ahin vs. Turkey did not help these plans. The Court ruled that there 
was no violation of Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) of the 
European Convention of Human Rights when the applicant was denied access to 
university examination and enrolment, because she wore a headscarf.114 Although 
the Court’s decision did not help resolve the headscarf issue in Turkey, this had 
no impact on the liberal basis of the AKP public discourse.115
ii). The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet I^leri 
Bagkanhgi)
On the other hand, the AKP showed less zeal in applying the same liberal 
discourse in the case of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Lyleri
1,4 See European Court o f Human Rights (ECHR), "Leyla §ahin vs. Turkey," (Fourth Section,
2004), p. 26. This decision came under heavy attack by European human rights organisations, 
which diagnosed a dangerous illiberal shift in the ruling of the Court, following the emergence of a 
headscarf question in EU member states like France.
115 In any case, the decision only ruled that headscarf restrictions in higher education did not 
violate the freedom of religion according to the European Convention. It did not pose any 
obstacles to the lifting o f the restrictions. See Taha Akyol, "Anayasa, Laiklik, Siyaset", Milliyet, 
27/4/2005.
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Ba§kanligi). The exponential growth of the activity of the Directorate since the 
1980s has been one of the clearest indicators of the Islamic social and political 
resurgence. Its budget in 2000 was eleven times that of the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security, one and a half times that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and 1.2 times that of the Ministry of Interior.116 Its personnel grew from 25,236 in
1970 to over 74,114 in 2004, while the number of mosques soared from 42,744 in
1 111971 to 76,445 in 2004. The expanding activity of the Directorate undermined 
the secular character of the state, given that it exclusively promoted Sunni Islam. 
Alevi associations and other religious minority representatives repeatedly 
addressed their grievances about the Sunni bias of the Directorate and the absence 
of any funding programmes for Alevi religious houses of worship (cemevi). The 
reform of the Directorate was suggested as a necessary step for the establishment 
of genuine secularism. Two possible solutions were suggested. The state should 
either cede control of the Directorate to the religious communities themselves, or 
maintain control of the Directorate, but guarantee the proportional representation 
of all religious groups in it, as well as their proportionate access to the 
Directorate’s budget.118
The prospect of Turkey’s EU membership brought the Directorate issue 
to public attention, as European Commission reports had repeatedly noted how it 
undermined the principle of secularism. During the ensuing discussions on 
necessary reforms, some suggested the transformation of the Directorate into an 
autonomous state authority, following the example of the Higher Education
116 Oran, "Kemalism, Islamism and Globalization: A Study on the Focus o f Supreme Loyalty in 
Globalizing Turkey", pp. 27-29
117 £akir and Bozan, Sivil, §effaf ve Demokratik Bir Diyanet I§leri Ba$kanhgi Miimkun mil? , pp. 
73-74. Nonetheless, the rise in the number o f mosques should not be only attributed to increasing 
religiosity, but also to rising welfare. Mosques were built in villages that could not afford one 
before.
118 Kara, "Diyanet l§leri Ba§kanhgi", pp. 194-96
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Council (Yiiksek Ogretim Kurulu-YOK). Others suggested the abolition of the 
Directorate and the takeover of its activities by the religious communities. The 
equal access of non-Sunni Muslims to the Directorate and its services was also 
underlined.119 While all these proposals could contribute to the elimination of the 
Sunni bias of the Directorate, the AKP government did not display the initiative it 
had shown in advocating the free profession of the Islamic faith in public space. 
Occasional statements by AKP officials -including Erdogan himself- on Alevi 
grievances regarding the Directorate did not convey the expected level of 
sensitivity and loyalty to liberal principles when it came to recognise Alevis as a 
separate religious group and not just as a branch of Sunni Islam. Age-old Sunni 
prejudices of Alevi Islam survived in the AKP. A statement of Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke volumes about the level of intolerance on the Alevi 
issue among Sunni Muslims. When asked during a television interview on his 
opinion on the Alevi question he replied that Alevism is not a religion and added:
If Alevism means to love Ali and follow his path, I am also 
Alevi. I am one of those who struggle to live like Ali. I am 
more Alevi than they are.120
It seems that the Sunni background of the AKP leadership has obstructed a liberal 
approach of the Directorate question and shed doubt about the depth of its liberal 
convictions. Nonetheless, the existence of a persistent debate on how to bring the 
Directorate’s role and functions in line with liberal and secular ideas provides 
evidence that, although the AKP has failed in this case to play the role of a
119 £akir and Bozan, Sivil, §effaf ve Demokratik Bir Diyanet tgleri Balkan I igi Mumkiin mil? , pp. 
110-17
120 See Timur Soykan, "Alevi Tepkisi Artiyor", Radikal, 9/10/2004 and Zihni Erdem, "Cemevi 
Sosyal Tesismi§", Radikal, 01/05/2005.
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catalyst, the introduction of a new, passive version of secularism has widespread 
social support.121
4. The Stance of Social Actors
a. The Bureaucracy
Turkey’s military and civil bureaucracy has considered the protection of the 
republican secular model to be one of its primary missions. Throughout the 
history of republican Turkey, the protection of this model has become the 
legitimising ground for numerous military interventions into politics. The military 
coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980 were all -a t least partially-justified as inevitable 
for the protection of assertive secularism against the threat of political Islam. The 
military undertook a guardian role of assertive secularism, which was 
institutionalised with the establishment of the MGK under the 1961 Constitution 
and outlined in the National Security Council Law and the Turkish Armed Forces 
Internal Service Law. The “soft” coup of 1997 reaffirmed the keen interest o f the 
military in the defence of assertive secularism. Given this recent historic 
precedent, the AKP experimentations with a novel, more tolerant type of 
secularism were bound to provoke reaction by the military. Despite the new 
political environment created by the prospect of EU membership and political 
reform, the headscarf issue served again as a reaffirmation of the civil and military 
bureaucracy’s commitment to the protection of the republican secular model and 
its unwillingness to negotiate any relaxation of the tough restrictions to the public 
manifestations of Islam.122 During his annual evaluation speech in the Directorate
121 (pakir and Bozan, Sivil, §effaf ve Demokratik Bir Diyanet iqleri Ba§kanhgi Miimkun mil? , pp. 
336-39
122 Binnaz Toprak, Fieldwork Interview (Istanbul, 12/1/2005)
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of War Academies on 20 April 2005, the Chief of the General Staff General Hilmi 
Ozkok defended the assertively secular model by stating that
Turkey is neither an Islamic state, nor an Islamic country. The 
principle o f [assertive] secularism is the cornerstone of all the 
values, which form the Republic of Turkey.123
Five days later, the President of the Constitutional Court Mustafa Bumin added 
that
The decisions o f the Constitutional Court and the European 
Court of Human Rights have reached a consensus on the 
headscarf issue. At this point, some print and electronic media 
try to keep this topic on the political agenda, while some 
political party officials state that they would make legal 
arrangements in order to have the right o f education with 
headscarf acknowledged. This is a type of behaviour aiming at 
securing political advantages through the use o f religious 
sentiment, unless it stems from lack of knowledge about the 
court jurisdictions. As long as the assertively secular clauses 
remain in the Constitution, all legal arrangements which would 
enable the entrance o f women wearing headscarves to higher 
education institutions as students and after their graduation to 
public offices of civil servants will be against the Constitution.
Even if such a clause is added to the Constitution, this new
123 Ozkok, Harp Akademileri Komutanhgindaki Yilhk Degerlendirme Komtqmasi
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constitu tional clause w ill be contrary [sic] to the  E uropean 
C onvention  o f  H um an R igh ts.124
This statement was legally unfounded and met with the reaction of many liberal 
columnists;125 yet, it showed that no support for any liberal openings in the issue 
of assertive secularism could be expected from top-level military and civil 
bureaucrats. Civil and military bureaucracy remained steadfast in their 
uncompromising defence of assertive secularism.
b. The Intelligentsia
The liberal and post-Islamist intelligentsia has strongly supported the reform of 
the assertively secular system. The social forces that brought the AKP to power 
expected the new government to promote full respect of their religious freedom. 
The headscarf issue gained a symbolic significance in this respect, as it was one of 
the most visible arid publicised manifestations of the extremities of assertive 
secularism. However, this was expressed not in an Islamist vocabulary, but in the 
language of political liberalism, multiculturalism and tolerance. In a response to 
the previously quoted speech by the President of Constitutional Court, the 
President of the AKP Parliamentary Group, irfan Giinduz, pointed out that
The head scarf issue should  be dealt w ith w ith in  the fram ew ork
o f  fundam ental hum an rights and  freed o m s Y ou can force
som eone to  cover or uncover her head, both are coercive. This 
is not the  business o f  the state, the state needs to  leave it to  
personal taste and  cho ice .126
124 Mustafa Bumin, Bilimsel Toplantiyi Agig Komqmasi Ankara, 2005), available from 
http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/ydonum/kur43.htm [posted on 25/4/2005]
125 ismet Berkan, "Turban: Yine, Yeni, Yeniden..." Radikal, 27/4/2005
126 Ankara Burosu, "Havada Bulut, Tilrbam Unut!" Radikal, 26/4/2005
Bumin’s comments also sparked a discussion about the true meaning of 
secularism. Passive secularism was dissociated from assertive secularism and 
defined on the basis of tolerance and lack of state interference into religious 
affairs. The Turkish assertive version of secularism was seen as a deviation, which 
turned the public against its very principles. Instead of being a means of 
suppression, passive secularism should promote freedom and democracy. In the 
view of the columnist Atilla Yayla:
T he w ords and behaviours o f  B um in and those w ho share his 
m entality  greatly  harm  secularism . This is an understanding  o f  
secularism , w hich is against the freedom  o f  relig ion  and 
conscience, has becom e a  religion itse lf  and aim s at erad icating  
from  social life o ther religions (especially  the relig ion  o f  the 
m ajority). T his understanding shakes social b e lie f  and  trust for 
secularism  and becom es the reason w hy accord ing  to  m ost 
people, the Turkish  type o f  secularism  is -w ith  good re a so n -  
understood  as atheist o r an tire lig ious....T h is  m entality  w hich 
vio lates hum an rights and freedom s and w as lastly  expressed  by 
B um in is being  m anifested  today in the h ead scarf issue, but 
tom orrow  can  be m anifested  in an other field. It can be reversed 
by the  individual and collective struggle o f  all dem ocrats. Thus, 
secu larism  can  cease to  be a  coarse m eans o f  social eng ineering  
and  becom e a  servant o f  freedom  and dem ocracy .127
Other columnists pointed to the false way Bumin evaluated the ECHR decision on 
the headscarf issue and the possibility of a redefinition of Turkey’s assertively 
secular model. In their view, nothing obstructed a more tolerant arrangement of
127 Yayla, "Bumin, Demokrasi ve Laiklik"
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state-religion relations through a constitutional amendment.128 The arguments of 
the intelligentsia displayed a high level of sophistication and maturity, making the 
case for the introduction of a genuinely secular system ever stronger.
5. The Incidence of Social Learning
There is a mixed record of social learning with regards to the question of the role 
of religion in politics and the impact of improving EU-Turkey relations. The 
adamant stance of the military and the judiciary on the preservation of the 
assertively secular character of the Turkish state clearly showed that little was 
learnt by them during the reform process. Steps made toward political 
liberalisation due to the need to meet the Copenhagen Criteria failed to change the 
way Turkish bureaucracy viewed the relationship between religion and the state. 
Religion was seen as a retrograde, destabilising factor that needed to be put under 
firm control through the implementation of an extreme -even for European 
standards- understanding of secularism.129 It was argued that this disregarded the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the majority of Turkey’s population and 
misunderstood its intentions. A similar error was made by traditional Islamist 
political parties, which also misinterpreted the religiosity of a large part of the 
Turkish population as support for an illiberal, non-democratic, Islamic state. 
However, as a survey by £arkoglu and Toprak clearly showed, the Turkish public 
opinion professed much more secular views than one might expect. Although the 
majority of Turkish population are observing Muslims, their religiosity was not 
translated into support for an Islamist political project. While only 19.8 per cent of 
the sample population expressed its support for an “Islamic law order” (§eriat
128 Ismet Berkan, "Gereksiz Lakirdilar", Radikal, 3/5/2005
129 Osman Can, "Tiirkiye Tarzi Laiklik", Radikal Iki, 5/12/2004
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duzeni),m  this support evaporated when it came to questions on specific 
applications of the Islamic law such as in family and inheritance affairs. Only 10.7 
per cent agreed with the implementation of the Islamic prescription of polygamy, 
14 per cent approved of the Islamic divorce rules, while 13.9 per cent expressed
t n i
their preference for Islamic inheritance rules. On the question of secularism, 
60.6 per cent agreed that there should be no party whose politics were based on 
religion.132 This showed the success of the Kemalist secularisation programme, as 
well as its limits.
While the views of the Kemalist state elite remained largely unaffected by
the EU-initiated liberalisation drive, Turkey’s Islamist intelligentsia were
profoundly affected. As the utopian nature of the Islamist political project became
clear, the European Union ceased to be the archenemy and became a source of
1 '1
emulation and inspiration. Old problems of Turkish politics like the question of 
secularism were now addressed in the language of political liberalism and human 
rights. Assertive secularism was now opposed in the name of Anglo-American 
passive secularism and pluralism,134 and calls for a pluralist and participatory 
democracy, real secularism and human rights in the Western/European sense have 
become the cornerstones of the Islamists’ resistance to the further narrowing of
i k
Turkish political space. Given that the European project was identified with the 
aforementioned values, it was the AKP and post-Islamist forces rather than the 
CHP and the Kemalist elite, which guided Turkey towards Europe. Through their 
successful management of the EU process, the AKP gained political legitimacy at
130 Ali Qarkoglu and Binnaz Toprak, Tiirkiye'de Din, Toplam ve Siyaset (Istanbul: TESEV 
Yayinlan, 2000), p. 17
131 Ibid., pp. 70-75
132 Ibid., p. 58
133 Dagi, "Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and the West: Post-Islamist Intellectuals in 
Turkey", pp. 149-50
134 Ibid., p. 139
135 Duran, "Islamist Redefinitions o f European and Islamic Identities in Turkey", p. 131
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the expense of the old secularist elites whose role as agents of Europe and 
modernity was severely undermined.136 The intensity and depth of learning within 
the AKP led to discussions on what remained from the Islamist political tradition. 
Without ignoring the impact of domestic politics,137 it was mainly the prospect of 
EU membership and the need to fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria that created a 
political environment conducive to this transformation. The prospect of Turkey’s 
EU membership minimised state leverage over the AKP, while the Copenhagen 
Criteria became the yardstick against which religious freedom and state-religion 
relations were measured. The position of the AKP on the headscarf issue and a 
series of other topics related to assertive secularism -but for the Directorate of 
Religious Affairs- suggested that the AKP had become the primary agent of 
Europeanisation in Turkey. Although the depth and sincerity of the AKP 
transformation was put into question by its opposition to reform of the Directorate 
of Religious Affairs, this should not be seen as outweighing the contribution of 
the AKP administration to the redefinition of secularism as part of an overall 
political liberalisation process.
6. Conclusions
The rather limited nature of legislative reform on the issue of secularism helps us 
to approach path dependence theory from an alternative perspective. The domestic 
balance of power between secularist, Islamist and liberal forces, as well as the 
unwillingness of the European Union to push for liberalisation in this field, did 
not allow for significant improvements. If there could not be any liberalisation, 
there could only be a stalemate and no reversal towards radical illiberal solutions.
136 Dagi, "Transformation o f Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and 
Westernization", pp. 31-33
137 Oni§, "Political Islam at the Crossroads: From Hegemony to Co-Existence", pp. 293-95
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Steps towards Islamisation could not be promoted, both because of the 
constitutional limitations and the vehement reaction that such a move would cause 
from the European Union. This became more than clear with the harsh EU 
reaction against the proposal to penalise adultery in August 2004. On the other 
hand, a further radicalisation of assertive secularism was no more possible, given 
Turkey’s need to comply with the principles of a liberal democracy. A radical 
reaffirmation of assertive secularism, in the vein of the 1997 reforms, appeared to 
be most unlikely.
While the limited nature of reforms in the field of secularism does not 
allow us to draw any conclusions on the applicability of historical institutionalism, 
the two-level game approach maintains its usefulness in shedding light on the EU 
role in the issue of secularism in Turkey. In the case of the headscarf issue, the 
AKP and liberals hoped that the impact of the European Union at the international 
level (Level I) would help them to lift the ban on the headscarf at the domestic 
level (Level II). Yet the decision of the ECHR not to condemn Turkey in the case 
Leyla §ahin vs. Turkey and the careful omission of the issue in EU Commission 
reports did not fulfil these expectations. It also showed that the AKP could not 
expect European assistance in affecting the domestic power balance on the 
headscarf issue in the foreseeable future.
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V I I  t u r k is h  n a x io n a l  IDENTITY
1. Territorial vs. Ethnic Nationalism
There have been a number of typologies of nationalism, yet the most useful for 
this study, which will be briefly explored here, is the division between territorial 
and ethnic nationalism. France and Germany are the most known examples of 
territorial and ethnic nationalism respectively. French nationalism was shaped 
under the influences of the work of Rousseau and the French Revolution. The 
civic-territorial concept of the nation was further developed during the French 
Revolution. All the members of the nation were citizens, equal before the law, 
while the members of the ancien regime did not even qualify as parts of the 
nation.1 Civic-territorial nationalism was carried to its extremes by the Jacobins. 
The nation was defined in even narrower terms. The opponents of the Jacobin 
reform programme were confronting the general will of the nation, it proclaimed, 
and could not be members of it; they were consequently fiercely prosecuted. 
Emphasis on the historic civilising mission of the nation, national homogenisation 
through mass education, the lack of any tolerance for minorities, militancy and 
missionary zeal also characterised Jacobin nationalism.2 The civic-territorial 
model of nationalism outlasted the rule of Jacobins, shaped French national 
identity and became popular across Western Europe. German nationalism was 
influenced by Romanticism and the German unification movement. Culture, 
language and common ethnic descent became the foci of nationhood. In contrast 
to the French case, where the state formed the nation, the German nation predated
1 Timothy Baycroft, Nationalism in Europe 1789-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), p. 6
2 Umut Ozkirimh, Theories o f  Nationalism: A Critical Introduction (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 
pp. 38-39
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its own state and had to struggle for its formation. German unification was 
realised in 1871 under the leadership of Prussia, and the German paradigm spread 
over Central and Eastern Europe. Numerous ethnic and linguistic communities 
aspired to imitate the German nationalist project and form nation-states hosting 
ethnic kinsmen. Ethnic nationalism soon led to ethnic strife and massacres, as the 
European continent was too small and diverse to accommodate the plans of all 
ethnic nationalisms. German ethnic nationalism remained exceptionally strong 
and was among the reasons for the German involvement in both World Wars. 
Although discredited in the aftermath of the wars, ethnic nationalism is still a 
crucial shaping factor of national identity in Germany and many nation-states in 
Central and Eastern Europe.
2. Defining Turkish National Identity
a. The Ottoman Legacy
The seeds of nationalism, spread from its Western European cradle, found fertile 
soil in the Ottoman Empire. In a region where multi-ethnic, multi-cultural empires 
had prevailed since antiquity, identities and affiliations had been developed on 
non-national lines. Religion and locality remained the determining factors in the 
formation of collective identities. The role of religion as identity badge in the 
Ottoman Empire was institutionalised by the millet system. Although the term 
millet is usually used to refer to the non-Muslim communities of the Ottoman 
Empire, it is true that the term referred to Muslims as well, anchoring the decisive 
role of religious affiliation in determining one’s identity.3 The identification of the 
Turkish nation with Islam was facilitated by the leading role of the Ottoman
3 Lewis, The Emergence o f  Modem Turkey, p. 335
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Empire in the Islamic world4 and its contribution to the expansion of Islam in 
Anatolia, Central and Southeastern Europe. Conversion to Islam was not only an 
act of personal belief or expedience, but also a shift of identity, voluntary 
participation in the Islamic community of believers (ummah) and identification 
with the Ottoman political ideology and culture. Nationalism was the intellectual 
force which challenged existing allegiances, identities and states, resulting in a 
radical re interpretation of the “self’ and the “other” and the transformation of 
religious communal into national identities.
Turkish nationalism was among the last to rise in the declining Ottoman 
Empire of the late 19th century. The preponderance of Islamic identity and the 
privileged position, which Sunni Muslims5 enjoyed, had initially deterred the 
proliferation of nationalist ideas, which would undermine the cohesion o f the 
multiethnic and multi-religious Empire. Nonetheless, the rapid rise of nationalism 
within Ottoman Christian minorities, the formation of nation-states in former 
Ottoman provinces and the imminent existential threat, which these developments 
represented for the ailing Empire, resulted in the development of Turkish 
nationalism. Defensive in nature, Turkish nationalism soon succeeded in striking a 
chord among Ottoman Turkish intellectual and military elites. Exposed to 
Western European intellectual debates, they found in nationalism -like so many 
Europeans at the same tim e- the panacea for the shortcomings of the Ottoman 
state. The rise of the Young Turk political movement became a turning point for 
the success of the Turkish nationalist project. Its political agenda was also shared 
by a small but disproportionately influential number of Russia-born Turkic
4 The Ottoman Sultan had been invested with the title o f Caliph (supreme political and religious 
leader o f all Muslims) since the early 16lh century, although this was mainly symbolic and not 
universally accepted.
5 Non-Sunni Ottoman Muslims (Alevi, Shiite, and Druze) often faced severe discrimination.
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intellectuals, who had been influenced by pan-Slavism, before migrating to the 
Ottoman Empire.6 In their view, the nation had to be freed from all the obstacles, 
which obstructed its political autonomy and empowerment. Nonetheless, a 
commonly accepted definition of the nation was hardly given. The basis of the 
new nation was under debate. Yusuf Ak9 ura, an immigrant intellectual from the 
Russian Empire, addressed in his seminal treatise “Ug Tarz-i Siyaset” the 
dilemmas of Turkish nationalism at the beginning of the 20th century.7 
Ottomanism, the hammering of an ethnie- and religion-blind territorial identity for 
all Ottoman subjects was rejected as a chimera, given that none of the Ottoman 
ethnic and religious communities was willing to substitute Ottomanism for its 
own identity. Pan-Islamism was dismissed as unrealistic, given the reaction it 
would cause from the Western powers, who ruled over large numbers of Muslim 
subjects. Pan-Turkism would antagonise the Russian Empire, who ruled over the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, yet Ak9 ura seemed eventually to lean towards it. The 
question was not definitely answered even after the 1908 Young Turk Revolution, 
which marked the end of Hamidian rule and brought Turkish nationalists to 
power.
An era of ambivalence and deliberation ended with the Balkan Wars, 
which sharply reduced the Empire’s territory in the Balkans and caused a huge 
refugee wave into the remaining parts of the Empire. The Young Turk triumvirate, 
which took over power in 1913 in the midst of the Balkan Wars, implemented a 
political programme aiming at the transformation of the Ottoman Empire into a 
Turkish nation-state. Turkey’s entry into the First World War facilitated the 
application of discriminative measures against non-Turkish Muslim minorities
6 Kushner, The Rise o f Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908, pp. 7-9
7 Yusuf Ak?ura; Ug Tarz-i Siyaset (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1976), pp. 19-36, 
originally published as Yusuf Akfura, "U<? Tarz-i Siyaset", Turk, 15/3/1904
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and even harsher steps against “non-assimilable” Christian minorities. Ottoman 
Armenians, Greeks and Assyrians often faced exile, deportation and even 
extermination.8 Pan-Turkism briefly gained momentum in the last years of the 
Ottoman Empire when the outbreak of the October Revolution and the collapse of 
the Russian Empire raised hopes for expansion toward the Caucasus and Central 
Asia. Nonetheless, these hopes were soon dashed with the ensuing Ottoman 
capitulation. In the aftermath of the First World War, the feasibility of the Turkish 
nationalist project was put into question,9 yet the leadership skills of Mustafa 
Kemal [Atatiirk]10 in the crucial years 1919-1923 guaranteed the establishment of 
a Turkish nation-state in Anatolia. The 1923 Lausanne Treaty signalled the end of 
a long series of wars, which left Anatolia ruined, but under Turkish sovereignty 
and with an unprecedented Muslim preponderance. While non-Muslims 
represented 20 per cent of the Anatolian population before the First World War, 
only 2.5 per cent of the population of the new Turkish Republic was non- 
Muslim.11
b. Turkish National Identity from 1923 to the 1990s
The formation of a Turkish national identity in the republican years was inevitably 
affected by the cataclysmic political developments that led to the foundation o f 
the Turkish Republic. The rise of a strong Soviet state from the ashes of the 
Russian Empire rendered any pan-Turkist ambitions unrealistic. The near
8 Nergis Canefe, "Turkish Nationalism and Ethno-Symbolic Analysis: The Rules o f Exception", 
Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 8, no. 2 (2002), pp. 145-50
9 Following the Moudros Armistice o f 31 October 1918, military forces o f Entente states, severely 
restricting Ottoman sovereign rights, occupied large parts o f Ottoman territory.
10 Surnames “ in brackets” were adopted after 1934, when the Family Name Law was passed.
11 £aglar Keyder, State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development (London: Verso, 
1987), p. 79 cited in Ayhan Aktar, "Homogenising the Nation, Turkifying the Economy: The 
Turkish Experience of Population Exchange Reconsidered" in Renee Hirschon, ed., Crossing the 
Aegean: An Appraisal o f the 1923 Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey (New York 
& Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2003), p. 81
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elimination of non-Muslim populations meant that Islam could cease being the 
defining element of Turkish national identity. In the aftermath of the Lausanne 
Treaty Ataturk denounced all religious and pan-Turkist ideals, focusing on the 
formation of a civic-territorial Turkish national identity rooted in Anatolia. 
Despite this clear preference, however, elements of ethnic and religious
nationalism survived in state policies and formed an interesting amalgamation
with the dominant model.12 This was a clear influence emanating from Gokalp’s
nationalist ideas, which comprised a fusion of French and German nationalism.13
i). Territorial Nationalism 
The application of the territorial nationalism model in Turkey was inextricably 
linked with the programme o f radical Westernisation, which Ataturk put forward 
in his effort to overcome Turkish political, economic and cultural
underdevelopment.14 For Turkey to converge with “contemporary civilisation” 
(muasir medeniyet),15 lessons were drawn from the decline and dismemberment of 
the Ottoman Empire.16 Both pan-Islamist and pan-Turkist ideologies had to be 
abandoned, and a territory-based model of national identity developed. The 
territorial version of Turkish nationalism that Atatiirk espoused fell short of both 
pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism in that it had a much more pragmatic perspective:
12 Akman suggested the use o f the term “modernist nationalism” as a more accurate description of 
Kemalist nationalism. See Akman, "M illiyet^lik Kurammda Etnik/Sivil Milliyetfilik Kar§ithgi", 
pp. 81-83 and Akman, "Modernist Nationalism: Statism and National Identity in Turkey", pp. 24- 
30.
13 Ay§e Kadioglu, "The Paradox o f Turkish Nationalism and the Construction o f Official Identity", 
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 32, no. 2 (1996), p. 184
14 Exploring Atatiirk’s modernization programme falls beyond the scope o f this study. For more 
information, see Lewis, The Emergence o f  Modern Turkey, pp. 256-93 and Zurcher, Turkey: A 
Modern History, pp. 194-203.
15 In Ataturk’s words: “We will raise our national culture up to the level o f contemporary 
civilisation.” See Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Atatiirkfun Soylevleri ve Demegleri (Ankara: Ataturk 
Kultiir, Dil ve Tarih Yiiksek Kurumu, Ataturk Ara§tirma Merkezi, 1989), p. 318.
16 loannis N. Grigoriadis and Ali M. Ansari, "Turkish and Iranian Nationalisms" in Youssef 
Choueiri, ed., A Companion to the History o f the Middle East (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing,
2005)
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Defending Anatolia and establishing a Turkish nation-state was within the 
military and political capabilities of Turkish nationalists, and all efforts were 
focused on this project. In his famous address to the Turkish Assembly from 15 to 
20 October 1927 (.Nutuk), Ataturk displayed his realist vision and elaborated on 
his effort to establish a territorial Turkish national identity:
“ I am  neither a  believer in a  league o f  all the nations o f  Islam , 
nor even in a  league o f  T urk ish  people. Each o f  us here has the 
right to hold his ideals, but the governm ent m ust be stable w ith 
a fixed policy, grounded  in facts, and w ith  one v iew  and  one 
alone: to safeguard  the life and independence o f  the  nation  
w ith in  its natural frontiers. N either sentim ent nor illusion m ust 
influence our policy. A w ay w ith  dream s and shadow s! They 
have cost us dear in the past!” 17
The French Jacobin model of republican territorial nationalism became the source 
of inspiration: Anatolia constituted the Turkish “fatherland,” the indivisible 
territorial unit, which would form the geographical basis of Turkish nationhood.18 
Citizenship and common culture were crucial elements in the development of 
territorial Turkish national identity. Equal citizen rights for all inhabitants of 
Anatolia would nurture “a sense of solidarity and fraternity through active social 
and political participation,”19 which would become the building blocks of Turkish 
national identity. Warfare, massacres and population exchanges in the first quarter 
of the 20th century had altered the multi-religious character of Anatolia. An 
undisputed Muslim preponderance was established, which made nation-building 
easier but by no means straightforward. Although the formerly strong Christian
17 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Nutuk (Ankara: Kultiir Bakanligi Yayinlan, 1980), pp. 6-7
18 Kushner, The Rise o f Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908, pp. 50-55
19 Smith, The Ethnic Origins o f Nations, pp. 134-36
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90 91communities had disappeared, Anatolia was still an ethnic mosaic, while a 
significant Alevi minority challenged the Sunni majority.22 Although Turkish 
national identity was not embedded in all the Muslim populations of Anatolia, 
these populations were deemed suitable citizens of the Turkish Republic, provided 
they opted for a subordination of their distinct ethnic and cultural features to the 
state-promoted Turkish territorial identity.23 There was little room for minority 
rights in the new Turkish Republic; even the minuscule non-Muslim minorities of 
Istanbul were feared.24 Everybody was expected to assimilate to the state- 
espoused national identity model.25 A massive education campaign was launched 
along with the secularisation and Westernisation campaign, which aimed to 
facilitate the establishment of a territorial-civic Turkish national identity in all the 
citizens o f the Republic. Emphasis on territorial nationalism, however, did not 
mean that ethnicity and religion ceased being a factor in defining Turkish national 
identity. Ethnic and religious elements maintained their importance in defining 
Turkishness.
ii). Ethnic Nationalism 
The model of ethnic nationalism found considerable resonance among Turkish 
nationalists in the late years of the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish nation was seen 
as a single unit, stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the borders of China, whose 
political unification should be furthered. The spread of ethnic nationalism was
20 Canefe, "Turkish Nationalism and Ethno-Symbolic Analysis: The Rules o f  Exception", pp. 145- 
46
21 For more information, see Peter Alford Andrews, ed., Ethnic Groups in the Republic o f Turkey 
(Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1989).
22 For a full account o f Turkey’s ethnic composition, see Ibid. .
23 Kili, "Kemalism in Contemporary Turkey", pp. 388-89
24 Etyen Mahfupyan, "Azmlik Ureten Zihniyet..." Zaman, 12/12/2004
25 This call was also addressed to non-Muslim minorities. Tekin Alp, a Jewish-born fervent 
Turkish nationalist intellectual campaigned for the voluntary assimilation o f non-Muslim 
minorities. Yet the appeal o f his efforts was rather limited. See Rifat Bali, "Tekin Alp" in Taml 
Bora, ed., Milliyetgilik (Istanbul: Ileti§im, 2002), pp. 896-99.
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boosted by the immigration of Russia-born Turkic intellectuals influenced by pan- 
Slavism.26 The consolidation of the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the October 
Revolution, the alliance of the Soviet Union with the Kemalist forces and the 
failure of the former Young Turk leader Enver Pa§a to establish a Turkic state in 
Central Asia meant that pan-Turkism would be indefinitely shelved. Despite the 
official adoption of territorial nationalism, state policies demonstrated that ethnic 
nationalism had left its imprint on official state nationalism. Discriminatory 
policies against population groups on the basis of their ethnicity were a 
continuation of measures taken in the last years of the Ottoman Empire and aimed 
at the same direction, namely minority assimilation or emigration.27 The 1934 
Resettlement Law {Iskan K anunuf8 and the 1942 Property Tax Law ( Vcuilk 
Vergisi K anunuf9 exemplified these policies. The importance of ethnic 
nationalism was also attested by the exaltation of the Turkish nation30 and 
language. Systematic efforts were made to dissociate the ethnonym “Turk” from 
any demeaning connotations it had carried throughout Ottoman history31 and turn 
it into a source of national pride. Additionally, the Sun Language Theory (Gune§ 
DU Teorisi), coined by the Turkish Language Society {Turk DU Kurumu) in 1935, 
attempted to prove that Turkish was the most ancient, accurate and beautiful 
language in the world and all the languages originated from it. The Turkish 
Language Reform Programme aimed at purifying Turkish from its Arabic and
25 Kushner, The Rise o f  Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908, pp. 7-9
27 Tanil Bora, "'Ekalliyet Yilanlari1: Turk Milliyetriligi ve Azinhklar" in Tanil Bora, ed.,
Milliyetgilik (Istanbul: ileti§im Yayinlari, 2002a), pp. 911-13
28 Turk Buyuk Millet Meclisi (TBMM), tskdn Kanimu (2510/1934)
29 Turk Buyiik Millet Meclisi (TBMM), Varhk Vergisi Hakkwda Kamin (4305/1942)
30 Cemil Ko?ak, "Kemalist Milliyet^iligin Bulamk Sulan" in Tanil Bora, ed., Milliyetgilik 
(Istanbul: ile t i§ im , 2002), pp. 37-41
31 Educated Muslim elites o f the Ottoman Empire preferred the term “Ottoman” (Osmanli) and 
attributed the term “Turk” to the Turcoman nomads, or later, the ignorant and uncouth Turkish­
speaking peasants o f the Anatolian villages.” See Lewis, The Emergence o f  Modern Turkey, pp. 1- 
3 and Kushner, The Rise o f  Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908, pp. 20-26,
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Persian influences.32 Anti-minority campaigns in the language field continued in 
1937 with the launch of the “Citizen, Speak Turkish” {Vatandag Tiirkge Konwf) 
campaign for the exclusive use of Turkish in public.33
Tolerance toward minorities did not characterise republican Turkish 
politics.34 Despite being recognised and protected by the Lausanne Treaty, the 
Armenian, Greek and Jewish minorities of Turkey faced persistent 
discrimination.35 Non-Muslim minority foundations were not recognised as legal 
personalities and were denied the right to acquire immovable property. Any 
property acquired despite the ban was confiscated.36 Restrictions in the freedom of 
religion and education were equally significant. The Orthodox Seminary on the 
island of Heybeliada (Halki) was closed down in 1971, which made the education 
of Orthodox priests in Turkey impossible. The Armenian and Jewish communities 
also faced analogous problems. The ecumenical ecclesiastical status of the 
Orthodox Patriarchate was persistently rejected, and the Orthodox Patriarchate 
was only recognised as the religious directorate of the shrinking Greek Orthodox 
minority in Istanbul. Minority education was protected by Article 40 of the
32 Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic, pp. 
109-14. For the “revival” o f Turkish vernacular in republican Turkey and its political 
connotations, see §erif Mardin, "Playing Games with Names" in Deniz Kandiyoti and Ay§e 
Saktanber, eds., Fragments o f  Culture: The Everyday o f Modern Turkey (London, New York: l.B. 
Tauris, 2002), pp. 119-25.
33 Ayhan Aktar, Varhk Vergisi ve 'Turklegtirme' Politikalan (Istanbul: ileti§im, 2000), pp. 130-34
34 Turan, "The Evolution o f  Political Culture in Turkey", pp. 101-05
35 Turkish ethnic nationalists have occasionally questioned the loyalty o f not only non-Muslim 
minorities, but also that o f Muslim Turks o f Jewish origin (S abbatean is ts-^^e /qy^^ ')- See ihsan 
D. Dagi, "Milli Ideoloji: Yahudi Kar§itligi", Interview with Nege Diizel, Radikal, 20/2/2005. For 
more information on the Sabbateanist identity, see Leyla Neyzi, "Remembering to Forget; 
Sabbateanism, National Identity, and Subjectivity in Turkey", Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, Vol. 44, no. 1 (2002).
36 Baskin Oran, Tiirkiye’de Azinhklar: Kavramlar, Lozan, Ig Mevzuat, Igtihat, Uygulama (Istanbul: 
TESEV Yayinlan, 2004c), p. 84
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Lausanne Treaty, yet in practice, state intervention seriously hampered the 
educational rights of the minorities.37
Despite discrimination against non-Muslim minorities, ethnic nationalism 
never became an ideological monopoly. Non-Muslim minorities were numerically 
insignificant, and a territorial national identity model was championed for all 
Anatolian Muslims. Nonetheless, it had a significant influence on the formation of 
state national ideology. In the 1960s, Turkish ethnic nationalism also found its 
political representative in the person of Alparslan Turkey and the Nationalist 
Action Party (Milliyetqi Hareket Partisi-MRV). Since then, the Cyprus and 
Nagorno Karabagh conflicts, as well as the Balkan crisis in the 1990s, have 
attracted interest in ethnic nationalism, while the demise of the Soviet Union, 
which briefly raised hopes for close cooperation of ex-Soviet Turkic republics 
under Turkey’s leadership, also mobilised some solidarity.38 Nonetheless, the 
realisation that the Turkic republics were not willing to accept a “big brother” role 
for Turkey cooled down ethnic nationalist fervour.39 It was through its covert 
impact on the official version of nationalism rather than through its political 
representatives that ethnic nationalism influenced Turkish national identity.
iii). The Role of Islam 
It is a historical irony that the nation, which had submerged its identity the most 
into Islam, was the first to attempt its radical dissociation from it.40 Early Turkish 
nationalists in the mid 19th century identified Islam as one of the basic elements of
37 For more details, see Alexis Alexandris, The Greek Minority in Istanbul and Greek-Turkish 
Relations 1918-1974 (Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies, 1983).
38 Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation (Bloomington IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1995), pp. 221-24
39 Tanil Bora, "Nationalist Discourses in Turkey", South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. 102, no. 2/3 
(2003), p. 436
40 Kushner, The Rise o f  Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908, pp. 1-2
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Turkish identity and considered it compatible with Westernisation.41 However, 
more radical views appeared soon, blaming Islam for Turkish underdevelopment 
and championing secularisation of the state and society according to the French 
positivist model. The most influential Young Turk thinker Ziya Gokalp attempted 
to integrate Turkish nationalism into modernity and Islam by differentiating 
between civilisation (medeniyet), culture (bars) and religion (din). He defined 
civilisation in technological and political terms. Culture was the set of values and 
beliefs, which defined a people and restricted religion into its essential content. 
The Turkish nation should adopt Western civilisation and rediscover its own 
Turkish culture, which had faded under the influence of Arab culture42 Islam had 
to be dissociated from Arab culture and restricted to the private sphere.43
Many Young Turks did not see Islam as an essential element of Turkish 
identity but rather as an impediment for the progress of the Turkish nation. 
However, political conditions did not allow them to implement anti-Islamic 
policies. On the contrary, Islam was used as a political tool and mobilising force 
in the wars against Western powers and neighbouring Christian states. Ataturk 
followed the same policy in the years of armed struggle (1919-1922), but 
disclosed his true intentions as soon as he was powerful enough to do so. Official 
secularisation policies tried to dissociate Turkish national identity from Islam,44 
their success, however, was only limited. At the elite level, Islam ceased to be an 
essential element of Turkish identity; at the grassroots level, however, the role of
41 Namik Kemal, one o f the leading figures o f Young Ottomans, is the most eloquent 
representative o f  this school o f thought. See Berkes, The Development o f  Secularism in Turkey, pp. 
208-18.
42 Ziya Gokalp, Tiirkgiiliigun Esaslari (Istanbul: Kum Saati Yayinlan, 2001), pp. 37-53, originally 
published as Ziya Gokalp, Tiirkgiiliigun Esaslari (Ankara: Matbuat ve Istihbarat Matbaasi, 1920).
43 Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic, pp. 
76-82
44 Gundiiz Aktan, Fieldwork Interview (Ankara, 27/1/2005)
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Islam as symbol of Turkish national identity persisted.45 Islam was the only 
unifying factor of the multilingual, multiethnic populations of Anatolia and the 
most tangible element of their Turkish identity.46 Intensive state efforts to 
inculcate territorial Turkish nationalism through the means of education and 
control of public and political Islam had only limited success. Islam eventually re- 
emerged in the public sphere during the rule of the Democrat Party (.Demokrat 
Parti-DP) in the 1950s and claimed an independent active role in Turkish politics 
in 1970, when Necmettin Erbakan founded the National Order Party {Milli Nizam 
Partisi-MNP), the first clearly Islamist party in the history of republican Turkey. 
Erbakan stressed the paramount importance of Islam as essential element of 
Turkish national identity, despite long state efforts to eliminate it. He also 
cultivated a nationalistic nostalgia for the Ottoman imperial past.47 In this context, 
he defended Islamic inter-state cooperation through the formation of an “Islamic 
Union,” in which Turkey would have a leading role (see p. 222). His argument 
was adopted by a group of conservative Kemalist intellectuals, the “Hearth of the 
Enlightened” (Aydmlar Ocagi), which argued for an Islamic revival as a means of 
strengthening Turkish nationalism against growing minority nationalist and leftist 
dissidence. These positions were elaborated into an ideological construction 
named the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” (Turk-islam Sentezi-TlS).48 Pre-Islamic 
Turkish heritage and Islamic culture were recognised as the cornerstones of 
Turkish national identity and fully compatible with each other.49 Islam was thus
45 Kadioglu, "The Paradox o f Turkish Nationalism and the Construction o f Official Identity", pp.
188-89
46 A significant percentage o f  the Anatolian population was refugees from former Ottoman 
territories, which they were forced to flee on the basis o f their Islamic religion, which identified 
them with Ottoman Turks.
47 Bora, "Nationalist Discourses in Turkey", p. 449
48 Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic, pp. 
178-81
49 Magnarella, "Desecularization, State Corporatism and Development in Turkey", pp. 39-40
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seen not as a fully-fledged political ideology, as it was by Erbakan, but as an 
element, which could revitalise Turkish nationalism.50 The emphasis given to 
Islam and Turkish ethnicity was a clear shift away from the main elements of 
Atatiirk’s nationalism.51
The military coup of 12 September 1980 acted as catalyst for the infusion 
of Islamic elements into official Turkish national ideology. Extreme secularist 
policies were held to be one of the reasons for the proliferation of radical leftist 
and rightist as well as Kurdish nationalist ideas, which resulted in civil strife and 
instability with detrimental effects for Turkey’s stability. Besides, state abstention 
from religious education had resulted in the increasing influence of legal and 
underground religious groups. In accordance with the views expressed by the 
“Hearth of the Enlightened,” religious instruction in Turkish primary and 
secondary schools became compulsory under Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution. 
The “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis”52 constituted the ideological core of the new 
school curriculum.53 The special relation between the Turkish nation and Islam 
was stressed, and similarities between pre-Islamic Turkish and Islamic 
civilisations and values were emphasised.54 All school textbooks were revised in 
1986 to conform to the new historical doctrine.55 Meanwhile, state funding of 
religious education and foundations increased exponentially. Islam was regarded
50 Duygu Koksal, "Fine-Tuning Nationalism: Critical Perspectives from Republican Literature in 
Turkey", Turkish Studies, Vol. 2, no. 2 (2001), pp. 64-65
51 Murat Beige, "Tiirkiye’de Zenofobi ve Milliyetfilik" in Tanil Bora, ed., Milliyetgilik (Istanbul: 
ileti§im, 2002b), pp. 189-90
52 Detailed information on the “Turkish Islamic Synthesis” can be found in the book o f one of its 
ideologues: Ibrahim Kafesoglu, Turk-lslam Sentezi (istanbul: Aydinlar Ocagi, 1985), pp. 159-213.
53 Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic, pp. 
181-87
54 Kadioglu, "The Paradox o f Turkish Nationalism and the Construction o f  Official Identity", pp.
189-92
55 Sam Kaplan, "Din-u Devlet all over Again? The Politics o f Military Secularism and Religious 
Militarism in Turkey Following the 1980 Coup", International Journal o f  Middle East Studies, 
Vol. 34, no. 1 (2002), p. 120
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as essential element of Turkish national identity, and its public manifestation was 
tolerated to the extent that it respected the principles of republicanism and 
secularism. The rise of an Islamist economic counter-elite in the 1980s made 
consumption patterns an additional level of identity debate between secularists 
and Islamists.56 The return of Necmettin Erbakan into politics as leader of the 
Welfare Party (.Refah Partisi-RP) polarised the debate on Turkish political Islam 
but did not disturb the balance set by the 1980 military regime.
c. Turkish National Identity since the 1990s
The debate on Turkish national identity gained new dimensions in the 1990s 
under the influence o f international and domestic factors. In the field of domestic 
politics, the escalation of the Kurdish conflict, the emergence of the Alevi 
question and the rise of political Islam to power challenged dominant perceptions 
of existing national identity. At the international level, the end of the Cold War 
was followed by increased interest in identity questions and a rise of nationalism. 
These brought the question of national identity into the epicentre of academic and 
popular interest.
i). The Impact of Global Actors
Interest in minority rights and identity discourses rose in the aftermath of the Cold
War. This was a response to the increasing global growth of nationalism and its
concomitant threats. As the appeal of Marxist ideas shrank and the demise of
communist regimes in Eastern Europe resulted in a power vacuum, nationalism
became in many cases a substitute ideology, which reshaped borders, caused
humanitarian catastrophes and brought the issue of minority protection to the fore.
56 On the commodification of religious identity politics since the 1980s, see Yael Navaro-Yashin, 
"The Market for Identities: Secularism, Islamism, Commodities" in Deniz Kandiyoti and Ay§e 
Saktanber, eds., Fragments o f Culture: The Everyday o f Modern Turkey (London, New York: LB. 
Tauris, 2002b).
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The plight of minorities in the wars of former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Iraq and the 
former Soviet Union made clear that the international community should be 
mobilised in the direction of better minority rights protection. At the European 
level, the Council of Europe addressed the problem through the preparation of two 
international treaties. The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages57 
and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities,58 which 
aimed at improving the level of minority rights protection within the member 
states of the Council.59 At the global level, the organisation of ad hoc international 
criminal courts for the wars of former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the campaign 
to establish a permanent International Criminal Court in the framework of the 
United Nations were significant steps.60 Nonetheless, this discourse had a minor 
influence on minority rights discourses and practices in Turkey.61 Turkey 
expressed its concern about the condition of Turkish and other Muslim minorities 
throughout the Balkans and the Caucasus, but failed to sign either of the two 
Council of Europe treaties on minority rights protection, and minority policies 
remained generally unaffected. It was only through Turkey’s recognition of the 
right of individual appeal to the European Court of Human Rights in 1990 and the 
increasing number of condemnatory judgements from 1995 onwards that a certain
57 Council o f Europe, European Charter fo r Regional or Minority Languages Strasbourg, 1992), 
available from http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/148.htm
58 Council o f Europe, Framework Convention fo r the Protection o f National Minorities 
Strasbourg, 1995), available from http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/157.htm
59 See Checkel, "The Europeanization of Citizenship?" p. 185 and Council o f  Europe, Provisional 
Report on the Reception and Resettlement o f Refugees in Turkey [ADOC6267 PROV 1403- 
10/7/90-2-3]: Council o f Europe, 1990).
60 In contrast, the concept o f “humanitarian intervention” and its application in the Kosovo and 
Iraq wars weakened the moral basis o f minority rights protection.
61 Western insensitivity to the minority rights situation in Turkey, while “humanitarian 
interventions” were planned in other parts o f the world, was often seen as evidence of Western 
double standards.
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degree of pressure was exerted in the direction of improving protection of 
minority rights.62
ii). The Impact of Domestic Politics
1). The Kurdish Issue 
Kurdish nationalism is a phenomenon, which far preceded the 1990s. 
Nonetheless, it was only in the 1990s that the Kurdish issue came to occupy a 
central position in Turkey’s political agenda. The PKK intensified its operations 
against Turkish armed forces in the eastern and southeastern provinces of Turkey 
and terrorist attacks against civilian targets throughout the country. The Turkish 
armed forces responded with the deployment of an increasing number of troops 
and the brutal forced evacuation of thousands of villages and migration. A state of 
emergency (Olaganustii Hal-OHAL) was declared in the eastern and southeastern 
provinces, according to Article 122 of the Constitution. This meant that severe 
restrictions of fundamental rights and freedoms —already weakly protected under 
the 1982 Constitution- were at the discretionary power of the Council of 
Ministers and regional governors. Throughout the PKK insurgency, from 1984 to 
2000, 4,049 civilians, 5,121 military personnel and 17,248 insurgents were killed, 
while 3,200 villages were destroyed, 380,000 people were forced to relocate in the 
region and another three million to migrate to Turkey’s big cities and Western 
Europe.63 This situation, which did not fall short of a normal war, polarised 
Turkish society and sharpened ethnic divisions.64
Kurdish -and any other ethnic- descent had not previously been an issue 
in Turkish politics, provided one fully adopted Kemalist civic nationalism. The
62 Yusuf Altinta?, Fieldwork Interview (Ankara, 28/1/2005)
63 Mustafa Saat^, "Nation-States and Ethnic Boundaries: Modern Turkish Identity and Turkish- 
Kurdish Conflict", Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 8, no. 4 (2002), p. 559
64 Dogu Ergil, Fieldwork Interview (Ankara, 26/1/2005)
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highest ranks of Turkish politics,65 bureaucracy and military were open to Turkish 
citizens of Kurdish descent, but only under the condition that they jettisoned their 
Kurdish identity. As Kymlicka accurately observed:
The problem  is no t tha t T urkey refuses to accept K urds as 
T urkish  citizens. T he problem  is precisely its attem pt to  force 
K urds to  see them selves as T urks.66
While assimilation policies were not tolerated by most Kurds, atavistic fears of 
Turkish nationalism re-emerged with the rise of the Kurdish question. Ethnicity 
started gaining importance and dividing Turkish society. When it became 
impossible to deny the existence of a Kurdish minority in Turkey, Turkish 
nationalists attempted to “otherise” the Kurdish nationalist movement.67 The 
Sevres syndrome (see p. 186) reappeared and hardened the position of the public 
opinion on the Kurdish issue. The military activities of the PKK further 
strengthened this suspicion. Although it has been argued that the PKK should be 
credited with attracting international attention to the plight of Turkey’s Kurds, in 
fact it worsened it. The PKK’s military operations and terrorist attacks gave a 
pretext for devastating reprisals by the Turkish armed forces and reduced the 
scope for a political solution of the Kurdish minority by sidelining voices 
advocating a non-violent solution to the Kurdish question.68 As long as the 
Kurdish question was approached as a national security issue, there could be no
65 Many o f the leading political and military figures o f republican Turkey were claimed to be o f -  
at least partial- Kurdish descent, ismet inonti, Cemal Gtirsel, Suleyman Demirel and Turgut Ozal 
were some o f  the Turkish leaders with alleged or real Kurdish roots. See Suver, Fieldwork 
Interview .
66 Will Kymlicka, "Misunderstanding Nationalism" in Ronald Beiner, ed., Theorizing Nationalism 
(Albany NY: SUNY Press, 1999), p. 134
67 Mesut Yegen, "Turk Milliyetqilligi ve Kurt Sorunu" in Tanil Bora, ed., Milliyetgilik (Istanbul: 
ileti$im, 2002), pp. 889-91
68 In the early 1990s, the People’s Labour Party (Hallan Emek Partisi-HEP) became the 
representative o f moderate Kurds who opposed the use o f violence but demanded the respect of 
human rights o f Turkey’s Kurds.
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hope of democratic reform, which could improve the position of Turkey’s Kurds. 
State persecution measures were not limited to PKK members, but also included 
most non-violent Kurdish political activists. The closure of the People’s Labour 
Party (Halkm Emek Partisi-HEP) and its successors Democratic Labour Party 
{Demokrasi Partisi-DEP) and People’s Democratic Party {Halkm Demokrasi 
PartoZ-HADEP) and the imprisonment of the leading figures of Ley la Zana, Hatip 
Dicle, Orhan Dogan and Selim Sadak further limited the possibility of a peaceful 
resolution.69 The situation improved only after the Turkish armed forces 
succeeded in significantly limiting the operational capacity of the PKK in the late 
1990s. The PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was forced to flee his refuge in Syria in 
October 1998 and was eventually captured in February 1999. The PKK then 
declared a unilateral ceasefire. The de-escalation of the armed conflict was a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the reconsideration of the Kurdish 
question as a human rights issue and part of the overall Turkey’s democratisation 
process. Nonetheless, serious violations of Kurdish minority rights persisted.70
The rise of the Kurdish issue succeeded in mobilising a substantial number 
of Turkey’s ethnic Kurdish population and had an irreversible effect on the 
Turkish national identity discourse. The ethnic homogeneity of the Anatolian 
Muslim population was openly questioned for the first time. The rise of Kurdish 
nationalism posed the first serious challenge to Turkish nationalism as it 
manifested the failure of civic nationalism to strike roots in a significant part of
69 See Hamit Bozarslan, "Kiird MilliyetQilligi ve Kurd Hareketi (1898-2000)" in Tanil Bora, ed., 
Milliyetgilik (Istanbul: lleti§im Yayinlan, 2002), pp. 866-67. After the closure o f the People’s 
Democracy Party (Halkm Demokrasi Partisi-HADEP), the political representation o f the Kurdish 
minority was assumed by the Democratic People’s Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi-DEHAP).
70 Baskin Oran, "Kurt Milliyetfilligin Diyalektigi" in Tanil Bora, ed., Milliyetgilik (Istanbul: 
Ileti§im Yayinlan, 2002), pp. 878-79
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the population.71 Moreover, it contested the most fundamental assumption of 
ethnic nationalism, namely the congruence of Islam with Turkishness in Anatolia. 
The majority of Turkey’s Kurds did not support terrorism and political violence, 
but claimed their fundamental human and minority rights.72 The failure to 
assimilate Turkey’s Kurds shook the self-confidence of Turkish nationalism73 and 
spread fear that other ethnic groups might follow the same path.
2). The Alevi Revival 
While the revival of Alevi identity could be first traced within the socio-political 
fermentations, following the promulgation of the 1961 Constitution, the dynamic 
reappearance of Sunni Islam in Turkish politics throughout the 1980s challenged 
the Alevi community. Increased interest in Alevi culture, reaction against attempts 
to undermine the secular character of the Turkish state through the rise of Sunni 
Islam into a dominant position and indecisiveness on how Alevi identity should be 
preserved, all characterised the Alevi community.
Two events marked the rise of Alevi conscience in the 1990s. A literature 
conference in Sivas was organised in July 1993 on the occasion of the festival of 
Pir Sultan Abdal, one of the most revered Alevi religious figures. Among the 
participants was Aziz Nesin, a prominent secularist writer, who had commenced 
the translation of Salman Rushdie’s controversial book “Satanic Verses” into 
Turkish. A mob of Sunni Islamist fanatics gathered outside the hotel, which was 
the venue of the conference and set it on fire. Seventeen participants perished -  
although not Nesin himself. The police, who had usually been exceptionally
71 A Kurdish nationalist historiography appeared for the first time as a response to established 
Turkish nationalist historical accounts. See Konrad Hirschler, "Defining the Nation: Kurdish 
Historiography in Turkey in the 1990s", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, no. 3 (2001).
72 Orhan Mirogtu, "AB Sureci, Dil Haklari ve Kurtler", Radikal iki, 17/10/2004
73 Mesut Yegen, "Turkluk ve Kurtler: Bugun", Birikim, no. 188 (2004), pp. 32-34
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effective in brutally suppressing all kinds of demonstrations, this time showed an 
unexplainable passivity and unwillingness to intervene, until it was virtually too 
late. The Sivas incident shocked public opinion, and most of all Alevis. It was 
clearly reminiscent of past massacres against Alevis in the 1970s. The passivity 
with which police treated the riots, raised suspicion about complicity of “deep 
state” circles to the anti-Alevi riots.74
The same level of distrust against state authorities was displayed in March 
1995, when unidentified gunmen assassinated an Alevi dede in a teahouse at 
Gaziosmanpa§a, a poor Istanbul neighbourhood with a large Alevi community. 
The event took a sectarian dimension, and serious riots erupted in which fifteen 
Alevis were killed in clashes with police forces. Opposition to state discriminatory 
practices further strengthened a feeling of Alevi unity.75 At the intellectual level, 
the struggle for the recognition of a separate Alevi identity intensified. Action was 
organised against state discrimination. Alevis insisted on the inclusion of Alevi 
Islam in school religious education and its recognition not as a branch of Sunni 
Islam, but as a different religious denomination with its own rich cultural and 
ideological heritage.76
The struggle for the recognition of a separate Alevi identity was marked 
by ambivalence on whether this struggle should be based on a claim for a 
religious minority status. Alevis hesitated to base their claim for religious and 
cultural rights on the recognition of their religious minority status. Republican 
official history celebrated Alevism as an offshoot of pre-Islamic Turkish culture,
74 Murat Kiigiik, "Mezhepten Millete: Aleviler ve Turk Milliyet<?iligi" in Tanil Bora, ed., 
Milliyetgilik (istanbul: Ileti§im, 2002), pp. 907-09
75 For more details, see Tiirkiye insan Haklan Vakfi (TIHV), 1995 Tiirkiye tmcm Haklan Raporu 
(Ankara: Tiirkiye insan Haklari Vakfi Yayinlan, 1997), pp. 194-213.
76 David Zeidan, "The Alevi o f Anatolia", Middle East Review o f  International Affairs (MERIA), 
Vol. 3, no. 4(1999), p. 81
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which preserved the essence, of Turkishness, while mainstream Sunni Turkish 
culture had become largely arabised.77 These accounts struck a chord among a 
large part of Turkey’s Alevi population. Alevi cultural diversity was not only 
looked down upon or despised as in the Ottoman years; on the contrary, it became 
the symbol of an original, unadulterated Turkish identity.78 Moreover, the same 
nationalist historical accounts denigrated the term “minority,” linking it with 
fragmentation of national unity, secessionism and collaboration with foreign 
powers.
This made difficult for many Alevis to accept the term “religious 
minority” for their community.79 The case of the Istanbul non-Muslim 
communities, the minorities par excellence of the Turkish Republic, was anything 
but appealing. State minority policies as well as their “suspect” patriotic 
credentials did not make the prospect of recognition of a special Alevi minority 
appealing. It was feared that Alevis would thus become second-class citizens like 
the non-Muslim minorities. In response to this, some Alevi representatives 
protested against the use of the term “minority” for Alevis in European 
Commission reports.80 Claiming protection for their religious and cultural identity 
against the Sunni majority was an important cause,81 but was not to be seen as 
compromising their Turkishness.
iii). Early Liberalisation Attempts 
Turkey’s ongoing economic liberalisation efforts had a spillover effect on national 
identity debates. Turgut Ozal, the architect of Turkey’s economic liberalisation
77 ibrahim Bahadir, "Alevilige Milliyetfi Yakla§imlar ve Aleviler Uzerindeki Etkileri", Birikim, 
no. 188 (2004), pp. 49-55
78 Kii^uk, "Mezhepten Millete: Aleviler ve Turk Milliyetriligi", pp. 901-02
79 Uneasiness with the term “minority” is clear in many reports on the Alevi issue. See inan Keser 
and Kivilcim Polat, "Aleviler islam Mufredatinda", Radikal iki, 5/12/2004,
80 istanbul Biirosu, "Aleviler, Rapordaki Azinlik Ifadesine Itiraz Edecek", Zaman, 20/11/2004
81 Erdogan Aydin, "Alevileri Ne Yapmali?" Radikal iki, 24/10/2004
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programme in the 1980s, attempted from his new position as President of the 
Republic to reduce ethnic tensions, which had soared, due to increasing state 
repression and the intensification of the PKK activity. A series of measures were 
taken aiming at reducing harsh freedom limitations and opening up a freer debate 
on national identity issues. Ozal himself was the first senior politician who openly 
spoke about his partially Kurdish descent, while discussion on ethnic backgrounds 
was still a taboo issue. Under OzaPs guidance, in April 1991, the ANAP 
government lifted a law, introduced by the 1980-1983 military regime, which had 
officially -though ineffectively- banned the use of Kurdish language in Turkey. 
The 1991 Gulf War and the influx of Iraqi Kurdish refugees into southeastern 
Turkey led the government to establish contacts with Iraqi Kurdish leaders, which 
was an implicit recognition of a Kurdish identity in Northern Iraq. Ozal’s example 
was followed by Prime Minister Demirel, who visited southeastern Turkey shortly 
after he took over office in November 1991 and declared in a public meeting in 
Diyarbakir that “Turkey has recognised the Kurdish reality.”82
OzaPs sudden death in April 1993 put an end to his political liberalisation 
agenda, yet promising statements from politicians did not disappear. In June 1993, 
Turkey’s new Prime Minister Tansu (filler83 stated that she viewed “the ethnic and 
regional richness of Turkey like the variation and colouration of a mosaic,” In late 
1994, she even came to the point o f rephrasing the famous saying of Atatiirk 
“How happy is one who says T am a Turk’” (Ne mutlu Ttirkum diyene) to “How 
happy is one who says ‘I am a citizen of Turkey’” (Ne mutlu Tiirkiye
82 Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds and the Future o f  Turkey (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 
p. 67
83 f ille r  has been one o f the most inconsistent and mercurial Turkish politicians, but this does not 
eliminate the political significance o f her statements.
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vatanda$iyim diyene).84 Yet these openings turned out to be little more than 
ephemeral. Verbal support was not turned into institutional reform, which could 
form a sound base for a new national identity debate. State repression of 
minorities continued unabated, as the armed conflict with the PKK continued. The 
rise of the Welfare Party into power in the mid 1990s alarmed the state elite, 
which then initiated a campaign to deter increasing Islamisation of Turkish 
society. While Islam had been viewed since the 1980s as cementing factor in a
society split by ideological and ethnic divisions,85 it once more became a threat to
state security. Turkish national identity was again envisioned without its Islamic 
component.
3. The Impact of the European Union
a. Before the Reforms
Despite the ongoing debate on national identity, there was little change in the 
relevant Turkish minority legislation, until the prospect of Turkey’s EU 
membership started exerting an important influence. The Treaty of Lausanne 
continued to be the main document, which outlined the rights of Turkey’s 
minority groups. Article 38§ 1 -2 stated that
T he T urkish  G overnm ent undertakes to  assure full and
com plete pro tection  o f  life and liberty to all inhabitants o f
Turkey w ithout d istinction  o f  birth, nationality , language, race 
or religion.
84 William Hale, "Identities and Politics in Turkey," (London: SOAS, 2003b), p. 23
85 Miihittin Ataman, "Ozal Leadership and Restructuring o f Turkish Ethnic Policy in the 1980s", 
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 38, no. 4 (2002), pp. 127-28
A ll inhabitants o f  T urkey shall be entitled to  free exercise, 
w hether in public or private, o f  any creed, relig ion o r belief, the 
observance o f  w hich shall not be incom patib le w ith  public o rder 
and good m orals.
Article 39 of the Treaty declared that
T urkish  nationals belonging  to non-M oslem  m inorities w ill 
enjoy the sam e civil and political rights as M oslem s.
A ll the inhabitants o f  Turkey, w ithout distinction  o f  religion, 
shall be equal before the law.
D ifferences o f  religion, creed or confession shall not prejud ice 
any T urk ish  national in m atters relating to the en joym ent o f  
civil o r po litical rights, as, for instance, adm ission  to  public 
em ploym ents, functions and honours, or the exercise  o f  
p rofessions and industries.
N o restric tions shall be im posed on the free use by any T urk ish  
national o f  any language in private intercourse, in com m erce, 
relig ion, in the press, o r in publications o f  any kind or at public  
m eetings.
N otw ithstand ing  the ex istence o f  the official language, adequate 
facilities shall be g iven  to T urkish nationals o f  non-T urk ish  
speech for the oral use o f  the ir ow n language before the C ourts.
Article 40 added that
T urkish  nationals belonging  to non-M oslem  m inorities shall 
enjoy the sam e treatm ent and security  in law  and in fact as o ther 
T urkish  nationals. Tn particular, they shall have an equal righ t to
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establish , m anage and control at their ow n expense, any 
charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and 
o ther establishm ents for instruction  and education, w ith  the 
right to  use the ir ow n language and to  exercise the ir ow n 
relig ion freely there in .86
Only Armenians, Greeks and Jews were officially recognised as minorities under 
the Treaty of Lausanne, even though their aforementioned rights were not 
respected. Large non-Christian minority groups, such as ethnic Kurds or Alevis, 
as well as Christian minorities not mentioned in the Lausanne Treaty, such as 
Assyrians (<Suryani), Chaldeans {Keldani), Protestants and Catholics, were not 
recognised as having any minority rights.87 The lack of an effective international 
system of minority rights protection meant that protection of minority rights could 
not be enforced from abroad. Turkey did not sign the Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities drafted by the Council of Europe; yet it was 
by no means alone in this respect among European states.88 Where Turkey lagged 
far behind EU member states was in the constitutional and legislative treatment of 
minority rights. The term “minority” was absent from the 1982 Constitution. 
Article 90§5, however, declared international agreements in which Turkey had 
been a signatory to have the binding force of law.89 This granted the Lausanne 
Treaty the status of domestic law, but subordinated it to the Constitution itself. 
Other constitutional stipulations put severe limits on minority rights. Article 3
86 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne, 
July 24, 1923" The Treaties o f Peace 1919-1923 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1924)
87 See Cengiz Qandar, "Asli Unsur ve 'Azinlik'", Terciiman, 12/10/2004. For an account o f the 
problems, which the remaining Assyrian population of southeastern Turkey faced, see Karl Vick, 
"Beliefs Endure as Believers Move on: Turkish Nationalism Reflected in Southern Town's 
Growing Homogeneity", Washington Post, 5/4/2005.
88 Hale, "Human Rights, the European Union and the Turkish Accession Process", pp. 116-18
89 International agreements thus remained inferior to the Constitution. Constitutional rulings, 
therefore, overruled - in  cases o f contradiction- the articles o f the Lausanne Treaty.
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declared that the Turkish state (Tiirkiye devleti) is in indivisible integrity “with its 
territory and nation” and that its language is Turkish. Article 26 forbade the use of 
“any language prohibited by law” - in  effect Kurdish or other minority languages- 
“for the expression and dissemination of thought,” while article 28 also forbade 
publications “in any language forbidden by law.” Article 42 also banned the 
teaching of any language other than Turkish as a “mother tongue.” This ban only 
affected local minority languages and never Western European languages, which 
remained the language of instruction in elite schools and universities. Article 24 
made religious -in  effect, Sunni- education mandatory in primary and secondary 
education, while Article 136 also outlined the role of the Directorate of Religious 
Affairs as part of the state administration. The identification of Islam with the 
Sunni Hanefi School resulted in severe violations of the rights of Turkey’s non- 
Sunni Muslim communities.90
b. The Reform Process
i). Constitutional Reform 
In the aftermath of the 1999 Helsinki European Council decision, Turkey’s EU 
candidacy facilitated reform programmes aiming at better protection of minority 
rights and a more inclusive definition of Turkish national identify. The 2000 
Accession Partnership document mentioned -among other issues- freedom of 
expression as a field where Turkey needed to strengthen constitutional and legal 
guarantees.91 Following the provisions of Turkey’s 2001 National Programme, 
significant constitutional amendments were made with the reform package of
90 Dilek Kurban, "Tiirkiye’nin Azinlik Sorununun Anayasal £6ziunu: E§itlik ile Yiizle§(me)mek", 
Birikim, no. 188 (2004), pp. 41-42
91 For the status o f constitutional protection o f minority rights in Turkey, see Dilek Kurban, 
"Confronting Equality: The Need for Constitutional Protection o f
Minorities on Turkey's Path to the European Union", Columbia Human Rights Law Review, Vol. 
35, no. 1 (2003).
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October 2001.92 The Preamble of the Constitution had refused protection of 
“thoughts or opinions,” which were against “Turkish national interests, Turkish 
existence, state and indivisible territorial integrity, history and moral values of the 
Turkish nation, Ataturk’s nationalism, principles, revolution and civilisation.” 
After the reform, the term “actions” replaced the terms “thoughts or opinions,” 
which meant that limitations in the constitutional protection of freedom of thought 
were lifted. Article 13 was also amended in the direction of expanding 
fundamental rights and freedoms. Until the reform, fundamental rights and 
freedoms could be restricted on grounds of the “indivisible integrity of the state 
with the nation and the country, national sovereignty, the Republic, national 
security, public order, general order, public benefit, public morals and public 
health.” Limitations of the fundamental human rights and freedoms could only be 
imposed “by law and in conformity with the reason mentioned in the relevant 
articles of the Constitution without infringing upon their essence.” Article 14 was 
rephrased so that “constitutional rights and freedoms might not be used to destroy 
the indivisible integrity of the state with the country and the democratic and 
secular Republic, based upon human rights.” The clause “no language, which is 
banned by law, can be used for the expression and circulation of thoughts” was 
removed from Article 26. Similarly, the clause “no publication can be made in a 
language, which is banned by law” was removed from Article 28. A new 
constitutional amendment was passed in May 2004, which aimed at bringing 
about convergence of the Constitution with the Copenhagen Criteria. Article 90 
resolved the issue of a contradiction between an active international treaty on
92 Turk Buyiik Millet Meclisi (TBMM), Tiirkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasasintn Bazi Maddelerinin 
Degi$tirilmesi Hakkinda Kanun
93 Commission of the European Communities, 2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards 
Accession, p. 41
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fundamental rights and freedoms and a subsequent domestic law in favour of the 
first.94 Hence, the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty could no longer be blocked 
by domestic legislation. In Article 30, the clause that allowed the confiscation of 
publishing houses in case of conviction for crimes against “the basic principles of 
the Republic and national security” was removed.95
ii). Legislative Reform 
Major improvements in legislation affecting the minorities were made as part of 
the EU reform packages. In the first reform package of February 2000, Article 
312 of the Penal Code was amended, so that statements inciting the public “to 
hatred and enmity with regard to class, race, religion, religious sect or regional 
differences” would only be considered as criminal acts if they were expressed “in 
a manner which could be dangerous for public order.” A clause was also added 
according to which, provocations, which could offend “a part of the people and 
harm human dignity”, became punishable. In the second reform package of March 
2002, the ban on publications in banned languages was removed from the Law on 
the Press. In July 2001, the Ministry of Culture confiscated and banned the selling 
of an official book, published in 2000, by the same Ministry, containing degrading 
and offensive language in relation to the Turkish Roma. Similarly, the Ministry of 
Education issued on 5 October 2001 a circular to eliminate pejorative words used 
about this group in definitions in dictionaries published by the Ministry.96 In the 
third reform package of August 2002, limitations on teaching and broadcasting of 
“languages and dialects traditionally spoken by Turkish citizens” were lifted. 
Article 159 of the Penal Code was amended to bring freedom of expression to the
94 Commission o f the European Communities, 2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards 
Accession, p. 24
95 Ibid., p. 38
96 Commission o f the European Communities, 2001 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards 
Accession, p. 29
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European Convention of Human Rights standards. The Law on Foundations was 
also modified, so non-Muslim foundations could acquire immovable property 
after a decision of the Council of Ministers. Finally, a chance to reopen closed 
civil and criminal cases was given.
In the fourth reform package of January 2003, the acquisition of 
immovable property by non-Muslim foundations simply required the approval of 
the Directorate. In January 2003, the review of past trials, which had led to 
confiscations of minority property, was finalised. Subsequently, the abolition of 
Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law in July 2003 broadened freedom of expression. 
The definition of terrorism was also updated to include the use of violence. 
Broadcasting of private TV and radio stations in minority languages and dialects 
became possible. The deadline for non-Muslim foundations to register their 
immovable property was extended. The freedom to erect a place of worship 
regardless of religion and belief was recognised. Limitations on the names given 
to infants were also lifted.
Turkey also made progress with regard to international conventions on 
human rights. In June 2003, the Parliament ratified the UN International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and the UN International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, but only after adding reservations with regard to 
minority rights.97 In the seventh reform package of July 2003, Article 159 of the 
Penal Code was amended, so that punishments for “offence against Turkism, the 
Republic etc.” became lighter. A similar reduction was secured with the 
modification of Article 169, which dealt with aid towards terrorist organisations.
97 See Commission o f  the European Communities, 2003 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress 
Towards Accession, p. 23. Turkey reserved the right to interpret and apply the provisions of 
Article 27 o f the Covenant, which referred to minority rights, “ in accordance with the related 
provisions and rules o f  the Constitution o f the Republic of Turkey and the Treaty o f Lausanne of 
24 July 1923 and its Appendices.”
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Criminal cases concerning torture and maltreatment were reviewed with priority 
to avoid the possibility of lapse. Legal personalities were given the chance to 
establish associations. Finally, the learning by Turkish citizens of minority 
languages -notably Kurdish- was facilitated, and the opening of private 
establishments teaching minority languages was allowed. In November 2003, the 
state of emergency was lifted in the last two provinces o f southeastern Turkey, 
Diyarbakir and §irnak. In September 2004, a new Penal Code was adopted. 
Article 216, which largely corresponded to the former Article 312, stated that 
individuals could be convicted under this article only if their incitement to 
“enmity and hatred” constituted a “clear and close danger” to public security.98
iii). Implementation of Reform 
Constitutional and legislative amendments were undoubtedly significant steps 
toward better protection of minority rights, yet the implementation of reforms 
often lagged behind expectations. In the case of broadcasting in minority 
languages, progress was remarkable but not without obstacles. After long 
hesitation, in June 2003, the state broadcasting corporation (Tiirkiye Radyo- 
Televizyon Kurumu-TRT) announced its intention to launch programmes in 
minority languages under certain conditions: Broadcasting would be made in 
national and not local channels. There would be no children’s programmes, no 
minority language teaching programmes, and all programmes would be subtitled 
or simultaneously translated into Turkish. The first Kurdish-speaking film with 
Turkish subtitles was broadcast by a local television channel in Diyarbakir in May 
2004.99 In June 2004, the TRT launched its own programmes in minority
98 Commission o f the European Communities, 2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards 
Accession, p. 38
99 Oran, Tiirkiye’de Azmhklar: Kavramlar, Lozan, Iq Mevzuat, Iqtihat, Uygulama, p. 102
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languages.100 A total of five hours of radio programme and four hours of 
television programme per week were made in Bosnian, Arabic, Kirmanqi Kurdish, 
Circassian and Zaza Kurdish.101 These broadcasts had high symbolic significance, 
but in practice, they had little more than cosmetic value. The TRT persistently 
refused to organise special channels broadcasting in minority languages. As far as 
private media broadcasting was concerned, a new regulation was published in 
January 2004, which allowed private national television and radio channels to 
broadcast in minority languages, but also set strict time limits for these broadcasts.
Applications of local private television and radio broadcasters in 
southeastern Turkey to broadcast in Kurdish were still pending in August 2005, 
when Prime Minister Erdogan visited Diyarbakir (see p. 303). In the aftermath of 
his visit, which was marked by Erdogan’s efforts to mend fences with the local 
Kurdish population, the High Radio-Television Board (Radyo-Televizyon Ust 
Kurulu-Kl\JK) was reported to have approved the applications of nine local 
television and radio channels for broadcasting in Kurdish.102
Finally, it should be noted that reaction against the measure also came 
from some minority associations themselves. The Vice President of the Bosnian- 
Herzegovinian Cultural Associations Federation Cemal §enel replied as follows:
“M ay our state be w ell (D evletim iz sag  olsuri). H ow ever, until 
today w e have not m ade such a  request. We are not anyw ay 
B osnians w ho live in Turkey, w e are first-class c itizen s.103
100 Ankara Burosu, "Erken Kalkan KUrtfe Dinler", Radikal, 5/6/2004
101 It is interesting to note that the Laz language was excluded from the list, while both dialects o f 
Turkey’s Kurdish population were included. The broadcasting o f songs in Laz in state media 
remained banned. See Ismail Saymaz, "Laz Fikrasi Gibi Olay", Radikal, 28/3/2005.
102 Ersan Atar, "Diyarbakir Afihminm Ilk Somut Adim Atildi: Kurtfe TV'nm Yolu Agihyor", 
Sabah, 17/8/2005
103 See Oran, Tiirkiye’de Azmhklar: Kavramlar, Lozan, Ig Mevznat, Igtihat, Uygulama, p. 113 and 
ismail Saymaz, "Bo§naklar Sitemkar", Radikal, 8/6/2004
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This again demonstrated that the identification of minority rights with a second- 
class citizen status was firmly embedded in public opinion.
As far as teaching of minority languages was concerned, more 
bureaucratic resistance was noted. Although reform measures clearly 
acknowledged the right to open private minority language schools, the 
administration found several reasons to delay this development. The name of 
applicant private schools, internal organisation issues, building safety 
specifications, the qualifications of instructors, the use of the term “language” 
(dil) instead of the term “dialect” (lehge) were all used as pretexts to delay the 
opening of private Kurdish language schools. When over 10,000 university 
students applied for the opening of Kurdish language courses, 446 were 
prosecuted for “sheltering illegal groups”, 533 were arrested, 3,621 were taken 
into custody and fifteen were sentenced with up to three years of prison.104 
Finally, six private schools started teaching Kirmangi Kurdish in Van, Batman 
and Urfa in April 2004, in Diyarbakir and Adana in August 2004 and in Istanbul 
in October 2004.105 However, student interest was low, and in July 2005, the 
school at Batman had to suspend its operation.106
Analogous problems were experienced in implementing reform in the case 
of non-Muslim minority foundations. The bureaucratic insistence on viewing 
these non-Muslim minorities and their foundations as “foreign” and dangerous 
and on stressing the principle of “international reciprocity” in acknowledging 
minority rights107 remained as an obstacle. In June 2004, a Regulation on the
104 Oran, Tiirkiye'de Azmhklar: Kavramlar, Lozan, Ig Mevzaat, Igtihat, Uygulama, p. 104
105 Commission o f the European Communities, 2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress 
Towards Accession, p. 49
106 Hatice Ya§ar and Arif Arslan, "Bir Efsanenin Sonu", Radikal, 19/7/2005
107 This was especially the case for the Greek minority, as Greece hosted its own Muslim/Turkish 
minority, whose rights were also often violated.
289
Methods and Principles of the Boards of Non-Muslim Foundations was adopted. 
This Regulation sought to address the problems with respect to elections to the 
boards of non-Muslim foundations, which could not be held regularly, due to 
membership diminution. Yet the progress made was only limited, as discretionary 
powers remained in the hands of state authorities.108
4. The “Working Group on Minority and Cultural Rights” Report
a. The Content of the Report
While the state administration showed it was slow to adapt to the constitutional 
and legislative reforms, a new debate on Turkish national identity rose at the 
intellectual level. A report prepared by the “Working Group on Minority Rights 
and Cultural Rights,” a committee working under the Office of the Prime 
Minister, acted as a catalyst of this debate. This report, which became public on 
17 October 2004, referred to key issues related to Turkish national identity and 
sparked a wide intellectual debate.109
The report attempted to heal the fundamental contradiction of Turkish 
national identity, which combined elements of territorial and ethnic nationalism, 
by advocating a purely civic national identity. It started with a short intellectual 
history of the term “minority” in the international and Turkish context. It then 
pointed out that, following the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey recognised the existence 
of minorities only on a religious -and not ethnic or linguistic- basis. Turkey 
maintained the same defensive approach by insisting on reservations to 
international treaties relevant to minority rights. Nevertheless, increased interest 
in minority rights since the end of the Cold War meant that Turkey’s approach
108 Commission o f the European Communities, 2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress 
Towards Accession, p. 43
109 Adnan Keskin, "Cesur Azinlik Raporu", Radikal, 17/10/2004
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was at odds with the dominant international view. The existence of minority 
group members within states should be treated as an objective fact, rather than 
being subject to state definitions. The international community was interested in 
the protection of the fundamental rights of minority members. What remained 
within the discretion of the state was whether minority status would be 
acknowledged to a group of minority members.110
The report then stated that the Lausanne Treaty was not fully implemented 
with regard to the human rights of non-Muslim minorities as well as all the 
Turkish citizens. For example, linguistic minority rights granted under Article 
39§4 of the Lausanne Treaty (see p. 280) were not fully acknowledged to Turkish 
citizens of -for instance- Kurdish origin, until the adoption of the EU reform 
packages in 2002-2003. The reasons for these restrictions were to be found in 
constitutional stipulations, which gave absolute priority to national integrity over 
minority and cultural rights. The report argued that this monolithic approach to 
national identity denied the existence of different constitutive ethnic identities and 
was, therefore, essentially undemocratic. It then went on to list a number of laws 
and court decisions where discrimination against minorities and an ethnic 
understanding of Turkish national identity were clear. As reasons for the narrow 
and false understanding of the minority issue in Turkey, the report listed the 
following:
■ Turkey did not follow global developments in minority definition 
and law and remains loyal to the 1923 regime. In fact, Turkey 
misinterpreted even the Treaty of Lausanne itself.
110 Azinlik Haklan ve KultUrel Haklar Cali§ma Grubu, "Rapor", Birikim, no. 188 (2004), p. 26
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■ The acceptance of a different minority identity was considered 
tantamount to the recognition of minority status/rights. However, the 
first was an objective situation, while the second was a state affair.
■ “Internal self-determination”, which was synonymous with 
democracy, was understood as “external self-determination”, which 
was synonymous with secession. As a result o f this, recognition of 
different identities was considered tantamount to state disintegration.
■ Monism and unity were perceived to be synonymous when referring 
to the nation. It was not understood that national monism gradually 
harms national unity.
■ While talking about the Turks, it was not seen that the term “Turk” 
was simultaneously understood as an ethnic - in  fact, religious- 
group.111
The report identified a conceptual and a historic-political reason for this situation. 
The first had to do with the relationship between a primary state and a secondary 
ethnic/religious identity (iist-kimlik/alt-kimlik) in republican Turkey. While state 
identity was “Ottoman” in the imperial era, in the republican era it became 
“Turkish.” This state identity identified the citizen in terms of ethnicity and even 
religion. This allowed for ethnic kin abroad to be called “Turks,” while non- 
Muslim minorities were called “citizens” and not “Turks.” This situation alienated 
all those citizens who were not of Turkish ethnic origin. If there had been a state 
identity based on origin “from Turkey” (Tiirkiyeli), this problem would not have 
existed. As this identity would exclusively refer to the principle of “territory” and 
not “blood,” it would equally treat all ethnic, religious and other identities. In this
111 Ibid., pp. 26-29
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respect, the report referred to the 1924 Constitution, which -in  contrast to the 
1982 Constitution- used the term “people of Turkey” in a way similar to the term 
“Turkiyeli.” This state identity would separate the concepts of “nation” and 
“citizenship” and would incorporate all ethnic/religious identities without 
exception.112
The historic-political reason was what is referred to as the Sevres 
syndrome (see p. 186). The fear of Turkey’s partition on a fashion similar to the 
Sevres Treaty created anxiety and paranoid fears about conspiracy theories. This 
seriously hampered the recognition of minority and cultural rights, as any similar 
requests were stigmatised as attempts to partition Turkey. The report argued that 
the reactionary mentality of the opponents of reform was similar to the mentality 
of those who opposed Kemalist reforms in the 1920s and 1930s.113
In conclusion, the report argued that despite serious attempts to create a 
mono-cultural homogeneous nation in Turkey, a mosaic of identities and cultures 
survived. It added that Ataturk’s “contemporary civilisation” thesis now referred 
to Europe of the second millennium. The European multi-identity, multi-cultural, 
democratic, liberal and plural social model had to been taken as a paradigm. In 
view of this, a series of rights should be recognised -notably the right to 
individual freedoms, the right to freely participate in economic and social 
activities, the right to participate in the state and the right to cultural pluralism. To 
implement these principles, the following steps should be taken:
■ The Constitution and the relevant legislation needed to be rewritten 
with a liberal, plural and democratic content and with the participation 
of civil society
112 Ibid., p. 29
113 Ibid., pp. 29-30
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■ The right of the citizens with a different identity and culture to protect 
and develop their own identities should be protected on the basis of 
equal rights citizenship.
■ Central and local government should become transparent and 
democratise on the basis of citizens’ participation and control.
■ International agreements and fundamental documents, which contained 
norms of human rights and freedoms, especially the Framework 
Convention of the Council of Europe, should be signed and 
implemented without reservations. Subsequently, statements denying 
ethnic and religious identities in Turkey should be abandoned.
b. The Opposition to the Report
The publication of this report caused widespread public interest. It attracted ardent 
support as well as vehement opposition, since it touched upon extremely sensitive 
issues. Nationalist groups formed the backbone of the opposition to reform, which 
included Members of Parliament, civil and military officials, trade unions and 
other NGOs.114 Apart from procedural objections, the report was attacked for 
advocating the replacement of the Turkish by a “TurkiyeW  state identity. It was 
argued that a Turkish state identity incorporated all ethnic and religious identities 
and that reducing Turks to an ethnic group was tantamount to rewriting history115 
and simplistic.116 Others argued that this report sought to terminate the Lausanne
114 Reaction also took violent forms. One o f the members o f “Working Group on Minority and 
Cultural Rights” grabbed a copy o f the report during a press conference and tore it into pieces. See 
Ankara Biirosu, "insan Hakki A9iklanamadi", Radikal, 2/11/2004 and Ankara Biirosu, "Yoku§: 
Azinlik Raporunu Bin Kere Yirtarim", Hurriyet, 2/11/2004. For later reactions, see Istanbul 
BUrosu, "'Azmliklar' Arbedesi", Radikal, 7/11/2004. For a response o f  the President o f  the 
Working Group, see ibrahim O, Kaboglu, "AB Var, Biz Du§unmeyelim", Radikal, 3/11/2004.
115 Gundiiz Aktan, "AB ve Azmhklar", Radikal, 26/10/2004
116 Ahmet (^akmak, "Turk'iin Ate§le Imtiham", Radikal Iki, 7/11/2004
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1 i 7 •Treaty. According to this view, Turkey had -like any other state- the exclusive 
right to name its minorities, which it had done in the Lausanne Treaty.118 Many 
argued that the acceptance of such a proposal would mean the abolition of the 
unitary character of the Turkish Republic. The transformation of Turkey into a 
federal, binational state119 would then comprise only a transitory stage toward the 
partition of the country on ethnic lines. Soon top-ranking state officials joined the 
debate condemning the report. The President of the Republic Ahmet Necdet Sezer 
argued:
Prom oting -a p a r t from  cultural r ig h ts -  ethnic, relig ious and 
confessional differences o f  com m unities, w hich live together, 
could  harm  national unity  and disintegrate the  n a tio n -sta te .... In 
the unitary state, country, nation and sovereignty  are single, 
indivisible. The founding and real elem ent o f  the R epublic o f  
Turkey is the T urkish  nation .” 120
The Chief o f the General Staff General Hilmi Ozkok pointed that
Turkey is a  unitary state w ith  a  m onist character. By saying 
“H ow  happy is one w ho says T am  a  T urk’” , A tatiirk based the 
R epublic on a prim ary identity  (ust-kimlik) foundation , w hich 
in tegrates relig ious and ethnic d iffe rences.121
According to these views, the term “Turk” combined the principles of state and 
ethnic identity.122 A more extreme view was expressed by the Commander of the 
First Army, General Hur§it Tolon. Tolon first wondered what a minority in
117 Erdogan Aydin, "AB, Lozan'i Tasfiye mi Ediyor?" Radikal iki, 17/10/2004
118 Sadi Somuncuoglu, "Geciken Azinlik Tarti§masi", Radikal, 21/10/2004
119 Fikret Bila, "Cumhuriyet ve Kimlik", Milliyet, 30/10/2004
120 Ankara Biirosu, "'Turk Ulusu Bir Ustkimliktir"', Radikal, 29/10/2004
121 Murat Yetkin, "Cumhurba§kam ve Genelkurmay Ba§kam'nin Mesajlan", Radikal, 29/10/2004
122 Sedat Ergin, "Amerikalihk, Tiirkiyelilik ve Tiirkluk", Hurriyet, 31/10/2004
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Turkey is. He then added that “everyone had rights as a Turkish citizen and that 
no one had rights above Turkish citizenship.”123 The government at first hesitated 
to take a clear position and then sided with the other state officials who expressed 
their disagreement with the content of the report. To sum up, the report was seen 
as an aberration from the Lausanne Treaty, which questioned Turkey’s unitary 
nature and territorial integrity, as the Sevres Treaty had attempted to do at the end 
of the First World War.
c. The Supporters of the Report
On the other hand, the report attracted strong support from parts of the media, 
NGO representatives and the intelligentsia. The idea of “TurkiyelilikJ’ was 
fervently supported by a large number of intellectuals who saw it as the best way 
to resolve Turkey’s Kurdish question. The development of a purely civic national 
identity would allow the sharing of this identity by all the Republic’s citizens. The 
most comprehensive defence of the report was given by one of its main drafters, 
Professor Baskin Oran. In Oran’s view, the report did not aim to abolish the 
Lausanne Treaty and restore the Sevres Treaty. On the contrary, the report showed 
that Turkey did not fulfil several of its obligations under the Lausanne Treaty. 
Turkey’s compliance with these obligations, for instance with Article 39§4, which 
guaranteed the freedom to use any language, would greatly improve the 
contemporary minority rights situation in Turkey.124 As regards the nature of the 
Turkish state and its territorial integrity, Oran argued that the report advocated 
neither the abolition of Turkey’s unitary state system, nor its partition. On the 
contrary, the principle of state territorial integrity was described as natural and
123 Istanbul Biirosu, "Tolon'dan Azinlik £iki§i", Milliyet, 24/11/2004
124 Baskin Oran, "'Azinlik Haklari ve Kiilturel Haklar Raporu'nun Biitun Oykiisii", Birikim, no. 188 
(2004a), p. 22
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non-negotiable. Moreover, the introduction of a measure of voluntarism in the 
notion of identity, which was one of the goals of the report, would strengthen the 
state. With respect to accusations that the report wished to create new minorities 
and divide the Turkish people, Oran replied that the existence of a minority is an 
objective fact, independent of the eye of the beholder or his wishes. However, the 
term “minority” had to be relieved of the negative connotation it had accumulated
1 ^ c
since the Ottoman era. It should not be synonymous with the non-Muslim 
minorities or being a “second-class citizen” or “secessionist.” 126 Finally, Oran 
stressed that the suggestion to introduce the term “Tiirkiyeir allowed those 
minorities, which did not identify themselves with the Turkish ethnic group, to 
identify themselves with the state. Despite its relative success, the Turkish 
primary state identity (ust-kimlik) failed to unite the whole population of the 
Turkish Republic. Since forced assimilation policies were impossible in the age of 
globalisation and in the context of Turkey’s EU membership negotiations, the 
Turkish state needed to accommodate itself to the existence of multiple ethnic and 
religious identities, which can be united under a single “Turkiyeli” identity. In his 
view, the introduction of this term would not divide, but rather unite all the 
citizens of the Republic regardless of ethnic or religious identity. It would also 
become the symbol of a liberal democratic, pluralist mentality, signs of which 
were already given by Ataturk in the 1920s when he preferred to use the term 
“people of Turkey” {Tiirkiye halki) instead of “Turkish people” {Turk halki)}11
Oran’s arguments enjoyed wide support from NGOs, liberal columnists 
and intellectuals. Violent protests and threats against the report and its drafters, as
125 Murat Beige, "Azinlik Degiliz Estagfurullah", Radikal, 4/5/2003
126 Oran, '"Azinlik Haklari ve Kiilturel Haklar Raporu'nun Biitun Oykusii", p. 23
127 Ibid., pp. 24-25. This argument was rebutted by columnists who argued that Ataturk used both 
terms, so he should not be quoted in the debate. See Taha Akyol, "Ataturk TUrk Devleti 
Demedi!!!" Milliyet, 2/11/2004.
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well as the government’s unwillingness to prevent them128 were condemned by 
numerous intellectuals and NGOs.129 Several arguments were developed in 
support of the report. The absence of a real ethnic basis of Turkish national 
identity130 demonstrated the need to overcome the myth of common ethnic 
descent of all Turkish citizens and to establish a civic national identity. The 
importance of ending all ethnic and religious discrimination131 and extending 
minority rights to all minority groups -not only to those mentioned in the 
Lausanne Treaty- became clear.132 Other columnists argued that Turkish political 
discourse would benefit from a clarification of the term “minority” and the 
removal of the negative implications it had acquired in the late Ottoman and 
republican years.133 Minority rights should be dissociated from the idea of 
partition134 and external self-determination.135 Turkish officials should abandon 
their phobic approach to minority issues.136 The reluctance of existing minority 
groups to identify themselves as such should be dealt with,137 so that minority 
rights ceased to be purely a function of Turkey’s Kurdish problem.138 Others 
pointed out that the proposed state identity had certain similarities with the late 
Ottoman state identity.139 The adoption of the term “Turkiyeli” would improve 
Turkey’s stability,140 as it would have a unifying influence on the people.141 Non-
128 Ibrahim O. Kaboglu, "Hiikumet Saldirganligi Tahrik Etti", Interview with Ne§e Diizel, Radikal, 
8/11/2004
129 Ankara Biirosu, "Sivil Toplum: Rapor Yirtma llkel ve Irk?i", Hurriyet, 2/11/2004
130 Tiirker Alkan, "Kim Hakiki Tiirk'tur?" Radikal, 19/10/2004
131 Etyen Mahgupyan, "Kimlik ve Korku", Zaman, 12/11/2004
132 §ahin Alpay, "AB Uniter Devleti Sorguluyor mu?" Zaman, 4/11/2004
133 Murat Beige, "Azmhklar Raporu", Radikal, 26/10/2004
134 Erol Katircioglu, "Ust Kimlik Arayi§inin Anlami", Radikal, 30/10/2004
135 Safa Reisoglu, "AB Yolunda Azinlik Kavgasi", Radikal, 11/11/2004
136 Murat Beige, '"Azinlik1 Fobyasi", Radikal, 6/11/2004
137 Murat Beige, "Azinligin Azinlik Olma Korkusu", Radikal, 7/11/2004
138 Anzor Keref, '"Asli U nsurlar've 'Digerleri'", Radikal iki, 31/10/2004
139 Cengiz £andar, "Eskiden Turkiyelilik' mi Vardi", Terciiman, 24/10/2004
140 See a series o f articles on this by Hadi Uluengin: Hadi Uluengin, "Evet, Turkiyeli (I)", 
Hurriyet, 27/10/2004, Hadi Uluengin, "Evet, Turkiyeli (II)", Hurriyet, 27/10/2004, Hadi Uluengin,
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Muslim and other minorities would no more be seen as the “other within us” 
(iigimizdeki oteki) or as “ local foreigners” iyerli yabancilar), but as full and equal 
citizens.142
The publication of this report comprised a milestone in the identity debate. 
The report succeeded in summarising the basic problems of mainstream Turkish 
national ideology and suggesting daring redefinitions of Turkish national identity. 
The public debate sparked as a result of this report was both interesting and 
polarised. The arguments of both supporters and opponents were indicative of the 
intellectual discourse developing in Turkish society.
5. The Stance of Social Actors
a. The Bureaucracy
The stance of the bureaucracy on the liberalisation o f the national identity 
discourse in Turkey was generally not constructive. The survival of an illiberal 
mentality meant that the implementation of these measures would not always be 
whole-hearted. Difficulties in implementation often led to the need for 
amendments, to reduce the discretionary powers of the administration. In general, 
the military, the civil administration, the courts and the police were not receptive 
to calls for raising the standards of minority protection to the European level. 
Parts of the judiciary also became an enclave of resistance against liberalisation. 
While liberal intellectuals were often indicted for comments, which did not abide 
by the official Turkish position on sensitive national issues, ultra-right mobsters 
received an extremely soft treatment by judicial authorities. In late August 2005,
"Evet, Turkiyeli (HI)", Hiirriyet, 28/10/2004 and Hadi Uluengin, "Evet, Turkiyeli (IV)", Hiirriyet, 
30/10/2004.
141 Baskin Oran, "Turk Ust Kimligi Ulkeyi Boliiyor", Interview with Ne$e Diizel, Radikal, 
25/12/2004
142 Ahmet insel, "Ayricalikli Ortakhk ve Ifimizdeki Oteki", Radikal iki, 12/12/2004
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Orhan Pamuk, one of the most famous Turkish writers, was indicted143 under 
Article 301 §1 of the Turkish Penal Code for insulting the Turkish nation.144 A few 
days later, on 6 September 2005, a group of ultranationalists, who violently 
interrupted a photograph exhibition to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the 
1955 pogrom against the Istanbul minorities, were released on the following day 
with minor material damage charges, at the clear discretion of judicial authorities, 
although they could have been detained or prosecuted for much heavier criminal 
offences.145 Both incidents showed that the stance of a part of the judiciary was 
still incompatible with a liberal approach to the issue of national identity.146 The 
practices of the General Directorate of Foundations regarding the property rights 
of non-Muslim minority foundations, especially in the cases where legal reform 
gave room to its discretionary powers, were characteristic of an enduring 
approach. The Directorate officials still viewed non-Muslim minorities as 
“ internal enemies” (ig du$manlar) or threats to domestic security and the 
territorial integrity of the state, on much the same lines as their predecessors. 
Hence, the confiscation of minority property and the subsequent weakening of the 
economic position of the minorities were seen as a contribution to state security. 
Even the renaming of Turkish fauna species to eliminate references to Turkey’s
143 See Karl Vick, "Turkey Charges Acclaimed Author", Washington Post, 1/9/2005 and Derya 
Sazak, "Orhan Pamuk’u Yargilamak", Milliyet, 3/9/2005.
144 During an interview with the Swiss newspaper “Das M agaziri\ on 6 February 2005, Pamuk 
was quoted as saying: "Thirty thousand Kurds and a million Armenians were killed in these lands, 
and nobody but me dares to talk about it."
145 Istanbul Biirosu, "’O Kafa' Serbest Birakildi", Radikal, 8/9/2005
146 Having said that, one needs not to forget that only two months before Pamuk’s indictment, the 
Istanbul Prosecutor’s Office had decided that his statements were, indeed, protected by free 
speech. This provides additional evidence for the deep division within the Turkish judiciary. See 
Soli Ozel, "Free-Speech Case Can't Hide Progress", International Herald Tribune, 8/9/2005.
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minority populations was seen by Turkish bureaucrats as a measure protecting the 
unitary nature of the state.147
Similar views affected both radicals and moderates in the armed forces. In 
May 2003, a secret report, drafted by the General Secretary of the National 
Security Council {Milli Guvenlik Kurulu-MGK) General Tuncer Kilim? clearly 
opposed even the hesitant liberalisation steps of minority legislation included in 
the sixth reform package.148 While General Ozkok defended the unitary character 
of the Turkish state and the monist character of national identity in October 
2004,149 other generals went even further, warning against the consequences that 
the recognition of minority rights would have for Turkey’s security. General 
Tolon disputed in November 2004 the existence of any minorities in Turkey, 
arguing that everyone was a first-class citizen.150 The ambivalence in reforming 
legislation regarding minority language broadcasting and education and the 
minimal character of the measures finally implemented showed that military 
views found support in the state broadcasting authority and civil administration. 
Similarly, the judiciary sometimes interpreted liberalising amendments in a way, 
which contradicted the spirit o f the law.151 Last, but not least, the incidents of
147 In March 2005, the Ministry o f Environment and Forestry decided to unilaterally rename 
Vitlpes Vulpes Kurdistanica, a red fox indigenous to southeastern Turkey, as Vulpes Vulpes. Ovis 
Armeniana, a wild sheep indigenous to eastern Turkey, was renamed as Ovis Orien Anatolictis. 
Capreolus Capreolus Armenius, a deer indigenous to eastern Turkey, was renamed as Capreolus 
Capreolus Capreolus. See Umit Letin, "Bakanhktan ‘Boliicu Hayvan’ Operasyonu", Hilrriyet, 
5/3/2005 .
148 Oran, Titrkiye’de Azmiiklar: Kavramlar, Lozan, Ig Mevzuat, Igtihat, Uygulama, pp. 100-01
149 Yetkin, "Cumhurba§kam ve Genelkurmay Ba§kam'nin Mesajlan"
150 Istanbul Biirosu, "Tolon'dan Azinhk £iki§i"
151 The case o f  the students who were criminally charged after applying for Kurdish language 
courses is illuminating. See Oran, Tiirkiye'de Azinhklar: Kavramlar, Lozan, Ig Mevzuat, Igtihat, 
Uygulama, p. 104.
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extra-judicial killings by security forces in southeastern Turkey were reduced in 
numbers, but did not disappear.152
Nonetheless, this should not lead to the conclusion that there were no 
reformist minds within the ranks of the bureaucracy. The Foreign Ministry and the 
General Secretariat for the European Union (Avrupa Birligi Genel Sekreterligi- 
ABGS) included a number of officials who were in favour of liberalisation. Their 
role was crucial in the drafting and implementation of reform of the legislation 
regarding the minorities.153 However, they were often not powerful enough to 
ignore calls to compromise their reform programme.
b. The Intelligentsia
The liberal intelligentsia played a crucial role as an advocate of the liberalisation 
of laws affecting the minorities and the adoption of a new basis for Turkish 
national identity. Benefiting from the more liberal political environment in the 
1990s, columnists, academics and NGO leaders started addressing the problematic 
status of minority rights protection in Turkey. Despite the escalating crisis with 
the PKK, many intellectuals stressed the need for a peaceful resolution of the 
Kurdish issue and full respect for minority rights in Turkey. Their main argument 
was that minority rights violations did not improve Turkish security, but only 
increased the appeal of Kurdish extremists to the mass of Turkey’s Kurdish 
population.154 Their requests were not always welcomed, as nationalist reactions 
were still powerful. Nonetheless, the public appeal of their argument rose, as 
governments started to implement reform measures in a slow and piecemeal
152 For such a recent event, the assassination of a man with his 12-year-old son at Kiziltepe, 
Mardin in November 2004, see Hasan Cemal, "13 Kur§unu, Ugur'u Sakin Unutmayin", Milliyet, 
10/12/2004 and Hikmet ^etinkaya, "Korku", Cumhuriyet, 1/12/2004.
153 Oran, Turkiye'de Azinhklar: Kavramlar, Lozan, Ig Mevzuat, Igtihat, Uygulama, p. 100
154 The ban o f Kurdish language by Turkish authorities was a basic theme o f PKK’s propaganda 
campaigns.
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fashion, following increasing international and EU pressure. The boldest part of 
the agenda of liberal intellectuals came to the fore with the publication of the 
“Working Group on Minority and Cultural Rights” report. This report was a 
product of this intellectual fermentation and epitomised the liberal answers to the 
minority and national identity questions of republican Turkey. Academics like 
Ibrahim Kaboglu and Baskin Oran were joined by a number of the NGOs, which 
were represented in the Working Group, in advocating liberal reform. What was 
more path-breaking was that the working group which produced this report was -  
albeit loosely- connected with the Office of the Prime Minister. Although the 
government took pains to dissociate itself from the report and its content, it was 
important to see that such views gained a semi-official status for the first time.
The fervent support of the report proposals by a significant number of 
columnists and the intense intellectual debate on the base of Turkish national 
identity also showed that these views were shared by a considerable part of the 
country’s intellectual elite. This intelligentsia succeeded in familiarising public 
opinion with liberal political ideas. In this effort, it was joined by liberal media 
and business capital, such as the newspapers Radikal and Birgiin, the magazine 
Birikim and numerous columnists/commentators in most Turkish media, as well 
as several business corporations, which are members of TOsiAD.155 The de- 
demonisation of the term “minority” was followed by proposals to reshape 
Turkish national identity, which would make it inclusive and tolerant of ethnic 
and religious differences. Turkey’s liberal intelligentsia succeeded in pointing 
out that security problems could not be solved by military means only, but by 
engaging Turkey’s minority populations, eliminating the discrimination between
155 §anli Bahadir K09, Fieldwork Interview (Ankara, 27/1/2005)
156 Ibrahim O. Kaboglu, "Cumhuriyetimiz Tek Soya Indirgenemez ", Interview with Derya Sazak, 
Milliyet, 1/11/2004
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first- and second-class citizens and making them feel Turkey to be their own
1 57country. Full recognition of minority rights would not be detrimental but rather 
beneficial to Turkish national security.158
6. The Incidence of Social Learning
The liberalisation of the discourse on minorities and national identity was also felt 
in the liberal shift o f the positions of several social actors with regard to minority 
rights and the nature of national identity. While the bureaucracy largely remained 
as an obstacle to liberalisation and expressed deep concerns about the 
reconsideration of the basis of Turkish national identity, it was no more a unitary 
actor. Fragmentation became apparent when, in the course of EU-Turkey 
negotiations, a considerable number of Foreign Ministry bureaucrats joined the 
cause of political liberalisation and attempted to reshape state policies in a more 
liberal fashion.159 Their attempts, however, were not always successful. Political 
liberalisation was no longer something to fear, but on the contrary a useful tool to 
pursue the national interest successfully.
The position of the AKP government was also significantly affected. 
Although in autumn 2004 he had carefully distanced himself from the report of 
the “Working Group on Minority and Cultural Rights,” Prime Minister Erdogan 
made an impressive opening toward Turkey’s Kurds during his visit to Diyarbakir 
in August 2005.160 He admitted the existence of a Kurdish problem in Turkey and 
argued that denying the existence of such a problem did not befit Turkey. He also 
linked the Kurdish question with the general problem of democratisation in
157 Baskin Oran, "Turkiye'de Herkes E§ittir", Radikal Cumhuriyet, 29/10/2004
158 Miiftiiler-Bac, Fieldwork Interview
159 Taml Bora, Fieldwork Interview (Ankara, 25/1/2005)
160 Economist Europe Section, "Peace Be Upon to You," Economist, 20/8/2005
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Turkey. He suggested that, like many other problems in Turkey, the Kurdish issue 
should be should be dealt within the framework of Turkey’s democratisation 
process. He also admitted that the state had made serious political and 
administrative mistakes in its treatment of citizens of Kurdish descent and other 
social groups in the past. He added, however, that no such mistakes could serve as 
pretext for supporting terrorism.161
Erdogan’s statements marked a milestone in Turkish politics. For the first 
time a Prime Minister openly spoke about a Kurdish problem in Turkey and 
admitted past errors in the treatment of the Kurdish and other minorities by the 
state. The reactions of social actors to Erdogan’s comments confirmed the 
existence of deep divisions within Turkish society. While Kurdish intellectuals 
and political leaders,162 Turkish liberals and associations like TUSIAD163 fully 
supported his statements, Erdogan was openly criticised by the CHP leader Deniz 
Baykal,164 who accused him of “flirting with the terrorists.” President Ahmet 
Necdet Sezer and the military members of the MGK also indirectly opposed 
Erdogan’s initiative by insisting on the conventional state policy on the Kurdish 
issue.165 Despite these reactions, Erdogan’s statements were a very daring step 
towards resetting the agenda of the minority question in Turkey. His remarks 
suggested that a new, more liberal approach towards the minority question was 
emerging in the Turkish government.
161 See Adnan Keskin, "Erdogan: Kurt Sorunu Demokrasiyle £ozulur", Radikal, 11/8/2005, 
Istanbul Biirosu, "Erdogan'm Diyarbakir Mesaji: Devlet Ge9mi§te Hatalar Yapti", Radikal, 
13/8/2005 and Hilal Koylu, "Siyasette Kurt Sicagi", Radikal, 14/8/2005.
162 Ankara BUrosu, "Diyarbakir Umutlu", Radikal, 12/8/2005
163 Istanbul BUrosu, "TCSIAD, Erdogan’a Destek Verdi ", Radikal, 17/8/2005
164 See Dogan Haber Ajansi (DHA), "Baykal'm Goru§u: Teroristle F lo rt", Radikal, 15/8/2005 and 
Murat Yetkin, "Erdogan ve Baykal'm Kurt Sorunu Tanimi", Radikal, 23/8/2005. Interestingly, 
Kurdish nationalists showed the same discontent with Erdogan’s statements. See Haluk §ahin, 
"Diyarbakir'in Kafasi Kari§ik", Radikal, 17/8/2005.
165 Deniz Zeyrek, "Bildiri Sezer Damgah", Radikal, 24/8/2005
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Civil society was more profoundly but unevenly affected. Although traits of 
illiberal thought with regard to minority rights could be traced even among 
members of minority associations (see p. 287), the process of EU reform made 
many NGOs aware of the need to protect minority rights and adopt a more 
inclusive basis of national identity. These NGOs, such as the Human Rights 
Association (Insan Haklari Dernegi-IHD) and the Human Rights Foundation of 
Turkey (Turkiye Insan Haklari Vakfi-TIHV), became increasingly active in 
collecting evidence of minority rights violations and campaigning for legal 
measures, which would put an end to them. The ensuing debate led to a state of 
creative confusion where old taboos were challenged and inclusive solutions were 
sought.166 Meanwhile, citizens’ interest in their own ethnic and religious heritage 
rose. The October 2004 “Working Group on Minority and Cultural Rights” report 
was drafted and approved with the support of several NGOs, which were 
members of the Working Group. Their support included even the most sensitive 
point of the report, which referred to the removal of any ethnic element from 
Turkish national identity. A large segment of civil society proved ready to adopt 
the cause of political liberalisation in the fields of minority rights and identity 
politics and to defend it.
7. Conclusions
Path dependence theory is helpful in better understanding the recent developments 
in the field of minority rights and national identity debates in Turkey. While in the 
1980s the existence of a Kurdish minority in Turkey was persistently denied and 
the use of Kurdish language banned, the reform process launched under the 
pressure of convergence with the Copenhagen Criteria since 1999 led to changes
166 Ergil, Fieldwork Interview
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whose costs of reversal became increasingly high. The reform process certainly 
benefited from the arrest of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, the military defeat 
of the PKK forces and the declaration of a unilateral ceasefire in 1999. However, 
when the PKK resumed its operations in 2004, a regression to past repressive 
legislative and administrative measures seemed to be off the agenda. The 
resumption of violence by the PKK in 2004 failed to have any visible negative 
effects in the process of liberalizing minority rights. People continued to argue in 
favour of Kurdish minority rights and support the idea of a civic Turkish national 
identity. The liberal democratic gains accumulated through the process of 
convergence with the Copenhagen Criteria could not be reversed.
The policy shift towards the better protection of minority rights and the 
launch of discussions on a civic rather than ethnic national identity can be better 
explained through the two-level game approach. Persistent EU pressure by the 
European Union on the issue of minority rights at the international level (Level I) 
empowered and encouraged the representatives of minority groups and liberal 
intellectuals who argued in favour of full respect for minority rights in Turkey at 
the domestic level (Level II). The publication of a report as controversial and 
daring as that of the “Working Group” could not have been possible without this 
change. Meanwhile, the applicability of historical institutionalism becomes ever 
clearer when one observes the role of the European Commission and the European 
Parliament in inducing reform in minority legislation and the opening of a new 
debate on the issue of Turkish national identity. The persistence of Commission 
reports, European Parliament reports and resolutions in addressing the problems 
of Turkey’s minorities and demanding their resolution, had a clear influence on 
the reforms made and the change of discourse on the issue of national identity.
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The temporal correlation of reforms with the publication of Commission reports 
and the promulgation of parliamentary resolutions provided ample evidence for 
this.
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS/PROSPECTS OF TURKISH POLITICAL 
CULTURE
1. Theoretical Considerations
a. Path Dependence and Turkish Political Culture
The study of EU-sponsored political reform in Turkey in the previous chapters 
made it clear that path dependence theory could help explain the process of 
liberalisation of Turkish political culture.1 Turkey’s approach to the European 
Union required a series of political decisions, which -among others™ entailed a 
reconsideration of state-civil society relations, the civilianisation of politics and a 
new approach to secularism and national identity. As Turkey was making steps 
towards convergence with the Copenhagen Criteria, it became increasingly 
difficult to change direction and relapse to old policies and practices. The Helsinki 
European Council decision in December 1999 became a landmark event. Giving 
Turkey the status of an EU candidate state had a critical and enduring facilitating 
impact on the process of political liberalisation.2 The increasingly realistic 
prospect of EU membership gave Turkey a political vision, while the Copenhagen 
Criteria became the yardstick against which any reform steps were measured. The 
increasing commitment of the 1999-2002 coalition government to Turkey’s EU 
accession process meant that it was willing to undertake daring reform measures 
to meet this target. The more the government invested political capital on the 
prospect of EU membership, the more difficult it became to reverse the process of 
political liberalisation. The possibility of a rejection of Turkey’s EU membership 
bid would have disastrous consequences for the electoral fate of all coalition
1 For the relevance o f path dependence theory in the study of political culture, see Pierson, 
"Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study o f Politics", p. 260.
2 For the role o f  contingency in path dependent political processes, see Ibid., p. 263
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government partners. The opposition of Turkish Euro-sceptic groups was already 
a “sunk cost” for the government.3 In other words, as the government knew that it 
would not enjoy any support from Euro-sceptics anyway, it did not hesitate to take 
measures, which could further alienate them. The number of choices the 
government was able to make was diminishing, and a precedent was emerging 
which no government was in a position to ignore. This observation became even 
more valid for the new AKP government, which was elected in November 2002. 
The challenged political legitimacy of the AKP and its leader Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan fixed the new administration even more firmly on the path of EU 
membership. Fearing that the bureaucratic establishment would attempt to ban the 
AKP -like its predecessors RP and FP- and permanently exclude its leadership 
from active political participation, the AKP government resumed the reform 
process with even greater zeal and resolve.4 As public expectations rose, the price 
of a policy of protecting the status quo and disengaging Turkey from the prospect 
of EU membership became exorbitant. Moreover, the oppositional position that 
part of the bureaucracy took towards the AKP government also facilitated the 
reform process. The opposition of the bureaucracy was an additional “sunk cost” 
for the AKP government. Hence, it only had a minor impact on the reform 
process.5 Steps towards the legitimation of civil society, acceptance of ethnic 
diversity, civilianisation of politics and a less assertive role of the state in religious 
affairs created a condition that made a relapse to the status quo ante virtually 
impossible.
3 For the role o f  “sunk costs” and the “rising price o f exit” in EU politics, see Pierson, "The Path to 
European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis", pp. 144-48.
4 The EU reform process was even called the second top-down revolution in Turkish politics after 
Atatiirk’s reform programme. See Oran, Tiirkiye'de Azinhklar: Kavramlar, Lozan, Ig Mevzuat, 
Igtihat, Uygulama, p. 94.
5 The only caveat to this point refers to the care o f the AKP government not to antagonize the 
bureaucracy to an extent that a military coup might be considered.
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The process of liberalising Turkey’s political culture, which was launched 
with the series of reform packages aiming to make Turkey meet the Copenhagen 
Criteria created a dynamic situation, which the government could not ignore. The 
emergence of a more effective civil society and the social legitimation of its role 
was a fa it accompli. Improvements in the constitutional protection of the freedom 
of association, the promulgation of a new, more liberal Law on Associations were 
decisions, corresponding not only to the Copenhagen Criteria, but also to the 
demands of Turkish society (see p. 154). As the process of political liberalisation 
was strengthening civil society, it became increasingly difficult for any 
government to reverse the process. The speed of reform may have been contingent 
upon issues arising, but the direction was never questioned by most Turkish 
opinion.
The effect on the process of civilianisation of politics was similar. The role 
of the military and the civil bureaucracy on political decision-making was 
challenged by liberal intellectuals and a significant part of civil society. As the 
European Commission reports repeatedly noted, there was a need to curtail the 
powers of the MGK, reform the judicial system and eliminate the supremacy of 
the bureaucracy. Hence, governments realised the necessity of liberal reform. 
Initial steps, which entailed the removal of military judges from State Security 
Courts and the establishment of the General Secretariat for the European Union 
(Avrupa Birligi Genel Sekreterligi-ABGS), culminated with the abolition of the 
State Security Courts and the appointment of a civilian in the position of the 
Secretary General of the MGK (see p. 194). Although these measures did not 
mean the end of the tutelary role of the state elite, they signalled a major change 
in the relations between state and society.
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As regards the role of religion in politics, the European Commission 
reports did not pay special attention to this, beyond insisting on the protection of 
the rights of religious minorities (see p. 279). Consequently, legal reforms were 
not as far-reaching, although the reform of Article 312 of the Penal Code did 
allow for more religious manifestations in the public sphere. Nevertheless, the 
overall political liberalisation process had a crucial impact on the level of public 
discourse on secularism. Although the European Union did not explicitly attack 
the assertive character of Kemalist secularism, but only some of its most extreme 
aspects, which constituted violations of fundamental human rights, it sparked a 
domestic debate on the need to introduce a liberal version of secularism, which 
would respect manifestations of religious belief in the public space (see p. 240). 
The increasing popularity of liberal ideas among Turkish Islamist intellectuals and 
its adoption by the AKP in its programme provided ample evidence for the 
emergence of a liberal discourse regarding state-religion relations.
Finally, on the issue of national identity, the European Commission reports 
exerted considerable pressure describing numerous human rights violations of 
several minority groups and stressing the need for urgent reform on this issue. 
Early reforms involving reluctant constitutional amendments and legal reforms 
were followed by much more comprehensive ones. The lifting of the ban on 
teaching and broadcasting minority languages was matched by the recognition of 
the primacy of international law over the constitution on all issues, including 
human and minority rights. As minorities benefited from their newly 
acknowledged rights, it was increasingly difficult to reverse the process. The 
initiated liberalisation process peaked with the publication o f the report of the 
“Working Group on Minority Rights and Cultural Rights,” which daringly set the
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agenda of a new inclusive national identity in Turkey. The lively debate, which 
followed, was unprecedented in the history of republican Turkey and showed that 
political liberalism had infiltrated large parts of the society and the state, to the 
point that a free discussion on even the most sensitive issue of national identity 
could be held (see p. 303). It was now impossible to support views about the 
absence of any minorities in Turkey, with the exception of non-Muslims, or the 
“Turkishness of the ‘so-called Kurdish minority,’” which had been advocated by 
state authorities and intellectuals until the early 1990s. This created conditions for 
the smooth transition of Turkish political culture from an essentially subject 
towards an increasingly participant model. While citizens used to adopt a much 
more submissive and deferential position, it now became increasingly difficult for 
them to reverse to their previous views of state-society relations and their political 
role as individuals.
b. The Applicability of Historical Institutionalism
The European Union has probably been the primary reason for the progress made 
towards the liberalisation of Turkish political culture. This comprises additional 
evidence for the validity of institutionalist theories, which have tried to explain 
the formation of the European Union. Unlike its member states, whose views and 
policies over EU-Turkey relations often fluctuated, the European Union, through 
its main institutional representative, the European Commission, followed a 
distinct policy line, which had a catalytic role in the liberalisation of Turkish 
political culture.
i). The European Commission 
The European Commission turned out to be a crucial actor in bringing about the 
liberalisation of Turkish political culture. Through its annual reports from 1998
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onwards, the Commission provided an accurate indicator of the shortcomings of 
Turkish democracy and also pointed to the areas in which reform was needed. 
When the reports commented on the lack of an effective legal framework for civil 
society, the institutionalised and informal political role of the military, the 
excesses of Turkey’s assertively secular regime or the violations of ethnic and 
religious minority rights, they defined the steps which Turkish governments were 
expected to take. The criticism included in the reports was generally constructive 
and fair and provided Turkey with valuable reform guidelines. The distinct role of 
the Commission regarding the transformation of Turkish political culture could be 
attributed to its partial autonomy and unique political horizon.
Although the European Commission had been established by the EU 
member states to serve the specific political goals the member states had 
indicated, it soon succeeded in developing new competences and authority. 
Despite the efforts made by the European Council to keep all powers in the hands 
of member states, the Commission was able to develop its own political role and 
powers. The Commission turned its bureaucratic privilege o f agenda setting into 
an influential political tool. Through its leverage in setting the discursive content 
of EU politics, the Commission acquired and exerted a considerable political 
influence. It acquired additional leverage through its role as “process manager.” 
The implementation of European Council decisions and the drafting of complex 
regulations and directives was a task assigned to the Commission, which in turn 
gave it important leverage.6 Its powers also grew as a result o f the inertia of 
rotating EU presidencies. Many smaller EU member states, which took over the 
presidency, had insufficient diplomatic infrastructure to deal with the complexity
6 Pierson, "The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis", pp. 132-35
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of European foreign policy issues. Thus, they de facto  assigned the work of their 
own diplomatic services to the Commission.7 The empowerment of the 
Commission had a facilitative impact on Turkey’s political reform process.
The different time horizons of the European Commission and the member 
states was a second reason for the Commission’s role in leading the 
transformation of Turkish political culture. While decision makers of member 
states were interested in the short-term consequences of their political actions, the 
Commission enjoyed the luxury of being able to plan long-term strategies. While 
the prospect of imminent parliamentary elections and the fear of popular 
discontent frequently became the most important factor in the member states’ 
shaping of EU policies, the Commission was exempt from such considerations. 
Since changes in the party composition of the governments of member states often 
meant changes in political positions, the Commission was characterised by a 
stronger sense of institutional continuity and a longer-term view of European 
political developments.8 This distinction became crucial in the case of EU-Turkey 
relations. The initially positive approach of many member state governments 
towards the process of Turkey’s EU engagement and eventual accession in some 
cases dwindled under the pressure of hostile public opinion toward the idea of 
Turkey’s accession. The rise of far-right, anti-immigrant political movements in 
several countries of Western Europe, which used their opposition to Turkey’s EU 
accession process in their domestic political campaign, alarmed centre-right 
parties throughout Europe. Fearing electoral losses to their right, these parties 
increasingly took circumspect, neutral or even negative positions, as far as
7 This problem, which grew even bigger with the accession o f many new smaller member states in 
2004 through the Eastern Enlargement, was attempted to be resolved through the EU 
Constitutional Treaty.
8 Pierson, "The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis", pp. 135-36
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Turkey’s full EU membership was concerned. This happened, just as Turkey 
seemed to be fulfilling the criteria for the start of accession negotiations, which 
gave its membership a realistic perspective. In contrast to the vacillating view of 
many member state governments, the Commission held to a steady position based 
on the principle of conditionality. This allowed the Commission to lead the 
process of EU-Turkey relations and pre-empt the decisions of the European 
Council on the issue in December 2002 and December 2004.
ii). The European Parliament 
The European Parliament has admittedly lacked the institutional powers and 
political clout that it should have exercised, given that it is the only popularly 
elected organ of the European Union. This became even clearer in the case of the 
Eastern enlargement, in which the Parliament was restricted to a rather passive 
role of following political developments and decisions made by other European 
bodies.9 Nonetheless, the Parliament proved to be unusually active and influential 
in the issue of EU-Turkey relations.10 By preparing reports and promulgating 
resolutions, the Parliament claimed its own distinct political role in the course of 
EU-Turkey relations. This could be seen a part of its search for an increased role 
in issues of EU enlargement, foreign policy and human rights.11 Although its 
stance had been very critical during the 1990s, pointing at violations of human 
rights in Turkey,12 its position shifted in view of the progress, which the reform
9 Karen Smith, The Making o f EU Foreign Policy: The Case o f  Eastern Europe (New York: 
Palgrave, 1999), p. 169
10 Soler i Lecha, "Debating on Turkey's Accession: National and Ideological Cleavages in the 
European Parliament", p. 55
11 Gamze Avci, "Putting the Turkish EU Candidacy into Context", European Foreign Affairs 
Review, Vol. 7, no. 1 (2002), p. 99
12 See Stefan Krauss, "The European Parliament in EU External Relations: The Customs Union 
with Turkey", European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 5, no. 2 (2000). This stance had created a lot 
o f friction in Turkey. For more details, see Gundiiz Aktan, "The European Parliament and 
Turkey", Perceptions: Journal o f  International Affairs, Vol. 3, no. 4 (1999).
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process had made. The Morillon, Lamassoure and Oostlander reports all criticised 
the Turkey’s human rights record, emphasising on the violations of Kurdish 
minority rights, but also recognised the steps made through the reform process.
The latest EU Parliament report was prepared by the Dutch MEP Camiel 
Eurlings on the eve of the December 2004 European Council decision and 
recommended the start of accession negotiations with Turkey. The status of 
human rights in Turkey, the Kurdish questions and issues that were not explicitly 
raised in the Commission reports, such as the recognition of the Armenian 
genocide by the Turkish state, became part of heated debate during the 
Parliament’s plenary session. On 13 December 2004, only four days before the 
crucial decision of the European Council, the Parliament approved the Eurlings 
report by secret vote and a wide margin. Although the parliamentary resolution 
was not binding for the European Council, it greatly facilitated its decision on the 
start of accession negotiations with Turkey. By setting an impeccable standard for 
the protection of human and minority rights and using its democratic legitimation 
to support the start o f accession negotiations, the European Parliament had a 
significant impact on the process of political reform and the liberalisation of 
Turkish political culture.
c. Two-Level Games and Political Culture
The impact of the European Union on the transformation of Turkish political 
culture can be better understood, if negotiations between the European Union and 
Turkey regarding Turkey’s prospective EU membership are conceptualised as a 
two-level game.13 Negotiations between the European Union and a candidate
13 See Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic o f Two-Level Games", pp. 433-35. 
For a thoughtful application o f Putnam’s model to a comparative analysis o f  Europeanisation in 
Poland and Turkey, see Ziya Oni§, "Diverse but Converging Paths to European Union
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member state differ from regular negotiations in that what is pursued is not a 
commonly accepted median point but rather the convergence of the candidate 
state to preset EU standards. Nonetheless, there is still room for negotiation on 
what constitutes “convergence” with the Copenhagen Criteria, which allows for 
the application of the two-level game model. In the case of EU-Turkey relations, 
negotiations gained momentum in the aftermath of the 1999 Helsinki European 
Council decision.14 A vicious circle of failed negotiations and reform efforts was 
turned into a virtuous one.15 In the Accession Partnership agreements of 2001 and 
2003, the European Union and Turkey agreed upon a reform agenda, which was 
to be implemented by Turkey on its way for the start o f accession negotiations. 
This created a framework for negotiations, which had already commenced. At the 
international level (Level I), the coalition government (1999-2002) and the AKP 
government (2002-2005) negotiated with the EU institutions, while at the 
domestic level (Level II), the governments negotiated with domestic political 
actors, namely civil and military bureaucracy, parliament, civil society and public 
opinion, on the implementation of the agreement. On the European side, the 
European institutions negotiating Turkey’s prospective EU membership (Level I) 
were dealing at the same time with the governments, parliaments and the public 
opinions of member states (Level II).
At the domestic level (Level II), supporters of political liberalisation have 
always existed in Turkey, yet their political power was limited and insufficient to 
bring about any serious political change. Nonetheless, the shift of negotiation to 
the international level (Level I) changed the domestic power balance and allowed
Membership: Poland and Turkey in Comparative Perspective", East European Politics and
Societies, Vol. 18, no. 3 (2004a), pp. 493-506.
14 Heper, "The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics", p. 82
15 Oni§, "Diverse but Converging Paths to European Union Membership: Poland and Turkey in 
Comparative Perspective", pp. 495-97
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supporters of liberalisation to pursue their own conception of national interest in 
the international context.16 As the government agreed that Turkey should comply 
with the Copenhagen Criteria before the start of accession negotiations, domestic 
proponents of liberal reform were strengthened. The commonly accepted strategic 
target of Turkey’s EU membership induced the opponents of political 
liberalisation to consent to liberal reform. While parts of the bureaucracy, the civil 
society and the public opinion viewed Turkey’s liberal openings as concessions 
and a part of a package deal between the European Union and Turkey, Turkish 
liberals were -in  effect- allied with the EU position.17 They saw liberalisation 
measures as a long-expected and absolutely necessary step in the process of 
Turkey’s democratic consolidation.
Similarly, the need of Turkey and the European Union to arrange for the 
start of accession negotiations helped both sides reach agreement. According to 
the two-level game approach, “the lower the cost of no-agreement to constituents, 
the smaller the win-set.”18 In other words, if the negotiating parties can afford to 
end the negotiation without an agreement, then the probability of an agreement is 
reduced. In this case, the Turkish government was more in need of an agreement, 
which would pave the way for accession negotiations. Given that the expectations 
of the public opinion had already been raised, any failure to reach an agreement 
with the European Union would be considered a serious failure, which would 
jeopardise the future of the incumbent government, as well as political and 
economic stability. In this respect, Turkey’s “win-set,”19 the set of possible 
agreements with the European Union, which could be accepted at the domestic
16 Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games", p. 457
17 For the incidence o f such alliances, see Ibid., p. 444.
18 Ibid., p. 442
19 On the definition o f win-sets, see Ibid., pp. 435-37.
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level, was relatively big, but not without limits. Some reforms, which appeared to 
go too far, were very hard to accept because of the reaction of the state elite (see 
p. 197). The EU institutions were interested in an agreement, as this would 
manifest the inclusive, liberal, secular value-based character of the European 
Union and would bring a state with serious economic and social problems, but 
equally large potential into the Union. On the other hand, the “win-set” of the EU 
institutions was limited by the need to protect the essentially liberal character of 
the reform process, as well as the circumspect - i f  not inimical— stance of the 
parliaments and public opinions of several member states regarding Turkey’s EU 
membership. The final agreement reached on 17 December 2004 lay at the 
intersection of both win-sets. In other words, the essentially liberal character of 
the reform was compromised by a more tolerant approach towards democratic 
consolidation, which was still clearly unfinished. For example, persisting 
problems with regard to religious freedom, minority rights and the role of the 
military into politics, did not deter the 2004 Brussels European Council from 
giving Turkey a date for the start of accession negotiations. This allowed the 
liberalisation process to strike deeper roots and to continue affecting political 
culture.
The observation that “the size of the win-set depends on the distribution of 
power, preferences and possible coalitions among Level II constituents”20 was 
also applicable in the case of EU-Turkey relations. When the Turkish government 
negotiated, its leverage was also influenced by domestic factors.21 A considerable 
faction within the civil and military bureaucracy in Turkey was eager to criticise 
any liberal reform, which could be interpreted as compromising national security
20 Ibid., p. 442
21 Ibid., pp. 4 4 8 -5 0
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or sovereignty. Minority rights, secularism, civilianisation of politics and a greater 
emphasis on the individual rather than the “communal” interest were all issues 
addressed by the liberalisation reform programme in a fashion that upset many 
bureaucrats. The record of three “hard” and one “soft” coup between 1960 and 
2004 provided the government with ample reasons for concern when it negotiated 
the process of liberal reform at the domestic level (Level II). Ironically, this 
strengthened the negotiating position of the government at the international level 
(Level I).22 The credibility of military threat against the incumbent government, 
which could undo any liberalisation efforts and bring Turkey back to its 
authoritarian past, increased the negotiation leverage of the government vis-a-vis 
the European Union.
This became even clearer when the AKP government took over power in 
November 2002. The weak domestic position of a government of a party whose 
leader had been banned from politics and risked being shut down by the 
Constitutional Court showed the European side that too much pressure on the 
AKP government to accelerate the reform process could bring about the exactly 
opposite results. The AKP government could be replaced —by democratic or 
undemocratic means- by a government that would be much less willing to pursue 
political liberalisation.23 This made the European Union often turn a blind eye to 
some of the shortcomings of the AKP reform programme, and especially its 
implementation.24 This pragmatic approach allowed for the continuation of the 
liberal reform process and the transformation of political culture.
22 For similar cases in the Third World context, see Ibid., p. 440.
23 Leading Article, "Why Europe Must Say Yes to Turkey," Economist, 18/9/2004
24 For more examples where a weak chief negotiator gains considerable leverage, see Putnam, 
"Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic o f Two-Level Games", pp. 458-59.
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2. An Assessment of the EU Role
It would be unfair to argue that the liberalisation of Turkish political culture could 
only be attributed to EU support, since domestic political and social dynamics 
were also crucial. Like global actors, domestic liberal political forces had -in  
some cases- a significant impact on the making of liberal reform. On the other 
hand, it would be equally inaccurate to underestimate the catalytic role, which the 
European Union played in accelerating and consolidating the changes, once the 
prospect of Turkey’s EU membership became a realistic perspective with the 
1999 Helsinki European Council decision.25 Until 1999, the EU political 
arguments were barely heard in Turkey, as there was no tangible membership 
prospect in the near future, but the situation changed significantly thereafter.26 
The European Union provided ample political, financial and logistic support to 
Turkish social forces that were committed to further a liberal democratic agenda. 
Some distortions did occur, such as in the field of civil society, where it could be 
convincingly argued that the flow of EU funds also led to a shift from voluntarism 
toward professionalisation and a instrumentalist, rather than issue-oriented 
approach. Nonetheless, the importance of EU financial support for political 
liberalism in Turkish public sphere should not be underestimated (see p. 145).
a. Legislative Reform
The EU role was even clearer in the case of the reform of the legislative 
framework. The authoritarian legacy of the 1980 military regime continued to 
hamper the development of liberal democratic activities throughout the 1980s and
25 Meltem Muftuler-Bac, "Turkey's Political Reforms and the Impact o f the European Union", 
South European Society & Politics, Vol. 10, no. 1 (2005), pp. 18-19
26 For the special case o f the EU impact on Turkey’s human rights situation in Turkey after 1999, 
see Sugden, "Human Rights and Turkey's EU Candidacy" .
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1990s, even though a multi-party democratic system had been restored. The 
proponents of liberal reform encountered an established view, according to which 
civil society and the state were viewed in competitive terms. It was feared that the 
reinforcement of Turkish civil society, political elites and the empowerment of 
minorities would inevitably mean the weakening of the Turkish state and the 
fragmentation of the Turkish people. The reform process was significantly 
accelerated with the rise to power of the AKP, which showed an unforeseen 
responsiveness to calls for reforms and willingness to implement the Copenhagen 
Criteria.27 An example is the series of reform packages, which aimed at the 
liberalisation of minority rights legislation, brought about some considerable 
changes, but failed to resolve the problem of minority rights in Turkey. Being the 
product of political calculation and compromise between EU requirements and 
domestic political pressures, reform packages were not bold and far-reaching 
enough. Nonetheless, it was due to European pressure and the need to converge 
with the Copenhagen Criteria that even this limited reform was made.
b. The Empowerment of Liberals
The impact of the European Union was significant in another indirect but equally 
important way. The prospect of EU membership and its requirements empowered 
Turkish liberal intellectuals, whose long-neglected political agenda became the 
agenda of Turkey’s EU membership process and legitimised their cause.28 While 
Turkish liberals lacked any strong political representation, which would enable 
them to pursue liberal reform in minority rights legislation, the decision across the 
political party spectrum to support Turkey’s full EU membership meant that
27 Aydin and Keyman, European Integration and the Transformation o f  Turkish Democracy, pp. 
12-13
28 Bora, Fieldwork Interview
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liberal political ideas had to be incorporated into government reform programmes. 
Although Turkish liberals argued, for example, that the reform of minority rights 
legislation was beneficial per se and should not be viewed as a concession to the 
European Union, the pace of reform was certainly accelerated, because it was seen 
as a necessary step towards achieving Turkey’s EU vocation. Turkish liberal 
intellectuals and NGOs were then recruited to advise government institutions on 
improving minority rights. The “Working Group on Minority and Cultural 
Rights” was only one of three state institutions formed to produce reports on 
improvement measures in the field of human rights.29 The report produced by this 
Working Group was a typical product of liberal political thought, which attempted 
to tackle the thorny issue of national identity in Turkey from a liberal perspective 
(see p. 289). The reaction to it showed the limits of political liberalisation in 
Turkey. Yet the publication of such a report was a landmark event. Before the 
prospect of Turkey’s EU membership emerged, it would have been impossible to 
express such opinions on minority rights issues and Turkish national identity, 
without facing criminal prosecution.30 Ideas about minority rights protection and 
civic national identity were linked to the failed Ottomanist project of the late 
Ottoman years. Even the comments, which Prime Minister (filler had made in 
1993 and 1994, pointing toward a “Turkiyeli” national identity, met with 
vehement reaction and found few supporters (see p. 291). The opening of such a 
liberal debate within Turkey was a major result of EU influence on Turkey.
29 The other two were the Human Rights Directorate {insan Haklari Ba§kanhgi) and the High 
Council o f Human Rights {Insan Haklari Ust Kunihi).
30 Cengiz £andar, "Azinhk Raporu: Dogru Rapor, Gerekli Rapor", Terciiman, 20/10/2004
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c. The Sense of Irreversibility
What further strengthened the liberalisation reform process was the widespread 
sense of its irreversibility. Liberal democratic ideas had already appeared in the 
1960s and 1970s, yet their dissemination was interrupted by two military coups in 
1971 and 1980, which altered the course of political developments in a radically 
authoritarian fashion. However, the growth of liberal democratic movements in 
the 1990s was protected against an authoritarian backlash. It was the European 
Union and Turkey’s decision to pursue EU membership by complying with its 
political criteria, which this time guaranteed that any liberalisation steps made 
could not be reversed.31 Although the implementation of the new legislation may 
have sometimes lagged behind expectations, this sense of reform irreversibility 
improved the self-confidence of Turkish reform supporters. The European Union 
successfully played the role of the anchor of political reform.
3. The EU Liberalising Effect on Turkish Political Culture
a. European and Turkish Political Cultures Revisited
A juxtaposition of European and Turkish political cultures, before the prospect of 
Turkey’s EU membership became a realistic possibility, would have affirmed that 
the incomplete liberalisation of Turkey’s political system had hindered a 
convergence between European and Turkish political cultures. Putnam’s 
observation that “social context and history profoundly condition the effectiveness 
of institutions” proved its validity in the Turkish case.32 It was the liberalising 
influence of the European Union, which peaked in the years 1999-2004 and
31 On the role o f  the European Union as an external anchor o f reform, see Nathalie Tocci, 
"Europeanization in Turkey: Trigger or Anchor for Reform?" South European Society & Politics, 
Vol. 10, no. 1 (2005), pp. 79-82.
32 Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, p. 182
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allowed for the infusion of participant elements and the transformation of political 
culture. Citizens gradually abandoned their traditional submissive and deferential 
stances towards authority and the state, defended their individual rights and 
adopted increasingly assertive positions when it came to issues of political 
participation. This did not mean that political culture underwent a thorough and 
fundamental transformation. Elements of continuity coexisted with evidence of 
change, which formed the basis for the gradual transformation of political culture.
b. Elements of Continuity in Political Culture
i). Civil Society
Significant steps toward the rehabilitation of civil society in Turkey could not 
fully eliminate embedded suspicion from part of the bureaucracy. Civil society 
was still considered an element divisive of national and communal unity, which 
furthered egotistic individual interests against the greater communal interest. The 
level of cooperation between the state and civil society associations did not 
improve greatly, even after the more friendly approach toward civil society 
adopted by the AKP government. Members of the judiciary often obstructed the 
implementation of reform by finding pretexts not to apply new legislation. The 
opposition of President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and the CHP to the liberalizing Law 
on Associations comprised additional evidence for the persistence of elements of 
a subject political culture, which clearly prioritised state over individual interests 
and distrusted civil society (see p. 157).
ii). State
The transcendental vision of the state maintained its appeal to a large part of the 
state elite. The absolute prioritisation of general over particularistic interests as the 
only way to protect long-term community interests, a mistrust of the people and
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its ability to make sound decisions and a recalcitrant defence of a tutelary role for 
the state elite continued to define its perception of state-society relations and the 
role of the citizen. The military’s insistence on the subordination of the Chief of 
General Staff not to the Minister of Defence, but directly to the Prime Minister 
may have looked like a “shadow battle,” but in fact spoke volumes about the way 
some of the military still viewed the civilianisation of politics. Political statements 
by the military on a variety of domestic political issues were reduced in numbers 
but never disappeared. Part of the judiciary was equally resistant to change. 
Procrastination and indifference to liberal reform was evident in several court 
decisions, while statements by high-rank judges showed a clear lack of liberal 
democratic understanding. A predominantly subject political culture continued to 
define the political outlook of a significant and powerful part of the bureaucratic 
and military leadership (see p. 197).33 The case of the CHP demonstrated the 
survival of an allegedly Kemalist, statist, nationalist ideology, which opposed 
Turkey’s European transformation.34
iii). The Role of Religion in Politics 
For many members of Turkey’s state elite the protection of republican assertive 
secularism continued to comprise one of their main missions. The “soft” coup of 
28 February 1997 had reaffirmed zero-tolerance policies against manifestation of 
religious belief in the public sphere. The closure of the RP and the FP, the 
hardening of state policies on the issues of headscarf and religious vocational 
schools were evidence of this approach. The unwillingness of the European Union
33 On the persistence o f a subject political culture as displayed in the postponement o f a conference 
on the Armenian Question in May 2005, see Murat Beige, "'§a§irma' Konusu", Radikal, 28/5/2005.
34 The statements o f the CHP leader Deniz Baykal in the aftermath o f  17 December 2004 are 
illuminating. See Murat Yetkin, "istedigimiz AB Bu Degil", Radikal, 19/12/2004 and Mustafa 
Unal, "Baykal'in AB Politikasi", Zaman, 22/12/2004. For a powerful critique, see Murat Beige, 
"AKP ve Muhalefet", Radikal, 24/12/2004.
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to take a clear position on the issue of secularism facilitated this policy. Court 
decisions continued to deny any manifestation of religion in the public sphere, 
while the military frequently referred to its guardian role regarding the assertively 
secular character of the Republic. Meanwhile, the will of the state elite to 
maintain the state grip over religion was indicated through the lack of any reforms 
of the structure and operation of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, despite 
increasing concern from the European Union, as well as religious groups (see p. 
245). Religion continued to be perceived as a parochial and potentially divisive 
element of the Turkish social fabric, which had to remain under firm state control. 
The perceived state interest again prevailed upon individual freedoms of religion 
and expression, which confirmed the predominance of the subject political culture 
model.
iv). National Identity 
The opening of a wide debate on Turkish national identity and minority rights did 
not mean that established approaches disappeared. On the contrary, insistence on 
a mono-ethnic, mono-cultural and illiberal model of national identity and 
opposition to full protection of minority rights characterised the stance of a 
considerable part of the civil and military bureaucracy. The practices of the 
General Directorate of Foundations regarding the property rights of non-Muslim 
minority foundations and recurring violations of the religious freedom of non- 
Muslim minorities comprised clear evidence of persistent suspicion and 
discrimination against non-Muslim populations. Fierce reaction by members of 
the military against any reform measures, which allowed teaching and 
broadcasting in minority languages, as well as the hesitant and restrictive fashion 
with which reform laws were applied by the judiciary, showed that the roots of
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opposition to liberal reform in the fields of minority rights and national identity 
were deep. Members of the civil and military bureaucracy also formed the 
backbone of the reaction against the “Working Group on Minority and Cultural 
Rights” report, pointing out that following the policy suggestions of the report 
would question Turkish national unity and territorial integrity (see p. 293). Laying 
emphasis on fear-based and essentialist arguments about the divisive role of 
minorities and the need to forge a national unity, and the sacrifice of minority 
rights for the alleged interest of the nation-state manifested the persistence of a 
subject political culture.
c. Evidence of Change in Political Culture
i). Civil Society
The emergence of elements of a new participant political culture became clear in 
the transformation of civil society in Turkey. The first step for this was the 
demystification of the state. The formerly impeccable image of the state came 
under challenge, and its famed efficiency and technical superiority were 
questioned. A growing number of civil society associations were getting involved 
in a pool of increasingly diverse and complex social activities, thus comprising a 
formidable counter-balance against the predominance of the state. The rise of a 
vibrant civil society also benefited from the increasing and unprecedented 
political mobilisation of business capital, which clearly favoured liberal political 
reform. The proliferation of liberal ideas also resulted in fragmentation within the 
state elite, a significant part of which supported the programme of political reform 
(see p. 156). All these developments supported increased citizens’ participation in 
politics and contributed to the liberalisation of political culture.
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ii). State
An instrumentalist vision of the state became increasingly popular in the process 
of EU reform, signalling a shift in Turkish political culture. Liberal views about 
state-society relations and the role of the citizen gained impetus within a growing 
segment of the political elites. Politicians, journalists and civil society leaders 
attacked deferential attitudes towards the state and stressed the need to renegotiate 
state-society relations and put the individual into the epicentre. The mainstream 
view of national security in Turkey was identified as the “Trojan Horse” of the 
state elite in its effort to maintain its control of the state and tutelary role over 
society. It was argued that a new, more restrictive definition of national security 
should be adhered to, so the state elite would lose its say on important domestic 
political issues. The de-securitisation of Turkish politics was seen as a 
precondition for the abolition of the bureaucratic elites’ prerogatives and the re­
establishment of state-society relations on a liberal democratic basis. This upsurge 
of liberal ideas did not leave the state elite unaffected. Fragmentation was 
observed within the civil and -for the first tim e- the military bureaucracy, as 
some of those concerned came to understand that the culmination of Turkey’s 
Westernisation process could only come about through its political liberalisation 
and EU membership (see p. 198). The active support of segments of the civil 
bureaucracy and the acquiescence o f the military leadership toward the 
liberalisation reform programme were crucial for its continuation and indicated 
that a more liberal political culture was proliferating, even among representatives 
of the hard core of the state.
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iii). The Role of Religion in Politics 
A change in the public discourse on the role of religion in politics became more 
than apparent under the impact of improving EU-Turkey relations. As the 
European Commission reports never addressed the question of secularism in 
Turkey, merely focusing on its most extreme applications in cases where human 
rights were severely violated, the opening of a debate on secularism in Turkey 
was an unintended consequence of the liberal reform programme.35 The debate 
ceased to cause the same degree of polarisation and was developed in a more 
accommodating fashion.36 Civil society associations and the liberal intelligentsia 
clearly differentiated for the first time between illiberal assertive secularism and 
liberal passive secularism, arguing that respect for the fundamental freedoms of 
religion and expression would not mean the wholesale abolition of secularism, but 
transition from an assertive to a passive version of secularism (see p. 250). This 
position found support among Turkey’s Islamist elites and found its political 
expression in the AKP. In the writings of Islamist intellectuals and the AKP 
programme, criticism of assertive secularism was for the first time based not on 
Islamic, but on liberal assumptions. The state was asked to guarantee the 
protection of the fundamental human rights of its citizens, not by abiding by 
Islamic legal principles, but by adopting a passive version of secularism (see p. 
253). Instrumental or real, this shift was still very important and signalled a 
crucial change in the process of liberalisation of Turkish political culture.
35 The “soft coup” of 28 February 1997 had certainly its own impact on these developments; 
however, it was the prospect of EU membership, which channelled and provided the ideological 
ground for them.
36 Fokas, "The Islamist Movement and Turkey-EU Relations", p. 164
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iv). National Identity 
An unprecedented debate on a variety of topics related to national identity and 
minorities came as a surprise. The European Commission reports consistently 
raised the problem of minority rights protection in Turkey. However, the 
discussion in Turkey went far further and incorporated the question of national 
identity. Spearheaded by the liberal intelligentsia and media, a public discussion 
was opened on issues that had been considered taboo ever since the foundation of 
the Republic. The need for Turkey to respect minority rights of its citizens not as a 
concession to the European Union, but because this was a basic feature of a 
democratic state, was clearly expressed. The debate culminated with the 
publication of the “Working Group on Minority and Cultural Rights” report, 
which daringly set the agenda for the resolution of Turkey’s minority questions 
(see p. 289). The publication of this report also made clear that liberal views on 
these issues had also been adopted by parts of the state bureaucracy. Civil society 
associations also joined the debate in support of the liberal reform agenda, while 
citizens’ interest in their own ethnic and religious heritage rose (see p. 305). This 
debate showed that an open and sophisticated discussion of sensitive political 
issues became possible in Turkey, and that civil society and individuals could be 
the leaders of this debate. This comprised additional evidence for the infusion of 
participant elements into Turkish political culture.
d. A Gradual Shift towards a New Paradigm
These observations corroborate the conclusion that the process of EU-Turkey 
negotiations has had a distinct liberalising impact upon Turkish political culture. 
There has been an ongoing process of social capital accumulation, a shift from a 
predominantly subject to an increasingly participant model of political culture. As
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Putnam put it, “changing formal institutions can change political practice.”37 
Turkish political culture has indeed changed, albeit at a slow pace.38 While 
Turkey’s urgent need to comply with the Copenhagen Criteria and ensure a date 
for the start of accession negotiations could have important effects, the hearts and 
minds of citizens, politicians and bureaucrats can only change with time. As 
Mehmet Ali Birand put it:
Old habits die hard. Sacrifice and determination are needed to 
establish a new system and overcome the network o f interests 
that took years to form among certain groups.39
Nevertheless, the gradual weakening of subject and reinforcement of participant 
elements in Turkish political culture can be affirmed. Before the European Union 
became a significant actor in Turkish politics and the prospect of Turkey’s EU 
membership a realistic one, Turkish citizens generally showed deference to any 
state decisions, no matter how undemocratic they were. Military coups and the 
tutelary role of the military in politics were tolerated as a necessary evil or even 
approved of. State interests were given absolute priority over individual ones. 
Civil society was viewed with suspicion as dividing the people, and giving undue 
priority to particularistic over community interests. National homogenisation 
policies were tolerated or accepted as a necessary part of Turkey’s modernisation, 
economic development and national security policy. Tight boundaries were drawn 
around public expressions of religious belief. Citizens rarely claimed their right to 
participate in political decision-making processes. Except in elections, they 
usually entrusted the management of political affairs to “expert” bureaucratic
37 Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, p. 184
38 Murat Beige, "Daha Qok Zaman Gerek", Radikal, 21/12/2004
39 Birand, "Tiirkiye Artik Tercihini Yapmali"
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elites, which were allegedly able to prioritise the long-term community interest 
over any kind of particularistic interest. Even citizens who did not agree with 
state policies and practices would rarely bear the burden o f responsibility of 
expressing their opinion publicly or engaging in political activities.
Since the 1999 Helsinki European Council decision gave Turkey a 
tangible perspective of EU membership, Turkish political culture entered a slow 
but steady process of liberalisation. Citizens showed increasing interest in 
political affairs and participation, and civil society associations grew in numbers 
and improved in quality. Civil society was viewed as an essential element of a 
participatory democratic political system. Horizontal networks of civic 
engagement were developed as a result of the growth of civil society and had a 
positive impact on the development of public trust and accumulation of social 
capital. Blind deference toward the state was replaced by a more critical approach, 
especially when state inefficiency and corruption became evident. Trust of 
bureaucracy weakened, and bureaucrats were no longer beyond criticism. The 
absolute prioritisation of community over individual interests ended. As 
adherence to democratic principles became increasingly important, political 
interventions by the military were no more seen as a legitimate exercise of the 
military’s guardian role, but as a serious blow to democratic consolidation. As 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, even to the detriment of state 
interests, became a social value, violations of minority rights were no longer 
ignored. The Turkish political spectrum was also rearranged, as politicians and 
intellectuals were now identified by their position on political liberalisation.40
40 Onen, Fieldwork Interview
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New cross-ideology social alliances were formed on the basis of liberal reform 
and the support for EU membership.
A major shift was also observed in mainstream political Islam. The Islamic 
political project was abandoned in favour of a passively secular, liberal and 
democratic regime. This signalled a major victory of political liberalism in 
Turkey, since it showed that Turkey could simultaneously nurture Western 
European political values and its own cultural identity. It also provided ample 
evidence that the liberal shift of Turkish political culture had penetrated the whole 
of Turkish society. This became even clearer with the rise of a new liberal 
discursive space. The organisation of an academic conference on the Armenian 
question in May 2005, which was intended to include the views of historians who 
disagree with the Turkish official view of the events, comprised a clear example 
of this. The conference had to be postponed under state and government pressure, 
demonstrating the limits of the liberalisation process. It finally took place in 
September 2005, in spite of judicial obstacles. The resolve of these intellectuals to 
further their liberal agenda became clear in their subsequent statement:
We, the participants of this conference....want to especially 
point out.... that “The emergence of different, critical and 
alternative voices, the demonstration of how Turkey actually 
contains such a rich multiplicity of thoughts would be, once 
again, to the utmost benefit o f Turkey. We believe that the 
holding o f our conference in the very near future would be one 
of the most significant steps taken in our country on the path to
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academic freedom, in the independence of universities, and in 
general toward democracy.”41
The organisation of such a conference aptly manifested the progress made in the 
liberalisation of Turkish political culture, as well as the remaining shortcomings. 
Although the impact of global and domestic actors was often considerable (see pp. 
128, 131, 181, 225), this study has shown that the causal link between the 
liberalisation process of Turkish political culture and the EU-initiated reform 
process is strong. What the European Union achieved by giving Turkey a 
membership perspective was to untangle the liberalisation process, by providing 
an anchor for liberal reform and facilitating the process of democratic 
consolidation.
i). Turkey’s EU Membership Perspective and the Euro- 
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)
To determine the effects of the EU accession process on Turkey’s political 
culture, one would ideally need to know what would have happened if Turkey had 
not been a candidate for EU membership. Although counterfactual history is 
impractical, one can arrive at useful conclusions based on the experience of the 
results of the EU policy towards non-candidate Mediterranean states. The success 
o f the EU strategy regarding Turkey becomes clearer when juxtaposed with the 
results of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP),42 an EU initiative launched 
in November 1995, which did not offer to the participant states the prospect of full 
membership. Instead, it merely aimed at developing closer political, economic and 
strategic relations between the EU member states and the rest of the littoral states 
of the Mediterranean. Its objectives were summarised as follows:
41 Istanbul Biirosu, "Bu Konferans Gecikmeyecek", Radikal, 27/5/2005
42 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership also became known as the “Barcelona Process.”
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■ The creation of an area of peace and stability based on the principles 
of human rights and democracy
■ The creation of an area of shared prosperity through the progressive 
establishment of free trade between the EU and its Mediterranean 
partners and amongst the partners themselves, accompanied by 
substantial EU financial support for economic transition and for 
helping the partners to confront the social and economic challenges 
created by this transition.
■ The improvement of mutual understanding among the peoples of the 
region and the development of a free and flourishing civil society by 
means of exchange, development of human resources, and the 
support of civil societies and social development43
However, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership failed to deliver the political results 
that its drafters had inspired. While in the field of economy the establishment of a 
Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010 and EU financial assistance of 
almost €11 billion from 1995 to 2005 were events of major importance,44 they 
failed to have any significant impact on the politics of the region. Despite an 
ambitious political agenda,45 no noteworthy improvements occurred in the fields 
of regional peace and stability, democratisation and civil society development in 
any of the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern states, which participated in the
43 European Commission, Euro-Med Partnership Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006 & Regional 
Indicative Programme 2002-2004 (Brussels: European Commission, 2001), p. 5
44 Roiy Miller and Ashraf Mishrif, "The Barcelona Process and Euro-Arab Economic Relations, 
1995-2005", Middle East Review o f International Affairs (MERIA), Vol. 9, no. 2 (2005), pp. 97- 
100
45 See Official Journal of the European Communities, Common Strategy o f  the European Council 
on the Mediterranean Region [2000/458/CFSP] (Brussels: European Council, 2000), pp. 1-3. A 
more ambitious “Euro-Med strategic partnership” followed by the inclusion of the Gulf states was 
proclaimed in the EU Council of June 2004. See European Council, Final Report on an EU 
Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East (Brussels: European Council, 
2004)
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Barcelona Process.46 The partnership offered to these states turned out to be too 
weak a political incentive to facilitate any steps towards democratisation.
(Figure 7)
V</vr v\/>vy
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Figure 7. Turkey's Prime M inister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a form er football Player, in 
probably the most difficult shot o f his career. (Published in the F inancial Times, 30/6/2005)
In contrast to that, offering Turkey the perspective of full membership was proven 
to have a much more profound domestic impact. Coupled by the existence of 
considerable domestic political and social forces willing to support the process of 
political reform, the EU membership incentive gave a vision and mobilised 
support for political liberalisation at an unprecedented level.
On the other hand, it would be too early to say that a full transformation of 
Turkish political culture from the subject to the participant model has occurred. 47
46 European Communities, The Barcelona Process, Five Years on (1995-2000) (Luxembourg: 
Office for Official Publications o f the European Communities, 2000), pp. 8-10
47 Ergiider, Fieldwork Interview
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The road towards the full liberalisation of Turkish political culture is still long and 
bumpy, and as Putnam stressed, “most institutional history moves slowly.”48 
Although the European Union has already had a liberalising effect on Turkish 
political culture, the culmination of this process depends on the future of EU- 
Turkey accession negotiations. The process of Turkey’s convergence with the 
acquis communautaire will have a great impact on the character of the Turkish 
political system.
4. The Future of Turkey’s EU Adventure and Political Culture
On 17 December 2004, the Brussels European Council set 3 October 2005 to be 
the date for the start o f accession negotiations with Turkey.49 This decision 
rewarded the reform efforts of two Turkish governments, although it did not mean 
that Turkey had been fully transformed into a liberal democracy. At the domestic 
European level, this decision was a great victory of those political forces, which 
envisioned an inclusive, political value-based and tolerant Union as opposed to 
those who feared the economic, social and cultural repercussions of Turkey’s 
prospective EU membership.50 Nonetheless, Turkey’s prospective EU accession 
posed very different questions from those raised by past enlargements.51 Turkey’s 
EU accession negotiations cannot be an easy process; problems are likely to arise 
not only from the Turkish, but also from the European side.
The European Union faces a series of serious internal challenges and 
contradictions, which may affect the course of EU-Turkey accession negotiations.
48 Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, p. 184
49 On the historic significance of the decision, see Mustafa Erdogan, "Avrupa Kimligi ve Tiirkiye", 
Terciiman, 16/12/2004.
50 For arguments in support of the view which finally prevailed at the European Council, see Edgar 
Morin et al., "Pourquoi il Faut Accueillir la Turquie", Le Monde, 12/12/2004 and Editorial, "A Bit 
Too Late to Go Cold on Turkey", Financial Times, 26/11/2004. For the opposite view, see Giscard 
d'Estaing, "A Better European Bridge to Turkey".
51 Etyen Mahfupyan, "Asil Tiirkler §a§irtacak", Zaman, 19/12/2004
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Turkey also has to give the final definite answer to the question of its identity, 
whether it belongs to the West or the East,52 and to participate constructively in 
the intellectual, institutional and political evolution, which has characterised post- 
Second World War Western Europe.53
(Figure 8)
Figure 8. European Duplicity and End (Z iel)-m oving regarding Turkey's EIJ M em bership. 
By Hule Hanisuc, f  International Cartoon Com petition, Don Q uichotte M agazine, Stuttgart, 
D ecem ber 2004.
a. A View from Brussels
The problems on the EU side are economic, political and strategic. Globalisation 
pressure makes the European Union reconsider the basic premises of its economic
52 On this issue, see Ahmet Altan, "Die Turkei ist Neurotisch", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
10/4/2005.
53 Aktar, "Olmayan Avrupa Du§uncesi Uzerine", pp. 273-74
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and social model. As China and India rise as new formidable global economic 
actors, it becomes increasingly difficult for the EU economy to raise its 
productivity, competitiveness and economic growth rates, without a deregulation 
of its labour rights legislation and social welfare system. The Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), one of the foundation blocks of the European 
Economic Community, has become exorbitantly costly, protecting a large, 
inefficient agricultural sector, which has done little to adjust to the new world 
economic environment. The need to increase and better manage the EU budget, so 
that new political, economic and social challenges can be better addressed, is dire. 
Moreover, there is increased speculation about the future path of the European 
integration process. A two-tier Union, a regression to a free-trade-zone model, or 
the development of a federal post-national model are all possible outcomes of the 
political and ideological fermentation, which the Union is currently undergoing. 
What is already clear, though, is that -assuming that Turkey’s EU accession 
negotiations bear fruit after ten years or more- Turkey will join a Union very 
different from what it is today.
The Eastern enlargement was an additional factor, which posed serious 
problems for the economic, social and political coherence of the European Union. 
Despite the obvious political and strategic advantages of incorporating ten new 
member states in May 2004, the difficulties, which the new enlarged European 
Union may face in decision-making often on the basis of unanimity, are likely to 
be intimidating. The ability of the European Union to combine the process of 
enlargement with its own deepening and develop accountable, smoothly 
functioning, democratic institutions, is clearly of critical importance.
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Also crucial will be the ability of the Union to develop strong common 
positions and strategies in issues of foreign and security policy against the United 
States, China and other global actors. The uncertain future of the EU 
Constitutional Treaty has confirmed that the institutional reform of the Union will 
be an extremely difficult task.
(Figure 9)
Figure 9. The uncertain future o f EU-Turkey relations is succinctly illustrated in this 
cartoon. (Published in the E conom ist, 30/9/2004)
The expectation that the prospective membership of Turkey, with its large 
population and weak economy, would make institutional reform even more 
difficult creates an additional obstacle to Turkey’s path towards full 
membership.54 Economic and political challenges at the European level have 
already affected domestic politics in Germany, France and other large EU member 
states. The rise of unemployment rates has helped xenophobic political parties to
54 Meltem Miiftiiler Bac, "Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Institutional and Security 
Challenges", Perceptions: Journal o f  International Affairs, Vol. IX, no. 3 (2004), pp. 33-36
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reassert their political presence. The results of the referendums on the EU 
Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in May and June 2005 clearly 
showed that public opinion in many EU member states has been alienated from 
the European project. The aggressive EU enlargement policy was identified as one 
of the main reasons for the multifarious problems of the European Union. Given 
that the Eastern enlargement cannot be undone and that the European Union has 
already committed itself to the full membership of Bulgaria and Romania, it was 
suggested that a moratorium should be imposed on further enlargement.55 This 
would mainly affect Turkey and Croatia, currently the two EU candidate states 
that have not yet started accession negotiations. Under these circumstances, 
Turkey runs the risk of becoming a scapegoat for the accumulated domestic EU 
problems. A significant number of EU commentators and politicians have already 
declared Turkey’s EU membership to be impractical for economic, political and 
cultural reasons and proposed a model of “privileged partnership,” instead.56 This 
opinion has become alarmingly popular among centre-right political parties in 
France and Germany and the majority of public opinion in many EU member 
states. Addressing public opinion fears regarding Turkey’s prospective EU 
membership seems to be one of the most crucial tasks for the European Union and 
Turkey.
On the other hand, one should remember that the European Union is still 
to a large extent a law-based organisation, where political expediency does not
55 This was the suggestion of the French Minister of Interior and possible candidate in the 2007 
Presidential elections Nicolas Sarkozy. See Edwy Plenel, "”Au Vif': Le Cas Sarkozy", Le Monde, 
1/7/2005.
56 This idea gained popularity within the centre-right of France and Germany. See Giscard 
d'Estaing, "A Better European Bridge to Turkey" and Angela Merkel, "Tiirkei: Partnerschaft Statt 
EU-Mitgliedschaft", Die Welt, 16/10/2004. For an interesting explanation of these responses, 
based on the otherisation of Turkey’s minority populations, see Insel, "Ayricahkli Ortaklik ve 
I^imizdeki Oteki".
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play a leading role. The European Union committed itself on 17 December 2004 
to the start of accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005 and cannot 
withdraw from that decision. Even though member states may have changed their 
minds about Turkey’s EU membership, EU institutions will have to follow the 
path set by the December 2004 decision. The end of the negotiation process, 
however, is anything but clear. Turkey’s convergence with the acquis 
communautaire, will require more reform efforts and full democratic
c ~ i
consolidation. The negotiation process will definitely be affected by the debate 
on the future shape and identity of the European Union. Turkey needs to make a 
strong case that its EU membership is not a liability but an asset for an inclusive, 
strong and tolerant Union, and also make its own valuable contribution to the 
debate. It also needs to defend its interests in a way that shows understanding
r o
towards EU concerns. The success of the process will mainly depend on 
Turkey’s will to continue reform with the same zeal and commitment.59 Accession 
negotiations will be a long and tedious process, with an expected duration of no 
less than ten years.60 On the other hand, they will also bear precious potential 
rewards for Turkey, Europe and the greater region. As Ramonet argued:
A long way still remains to be traversed as regards respect 
of public freedoms and the basic rights....But the prospect 
for accession to the Union has already had as principal 
effect the reinforcement of Turkey’s democratisation, its 
laicisation and the defence of human rights. While the large
57 Nicolaidis, "Europe's Tainted Mirror: Reflections on Turkey's Candidacy Status after Helsinki", 
pp. 275-76
58 Mehmet Ali Birand, "tki Se?enegimiz Var: Kavga ve Anlayi§", Posta, 1/7/2005
59 Mehmet Ali Birand, "AB Ertelemez, Bize Erteletir", Posta, 30/6/2005
60 Eser Karaka§, "En Calkantili 10 Yila Giriyoruz!..." Interview with Ne$e Diizel, Radikal, 
20/12/2004
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countries o f  the Eastern M editerranean arc th reatened by 
violence and current obscurantists, this accession w ill 
constitu te  a concrete m essage o f  hope, peace, o f  prosperity  
and dem ocracy .61
(Figure 10)
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Figure 10. O rientalist stereotypes persist even among the supporters o f Turkey's EU 
M em bership. This is how a cartoonist o f the Econom ist perceives Turkey's EU M em bership. 
(Published in the E conom ist, 7/10/2005)
Therefore, the success of Turkey’s EU membership adventure should s Also 
crucial will be the ability of the Union to develop strong common positions and 
strategies in issues of foreign and security policy against the United States, China 
and other global actors. The uncertain future of the EU Constitutional Treaty has 
confirmed that the institutional reform of the Union will be an extremely difficult 
task, how that the European Union is fully committed to democratisation and can 
use its “soft” power potential to expand the zone of democracy. It could thus 
disprove the “clash of civilisations” thesis62 by contributing to the improvement of
61 Ignacio Ramonet, "Turquie", Le Monde Diplomatique, 11/2004
62 Owen Bowcott, "Turkey in EU 'Would Bridge Cultures'", Guardian, 21/11/2002
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* ATrelations between the West and the Islamic world. In the words of the UK 
Foreign Minister Jack Straw, Turkey’s EU membership is the acid test of whether 
Europe could defeat terrorist attempts to sow division between Islam and the 
West.64
b. Turkey’s Democratic Consolidation and Political Culture 
In the words of Przeworski, democratic consolidation means that democracy
becomes the only game in town, when no one can imagine 
acting outside the democratic institutions, when all the losers 
want to do is to try again within the same institutions under 
which they have just lost.65
In this study, democratic consolidation has been understood in its “maximalist” 
understanding. A democratically consolidated state is not just the state where free 
democratic elections prevail, but also the state where democratic values have been 
embraced by the majority of citizens after a long socialisation process.66 This 
process goes along with the establishment of a civic, participant political culture. 
In the case of Turkey, a multi-party political system and free elections have 
largely been in place since 1950. Nonetheless, the transition from a procedural to 
a substantive form of democracy did not gain momentum until the emergence of 
the European Union in Turkish politics and Turkey’s EU membership perspective 
became realistic. The European Union acted as a catalyst for the start of 
reconstructing the state on a democratic basis.67 This study has focused on the
63 §ahin Alpay, "Tiirkiye ve Uygarliklar Cati§masi", Zaman, 18/12/2004
64 Tom Happold, "Straw: Turkey is EU 'Acid Test'", Guardian, 23/3/2004
65 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 26 cited in 
Ozbudun, "Turkey: How Far from Consolidation?" p. 124
66 Ozbudun, "Turkey: How Far from Consolidation?" p. 124
67 E. Fuat Keyman, "Cumhuriyet Projesi ve Avrupa Birligi", Radikal Cumhuriyet, 29/10/2004
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steps made toward the emergence of a participant political culture. This process is 
anything but complete, and its final success will be affected by the course of 
Turkey’s EU accession negotiations. It also depends on the extent to which the 
liberal reform cause will not just be an elite issue, but will also be embraced by 
the vast majority of public opinion. Public support for EU membership in Turkey 
has been repeatedly confirmed to be over 60 per cent,68 yet the resilience of this 
support will be tested when the public becomes familiar with the details of what 
Turkey’s membership of the European Union entails. Democracy should no more 
be seen as a luxury,69 or a means for other ends, but as an end in itself.70 The 
value of liberal reform should not be instrumentally measured against the 
successful flow of accession negotiations, but against the completion of Turkey’s 
democratic consolidation process.
The role of the AKP, with its widespread appeal to the periphery of 
Turkish society, in popularising the liberal reform discourse initiated by the 
European Union, is o f critical importance for the success of the process.71 The 
repeated statements by Recep Tayyip Erdogan and other AKP officials that the 
democratisation process in Turkey has become independent from EU-Turkey 
relations could be seen as a very important signal. It is argued that even if 
Turkey’s EU accession process fails, the Copenhagen Criteria will be simply 
renamed as the “Ankara Criteria,” and democratisation reform will resume.72 
As Erdogan himself put it:
68 Ali (^arkoglu, "Who Wants Full Membership? Characteristics of Turkish Public Support for EU 
Membership", Turkish Studies, Vol. 5, no. 1 (2003), pp. 173-75
69 Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, p. 198
70 Heper, "The Consolidation of Democracy versus Democratization in Turkey", pp. 141-42
71 On the crucial role of AKP for the future of reform, see Ciineyt Ulsever, "AKP AB'ye 
Direnebilecek mi?" Hurriyet, 2/6/2005.
72 Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci, Turkey as a Bridgehead and Spearhead: Integrating EU 
and Turkish Foreign Policy [Working Paper No. I]  (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 
2003), p. 7. Also see Bulent Aydemir and Akin Olgun, "Ba§bakan'dan 3 Mesaj", Sabah, 
29/5/2004.
We separated religion from democracy. We are walking on the 
way o f democracy. The European Union is the best project of 
the 21st century. If you take us [Turkey] in the European Union, 
our membership will be beneficial for everyone who wants 
democracy....Otherwise, we will continue on our way, calling 
the Copenhagen Criteria the Ankara Criteria. The European 
Union is a part o f Turkey’s civilisational project. However, we 
conducted these reforms to fulfil the democratic dreams of our 
own people. This was not just a requirement for a membership 
perspective.73
Viewing Turkey’s political liberalisation as beneficial per se for Turkey, rather 
than merely as a concession to the European Union, shows that the AKP is willing 
to rise to the circumstances and support Turkey’s democratisation process, 
regardless of the outcome of Turkey’s EU accession negotiations. This policy will 
also facilitate the rise of a participant political culture.
As these concluding lines are written in September 2005, the process of 
political liberalisation in Turkey seems unlikely to be undone, thanks to the 
impact of the improving EU-Turkey relationship. Ozbudun’s pessimistic comment 
in 2000 that “there is...little reason to hope that democracy will soon become 
consolidated [in Turkey]”74 did not take into account the impact that Turkey’s EU 
accession process was to have on the rise of an increasingly participant political 
culture. Thanks to the European Union, Turkey’s democratic consolidation might 
come sooner than many expected.
73 Istanbul Burosu, "Erdogan, ‘§antaj’ Sorusuna Kizdi: Ne Alakasi Var?" Zaman, 4/9/2005
74 Ozbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation, pp. 153-54
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